

The Impact of Idealism

The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought

VOLUME I

Philosophy and Natural Sciences



The Impact of Idealism

Volume I. Philosophy and Natural Sciences

The first study of its kind, *The Impact of Idealism* assesses the impact of classical German philosophy on science, religion and culture. This volume explores German Idealism's impact on philosophy and scientific thought. Fourteen essays, by leading authorities in their respective fields, each focus on the legacy of a particular idea that emerged around 1800, when the underlying concepts of modern philosophy were being formed, challenged and criticised, leaving a legacy that extends to all physical areas and all topics in the philosophical world. From British Idealism to phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism and French post-modernism, the story of German Idealism's impact on philosophy is here interwoven with man's scientific journey of self-discovery in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – from Darwin to Nietzsche to Freud and beyond. Spanning the analytical and Continental divide, this volume examines Idealism's impact on contemporary philosophical discussions.

NICHOLAS BOYLE is the Schröder Professor of German Emeritus in the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow and former President of Magdalene College.

LIZ DISLEY is a Research Associate in the Department of German and Dutch at the University of Cambridge.

KARL AMERIKS is McMahon-Hank Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.

The Impact of Idealism

The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought

General editors Nicholas Boyle and Liz Disley

Associate general editor Ian Cooper

Volume I. Philosophy and Natural Sciences
Edited by Karl Ameriks
Volume II. Historical, Social and Political Thought
Edited by John Walker
Volume III. Aesthetics and Literature
Edited by Christoph Jamme *and* Ian Cooper
Volume IV. Religion
Edited by Nicholas Adams

German Idealism is arguably the most influential force in philosophy over the past two hundred years. This major four-volume work is the first comprehensive survey of its impact on science, religion, sociology and the humanities, and brings together fifty-two leading scholars from across Europe and North America. Each essay discusses an idea or theme from Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte or another key figure, shows how this influenced a thinker or field of study in the subsequent two centuries, and how that influence is felt in contemporary thought. Crossing established scholarly divides, the volumes deal with fields as varied as feminism, architectural history, psychoanalysis, Christology and museum curation, and subjects as diverse as love, evolution, the public sphere, the art of Andy Warhol, the music-dramas of Wagner, the philosophy of Husserl, the novels of Jane Austen, the political thought of fascism and the foundations of international law.

The Impact of Idealism

The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought

VOLUME I

Philosophy and Natural Sciences

General editors Nicholas Boyle and Liz Disley

Edited by Karl Ameriks





University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107039827

First published 2013

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow, Cornwall

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
The impact of idealism.
volumes cm. – (The Legacy of post-Kantian German thought)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-107-03982-7 (v. 1) – ISBN 978-1-107-03983-4 (v. 2) –
ISBN 978-1-107-03984-1 (v. 3) – ISBN 978-1-107-03985-8 (v. 4)
1. Idealism, German. I. Ameriks, Karl, 1947– editor of compilation.
B2745.I47 2013
141 – dc23 2013017436

ISBN 978-1-107-03982-7 Hardback

Contents

Illustrations

Contributors

Karl Ameriks
University of Notre Dame

Nicholas Boyle
University of Cambridge

Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Boston University

Liz Disley
University of Cambridge

Dina Emundts
University of Konstanz

Christian J. Emden
Rice University

David Fergusson
University of Edinburgh

Michael Friedman
Stanford University

Sebastian Gardner
University College London

Gary Gutting
University of Notre Dame

Robert Hanna
University of Colorado

Dieter Henrich
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Peter Hylton
University of Illinois

Robert Pippin
University of Chicago

Robert J. Richards
University of Chicago

Robert Stern
University of Sheffield

Acknowledgements

This series of studies of the influence on the humanities of German Idealist philosophy results from the work of an International Research Network sponsored by the Leverhulme Trust, with additional support from the Newton Trust and the Schröder fund of the University of Cambridge. The editors would like to thank the Trusts and the Schroder family for their financial assistance.

Planning for the Network began in 2006, with Ian Cooper as the first Project Manager. Liz Disley took over as Project Manager in May 2010. For invaluable help and support in the early stages of the project, the General Editors are grateful to the Steering Committee of the Network, whose members include: Ian Cooper, Nicholas Adams, Karl Ameriks, Frederick Beiser, Vittorio Hösle, Stephen Houlgate, Christoph Jamme, Martin Rühl, John Walker and our patron, Onora O'Neill. A grant from Cambridge University's Department of German and Dutch enabled the Committee to meet in Cambridge in 2008. Throughout the Project the staff of the Department and of the Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages have been generous with their time and prompt with their help. Thanks are due in particular to Sharon Nevill and Louise Balshaw, and to successive Heads of the Department of German and Dutch, Christopher Young and Andrew Webber. We are also most grateful to Regina Sachers for some crucial and timely advice, and to Rosemary Boyle who has acted throughout as management consultant and has more than once intervened decisively to keep the show on the road.

The General Editors owe special thanks to the leaders of the four groups into which it was decided to divide the Network, who are also the editors of the individual volumes in this series. They agreed themes with the General Editors, assembled teams to study them, and led the workshops in which they were discussed. The work of the Philosophy and Natural Science group

in the University of Notre Dame was supported by the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, and that of the Aesthetics and Literature group in Leuphana University, Lüneburg, by the Thyssen-Krupp-Stiftung. For this support, and for the hospitality of both universities, the General Editors would also like to express their gratitude.

Workshops met in Notre Dame, Lüneburg and Cambridge in 2010, and again in Lüneburg and Cambridge in 2011. A concluding plenary conference, open to the public, was held at Magdalene College, Cambridge, in September 2012. On all these occasions staff and students at the host institutions provided help and advice, generously and often anonymously, and to them too we express our thanks.

While we hope that our contributors feel that participation in the Network has been rewarding in itself, we thank them for giving us the benefit of their thinking, for attending the workshops and the conference, and particularly for presenting their work within the constraints of a very tight timetable. For invaluable editorial support in preparing all four volumes for the press we are especially indebted to Jennifer Jahn. Only her intensive and always cheerful commitment to the project allowed us to meet the deadlines we had set ourselves.

Abbreviations

DP	F. Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1982.
FSW	*Johann Gottlieb Fichte's sämmtliche Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, 8 vols. Berlin: Veit & Co., 1845/6. Reprinted as vols I–VIII, *Fichtes Werke*, 11 vols, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971.
GA	M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, various editors and dates, Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman.
GS	*Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1900–.
GW	G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in Verbindung mit der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 31 vols to date, Hamburg: Meiner, 1968f.
HKA	F. W. J. Schelling, *Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. W. G. Jacobs, H. Krings and H. Zeltner, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976ff.
HW	G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–71.
KG	F. Nietzsche, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967 onwards.
KW	I. Kant, *Werke in sechs Bänden*, ed. W. Weischedel, Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1956–62.
Nachlass	*Johann Gottlieb Fichte's nachgelassene Schriften*, 3 vols, Bonn: Adolph Marcus 1834/5. Reprinted as vols IX–XI, *Fichtes Werke*, 11 vols, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971.
NW	F. Nietzsche, *Werke in Drei Bänden*, ed. Karl Schlechta, 3 vols, 3rd edition, Munich: Carl Hanser, 1965.

PdR G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20*, ed. Dieter Henrich, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983.

PeS F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874.

SpSW A. Schopenhauer, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher, 7 vols, 4th edn, Mannheim: Brockhaus, 1988.

SSW *Schellings sämmtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61.

Translations

Anthropology Gregor, Mary, trans., I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.

CF I. Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, New York: Abaris Books, 1979 (reprinted by University of Nebraska Press, 1992).

CPJ Guyer, Paul and Matthews, E., trans., Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

CPR Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen, trans. and eds., Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

CPrR Reath, Andrews, Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Introduction by Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Enc. Brinkmann, K. and Dahlstrom, D., eds and trans., G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

IET Pfau, Thomas, trans. and ed., *Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F. W. J. Schelling*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

LL Young, J. Michael, trans. and ed., Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

MFNS Ellington, J., trans., Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1970.

PR Wood, Allen, trans., G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Prol Ellington, J., trans., Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.

PS	Miller, A. V., trans., G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
SK	Heath, Peter and Lachs, John, trans., J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge with the First and Second Introductions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
SL	di Giovanni, George, ed. and trans., G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
STI	Heath, Peter, trans., Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1978.

Foreword

What was Idealism and what is it now?

Idealism was set in motion by a number of factors. It can be seen equally as the deflection of a loss and as the opening up of a perspective on a broad new intellectual landscape.

Neither the concepts of traditional metaphysics nor the procedures of mathematical natural science are adequate to the processes by which human experience and self-understanding are constructed. They both fail when faced with the task of accounting for the formation of the basic units that organise the realities in which human living is embedded: the organism, the historical world, religion, the state, the practice of art. These forms of reality, and the sources of their grounding, are the 'ideas' that have given Idealism its name.

In order to end a situation in which what was closest and most essential to Man necessarily remained incomprehensible to him, the Idealists had to find conceptualisations and a philosophical method that would permit some insight into these realities. Such a method would have to be capable of eliminating the alienation of dispassionate scientific explanation from conscious human experience so as at the same time to illuminate that experience from within and to liberate it. But since the Idealists started out from a critique of the established paths to knowledge they had to expect their search for an appropriate method not only to open up new depths of insight but also to reveal profound dilemmas and ambiguities in the approach to the manifold realities that determine human life. Only subsequently might it be possible to establish, and eventually to confirm, the prospect of understanding all reality as a whole and from its very foundations.

However, in order not to get lost in the formulation of multiple tasks, nor to be distracted by the collection of fascinating but isolated insights, or to be diverted from the goal of an ultimate, all-embracing understanding, the Idealists came to rely on a method they had newly formulated for themselves. It emerged in effect from their direct opposition to the methods whose inadequacy they had demonstrated. The result was the proclamation of new and allegedly proven solutions to the mysteries of the universe, together with the claim to have completed for good the task of philosophy – a claim necessary in its time but, we are bound to think, premature, probably for any subsequent time.

After two centuries we have long been fully aware that we can agree neither with the specific conclusions of the Idealists nor with the manner of their proclamation. But the enormous body of issues first raised by them, and to which they made such extraordinary contributions, is still fundamentally unchanged. Except that in the meantime the further task has been added of clarifying for ourselves what the Idealists were doing and their particular historical position.

Together and at one with them, in that respect, we need to maintain and elaborate the vision of a totality in which insight and ethical orientation are combined, without our being able to count on some pansophic procedure guaranteeing true and complete knowledge. As we can now see today, that would actually be directly opposed to the true and original purpose of the Idealist project.

We can be pleased and gratified that in our time all these tasks are being pursued at a high level and in a conversation that is no longer restricted by the frontiers between languages and traditions. This project is a hitherto unique undertaking and I wish it a broad and fruitful influence.

Dieter Henrich

General introduction: the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

Nicholas Boyle

I

Between 1781, when Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared, and 1807, when Hegel published the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, an intellectual revolution took place in Germany as long-lasting and widespread in its effects as the contemporary political revolution in France. Unlike the French Revolution, however, the German revolution has been underestimated and the extent and degree of its influence inadequately recognised, even in Germany, where its role in the cultural history of the nation overshadows and distorts the appreciation of its international significance. Yet throughout the European and American worlds and, by extension, wherever Euro-American culture has left its mark, Kant's critique and reappraisal of the Enlightenment consensus, and the response to his challenge by the next generation of German thinkers, have profoundly affected theory and practice in most of the fields studied by the humanities and social sciences. Political thought was given a new direction by Kant and the post-Kantians through a new understanding of the State and of the foundations of law, and social and critical theory is largely a post-Kantian invention. In its transformation by Marx, Hegel's social thinking determined the political landscape of the twentieth century and still provides the ideology through which one fifth of the human race is at least nominally ruled. Kant, and Hegel's disagreement with Kant, gave later moral and religious thinking some of its canonical problems and most powerful concepts – autonomy, universalisability, ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), and (world-)spirit, for example. Aesthetics, itself a disciplinary innovation of eighteenth-century German academic Enlightenment, was almost immediately refounded by Kant's followers and, together with their new and immensely persuasive concept of 'Art', has influenced the understanding, the institutionalisation,

and thus the practice, of literature, music, the visual arts and architecture, down to the present day. Even in the biological sciences the monistic and evolutionary tendencies and morphological interests of the post-Kantians prepared the way for the now all-powerful Darwinian model, while their various pioneering formulations of the concept of the unconscious mind bore fruit in the later development of depth psychology. It goes without saying that across the world much of academic philosophy still devotes itself to what are essentially Kantian and post-Kantian questions, and even the philosophy practised in Anglo-American universities sometimes proves on close inspection to incorporate elements that derive from the same source. The pathways through which an initial complex of potent innovations, concentrated and localised in a specific social and geographical context, came to be a major determinant of Western thinking are still imperfectly understood. The phenomenon itself is only hazily discerned and is often ignored. Over the last five years more than forty scholars from Europe and North America have collaborated in the task of tracing the presence in the self-understanding of the modern world of Kant's 'Copernican' revolution and its consequences. Under the title *The Impact of Idealism* we now present our findings. Preliminary and partial though these may be, they amount together to a recovery of a significant but forgotten part of our shared intellectual inheritance.

Such a venture naturally raises acute problems of definition. One possible misunderstanding can be dealt with fairly easily. The term 'Idealism' in our title is shorthand for 'German Idealism', a reasonably familiar and established concept in the history of philosophy.[1] This project is not concerned with the historically unlocalised 'view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence'.[2] Nor is it concerned, except for purposes of comparison and derivation, with philosophers earlier than the German Idealists – Plato or Berkeley, for example – who might for one reason or another be called 'idealists' too. 'German Idealism', however, is a term that raises its own problems. Are the figures conventionally grouped under this heading properly described as 'idealists' in the sense that they adopted some such philosophical position as that just cited? Even if they did not, or even if it is irrelevant whether they did or did not, did the doctrines which they actually held have enough in common for them legitimately to be treated as a group? Did their positions change so much in the course of their lifetimes that no single term could be appropriate to their different phases? These difficulties, real though they may be in contexts different from the present, can also be resolved fairly easily, as far as these essays are concerned, if it is accepted that

the term 'German Idealism' is also historical shorthand. 'German Idealism' is short for the principal philosophers who were part of the remarkable cultural efflorescence in Germany at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, notably Kant and those who were in productive dialogue with Kant and with one another, and who all at some time and in some sense used the term 'idealism' to describe at least some part of what they believed and taught. German Idealism is what Goethe, himself a figure on its margins, in 1805 called 'that great philosophical movement, begun by Kant' which, he said, 'no scholar . . . has with impunity rejected, opposed, or scorned'.[a] The term 'German Idealism', in short, means, for present purposes, the philosophical work of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, and – more controversially, perhaps – some components of the work of such major literary contemporaries of these as Goethe, Schiller, Hölderlin and Friedrich Schlegel. It does not affect the unity of the phenomenon we are studying that there are real and possibly serious differences in the meaning of the term 'idealism' when Kant uses it in conjunction with the words 'critical' or 'transcendental', when Fichte or Schelling oppose it to 'dogmatism' or 'criticism', or Schiller opposes it to 'realism', or when Schelling and Hegel use it in connection with their philosophy of identity. It is perfectly normal in the history of ideas, as of politics, to find that the flags or slogans for the sake of which battles are nominally fought mean different things to those whom they unite in a common cause.

If 'Idealism' is a term in need of explication, 'impact' is no less so. The task we have set ourselves is not just a matter of reception history, nor of the influence of one individual figure on another. It also involves recognising how questions given their canonical modern form in the German Idealist period – for example about knowledge, self-consciousness, freedom, society, history, God – have been renegotiated in different times and contexts, and how the original questions and answers have often survived that renegotiation. But further still, and most challengingly, perhaps, it involves recognising those areas where German Idealism has not been received, but should have been: the areas where the work of these great thinkers can still act as a creative stimulus and produce new thoughts for a new age. The full and proper title for such a project would presumably therefore be something like: 'The reception, influence, and continuing relevance of those younger German philosophical contemporaries of Kant who saw their work as in productive

a. 'Daß kein Gelehrter ungestraft jene große philosophische Bewegung, die durch Kant begonnen, von sich abgewiesen, sich ihr widersetzt, sie verachtet habe.' *Goethes Werke*. Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, ed. E. Trunz (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), xii, 120.

dialogue with his, and of Kant's work in so far as they received it in that sense.' 'The Impact of Idealism' may be less accurate a title, but it can hardly be denied that it is shorter.

From its inception the project has faced the intractable problem of reconciling breadth and depth. In many areas – social theory, the philosophy of mind, post-structuralism, aesthetics, for example – the contribution of the German Idealists has obviously been so extensive and pervasive that whole monographs could not do it justice. W. J. Mander's recent monumental study of British Idealism[3] also demonstrates how richly a neglected and seemingly limited field can reward the investigator. Since it was our principal motive to draw attention to a feature of the cultural landscape so big that few even noticed it, we early decided that we had to aim to be 'comprehensive rather than exhaustive'. We believe, that is, that we have, more or less, mapped out the terrain, identified many of its major features, and at least touched on most of the issues that need further discussion. We have combined general surveys with selected studies of detail that are intended to be exemplary. But we cannot possibly claim to have dealt with everything this topic might include, not even within the four volumes generously allotted to us by our publishers. Volume I has to discuss not only the academic study of philosophy in several different countries, but also developments in the theory and practice of natural science. Volume II embraces social, political and moral philosophy, and gender studies. Volume III deals with literature, literary theory and aesthetics, Volume IV with Biblical, systematic and moral theology. The bibliographies appended to each of these volumes will, we hope, be a guide to future study of the Idealist legacy in all these fields. But they are also a warning of how much has had to be left out.

There are, finally, some more specific definitional problems that have had to be settled – how satisfactorily, the reader must judge. First, there is the question of Schopenhauer. It could be urged against including Schopenhauer in a study of German Idealism that he vehemently scorned the work of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and that his doctrine of 'the Ideas' was wholly distinct from theirs, and indeed from Kant's, and had a different origin. That, however, would be to give insufficient weight to the historical connection. Schopenhauer may or may not have been a philosophical idealist but, historically speaking, he was certainly a post-Kantian. He explicitly states that he regards his theory of knowledge as a continuation and correction of Kant's.[4] Indeed, his entire system is structured around Kant's distinction between 'appearances' – for Schopenhauer, 'representation' – and 'things as they are in themselves' – for Schopenhauer the one thing-in-itself, the will.

Dissatisfaction with Kant's treatment of that distinction was a common factor in the philosophical beginnings of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and figured prominently in the critique of Kant by Schopenhauer's teacher, G. E. Schulze ('Aenesidemus') (1761–1833).[5] In so far as he set out to redo Kant's work and to reinterpret his terminology – 'understanding', 'reason', 'freedom', even 'ideas' – Schopenhauer clearly shared an ambition with his older contemporaries, even if he accused them of 'charlatanism' and 'windbaggery'.[b] To exclude him from our discussion would be to overlook an important route by which, through Wagner and Nietzsche, Thomas Mann and Samuel Beckett (and indeed Ludwig Wittgenstein), the themes of German Idealism entered the high culture of the twentieth century.

A second, rather different problem, is posed by Kant himself. A full survey of Kant's influence on modern thought would have a narrower and deeper focus than the present project, but would also run to many more volumes.[6] The contributors to *The Impact of Idealism* accepted – on the whole – that it made sense to maintain the historical perspective and to treat Kant as the first and most influential figure in a school, rather than to attempt to assess him in independence of the powerful thinkers through whom his work was first refracted. Kant, in other words, is here treated as one of the post-Kantians, or as the originator of questions with which his immediate philosophical successors were concerned, rather than as one of the isolated and supra-historical giants of Western philosophy (which of course he also is).

If, however, a historical perspective is to be adopted, the question might be raised whether German Idealism has been distinguished clearly enough from Romanticism – whether, therefore, the limits of the present investigation are either too broad or too narrow. To that a simple answer might be that not until there is a generally accepted definition of Romanticism can it be distinguished clearly from anything. A genuine problem arises only with the group centred on Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772–1801) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) known as 'Jena Romanticism'. That problem can be eliminated if the view is accepted that this group, which undoubtedly showed some philosophical originality, would be better termed 'the literary school of German Idealism', and after the dispersal of the school in 1803, there were no further serious philosophical contributions from an unarguably 'Romantic' quarter. Seen in the international context these distinctions anyway dwindle into insignificance. In a European perspective,

b. 'Windbeutelei und Scharlatanerei.' SpSW i, xx.

Goethe, Schiller and Hölderlin are pre-eminent representatives of Romanticism, however they may be classified in Germany. For the purposes of this investigation they may equally naturally qualify as German Idealists: Goethe as a self-confessed eccentric Kantian (but perhaps the truest Kantian of them all);[7] Schiller as a highly influential reinterpreter of Kant's aesthetics; Hölderlin as not only the supreme philosophical poet of the movement – as Aquinas was to Dante, so Fichte was to Hölderlin – but also the *éminence grise* who pointed the young Hegel towards his true vocation. In terms of social and cultural history, German Idealism was the philosophical core of a movement of which the more literary outliers in Germany are given the name of 'Romanticism' (and, for good measure, of 'Classicism', but that is another matter). That movement was an outburst of intellectual activity extraordinarily concentrated in time and space, and of extraordinary internal coherence and connectedness, to which the distinction between literature and philosophy was of little relevance. If we are seeking a cause for this intellectual explosion that a social historian can understand, then we can probably say that it lay in a religious crisis experienced within a particularly restrictive social structure. We may well see in the extension of this crisis to less restrictive societies a reason for the impact of Idealism in contexts and countries very different from those in which it originated.

II

Germany from Anglophilia to the first Critique

The beginnings of German Idealism, in the sense in which the term is used here, lie in the decade of virtual silence, from 1770 to 1781, during which Kant, woken from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume, but at first publishing almost nothing, meditated and drafted the first edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It was not mere chance that these ten years coincided with the period known in literary history as Storm and Stress (*Sturm und Drang*). The 1770s were a time of cultural crisis in Germany; out of the crisis emerged the distinctive form both of modern German literature and of modern German philosophy; and the crisis itself was the consequence and manifestation of a distinctively German social and political problematic.

Germany – if we mean by that the area of the Second Reich in 1914 – was in the eighteenth century something of a sleeping giant.[8] Its population of around 20 million was over twice that of England and Wales, but the economy was overwhelmingly agricultural: the largest towns – Vienna, Berlin,

Hamburg – had fewer than 200,000 inhabitants at a time when London had over a million. After the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) economic leadership and political control had passed from the bourgeoisie, from the craftsmen and bankers, into the hands of local, absolute rulers. In England and France there was a significant property-owning middle class, a bourgeoisie in the full sense of the word, amounting to perhaps 25 per cent of the population.[9] In Germany the equivalent class was proportionally much smaller and could engage in political or economic activity of only local importance. But in the middle third of the eighteenth century a wind of change began to blow. After the Seven Years War (1757–1763) and the victory of the allied Protestant powers, Prussia and Great Britain, over Catholic France and Austria, the literary and intellectual culture of the English-speaking middle classes, which industrially and commercially were going from strength to strength, enjoyed ever greater prestige and influence in Germany, and threatened to displace the court-focused culture of France, dominant in the German princely states since 1648.

This turn, however, despite later interpretations of it as an embryonic nationalism, had much less to do with ethnicity and patriotism than with class and politics. To reject French models in favour of English models, or models found in an Anglophone world, was to reject an absolutist state structure, centred on courts and sustained by a rigid hierarchy, in favour of a bourgeois class that was or desired to be culturally autonomous, and by implication it aspired to political autonomy as well.

Unfortunately, the desire was not commensurate with the realities. The point of decision, the point at which dreams had to dissolve and Germany had to decide to find its own way forward, was the crisis we now call Storm and Stress. Storm and Stress was the moment when Germany made its most strenuous attempt to have a bourgeois culture according to the English pattern and discovered that it could not. From roughly 1765 to roughly 1785 Germany saw an attempt to establish an at least partly commercial national theatre in Hamburg, free of the princely patronage that theatres elsewhere all required; it saw attempts to write plays that had some of the characteristics of Shakespeare, and some of the characteristics of the eighteenth-century English novel; it saw the growth and exaggeration of a cult of sentimental relationships based at least partly and consciously on models provided by Richardson and later Laurence Sterne; it saw in philosophy an engagement with the more materialist and sceptical elements in the thought of Locke and Hume, and the translation and discussion of the moral and economic philosophy of such figures of the Scottish Enlightenment as Hutcheson,

Ferguson and Adam Smith. It even saw the writing of the one realistic novel of contemporary German life which completely corresponded to the English formula, for it was both a runaway publishing success and the vehicle of some of the deepest thinking of the time – Goethe's *The Sorrows of Young Werther*. But *Werther* stands alone, and not even Goethe could write another novel like it, because *Werther* is the novel of the *failure* of the Storm and Stress. It catches the moment when the German Protestant intelligentsia were forced to recognise that their material circumstances did not permit the simple transplantation on to German soil of the western European Enlightenment, and especially of its English version. *Werther* is a parable of the fate of the German middle class in the watershed decade of the 1770s, and it was hugely popular because in it the German middle class recognised itself. But it took Goethe ten years, during which, like Kant, he published next to nothing, to recover from the crisis it represented and to define for himself a new path. By the late 1780s, the mid-century period of Anglophilia was over and the German literary and philosophical renaissance was well under way.

For Kant too the 1770s were a period in which he struggled to accommodate to native German circumstances a powerful, even threatening, impulse from the Anglophone world. Because he was seeking, or at any rate achieved, an accommodation, his struggle, unlike Werther's, did not end in disaster and, like Goethe, he survived to see others travel the path he had defined, though to a destination that was not his own. This cannot be the place to attempt to survey the critical philosophy as a whole. It is, however, important to recognise both how personal and how typical was the challenge to Kant represented by his encounter with Hume. In 1770 Kant was finally appointed to the one post he aspired to, the professorship of logic and metaphysics at Königsberg. He had over twenty years of exertion, waiting and self-denial behind him, and he expected to continue teaching the foundations of the (gently updated) rationalist philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff as he had done hitherto. No sooner had he reached this goal, however, than a sudden recognition of the full force of Hume's scepticism put in question both the validity of what he had done in the past and the integrity of any attempt to carry it on into the future. Nor was the confrontation simply intellectual and personal: it was a confrontation of social and political cultures. If Leibnizian rationalism was, as Voltaire devastatingly presented it in *Candide*, a demonstration of a divinely sanctioned order in things, exemplified, *inter alia*, in the monarchical order of the German states, Humean empiricism spoke alluringly of an ungrounded, perhaps adventitious, order constructed out of the habits, passions and judgements of human beings subject to no authority but

themselves – the free men, as it were, of the Anglo-Scottish bourgeoisie. The fight for supremacy in Kant's system between sensibility and understanding, and, in moral matters, between understanding and reason, was also a fight between English and German models of (social) order, for a generation and a class that saw in England a hope for emancipation in Germany.

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' – his decision to explain the regularities in our experience by the necessary ways in which we think rather than by the necessary ways in which things behave – was widely understood at the time (and subsequently) as an assertion of the absolute right to self-determination of the individual 'subject' (whatever that might be), possibly even in a political sense. If anything, it was the opposite. By showing how the rationalist, Leibniz–Wolffian order of things was not a feature of the external world, but was internal to us, Kant might appear simply to have made every man his own monarch: in fact, though, he had also shown that the monarchs' realm was *only* internal. Everyman might count himself a king of infinite space, but he was bounded in a nutshell. Kant's truly subversive step, in the German context, was to require that to count as knowledge thoughts must have a content locatable in space and time. That was his – very extensive – concession to Hume, and to English empiricism generally, and an empowerment, not of an infinite and internal subject, but of *l'homme moyen sensuel* finding a way through the external world. If he then further required that sensibility should submit itself to being ordered by a rationalist system, so that coherent individual experience should become possible, that was an accommodation to established authority which internalised an existing power structure rather than offered emancipation from it. However, through being internalised, the monarchical authority did indeed become subject to the free decision of the ethical agent to recognise it, and in that sense the common contemporary interpretation of Kantianism as a philosophy of self-determination was correct after all. It was wrong, though, – and for this the systematisation of Kantian critique by K. L. Reinhold (1757–1823) was as responsible as Fichte's ethically based polemic in favour of a philosophy of the ego – in two important respects. First, it reduced the epistemological caveats with which Kant surrounded his doctrine of freedom to the simple opposition of 'appearances' and 'things-in-themselves'.[c] And, second, it overlooked that Kant postponed the full realisation in space and time of a self-determined rational human order – a 'Kingdom of God'[d] – to an indefinite future that

c. 'Erscheinungen, Dinge an sich selbst.' e.g. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B592, A564.
d. 'Reich Gottes.' e.g. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, A232 (KW VII, 260).

could be approached only asymptotically. Like other Ideas he postulated, the perfect harmony of freedom and nature could have only regulative, not constitutive status: it was a goal to strive for, not a goal it was realistic to expect to attain. When Kantianism became German public property in the 1790s, it was not appreciated that its originator had learned the lessons of the 1770s. A realistic Idealist, such as Kant, could strive for the liberation of the German middle class, but, unlike his Storm and Stress contemporaries, did not expect to attain it in his own lifetime.

The extraordinarily subtle equilibrium that Kant established between the conflicting powers he identified in the mind enabled him, after the crisis of the 1770s, to maintain in his public life a position as the loyal, republican, subverter of an authoritarian, monarchical, regime. That position was perfectly attuned to the particular circumstances in which Kant found himself: not Hume's circumstances as a man (eventually) of private means who never held an academic post, but the distinctive circumstances of the German middle class and, within that class, of the publicly active intelligentsia. In two significant respects Kant was unlike Hume, but like other intellectuals among his fellow-countrymen: he was a state employee, and he was a university professor. Enlightenment Germany might be lacking in rentiers, or industrial or commercial capitalists, but, thanks to its multiplicity of sovereign princes, it had in abundance a class of state-salaried officials. Germany's officials – and there were tens of thousands of them – were close to political power, and were often its executive arm,[10] but could not exercise it in their own right. What distinguished them as a class was not their material but their intellectual capital – their university education. Germany had around forty universities at a time when England had two, but these were not founded or maintained out of a disinterested love of learning. They were founded to educate civil servants, and functioned as 'channels for social advancement into the ranks of the clergy and the bureaucracy'.[11] Consequently, the classes which became the vehicle of the second German renaissance were not a commercial or industrial bourgeoisie, but the cultural triangle of forces composed of the Protestant clergy, the professors and the secular administrators, united by their economic dependence on the state they served and by the university education that has led historians to give them the name *die Gebildeten*.[12] However, although Kant's achievement of an equilibrium between Hume and Leibniz made sense of his personal position as a loyal yet critical state official, his example was not one that could be followed by many from the generation that came to maturity after 1770. To understand how it came about that, after a first wave of enthusiasm, not

(critical) Kantianism, but Idealism emerged as the preferred response to the crisis of Storm and Stress, and to the obsolescence of the English model, we have to take account of one further factor in the complex dilemma facing the German middle class of the time.

Germany's crisis of faith

Since in the German Protestant states clergymen were officials, appointed by an organ of government (usually the local Consistory), rather than by the holder of a property right, as in England, the state was closely interested in their education and it was natural for a young man of ability to embark on a theological career as a way to advance himself. His education might be paid for and he could look forward to an official position, though, since there were more theology students than available cures, he might have to spend some time as a schoolmaster or a private tutor. The route is clearly discernible in the careers of Winckelmann and Fichte, for instance, and of course of Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling (though the Württemberg church had more independence than most, ducal visitations of the Tübingen *Stift* underlined its accountability to the state). Religion in Protestant Germany was so closely linked to the state, and intellectuals were so dependent on state positions to earn a livelihood, that for most of them (Goethe being the great exception who proves the rule) the status of religion for a rational man was a matter of personal and material importance.

However, the mid-century Anglophile turn had a deeply unsettling effect on German Protestantism. In the early eighteenth century English Biblical criticism was more learned and adventurous, and English deism was more radical, than anything to be found in Germany. But around 1740 a remarkable transfer of speculative energies took place.[13] The English lost interest in any but perfunctory and occasional religious controversy and gave their attention instead to industry and empire. The 'English Enlightenment', which could be said to have begun with the publication of Newton's *Principia* in 1687, was effectively over, leaving Gibbon and Hume (more of an English deist than a Scottish Enlightener) as the lone surviving voices of unbelief in an age of religious incuriosity which lasted for well over a hundred years. At about the same time, the German clergy and professorate (Lessing's father, for example) took up the baton, translating the English scholarship and refuting, and thereby publicising, the arguments of infidels, whether French, English or, worst of all, Spinoza. An Age of Doubt began in Germany, over a century before Victorian England experienced anything similar. Could an

intending clergyman continue in a career that required his confession of beliefs which he no longer held? On the answer to that question – given the absence of alternative options in Germany's underdeveloped private sector – might depend a man's hopes of ever earning a reasonable living in state employment. As an honourable alternative to hypocrisy or poverty an accommodation with the new ideas became a pressing necessity, and might take one of two forms. Either the theologian might remain in office but seek to restate Christian claims and beliefs so that they seemed not to conflict with the attitudes of the rational critic, or even to outflank them – the strategy of Herder and Schleiermacher, who stand at the beginning of the nineteenth-century search for 'the essence of Christianity'. Or the ex-theologian might look for some other home in the state structure: move into secular administration (F. I. Niethammer (1766–1848) became a minister of education), or into the university, as a professor of a new subject born out of the old: pedagogics, aesthetics, modern literatures, history or, and above all, philosophy. When Fichte said of his role as a university philosopher, 'I am a priest of truth: I am in her pay',[e] he was laying claim to the succession to the Christian priesthood, and, with characteristic bluntness, to its stipends as well. The final step in this direction, however, was taken by Schelling, who, crowning the new structure of state-subsidised philosophy with the new concept of Art (the means, Schiller had shown, of a secular redemption), called for the state to recognise its duty to sponsor the Artists.[14]

The overwhelming importance to the German cultural revival of the move from theology into secular alternatives (which often enough retain a certain religious colouring) was long ago demonstrated quantitatively by Herbert Schöffler. Confining himself to literature, and taking no account of philosophy, he listed 120 German writers, born between 1676 and 1804, who either studied theology or were the sons of theologians, and commented:

> Ministers take an ever-increasing interest in general literature; young students of theology attract and hold the attention of their contemporaries by works on the border-line between the older devotional literature and literature proper; the sons of the clergy, like many of their fellow-students, abandon the study of theology with increasing frequency as *Aufklärung* spreads, or when they have finished their studies do not enter the church. From 1740, at all events, clergy, their sons and young theologians generally, come into literature in

e. 'Ich bin ein Priester der Wahrheit, ich bin in ihrem Solde.' *Fichtes Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, reprinted Berlin, 1971, VI, 333.

> shoals, so that from the middle of the century its total aspect undergoes a great change.[15]

W. H. Bruford then extended Schöffler's analysis to philosophy:

> Although the critical zeal of the *Aufklärung* in Germany, once it had got under way, stopped at nothing in its search for truth, a series of profound and learned thinkers wrestled with the problem of reconciling science with religion, for them *the* problem of their day, and in the great period of German idealism, between Lessing and Hegel, went far towards reaching a synthesis which aimed at preserving the essential meaning of protestant Christianity, without doing violence to modern rational convictions.[16]

Kant, like Goethe, owed nothing to theology, and kept it at arm's length, but Kant and Goethe both stood apart from the intellectual mainstream of their time. Post-Kantian Idealism, because it addressed the needs of the majority of the later eighteenth-century intelligentsia, was able to define a future for the national culture after the collapse of Storm and Stress, in independence of the treacherous English example, while the solutions found by Kant and Goethe were to a great extent personal to them. Crises of conscience and vocation led a whole generation to seek alternative courses of life, sources of income, and interpretations of existence, but of necessity within the existing state structure (of which established Protestantism was a part), not outside it. In that sense, and for that reason, German Idealism was indeed, as Nietzsche later recognised, a reinterpreted religion, of which philosophers and literary artists were the secular priests. 'The Protestant pastor', he wrote, 'is the grandfather of German philosophy.'[f]

Idealism triumphant

For the generation of the 1790s, the hopes that twenty years earlier had been placed in the English model were revived equally by events in France and by the new possibilities opened up by the Kantian philosophy. The political constraints on the German middle classes, the religious dilemmas of German intellectuals and the heaven-storming ambitions they none the less harboured are all reflected in the mysterious fragmentary document in Hegel's handwriting which has become known as *The Earliest Systematic Programme of German Idealism* (*Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen*

f. 'Der protestantische Pfarrer ist Großvater der deutschen Philosophie.' *Der Antichrist* (§10), NW ii, 1171.

Idealismus),[17] and in which thoughts characteristic of Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling can all be discerned. Probably written in 1796–1797, the essay, or address, culminates in a call for the transformation of society by setting up a 'new religion'.[g] The new religion, Kantian in origin, but modified by Schiller's aesthetics, will overcome the contemporary hostility between the 'Enlightened' and the 'Unenlightened'[h] – that is, between those who have absorbed the deist critique of Christianity and those who remain uncritically attached to their old faith – and will transfer to Germany the Revolution that has established 'liberty and equality'[i] in France (an explicit allusion to the revolutionary slogan, which in 1796 did not have its present triadic form). The fragment, however, says nothing of any political actions that might be necessary to bring this transformation about: the change will be the work of 'a superior spirit, heaven-sent'[j] – a returning Christ or Dionysus, perhaps; what Hölderlin later calls 'the Prince of the Feast'[k] or Hegel one of the 'world-historical individuals'.[l] The new philosophy of Art will achieve what Storm and Stress could not: it will heal the divisions in society, for in Art the sensual is reconciled with the rational, and the theoretical with the practical. It is through the religion of Art, in short, that the philosophers will become kings.

The Earliest Systematic Programme . . . is a fascinating document of intellectual history because in it the full range of the concerns of German Idealism can be seen emerging from specific areas of the Kantian philosophy, under the impress of Fichte and Schiller, and inspired by an explicitly religious enthusiasm. Three features stand out. First, there is a focus on self-determination: on the practical rather than the theoretical philosophy, and specifically on the concept of freedom. In the document's first surviving lines morality is said to have absorbed the whole of metaphysics, and even to provide the basis on which to reconstruct the foundations of physics – a first glimmering of the programme of *Naturphilosophie*. Then there is a pronounced desire to extend the scope of the transcendental method, the Copernican Revolution, of which Kant's practical postulates are said to be merely an example. 'How must a world be constituted for a moral being?'[m] is, it is claimed, the question which will open up to us the conceptual basis of physics. By inquiring into the conditions for the possibility of what is real, we may come to an

g. 'Diese neue Religion.' HW i, 236.
h. 'Aufgeklärte und Unaufgeklärte.' *Ibid.*
i. 'Freiheit und Gleichheit.' *Ibid.*
j. 'Ein höherer Geist, vom Himmel gesandt.' *Ibid.*
k. 'Fürsten des Festes.' Hölderlin, 'Friedensfeier', ll.15, 112.
l. 'Welthistorische Individuen.' HW xii, 45.
m. 'Wie muß eine Welt für ein moralisches Wesen beschaffen sein?' HW i, 234.

understanding of the necessary systematic unity of the knowable world. And third there is a deployment of the Kantian notion of the regulative 'Idea' well beyond the bounds of anything that Kant could have regarded as legitimate. The author of the fragment proposes three Ideas as the pillars of his system (without indicating how he derives them): the Ideas of 'I myself as an absolutely free being', of 'Humanity' and of 'Beauty'.[n] The first of these has clearly Fichtean echoes and is the basis for the future philosophy of Nature. The Idea of Humanity, derivative of Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters*,[18] grounds both a philosophy of history and the basic concepts of Kant's religion within the bounds of mere reason ('a moral world, the Godhead, immortality').[o] The Idea of Beauty, 'which unites them all',[p] is described in terms which point to a contribution from Hölderlin. However, the philosophy of beauty, which unites the philosophies of nature and of history, is also said to be 'the philosophy of Spirit',[q] and that in turn suggests the hand of Schelling, who in 1796 first publicly launched the concept of Spirit (as a synthesis of subject and object) on a journey that was to last over thirty years.[19] From the philosophy of the ego to the philosophy of art, via nature, history, religion and spirit, the entire future trajectory of Idealism is foreshadowed in these few pages.

In 1796, though Fichte and Schiller both held professorships at the University of Jena, Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling were all still dependent on tutorships for a livelihood. Aware of how remote the inhospitable world around them was from transformation by their post-Kantian Ideas, they pledged themselves to keep alive their hope for a new German religion, embodied in the quasi-Masonic password 'the Kingdom of God'[r] (an allusion to the role of that concept in Kant's treatise on religion). Hölderlin maintained his faith in the Kingdom, as the condition of his creativity as a poet-priest, until his mind finally clouded over. As Schelling and Hegel achieved the university positions which alone could give personal security to ex-theologians, their reinterpretation of the religion of which they had ceased to be ministers but to which, despite repeated charges of heterodoxy, they declared themselves faithful, became the substance of academic philosophy. They both soon outgrew the naïve millenarianism of *The Earliest Systematic Programme* . . . and engaged seriously with the Kantian philosophy.

n. 'Von mir selbst als als einem absolut freien Wesen . . . der Menschheit . . . der Schönheit.' *Ibid.*, 234–35.

o. 'Von einer moralischen Welt, Gottheit, Unsterblichkeit.' *Ibid.*, 235.

p. 'Die alle vereinigt.' *Ibid.*

q. 'Die Philosophie des Geistes.' *Ibid.*

r. 'Reich Gottes.' *Briefe von und an Hegel. Band I: 1785–1812*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), 9, 18.

In particular, they both found in Schelling's concept of 'Spirit' the tool with which to overcome the schematic opposition between 'appearances' and 'things-in-themselves' to which public discussion had reduced the subtleties of Kantian 'critique'. Both, too, in different ways, resisted what seemed to them Kant's displacement of ultimate truth, the goal of philosophy, into an ideal future, never attainable in reality: Schelling sought to demonstrate the identity of Spirit and Nature, while Hegel pursued rather the identity of Spirit with the social and historical realm, and entered more deeply into dialogue with Kant's methodology in his *Science of Logic*.

From the lecture-rooms of the University of Berlin – founded in 1810, with Fichte as its first rector, and following principles they had helped to articulate – Hegel and Schelling eventually came to dominate German thought and culture in the first half of the nineteenth century. Simply by its unique situation in a capital city (all eighteenth-century German universities were located at some distance from the centre of political power), the University of Berlin proclaimed a Fichtean, and to some extent Hegelian, conception of learning as an arm of the modern state. Art too was shown in Berlin to have a public and educational purpose: since it was thought that the reconciliation through Art of the rational and the sensual, in an organic social whole, had been most perfectly achieved in ancient Athens, the neo-classical architecture of K. F. Schinkel (1781–1841) was particularly suited for the public buildings, museums and galleries that neighboured the University. Munich, where Schelling taught before he moved to Berlin, soon followed the Berlin example, and in the matter of architecture too (Leo von Klenze (1784–1864) there playing the role of Schinkel). The students formed by these new-style metropolitan universities were not simply philosophers: lawyers and theologians, historians and philologists, educationalists and ethnographers also learned to recognise and trace the movements of the Spirit. Even the medical and natural sciences were affected by the Idealist concepts of organic form and the unity of Nature – vividly illustrated in the work of Alexander von Humboldt – and an atmosphere was prepared that was ready to receive Darwin's great synthesis. To a remarkable extent the agenda set by *The Earliest Systematic Programme* . . . was realised, even if Germany did not quite arrive in the Kingdom of God.

Three phases of post-Hegelianism

However, around 1830, a change began in the economic and social realities that had created the eighteenth-century crisis, had severely limited the possible routes of escape from it, and had thereby dictated the conditions

under which Idealism had emerged. The German population grew rapidly – by 60 per cent between 1815 and 1848 – industrialisation and urbanisation started a little tentatively in the 1830s, a railway-led boom in the 1840s was followed by a crash at the end of the decade, but for thirty years after the abortive revolution of 1848 the economy grew steadily, partly thanks to the free-market policies adopted by Bismarck's Prussia. By the time of the wars between 1866 and 1871, by which Bismarck established the Second Reich, Germany had a capitalist bourgeoisie, comparable in every way with that of France, England or America, and eager for the political power that its predecessors had not enjoyed since the sixteenth century. The class of state officials, however, who until 1848 had the ear of the monarchs and were their virtually omnipotent instruments, found themselves forced into the background. For the intelligentsia, the twenty years after the death of Hegel were therefore a period of uncomfortable transition. For the first time it was becoming possible for a member of the German middle class to make a living while following an intellectual vocation outside the church or the university: private capital was accumulating, a greater variety of business careers was becoming available, and in particular authorship and journalism grew significantly more lucrative as copyright was established and literacy rates rose: in the cities the number of bookshops doubled between 1831 and 1855.[20] On the other hand, until the humiliating fiasco of 1848, the triangular official class of clergy, professors and administrators still enjoyed the prestige conferred by proximity to power and by its role as guardian of the cultural achievements of the previous two generations. Even if failure to secure a position within that golden triangle was no longer the existential threat it had been to Hölderlin or Kleist, it could still occasion resentment at the felt exclusion from the national tradition – especially if those excluded thought of themselves as the tradition's true inheritors.

The first phase in post-Hegelian Idealism, until around 1850, was consequently a phase whose principal representatives were disappointed would-be professors, reluctant bourgeois or embittered freelances, poised between continuity and discontinuity with the great age that had preceded them. Schopenhauer was one of the earliest: having abandoned the university after a pointlessly self-destructive contest with Hegel, he withdrew into semi-retirement, lived on investments inherited from his commercially successful father, and denounced 'professorial philosophy'[s] for rehashing optimistic theodicy. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), despite the efforts of his friends, was unable to obtain a professorial chair and was supported for much of his

s. 'Kathederphilosophie.' SpSW i, xxvii–xxviii.

life by his wife's income from a porcelain factory. Karl Marx (1818–1883) similarly saw his academic prospects evaporate when his teacher, Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), was dismissed for inculcating atheism (and democracy), and had to support himself in London from the family money of Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), derived from the Manchester textile industry. Bauer himself financed his later prolific writing career from a small tobacco business and the proceeds of journalism. D. F. Strauss (1808–1874) lost his professorship in Tübingen on publishing his *Life of Jesus* in 1835; the civil war that broke out in Zurich when he was nominated for a chair of theology there ensured he would never be offered such a post anywhere else; and he turned to writing successful popular biographies and literary criticism.

Yet for all the radical difference in the economic sub-structure of their lives, the thinkers in this first phase of post-Hegelianism could not detach themselves from their intellectual inheritance. Typically, they saw themselves as *reversing* what had gone before, but reversal is dependence too. They went back to the problematic that underlay the attempt to move on from Kant in the 1790s, the relation between the (allegedly) free ego and the 'thing in itself', which – following Schelling's attack on Hegel in his inaugural Berlin lecture of 1841 – they usually characterised as a relation between 'thought' and 'being', they declared for the thing, and they dubbed themselves materialists rather than idealists. 'Thought comes from being,' Feuerbach wrote, 'not being from thought.'[t] For Hegel, such an antithesis was false, but his successors lacked his ability to mediate between these apparent opposites and preferred the superficial drama of conflict. F. A. Trendelenburg (1802–1872), one of the few academic philosophers of merit to retain his chair – perhaps thanks to his roots in classical philology – saw the antithesis as a renewal of the opposition between Democritus and Plato. Despite his critique of Hegel's totalising claims, Trendelenburg's resolution of the problem by looking to a gradual, if always incomplete, synthesis of the empirical sciences, in the manner of Aristotle, was nearer to Hegel's own covert Aristotelianism than the unyielding dichotomies assumed by the non-academic post-Hegelians. If they offered an epistemology at all, it regularly subordinated the human power of thinking to some prior principle: the will (Schopenhauer); the senses (Feuerbach); social being (Marx); a decisive leap of faith (S. Kierkegaard (1813–1855), whose social position in Denmark

t. 'Das Denken ist aus dem Sein, aber das Sein nicht aus dem Denken.' *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie*, Ludwig Feuerbach, *Werke in sechs Bänden*, ed. E. Thies (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975), iii, 239.

resembled that of Schopenhauer). The crucial concept of 'Spirit' was abandoned, its place in historical and social thought being gradually taken by 'culture' (*Kultur*).[21] Yet the systems built on this avowedly anti-Idealist basis not only involved – often detailed – exegesis of Kant or Hegel: they also had a tendency, even when they were not overtly theological, to terminate like their predecessors in a reinterpreted religion. Schopenhauer gave supreme metaphysical status to the experience of redemptive Art (a conception he owed to Schiller) and made it the precursor of the only possible free and ethical act, the negation of the will. Feuerbach, after his systematic reversal of theology into anthropology, found the essence of Christianity in the worship of Man as God. Marx crowned his economistic rethinking of Hegel's philosophy of history with an emancipatory humanism, the interpretation of which has never ceased to be controversial (and has cost innumerable lives). Even Strauss at first thought it possible to use Hegel to rescue Christianity from the wreckage to which his historical criticism had reduced it. Richard Wagner (1813–1883), after a flirtation with political revolution, turned to Schopenhauer and a cult of 'sacred German Art'.[u] Uniquely among German intellectuals, he succeeded in building a permanent and much-frequented temple to it at Bayreuth, while his own life became a strangely anachronistic revival of that of an eighteenth-century court favourite, thus fully realising Fichte and Schelling's conception of the Idealist Artist as a state official or secular priest.

As the new bourgeoisie consolidated its position after 1850, however, it sought a culture of its own, fully independent of the compromises that over the previous century had attended the bid for power of German officialdom. There was nothing reluctant or half-hearted about the second phase of post-Hegelianism, and its materialism was presented not as a reversal of Idealism but as an unambiguous rejection. In the twenty years between the 1848 revolution and the foundation of the new Reich, Germany grew to be an industrial power capable of defeating France and challenging Britain. At the same time, 'German philosophy', ceasing to mean the products of the cultural renaissance from Kant to Hegel, came instead to mean the aggressive atheism and anti-spiritualism that, buttressed by appeals to the more recent achievements of the natural sciences, were popularised by Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899) and Karl Vogt (1817–1895), men

u. 'Die heil'ge deutsche Kunst.' *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, Act Three, R. Wagner, *Die Musikdramen*, ed. J. Kaiser (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981), 492–93.

who lost, or gave up, their academic posts and made a living from their books.

> A general distaste for any kind of non-practical or non-realistic philosophy has taken hold of all sober spirits [Büchner wrote]. Any reasonably adequate intelligence throws itself into the empirical sciences of nature and history and dismisses philosophical verbiage with contempt.[v]

In 1872, Strauss too, with his Hegelianism abandoned and by then the grand old man of German letters, assured the readers of *The Old Faith and the New* (*Der alte und der neue Glaube*) that 'we are not Christians any more'[w] and that Germany could turn from the Bible and the hymn-book to Lessing, Goethe and Schiller ('our great poets')[x] and to Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven ('our great musicians')[y] – to the secular religion of 'Art'.[22]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the university philosophy of the officials began to fight back against the materialist paradigm, and the new currents of thought began to stir that were to flourish in the twentieth century: neo-Kantianism, phenomenology and a new approach to logic. In all of these tendencies a willingness to rehabilitate at least some aspects of Idealism can be discerned. Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) grafted Darwinism on to the native tradition of Nature Philosophy, from which Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) detached himself, looking rather to Kant and Fichte, of whose son he was a close friend. The dominant figure in the academy in this period, R. H. Lotze (1817–1881), strove to keep a balance – or to remain undecided – between a mechanistic approach to natural science and a personalist approach to questions of value. Even if he did not found a school, Lotze had innumerable pupils, both from Germany and from abroad. Far more effectively, though, in the long run, F. L. G. Frege (1848–1925) questioned the logical basis of the new materialism. But the most dramatic development in the third phase of the impact of Idealism on nineteenth-century Germany was the work of a solitary. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) reversed the

v. 'Eine allgemeine Abneigung gegen jede Art nicht-praktischer oder nicht-realistischer Philosophie hat sich aller nüchternen Geister bemächtigt. Jede nur halbwegs brauchbare geistige Kraft wirft sich auf die empirischen Wissenschaften der Natur und Geschichte und verachtet den philosophischen Phrasenkram.' L. Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, 9th edn (Leipzig: Theodor Thomas, 1867), xxxi ('Vorwort zur dritten Auflage').

w. 'Wir sind keine Christen mehr.' D. F. Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntniß* (Bonn: Emil Strauß, 1881), 94.

x. 'Unsern großen Dichtern.' *Ibid.*, 303.

y. 'Unsern großen Musikern.' *Ibid.*, 341.

reversal, and in a bourgeois world spoke up again for the Germany of the officials more loudly than the professors yet dared to do. The question of God meant nothing to Büchner and Vogt, except as an opportunity for publicity, and Kant's Copernican revolution was to them just word-play in a defunct philosophical vocabulary. For Nietzsche, both remained topics of consuming interest. His revulsion from the complacency and philistinism of the second, post-Idealist, phase, embodied for him in the later Strauss, initially returned him to the inverted Idealism of Schopenhauer and Wagner, and throughout his subsequent career he shared with the transitional thinkers of the mid century a relish for subordinating thought to being – whether the impersonal will, or the bodily and animal needs he claimed to investigate as a 'physiologist',[z] or the power-relations he postulated between social classes, such as priests and slaves. Moreover, sociologically speaking, Nietzsche was himself a man of that first post-Hegelian phase, a displaced academic, enabled by private means to live and write outside the institutional structure of the state, but deeply envious of the cultural officials of the German Golden Age, who had been acknowledged, by their rulers, if not by a wider public, as the preceptors of a whole society. He wrote, he said, 'for all and for none'[aa] – for all, in ambition for the future and in nostalgia for the past; for none, in the present reality of bourgeois Germany. His contemporaries had gained everything the oppressed and reduced eighteenth-century middle classes could have hoped for – wealth and esteem, and power among the nations of Europe, if not yet in their homeland – but they had lost what had made that past age uniquely distinctive, 'spirit' (*Geist*).[23] In order to oppose the false 'culture' of Strauss and the late nineteenth-century 'Bildungsbürger', Nietzsche reasserted the value of the non-bourgeois culture created a hundred years before, and specifically (against Strauss's bland and nationalistic appropriation of 'our great poets') the value of what in it was by now opaque and incomprehensible: its cosmopolitanism, its suspicion of material wealth, its sense of existential exposure, the seriousness of its religious questions, and the awareness, which it owed to Kant, of the subjective element in all thinking – what Nietzsche came to call 'perspective'.[bb] Nietzsche thus handed on to the twentieth century an uneasy recognition that somewhere within the legacy of German Idealism lay dormant a power that could put in question much of what passed for the achievement of modernity.

z. 'Physiologe.' e.g. NW ii, 1126.
aa. 'Für alle und keinen.' Subtitle of *Also sprach Zarathustra* NW ii, 275.
bb. 'Perspektive.' NW ii, 249, 861.

III

Coleridge and Carlyle

By the end of the eighteenth century Idealist philosophy had in Germany already done its work of neutralising religious crisis and critique. For the author, or authors, of the *Earliest Systematic Programme* . . . the publication between 1790 and 1793 of a monument of what came to be known as the 'mythological school' of higher Biblical criticism, in which the opening chapters of Genesis were treated throughout as 'myth',[24] posed no problems of conceptualisation or of conscience. For Hegel it was simply part of the modern 'way of treating'[cc] the Christian religion which a respectable fraction of the public saw as 'beneficial Enlightenment',[dd] contentious though it might be for others. Great Britain, however, which did not acquire the word 'myth' for another fifty years, did not wish to be Enlightened. After Canning's coterie launched a devastating satirical assault on German literature in the *Anti-Jacobin* of 1797–1798, denouncing it as an instrument of political, moral and religious revolution, hand-in-glove with the French enemy, English publishers, writers and readers put up the shutters against corrupting foreign influences. Two decades of interested openness to German writing came to an abrupt end. Canning's real target, of course, was nearer home: the democratic sympathies of the freethinking radicals grouped around Robert Southey and S. T. Coleridge (1772–1834). His purpose was political rather than critical. But as a consequence of this sudden bout of early McCarthyism – perhaps understandable as a response to a long-lasting national state of military emergency – England closed its mind to the religious developments that in Germany had provoked the literary and philosophical reaction: it wanted neither the malady, nor the remedy. But a man of Coleridge's profound intelligence and panoramic reading could not be content with life in a sound-proof box, and the original English deist traditions continued a subterranean existence, particularly in the Unitarian movement, a stratum in English society which remained receptive of Continental ideas, especially in the realm of Biblical criticism.[25] Coleridge could not have stayed insulated from doubts, even if he had been prepared to accept mental torpor, and thanks to his fluent reading knowledge of German he had, most unusually, direct access to the Kantian and post-Kantian procedures for resolving them. Directed to the study of German and of Kant by the Bristol Unitarian Thomas Beddoes (1760–1808), he read all three *Critiques* thoroughly, borrowed Schelling's books from the

cc. 'Behandlungsart.' HW 1, 104. dd. 'Wohltätige Aufklärung.' *Ibid.*

library of Henry Crabb Robinson (1775–1867) and, as is now well known, borrowed Schelling's thoughts in writing his *Biographia Literaria*.[26] He and Crabb Robinson (who had heard Schelling lecture during his most brilliant period, in Jena, and had given tutorials on Kant to Madame de Staël (1766–1817)) were virtually alone in bringing to England 'the new faith' of 'Kantism', as Crabb Robinson called it.[27] Such, however, was the politically motivated hostility to their interest that neither ventured to further it by publication.[28] Their work of transmission was confined to conversation and, in Coleridge's case, to indirect but extensive allusion in what he did publish, especially in his *Aids to Reflection* (1825), which avowedly aim 'to set forth at large the momentous distinction between Reason and Understanding',[29] and which Crabb Robinson described as 'exhibit[ing] the best adaptation of Kantian principles to English religious sentiment'.[30] Coleridge, who was willing to call himself a 'transcendental philosopher',[31] appreciated both the systematic importance to Kant of the distinction between 'Verstand' and 'Vernunft' and its potential for religious apologetic, and retraced the arguments of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, restoring often enough the Scriptural contexts from which Kant had abstracted them. It is correct, no doubt, that Coleridge's adaptation of the Kantian distinction, so that 'Reason', in its own right, becomes a source of knowledge of things unknown to materialism and Utilitarianism, is 'a debasing of Kant's carefully built-up system'.[32] But it should not be overlooked that this debasing, if such it is, is closely parallelled in contemporary German philosophy: the *Earliest Systematic Programme* . . . gives a similar role to the Ideas of Reason as the foundation for its new theory of physics, history and religion, thus broadening the scope of the faculty whose pretensions Kant had sought to rein in. And in asserting that 'Reason indeed is much nearer to sense than to understanding',[33] Coleridge was claiming for his 'Reason' the power of 'intellectual intuition' denied by Kant but demanded by Fichte and those Fichte influenced. Coleridge may not have been an orthodox Kantian, but he was recognisably a post-Kantian Idealist – the only English representative of the species, and isolated partly because, during his lifetime, he hid the light of the new faith under a bushel. Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), by contrast, was significantly original neither in extending nor in expounding his Coleridgean understanding of Kant, but was a very effective publicist for it. In his essays in the *Edinburgh Review* during the 1820s, and above all in *Sartor Resartus* (first published in magazine form in 1833–1834), he drew the attention of the next generation to the resources offered by 'a right study of German literature' to those who needed to 'reconcile . . . reason with faith'.[34]

The importance of *Sartor Resartus* was at once recognised in America where in 1836 R. W. Emerson (1803–1882) arranged for its first publication in book form in Boston, two years before the first British edition appeared.

Idealism in America

The situation of the New England clergy, particularly the Unitarian clergy of Harvard, in the 1820s and 1830s was not dissimilar to that of the German clergy half a century earlier, and the 'infidel philosophers and theologians of Germany'[35] – to quote the sulphurous denunciation of them by Andrews Norton, Harvard's uncompromising defender of orthodoxy – spoke to their condition. True, the American circumstances were not so constricting: the separation of church and state, an expanding private economy and the ever open frontier created opportunities for alternative careers that did not exist in Germany. Emerson's elder brother gave up the church for Wall Street, and Ralph Waldo could live well on secular sermons delivered in lecture halls and periodicals without needing to claim a stipend from the state. But those who had been trained as the spiritual and moral instructors of the people and who found themselves unsettled by philosophical doubts, or by doubts about the reliability of Biblical testimony, which no established political interest sought to suppress, but who wanted nevertheless to continue in that role, whether inside or outside the institutions that had nurtured them, looked for reassurance to the wisdom of Germany. It came to them first of all through the medium of Coleridge. James Marsh (1794–1842), a Vermont Calvinist, seeking support for orthodoxy against the Lockean empiricism that was ravaging the faith of his Unitarian neighbours, published the *Aids to Reflection* in 1829, singling out in his 'Preliminary Essay' the Kantian core of the work: 'The key to [Coleridge's] system will be found in the distinctions, which he makes and illustrates between *nature* and *free-will*, and between the *understanding* and *reason*.'[36] Emerson no doubt learned the latter distinction from Coleridge, but in his lecture, 'The Transcendentalist', of 1842 he acknowledged its origin in the thinking of 'Immanuel Kant of Königsberg' who, according to Emerson, by giving the name 'Transcendental forms' to 'intuitions of the mind itself' (by which presumably he meant what in Germany would have been called 'intellektuelle Anschauung') had provided the term by which 'the Idealism of the present day' was now known: Transcendentalism.[37] Emerson must have owed his appreciation of the German background to Coleridge's thinking to Frederic Henry Hedge (1805–1890), who was later to become professor of German literature in Harvard and who had a much better grasp

than he of the difference between Kant and Fichte. In 1833 Hedge, who as a young man had spent four formative years in Germany, published an essay, 'Coleridge's Literary Character – German Metaphysics', which drew attention to the philosophical tradition that had 'exercised so decisive an influence over all [Coleridge's] writings': 'we do fully believe that whatever excellence [Germany] has achieved in science, in history, or poetry is mainly owing to the influence of her philosophy . . . to the transcendental method. In theology this influence has been most conspicuous.'[38] 'Hedge's Club' of Harvard alumni who gathered round Hedge on his visits to Boston from his congregation in Maine, to draw on his knowledge of German philosophy, became, under the name of the Transcendental Club, the fountainhead of the most significant intellectual movement in nineteenth-century America.

The connection between German Idealism and American Transcendentalism was neither tenuous nor superficial, but of course the American product had its own distinctive character. Kantian Reason, interpreted as an inner divine light, or as God Himself in man, and so as capable of grounding, or substituting for, all the truths of the (Unitarian) Christian religion might allow some, such as Hedge himself, or Theodore Parker (1810–1860) in the earlier part of his career, to continue with an untroubled conscience in the profession of a minister. But the relative openness of American society, and its free market in religion and in intellectual culture generally, untrammelled by a monopolistic official class, also allowed a more rapid and less traumatic development towards an explicitly secular Idealism than was possible in Germany. In 1832, Emerson, after reading Goethe's crypto-Kantian novel, *Wilhelm Meister*, commended and made available to him by Carlyle, and after learning that Germans found, not in any Christian writer, but in Goethe 'the restorer of Faith and Love after the desolation of Hume and the French . . . he married Faith and Reason for the world', promptly gave up his clerical career.[39] George Ripley (1802–1880), in whose house 'Hedge's Club' first met in 1836, an early proselytiser of the theology of Schleiermacher, resigned his ministry in 1840 in order to found the Brook Farm utopian community (and after its failure struck out on a literary career that made him a millionaire). Other members of the Club followed the same trajectory of an 'earthward pilgrimage', as it was called in a book of that title which owed much to Idealist thought, by Moncure Conway (1832–1907),[40] who was converted from Methodism to Transcendentalism by Emerson in 1852, and who, after abandoning theism altogether, ended his career as the leader of London's South Place Ethical Society (which named its Conway Hall after him). Conway fought all his life against slavery, and Parker and Orestes Brownson

(1803–1876) also turned increasingly to social campaigning, though Brownson, like Friedrich Schlegel, avoided the slide into agnosticism by eventually rejecting Transcendentalism in favour of Roman Catholicism.

A further distinctively American feature of Transcendentalist Idealism was its individualism. Because the independent history of the United States began with an act of rebellion against state authority, the Union, since its inception, has found it difficult to ground its own authority as a state in terms which do not automatically delegitimate it. The problem has been uniquely acute since, with an entirely immigrant population (the native peoples being for this purpose disregarded), it could not claim to be simply the political form of an ethnically or historically defined 'nation'. As a result, its constitutional theorists from Jefferson to Rawls have sought to base its legitimacy on the more or less fictional wills and rights of more or less fictional individuals, assumed to have entered voluntarily into association with one another. As a further result there has been little place in mainstream American thinking for the political philosophy of Hegel. In this respect (if not in others) Transcendentalism was an all-American movement. Even its aesthetician, Margaret Fuller-Ossoli (1810–1850), who edited its periodical *The Dial* for most of its short life (1840–1844), drew on Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, and through them on Schiller, rather than on Hegel.[41] Not that the Transcendentalists were blind to social issues: their heyday coincided with the seven-year depression that followed the financial crash of 1837, and the activism of both Parker and Brownson was a response to the economic miseries of the time. Brook Farm too, like Bronson Alcott's (1799–1888) Fruitlands, and like the many other experimental communities that sprang up in the 1840s, was a directly practical project of social repair. But the theory that inspired it, though claiming philosophical origins, and going by the name of 'democracy', was an egalitarian individualism that derived from the inability of the Founding Fathers to define themselves as a state. According to Ripley's closest associate at Brook Farm, the experiment arose from the idea of 'Transcendental philosophers . . . that democracy, while it existed in the Constitution of the United States . . . should be raised up from the sphere of politics . . . into life, and be made social'.[42] A Hegelian would have known that the social can be 'raised' to the sphere of politics, but not *vice versa*. Transcendentalism took much from German Idealism in the fields of epistemology, theology and, to some extent, aesthetics, but its political theory came from the American Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, and the wholly logical conclusion of that theory in practice was Thoreau's 'community of one'[43] in his hut beside Walden Pond.

As Hegel's star was setting in Germany it began to rise in the English-speaking world. After a decade in which he was known only through scattered and distorted summaries, and mainly as the obscure and sinister mentor of the notorious Strauss (whose *Life of Jesus* was ambiguously reviewed by Parker in 1840), suddenly, in the space of two years, America acquired a comprehensive and sympathetic account of the Hegelian system and some well-chosen translations by which to judge it. In 1847 Hedge's anthology, *Prose Writers of Germany*, included extracts from the 'Introduction' to Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* and his essay, 'Who Thinks Abstractly?', translated by the Presbyterian theologian H. B. Smith (1815–1877);[44] and in 1848 the first monograph was published in Boston: J. B. Stallo's (1823–1900) *The General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature . . . Embracing the Philosophical Systems of Schelling and Hegel and Oken's System of Nature*. In his 520 pages Stallo, a German immigrant and later an important lawyer, covered not only physics and chemistry, of which at the time he was professor in Fordham, but also the philosophy of mind, society and history. Stallo's reading of Hegel as demonstrating, through a series of 'evolutions', that 'the implacable rigor of cosmic laws, which sways *extensive matter*, is identical with the eternal freedom of *mind in its infinite intensity*'[45] profoundly impressed Emerson, the final period of whose thought was marked equally by Hegel and by Darwin.[46] Hedge and Stallo between them provided the resources from which H. C. Brokmeyer (1826–1906) and W. T. Harris (1835–1909) in St Louis drew their initial knowledge of Hegel,[47] and after the Civil War it seemed that Hegel's moment, and that of St Louis, had come. St Louis, the booming gateway to the west, had become a centre for German liberals emigrating after the failed revolutions of 1848, who distinguished themselves in the Union forces during the war; the city had thriving German-language journals and bookshops; and there was a serious expectation that it might replace Washington as the federal capital. The war had raised issues of political theory to which Transcendentalist individualism, especially in its utopian variants, was unequal, and Hegel's understanding of the role of institutions in mediating between society and the state, and between law and morality, made him the philosopher of the post-war world. For nearly twenty years the centre of speculative gravity in America moved from Boston to St Louis, where Brokmeyer and Harris founded the Philosophical Society in 1866 – initially to sponsor the publication of Brokmeyer's translation of Hegel's *Logic* (it never appeared) – and where, more significantly still, Harris edited the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (1867–1893), the first philosophical journal in the English language, which carried principally, though not exclusively, articles

on Hegel, Kant and Fichte, and extensive translations from their works. The New England Transcendentalists, especially Emerson and Bronson Alcott, were the early inspiration for Brokmeyer and Harris,[48] but the background of the Transcendentalists was in theology: the St Louis Hegelians were laymen, mainly teachers and professors, seeking to serve a new nation-state (Harris, an enthusiast for Froebel's ideas and patron of America's first publicly funded kindergarten,[49] became US Commissioner of Education, and Brokmeyer was for a while acting governor of Missouri) and through their journal, their very numerous books and, eventually, their pupils (among them, A. O. Lovejoy), they founded philosophy as a secular subject of study within the American educational system. Thanks perhaps to the deeply rooted American resistance to a state-centred political theory, however, their original emphasis on a Hegelian theory of institutions was diluted with time, and a demand was expressed for a more 'personal idealism', which G. H. Howison (1834–1917), a member of the core group, went off to promote in Berkeley. The impact of the St Louis Movement was, in the long term, felt more in the liberal arts curriculum than in the twentieth-century departments of philosophy or of political science. The lectures of Harris's right-hand man, the polymath educationalist Denton Snider (1841–1925), who described Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe as his 'four Bibles' (and who wrote the first essay in praise of skyscrapers), were a major source for the 'Great Books' programme. None the less, the owl of Minerva took flight in the dusk and the movement's influence reached its apogee when philosophy's centre of gravity returned to New England after the bursting of the St Louis bubble in 1880.[50] When Alcott achieved his lifelong ambition and established in Concord his Platonic academy, or rather summer school for all-comers, it was quickly dominated by Harris, Snider and the contingent from St Louis. From 1879 to 1888 the Concord School of Philosophy attracted up to 2,000 participants at a time. In the Darwinian and materialist era the public demand for a secular recasting of religious truths was urgent and increasing, and through its synthesis with Transcendentalism, St Louis Hegelianism acquired the theological appeal of its older partner. 'By 1900 the regnant philosophy in American colleges and universities became Hegelian.'[51] The reign was brief, but when in 1906 the young T. S. Eliot moved from St Louis to study Idealism in Harvard he was still following a path marked out for him by the generation of Harris and Denton Snider.

The rise of the professional university philosophy department, to which they had both contributed, ensured the eclipse equally of Transcendentalism and of St Louis Hegelianism. But the transition was gradual and the great figures who inaugurated the new era retained much of the vision of their

predecessors. The foundation in 1876 of America's first research university on the German model, Johns Hopkins, gave to native philosophy the new and prestigious status of an academic discipline, but the first outstanding teachers of the subject, C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) (who lectured in logic) and G. S. Morris (1840–1889), both had New England Transcendentalist Idealism in their backgrounds. Peirce, from a Harvard family, claimed to know 'almost the whole' of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by heart, derived the term 'Pragmatism' from Kant's usage, and famously remarked that 'my philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume'.[52] Morris, a Presbyterian who had studied with Trendelenburg and was a pupil of Hedge's translator, H. B. Smith, retained his teacher's concern that philosophy should reconcile faith and science and fostered it in both his own star pupils, John Dewey (1859–1952) and Josiah Royce (1855–1916).[53] Dewey came to Johns Hopkins from the Vermont school of the Coleridgean James Marsh, and Morris for a while made a (critical) Hegelian of him. 'I should never think of . . . denying,' he later said, 'that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking.'[54] Royce's own impressively innovative fusion of Kant's ethical idealism with Hegelian monism succeeded in incorporating the more individualist perspective of the later St Louis Movement[55] into a vision of intellectual, moral and religious community which gave substance to the utopian dreams of the Transcendentalists, an answer to Thoreau at last. William James (1842–1910), Royce's closest friend, and lifelong philosophical adversary, a Bostonian to the core, had like Royce studied with Lotze, but was unable to achieve a similar coherence. Overimpressed by the fact-fetishism of Emerson's favourite natural scientist, J. L. R. Agassiz (1807–1873), he lacked an understanding of the communitarian aspects of religion, reducing it, however sympathetically, to a matter of personal psychology. There is a deep continuity in nineteenth-century American thought from Transcendentalism to Pragmatism, a ceaseless interaction between the individualist Bill of Rights tradition and German Idealism. That Royce's roots lie in that interaction is obvious, but so do those of Peirce, Dewey and James. They may have had a more professional conception of philosophy (and that in itself was a German inheritance), but all four of them published their first academic articles in the house journal of St Louis Hegelianism, Harris's *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.

British Idealism

In Britain the general reception of Idealism was initially slower than in the United States, but all the more energetic when it came. After *Sartor*

Resartus the authority of Carlyle's personality gave impetus to the growing awareness in the scholarly community that a knowledge of German was an essential tool of the trade, though philosophy did not at first profit directly. William Whewell (1794–1866) in Cambridge, fully conversant with both the language and the literature, was scathingly critical of the imprecision and inaccuracy of Schelling and Hegel's ventures into natural science but approved of Kant's analysis of its conceptual foundations. Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893) in Oxford took Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as his guide in his lifelong project of translating and commenting on the dialogues of Plato. In 1838 (the year of the first English translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*) the twenty-one-year-old G. H. Lewes (1817–1878), a free-thinking Bohemian littérateur, armed with a letter of introduction from Carlyle, set off for Berlin where Varnhagen von Ense presented him with his own copy of Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*. The article Lewes then wrote on the *Aesthetics*, in partial imitation of Carlyle, without Carlyle's enthusiasm for his subject, was for over twenty years the only substantial piece on Hegel to appear in an English periodical. In 1845–1846, however, Lewes followed it up with the four (small) volumes of a *Biographical History of Philosophy*, which included an extensive introduction to Kant but rather less on the post-Kantians, Hegel being dismissed as 'preposterous'.[56] Lewes, from a family of soldiers and actors, and without a university education, had no interests in common with the clergy and was, if anything, repelled by the quasi-religious elements in Idealism. In his *Biographical History* he showed himself fully a secular bourgeois of the mid nineteenth century by his preference for the 'positivist' and scientific, supposedly post-philosophical, system of Auguste Comte. Mary Ann Evans (1819–1880), not yet known to him, and not yet George Eliot, was already similarly inclining to the mid-century materialist inversion of Idealism, but in her case the impetus came by a channel that linked her in spirit and sympathy much more closely than Lewes to the German tradition of secularised religion. Her friendship with radical Unitarians set her at odds with her clerical father and provided her with knowledge of German Biblical criticism,[57] which from the age of twenty she was able to read in the original. Her translation of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, begun two years after she ceased accompanying her father to church and published in 1846, completed her act of rebellion, though she was unimpressed by Strauss's Hegelian escape-route from atheism, and found Feuerbach more congenial, publishing her translation of *The Essence of Christianity* in 1854. In England in the 1840s and 1850s religious scepticism, though spreading silently among the intelligentsia, was still a socially unacceptable aberration of individuals: giving it public expression in his novel *The Nemesis of Faith* (1849), ceremonially burnt

in Oxford, cost J. H. Froude his college fellowship. Recollecting the atmosphere in his dissenting theological academy during these years, William Hale White's 'Mark Rutherford' writes that the world outside its walls 'was seething with the ferment which had been cast into it by Germany and by those in England whom Germany had influenced', though within the walls 'the word "German" was a term of reproach signifying something very awful although nobody knew exactly what it was'.[58] In 1859, however, everything changed and within a decade Germany was no longer the malady but, at last, the welcome remedy.

The near coincidence of the publication of Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* and of the collection *Essays and Reviews* marked a turning-point in English intellectual life. Protected by the surrounding wall of Establishment equally from German higher criticism and from German philosophical theology, Biblical literalism had been able to grow and spread within the English evangelical movement long after it had lost its hold on German Protestantism. The shock of Darwin's work was felt first in England not, as in Germany, as the imposition of a new perspective on natural processes and human history, but in the thoroughly anachronistic form of a challenge to the inerrancy of Scripture. Indeed, the rumpus aroused by the essayists, three of whom, including Jowett, were charged with heresy, for some time drowned out the much more radical message of *On the Origin of Species*. By reviving the *topoi* of early eighteenth-century deism – the 'evidences' of Christianity, the possibility of miracles, the principles of Scriptural interpretation, the relation between reason and revelation – the essayists, thanks largely to their ecclesiastical and academic standing, breached the protective wall, made Doubt no longer eccentric but respectable and brought it into the heart of the Church of England. The reaction was not long delayed: the course Germany had pioneered a century before was soon retraced by English intellectuals.

In 1865 J. H. Stirling (1820–1909), an amateur philosopher and admirer of Carlyle, published *The Secret of Hegel*, the first full-length British exposition of Hegel's work (nearly twenty years after Stallo's), and the fruit of years of study begun because Stirling believed Hegel had 'reconciled to philosophy Christianity itself' and that Kant and Hegel had 'no object but to restore Faith . . . in Christianity as the Revealed Religion'.[59] During the 1860s, as the St Louis Movement gathered momentum after the end of the Civil War, Oxford and Glasgow grew into the twin capitals of a British form of Idealism. T. H. Green (1836–1882), a fellow of Balliol from 1860 and pointed towards Hegel by Jowett, together with his lifelong friend Edward Caird (1835–1908) (Merton and Glasgow, and himself then Master of Balliol) made up a first

generation who, in a decade of teaching and study, 'turned to German idealism in [their] attempt to rescue religion'[60] and prepared the welter of publications that began in 1874 with Green's massive and polemical *Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature*. A second generation of their pupils – among them Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), A. S. Pringle-Pattison (1856–1931) and F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), the one indisputable genius the movement produced – was no less willing to see philosophy as the champion or inheritor of religion, possibly as both. Green, Bosanquet and Bradley were all sons of evangelical clergymen and Caird's brother was a Church of Scotland minister who became a prominent neo-Hegelian theologian; Green saw philosophy as 'the reasoned intellectual expression of the effort to get to God'; Bosanquet thought religion 'the only thing that makes life worth living at all'; and even Bradley remarked, with the mannered ambiguity of expression which he passed on to his disciple, T. S. Eliot, that 'with certain persons the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity'.[61] Only in the third generation of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925) did the need to respond to the crisis of 1859–1860 cease to be a principal motive for embracing Idealism. By then, however, philosophy was fully established as an academic subject within the university and no longer needed to justify itself to the world at large. As in Germany sixty years earlier, and as in contemporary America, the pioneers who had fought to bring philosophy into the academy were elbowed out by a new breed of professionals. But what the new professionals talked about was still Idealism, though not living but dead: a loosely articulated body of issues left over from a previous age, such as knowledge, identity, freedom, value, God. The task of philosophy became, not to innovate, but, in G. E. Moore's word, to 'refute':[62] to dissect and pick over the carcase, to demonstrate, in ever finer detail and with ever greater rigour (this constituting philosophical 'progress'), the falsity of the positions once adopted by religiously motivated Idealists, who themselves were gradually forgotten.

It was not only in the universities, themselves being remodelled to compare and compete with their German counterparts, that the reaction to Britain's crisis of faith followed the original German pattern, if in easier economic and political circumstances. The semi-fictionalised memoirs of those who did not take the route into philosophically reinterpreted religion and who read the crisis as a generational conflict, like that of 'Storm and Stress' – 'Mark Rutherford''s *Autobiography*, Samuel Butler's *The Way of all Flesh*, Edmund Gosse's *Father and Son* – all point to literature as an exit from the struggle with incredible and unrewarding dogma. As among German

thinkers from Karl Philipp Moritz to Schopenhauer, so in late Victorian England 'Art' came to offer the consolations of a religion felt to be obsolete. It is not chance that British Idealism flourished at the same time as Britain's most self-consciously aesthetic movement in literature and taste: the term 'aesthetic', introduced from German into French usage by Madame de Stäel and into English by Coleridge, did not become widely used until the 1870s, and when Oscar Wilde said 'all Art is quite useless',[63] not only was he echoing the sentiments of Moritz and Kant before him but he was also using the word 'Art' in the sense (of an epistemic category including what had previously been known as literature and the several 'fine arts') systematically refined by Schiller. Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic* (1892) was 'the first such work ever to be written in English'[64] and was heavily dependent on Hegel. But Bosanquet's central question, to which he thinks Hegel alone gives a satisfactory answer, is 'How can the sensual and the ideal world be reconciled?',[65] and that is a Schillerian rather than – as Bosanquet believes – a Kantian question. It is likely that Schiller's belief in the educative function of 'Art' lies behind the aesthetic 'high seriousness' offered, in response to the ebbing of the sea of faith, by Matthew Arnold (1822–1888),[66] who was to have so powerful an influence on English literary studies in the twentieth century.

A remarkable feature of British Idealism, which it shared with the early phase of St Louis Hegelianism, was the development of an ethical, social and political philosophy which, while clearly Hegelian in its origins, was neither materialist nor authoritarian in its tendency – unlike, therefore, both the left and right wings of German Hegelianism – and which seems in retrospect so countercultural as to be worth reviving. For Bradley the isolated individuals, assumed in British utilitarianism to be the building-blocks which, put together, constituted society, were a 'fiction', since every human being 'is one of a people, he was born into a family, he is lives in a certain society, in a certain state', and for Green our 'manifold relations to nature and other persons . . . form the reality of the self'.[67] They could therefore elaborate an ethical political theory in which social organisation and the pursuit of the common good were not at odds with the self-fulfilment of individuals. Without being overtly socialist, this theory allowed a major role for the state in remedying the obvious social ills of late Victorian Britain and, unacknowledged, has probably continued to undergird British social policy to the present day. For the Idealists differed markedly from their professional academic successors in engaging in political, administrative and public charitable activity not as a matter of personal duty but as a consequence and expression of their philosophical viewpoint. Some, notably, R. B. Haldane

(1856–1928), became major public servants. However, in the last years of the nineteenth century in Britain, as in America, a dissenting tendency of 'Personal Idealism' arose within the movement, a re-emphasising of the individual as a metaphysical and ethical unit, associated particularly with Pringle-Pattison. As in America too, this resurgent individualism heralded the break-up of the entire movement. None the less, the tradition of civic responsibility, though it could not be said to follow from his metaphysical 'new realism', was maintained by Russell even after he had abandoned most of his Idealist inheritance. Only his pupil, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), continued, albeit in a tormentedly personal fashion, to hold to the belief that a philosopher's thinking had to determine his or her life.

A global philosophy

While British philosophers were laying the basis for liberal and Fabian communitarianism, the social and political thinking of the original Idealists was bearing more dangerous fruit, both further east and for a time in London itself. In the Moscow circle of Nikolai Stankevich (1813–1840) German philosophy was first introduced to Russian intellectuals, among them Alexander Herzen (1812–1870) and Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), who both later spent periods in London when Marx was already settled there. Herzen, as a liberal reformer with strong sympathies for the British empiricist tradition (and even that was enough to make him unwelcome in his homeland), was more open to Goethe and Schiller's programme for aesthetic education than to Schelling's natural philosophy, which he ridiculed, or to Hegel's logic. But unlike the British Idealists, he saw in the philosophy of Hegel 'the algebra of revolution. It emancipates man to an extraordinary degree and leaves not a stone standing of the Christian world, of the world of outlived tradition.'[68] No doubt it was that possibility in Hegel's thought that initially made Bakunin into his fervent disciple and his first Russian translator. But Bakunin's politics grew more extreme after the failure of the revolutions of 1848–1849 (in which he collaborated with Wagner) and after his brutal persecution by the Russian authorities. Feuerbach converted him to what he thought of as materialism, but his first love had always been Fichte (whom he also translated) and his later radical anarchism was based on a principle of individual autonomy quite as uncompromising as Fichte's and considerably more unpractical. Bakunin's political theory is of interest only for its confusion, but it enabled him to recognise the dictatorial potential of Marxism and so to get himself thrown out of the First International in 1872. As Marx

and Marxism came to dominate the European revolutionary movement so Engels's picture of the recent history of philosophy – as a dialectical progression through French materialism and German idealism to Marxist dialectical materialism – came to dominate the reception of post-Kantian thought by socialists, particularly Russian socialists. Fichte, Schelling and, especially, Hegel were guaranteed an after-life, but only as the antecedents of Marx. G. Plekhanov's (1857–1918) *The Development of the Monist Conception of History* (1895) ('monism' being by then a code name for 'materialism') passed on Engels's stylisation of the Idealists to the young V. I. Ulyanov (1870–1924), later 'Lenin', who could not be accused of being unpractical.

Cultural and personal links between Russia and Germany – through the Imperial family, the army, the administration and the universities – were close from the mid eighteenth century onwards, but France was less receptive of external influences. However, the Revolutionary Napoleonic wars – through occupation, emigration and even mutual imprisonment – greatly multiplied the personal interactions between France and Germany, and Madame de Stäel's *De l'Allemagne* created as much curiosity as it satisfied. Victor Cousin (1792–1867) toured Germany in 1817–1818, seeking deeper knowledge of philosophy since Kant (whom he had already studied), and met Hegel, Schelling, Jacobi and Goethe. Partly through his later influence on French education, and the authority he acquired as translator of Plato and Proclus, Cousin's own system of 'eclecticism' and his devotion to the history rather than the practice of philosophy became something of a default position for French academic philosophers throughout the nineteenth century. While it could itself hardly be described as 'Idealism' (though Lewes thought it 'nothing but a misconception of Hegel's "History of Philosophy" '),[69] 'eclecticism' certainly showed the impact of Kant and post-Kantian thought: the questions that occupied Cousin, such as the nature and accessibility of the Absolute, were often enough Idealist questions but he gave them psychological answers, adopting a position half-way between the German school and the Scottish school of common sense, who remained for him the preferred guide. A more distinctly Idealist – or as he said, 'spiritualist' – position was adopted by Cousin's pupil and critic J. G. F. Ravaisson (-Mollien) (1813–1900) who studied with Schelling in Munich, stressed the unconscious continuity of mind and nature and, with his disciple, the Kantian Jules Lachelier (1832–1918), was a principal influence on Henri Bergson (1859–1941), who dedicated his first work to Lachelier. Bergson's teacher, Émile Boutroux (1845–1921), a student of Leibniz and Fichte, as well as of ancient philosophy, was, unlike his pupil, a typical product of the

eclecticist style. The principal contribution of Cousin's school to the Idealist tradition was to keep it alive, if safely bottled up, as a possible object of historical study. Preserved by the prestige attaching to the subject 'philosophy', a compulsory element in French secondary education since the Napoleonic reforms, the German post-Kantians remained available as a resource, unforgotten if largely unused, until in the twentieth century they were released to play a central role in a new and creative phase of French thought.

In the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth the Western world had a globalised philosophy to match its globalised economy. From St Petersburg to St Louis, and indeed to San Francisco, in Germany, France and Britain, in Australia, South Africa and Canada, the thought of Kant and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Schopenhauer and Lotze provided at least a reference point and often enough the substance of discussion, particularly in the newly created departments of philosophy in the English-speaking countries. In Italy, in this period, Croce and Gentile were beginning their studies of Hegel, as was Fernando Pessoa in Portugal. The Unitarian, and later founding Humanist, R. W. Sellars, father of Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989), was studying in Heidelberg with a pupil of Haeckel's. T. S. Eliot was listening in Paris to Bergson (from whom Sellars had also sought advice) and J. Ortega y Gasset was studying Kant in Marburg. Spain already had a long-established autonomous Idealist tradition – issuing, as in Britain, in important public educational work – that derived from C. C. F. Krause (1781–1832), a pupil of Fichte and Schelling, and a teacher of Schopenhauer, and the inventor of the term 'panentheism'. (It is a matter of regret that it has not been possible to include a study of *krausismo* in the present collection.) In Japan, universities were being founded on the Prussian model inaugurated in Berlin by Humboldt and Fichte. Yet within a generation that shared philosophical world was no more, and the global economic and political order was shattered in the catastrophe of the First World War. Even before 1900, however, there were signs of the disintegration to come. As early as 1876 George Eliot's most ambitious novel, *Daniel Deronda*, foreshadowed the breakdown of the attempt to marry an international Idealist perspective to an English realist tradition.[70] The incompatibility, or at least the antagonism, was her theme, as it was of the novel she had before her as an example, Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, and that the theme was lost on her audience only proved the point. In the decades that followed, the dissident movement of Personal Idealism in Britain and America assorted all too well with an increasing cultural nationalism that prepared, or reflected, a

readiness for more material conflicts. In the name of Personal Idealism, Henry Sturt in 1906 denounced Green, Bradley and Bosanquet for importing German 'fallacies . . . uncongenial to our national habit of mind'.[71] Meanwhile in Germany the names of Kant and Hegel, Goethe and Schiller, had begun to be deployed as evidence of the superiority of a German 'culture' that had triumphed in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and, it was implied, could be expected to triumph again: 'a fanfare of vanity', Nietzsche wrote, 'that from time to time is sounded across the German frontier'.[ee] Round the world, the social position of philosophers came to resemble more closely that of most German philosophers over the preceding century – as national civil servants – and so it became easier for them to see themselves and their subject as furthering a national rather than an international interest. Philosophers ceased to be self-employed private citizens (like Emerson or Bosanquet), or actively engaged in public life (like Harris or Haldane), or dons without teaching responsibilities (like Bradley) and became expert pedagogues or researchers employed by national institutions, whose discussions with their fellow experts did not need to be generally accessible or generally relevant. As a result, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the universal reach of the Idealist systems, their commitment to the whole of humanity and to international understanding, seemed less definitive of them than their origin in Germany – even, unfortunately, to the Germans.

Notes

1. See, for example, the classic anthology of texts by Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Rüdiger Bubner (ed.), *Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellung. VI. Deutscher Idealismus* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1978), translated as *German Idealist Philosophy* (London: Penguin, 1997).
2. T. L. S. Sprigge, 'Idealism', in Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), iv, 662.
3. W. J. Mander, *British Idealism: a history* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
4. SpSW i, 493.
5. *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie* (n.p., 1792).
6. Such a project is indeed under way, *The Legacy of Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer, and to be published by Oxford University Press.
7. Nicholas Boyle, *Goethe: The Poet and the Age. Volume Two. Revolution and Renunciation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 326–27, 546.

ee. 'Eine Fanfare der Eitelkeit, welche man von Zeit zu Zeit über die deutsche Grenze hinüberbläst.' NW i, 928.

8. For the following details see in particular: Hagen Schulze, *Kleine deutsche Geschichte* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2011); W. H. Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935).
9. Peter Earle, *The Making of The English Middle Class* (London: Methuen, 1989), 80–81.
10. Eda Sagarra, *A Social History of Germany* (London: Methuen, 1977), 12.
11. Hans Heinrich Gerth, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800: Zur Soziologie des deutschen Frühliberalismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 33.
12. Rudolf Vierhaus, *Deutschland im Zeitalter des Absolutismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 78, and Gerth, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800*, 44–45.
13. Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Hart-Davis, 1962), ii, 316.
14. *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, in F. W. J. Schelling, *Schriften von 1801–1804* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 586.
15. Herbert Schöffler, *Protestantismus und Literatur* (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1922), 228, cited in W. H. Bruford, *Theatre, Drama, and Audience in Goethe's Germany* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1950), 114.
16. Bruford, *Theatre*, *ibid.*
17. HW i, 234–36.
18. See in particular Letter 10, last paragraph: 'Dieser reine *Vernunftbegriff* der Schönheit . . . müßte sich als eine notwendige Bedingung der Menschheit aufzeigen lassen', F. Schiller, *Sämtliche Werke*, eds G. Fricke and H. G. Göpfert (Munich: Hanser, 1965), v, 600.
19. In his articles 'Allgemeine Übersicht der neuesten philosophischen Literatur' in Niethammer's *Philosophisches Journal* in 1797, republished in 1809 as 'Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre', in F. W. J. Schelling, *Schriften von 1794–1798* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), 223–332.
20. Schulze, *Geschichte*, 100.
21. See R. Geuss, 'Kultur, Bildung, Geist', in *Morality, Culture, and History: essays on German philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 29–50; and N. Boyle, 'Redeeming *Culture*' in Charles B. Gordon and Margaret Monahan Hogan (eds), *Sacred Imagination* (Portland: University of Portland, Garaventa Center, 2009), 121–31.
22. Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 302.
23. NW i, 137.
24. J. G. Eichhorn, *Urgeschichte*, ed. J. P. Gabler (Altdorf: Monath und Kußler, 1790–1793). See Elinor Shaffer, *'Kubla Khan' and* The Fall of Jerusalem: *the Mythological School in biblical criticism and secular literature 1770–1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 317.
25. Shaffer, *'Kubla Khan'*, 24, 26.
26. For Coleridge's reading of Kant see R. Ashton, *The German Idea: four English writers and the reception of German thought 1800–1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 36–48; on Schelling, 53.
27. Henry Crabb Robinson, *Essays on Kant, Schelling, and German Aesthetics*, ed. James Vigus (London: MHRA, 2010), 33.
28. Ashton, *German Idea*, 42.

29. S. T. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 'The author's preface', e.g. 7th edn, ed. Derwent Coleridge (London: Moxon, 1854), xv–xvi.
30. Ashton, *German Idea*, 29.
31. *Ibid.*, 40.
32. *Ibid.*, 47.
33. Coleridge, *Aids*, 174, 'On Spiritual Religion'.
34. Ashton, *German Idea*, 19–20, citing Francis Espinasse's recollections from 1893.
35. Andrews Norton, 'A Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity' (1839), in George Hochfield (ed.), *Selected Writings of the American Transcendentalists* (New York: New American Library, 1966), 203–09, 203.
36. Hochfield, *Selected Writings*, 107.
37. *The Works of R. W. Emerson* (London: Routledge, n.d.), 619, 621.
38. Hochfield, *Selected Writings*, 123, 127.
39. Henry A. Pochmann, *German Culture in America: philosophical and literary influences 1600–1900* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), 169, 595.
40. Moncure D. Conway, *The Earthward Pilgrimage* (facsim. reprint of edn published in London: John Camden Hotten, 1870) in James A. Good (ed.), *The Ohio Hegelians* (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), vol. 2.
41. Pochmann, *German Culture*, 441, 443, 445.
42. Richard Francis, *Transcendental Utopias: individual and community at Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and Walden* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 49. I am grateful to Richard Francis for his guidance, over many years, through the thickets of American Transcendentalism.
43. Francis, *Transcendental Utopias*, 218–49. See Robert S. Fogarty, *All Things New: American communes and utopian movements, 1860–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 24.
44. Pochmann, *German Culture*, 583–84. Loyd D. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers: the Ohio Hegelians: John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, and August Willich, with key writings* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), 14.
45. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers*, 33.
46. Pochmann, *German Culture*, 198.
47. *Ibid.*, 269; Easton, *Hegel's First AmericanFollowers*, 45.
48. Pochmann, *German Culture*, 269, 274.
49. *Ibid.*, 286.
50. *Ibid.*, 259.
51. *Ibid.*, 234.
52. *Ibid.*, 313–14.
53. *Ibid.*, 314, 670.
54. *Ibid.*, 671.
55. Specifically of Howison in Berkeley, where the young Royce both studied and lectured.
56. G. H. Lewes, *A Biographical History of Philosophy* (London: C. Cox, 1851), iv, 210.
57. Shaffer, *'Kubla Khan'*, 230–31.
58. [William Hale White], *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), 65, 61.
59. Mander, *British Idealism*, 18.
60. *Ibid.*, 160.

61. *Ibid.*, 139, 416, 170.
62. G. E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', *Mind* 12 (1903), 433–53.
63. Oscar Wilde, *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, 'The Preface', *The Works of Oscar Wilde*, ed. G.F. Maine (London: Collins, 1957), 17.
64. Mander, *British Idealism*, 332.
65. *Ibid.*, 334.
66. Either directly or mediated through Goethe. James Simpson understates the ethical (and so Schillerian and Kantian) element in Goethe's understanding of the development of Art and culture (though he is no doubt right to say that in Arnold it is more pronounced): J. Simpson, *Matthew Arnold and Goethe* (London: MHRA, 1979), 127.
67. Mander, *British Idealism*, 189, 207.
68. Alexander Herzen, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), 521.
69. Lewes, *Biographical History*, iv, 241.
70. Shaffer, *'Kubla Khan'*, 288–90.
71. Mander, *British Idealism*, 366.

General introduction: the twentieth and twenty-first centuries

Liz Disley

1. From inauspicious beginnings to the 'return of metaphysics' – German Idealism at the turn of the century

At first glance, the impact of Idealism at the dawn of the twentieth century seemed to be on the wane. In America, George Santayana, a student of William James, spearheaded a common-sense return to naturalism and realism, attacking not only Idealism itself but also perceived Idealist elements in pragmatism. His five-volume *Life of Reason* (1905–1906) was an ambitious and broad-based contribution to philosophy, focusing not only on metaphysical and epistemological topics, but also on religion and literature. An early advocate of epiphenomenalism, that is, the view that mental events are caused by physical events and have no influence on subsequent physical events, Santayana's wide-ranging project could hardly have been more hostile to classical German Idealism. He was to exercise significant influence on subsequent figures in English-speaking philosophy, including Bertrand Russell, as well as on literary figures such as Wallace Stevens. In the German-speaking world, 1908 saw the first meeting of what would ultimately become the Vienna Circle, which would foster the development of the enormously influential logical positivist movement. As well as being a philosophical methodology, logical positivism was a fundamentally empiricist movement which saw all knowledge as proceeding from experience. In this sense, it too was inimical to German Idealism, and saw many of the tenets of the earlier movement as metaphysical and therefore meaningless statements. The logical positivist movement and German Idealism did not operate in entirely separate worlds, however, and many of the central questions and concerns of both were brought together in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and those who worked with him.

With some caveats, then, it might be said that the very first few years of the twentieth century did not look particularly hopeful for the impact of German Idealism in most of the key geographical centres of philosophical thought, that is, America, Britain and Germany itself. In France, however, another admirer of William James, Henri Bergson, was developing his thought in a manner rather more amenable to German Idealism and arguing against the positivism propagated by Durkheim. Bergson's work would go on to be influential for a range of figures across the European continent, most notably Edmund Husserl. In this sense, French philosophy provided the most fertile ground and original point of dissemination for early twentieth-century successors of German Idealism. Other continental European countries displayed the impact of Idealism in quite different ways; Giovanni Gentile in Italy produced a theory of Absolute Idealism that claimed that reality is constituted by the pure act of perception.[1] His philosophy would later be used as a central tenet of Italian fascist thought. Concerns about national identity from a rather difference perspective were expressed by the fairly disparate Spanish 'Generación del 1898', whose most prominent member, Miguel de Unamuno, was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and used some of the language inherited from classical German Idealism, such as concepts of reason and the will, in his Christian vitalist existentialism.

How did German Idealism's legacy progress over the course of a century from its apparent complete usurpation in its first decade by one or another version of positivism, remaining only as a repository to be mined for conceptual vocabulary or the most dubious of political ends, to emerge in the century's last decade as part of a 'return of metaphysics' that found, and continues to find, an appreciative audience on both sides of the Atlantic, including the European continent? The two main figures of contemporary neo-Hegelianism, John McDowell and Robert Brandom, are also two of the most influential living philosophers, engaging scholars on both sides of the analytical/Continental divide, whilst belonging most obviously to the Anglo-American side of that division. The philosophy of Hegel in particular, but also of Kant, is for McDowell and Brandom an indispensable resource for the tracing-out of, respectively, a minimalist empiricism and an analytic pragmatism. How did philosophy move from Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' to McDowell's *Mind and World*, split itself into two along analytical/Continental lines and, to some extent, put itself back together again, in only ninety years?

This question has, of course, many answers, only some of which can be sketched out in this 'Introduction'. A number of them have to do with

developments in thought that go far beyond what might narrowly be termed 'philosophy'. The turbulent and violent twentieth century, with its unprecedented pace of technological change, had a profound impact on our evaluation of human experience, yielding an emphasis on the first person perspective and on an understanding of this perspective as at the same time inviolable and of inherent value, and demanding intense scrutiny and often scepticism. Unreliable narratives, such as those presented by writers throughout the twentieth century, from Franz Kafka, through Vladimir Nabokov, to J. M. Coetzee and Zoe Heller, are understood as presenting versions of a subject-centred reality that are valuable often precisely *because* of their mendacity and the extent to which they fail to fit into a broader social reality. This contextualisation of the first-person experience is inherently both idealist in nature and phenomenological in method. When assessing the world they present, the reader looks not for the thick Cartesian curtain between appearance and reality, but the situation of the narrator's perspective amongst the perspective of others, and against the possibility of a shared social truth, using the individual experience as the key to tracing out what must be true of a Kantian noumenal world hidden from view, or, perhaps more probably, a Hegelian phenomenological narrative of the underlying pattern of human relationships. Here as well the increased interest in, and concentration on, the experience of minority groups and women has shown the influence of German Idealism, with studies of a Hegelian-influenced concept of recognition playing an important part in philosophies of race and gender.

The development of new methods, basic principles, concepts and vocabularies in the field of psychology both bear the hallmarks of German Idealism and contribute themselves to ongoing philosophical legacies of Idealist thought. Transcendental philosophy, by separating out the ego from the natural world and placing the former at the centre of experience and reality, provides the condition of possibility for Freudian and later psychology, even if some forms of Idealism – particularly Hegelian – might be seen as placing more emphasis on a supra-individual Absolute Ego than the individual ego (after all, Hegel sees the maxim 'Know thyself' as a call to humanity in general, and not the individual).[2] The development of theories of the sub-conscious might present a challenge to a Kantian picture of a rational, autonomous being, but the Freudian account of self-alienation feeds into the Marxist tradition, ultimately influenced by Hegel's account of the development of self-consciousness.

Political realities have also done much to guide the pattern of German Idealism's influence, and it is here, at the level of the concrete, that Kant

becomes the more influential figure. It is hardly surprising that, in a post-war liberal democracy with, particularly in the case of Europe, important supra-national elements, Kant's political thought seems more relevant than ever. Kant's *On Perpetual Peace* in particular is strongly in tune with a mood of political idealism, shaped by Enlightenment values, which emerges in times of prosperity as well as, often, of threatened or actual adversity, but is tempered with a moderate realism in the knowledge that the striven-for goal will always remain just out of reach. The level of empirical detail employed by Kant in such texts as *What is Enlightenment* make his examples relevant to the most modern debates, such as the varying responsibilities of scholars and officials, discussed by him when distinguishing between public and private reason.

Another sense in which political realities become relevant to the legacy of German Idealism can be observed in the interwar period and the growth of fascism in Europe. This period coincides with the development of the first major twentieth-century philosophical movement to display the impact of German Idealism, that is, phenomenology. Centred around Edmund Husserl, this movement gathered pace over the second decade of the twentieth century, but by the mid 1940s its members were all exiled for reasons of political belief or ethnic origin, or dead – sometimes, as in the case of Edith Stein, as direct victims of the Nazi terror. Political circumstances in the 1920s directly prevented Husserl from joining the Fichte circle of the south-west German, or Baden, School, which included elements of national socialist thought that excluded the Jewish philosopher, and those in the 1930s prevented him from publishing his work in Germany (*The Crisis in the European Sciences* of 1936 had to be published in Belgrade). Exile, however, brought those working on phenomenology into closer contact with other parts of the world and philosophical traditions, as, for example, in the case of Alfred Schutz, who went to work at the New School in New York after being forced to leave Germany in 1939. Such cases of exile also fostered what we would now call interdisciplinary work.

II. Germany and Austria: the rejection of metaphysics

Early twentieth-century phenomenology

The story of the early phenomenologists' interaction with German Idealism is partly a story of missed connections. Phenomenology is and was a

methodology rather than primarily a philosophical school with substantive metaphysical commitments. Nevertheless, it is a movement radically opposed to logical positivism and based around the first-person point of view, which emphasises the transcendence of the human subject and the primacy of individual human experience. In this sense, there is a clear line that can be drawn from classical German philosophy through the phenomenologists and, to some extent, existentialists, and that emerges in contemporary social philosophy. A very important point of comparison between German Idealism and the work of phenomenologists such as Husserl is the crucial role accorded to human relationships in the constitution of a social reality. As the first philosopher to talk explicitly in terms of intersubjectivity, Husserl raises questions of the role played by the Other in the constitution of the self in a way that echoes the work of Hegel and Fichte in particular. Husserl's work on the phenomenological experience of time, and the work of his student Eugen Fink, brought up again the central importance of the subjective nature and ideality of time, a subject that had been neglected since Kant and Hegel.

Whilst being strongly influenced in his early scholarly career by early psychology – particularly the work of Wilhelm Wundt, who was the first person to refer to himself as a psychologist and whose lectures in Leipzig Husserl attended – Husserl and his phenomenological colleagues were keen to restrict the influence of descriptive psychology on logic. Logical structures, according to Husserl – arguing to some extent against the greatest influence on him, Brentano – are not affected by the specifically human standpoint. Instead, Husserl argued for what he thought of as the 'natural' standpoint or attitude, the view that being intentionally directed towards material objects involves constituting those objects. This is a radically idealist proposition, and one which tackles head-on the central Cartesian question of the existence of mind-independent objects by advocating the bracketing of questions about the 'external' world. Our worldview, and indeed our world, he claims, is determined epistemologically rather than psychologically.

In many ways, this brings phenomenologists such as Husserl into direct conflict with that other great development of the early twentieth century, that is, Freudian psychology and the study of the unconscious mind. For the phenomenologist, it is the structures of conscious experience that determine our world and, to a great extent, the very nature of the self. Such a view dispenses not only with the idea of the unconscious mind, but also with the idea that the psychological constitution of the self has a direct influence on conscious experience. In fact, the conflict between phenomenology

and Freudian psychology reinterprets and restates a key conflict within German Idealism itself. After the Copernican turn or revolution, ought one to focus, as Kant does, on human subjects as centres of epistemic experience? Or ought one, alternatively, to see the study of consciousness (which is phenomenology in both Husserl's and Hegel's senses, after all) as encompassing all the richness of human psychological experience? The central problem or conflict that emerges in the early part of the twentieth century involves the same basic questions as the problem that shapes much of the divergence in opinion between the original German Idealists. This debate reached far beyond the confines of the German-speaking world, involving particularly the phenomenologists' Marxist successors.

The rejection of metaphysics

Husserl's particular phenomenological method, which aimed at observing the structures of conscious experience in the absence of any metaphysical system or commitments, had a profound effect on mid twentieth-century philosophy, in particular through his pupil, Heidegger, who also emphatically wanted to reject metaphysics. This rejection crossed geographical boundaries and established divides in philosophy, and in the mid twentieth-century German-speaking world it was strongly influenced by Idealism. Heidegger moves decisively away from the philosophy of the *individual* subject and insists that *Dasein* is not a subject or a substance, but the terminology and concepts he employs – *Mitsein*, *Sorge* and *Fürsorge* in particular, but also *Vor-* and *Zuhandenheit* – reveal a picture of the world of shared experience, and of encounters with the world, which recalls Hegel's phenomenology. Heidegger, in rejecting the philosophy of the subject, is also influenced by Nietzsche; thus, the roots of the rejection of metaphysics stretch back to the end of the nineteenth century. Lévinas, whose early influences were all from the German-speaking world, displays, perhaps more than his two initial critical targets, Heidegger and Husserl, a strong constructive force in his rejection of metaphysics, and in his rejection of the two earlier philosophers' rejections as insufficient. The Other, for Lévinas, is not just someone I encounter incidentally and assume is in some way relevantly similar; rather, the other calls to me, demands attention, and indeed can summon me even without words. There are clear parallels here with Hegel's master–slave dialectic in the Self-Consciousness chapter of the *Phenomenology*. Lévinas rejects metaphysics even more explicitly when he sees the encounter with the Other as an argument for ethics and first philosophy.

Lévinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy is, of course, fundamentally anti-foundationalist, and he is a definitive example of someone whose theoretical philosophy – in as far as he has a definable theoretical position – is explicitly led by his practical–philosophical commitments. Heidegger's philosophy is also led by something other than a pure desire to sketch out the theoretical conditions of existence of Dasein and the ontological facts of its Being. His discussion of authenticity is central to *Being and Time I*, and, whilst it is not an ethics, it is a clear statement that there are better and worse ways for *Dasein* to be, and certain metaphysical understandings of its own Being place it in a destructive form of error. On the most fundamental level, we do not look at how the world is and ask how the human subject fits in to this world; rather, we ask how the world must be, given that we are the kinds of being we are. This insight is a continuation of the Copernican revolution.

How far, though, was the rejection of metaphysics a rejection of *German Idealist* theoretical philosophy rather than the entirety of modern philosophy since Descartes, and how far was it a continuation of the subject-centred philosophy of Hegel and Fichte in particular? The rejection of metaphysics, in as far as it can be considered a single movement with a single goal, was a radically subject-centred tradition, even if it did not want to engage explicitly with the subject–object dichotomy and rejected the use of metaphysical language. Moreover, Heidegger and Lévinas in particular continue Hegel and Fichte's claim that the self can only be (or be truly self-conscious) in the Other, or at least that an other is necessary for a fully developed version of human being. Lévinas continues the trend of Husserlian phenomenology when he suspends the cognitive distinction between the self and the Other, seeing it as a cognitive decision to place the Other in the 'outside' position. Transcendence as the Other in the self is the main theme of *Otherwise than Being*, and this is a particularly idealist kind of transcendence. Just like Hegel, Lévinas and those who want to take his position then have questions to answer about how to account for actual human being, and actual social life, which Lévinas partly answers in *Totality and Infinity*, showing, as Hegel does, that there is no conflict between proposing a rejection of a false subject–object dichotomy and providing us with a rich account of human social life. Heidegger also has a detailed account of social life, complicated by the ever-present question of the 'who' of *Dasein*. (Can we speak of *Dasein* as we would of a human subject, a Hegelian self-consciousness, a Kantian rational being?) His concept of *Mitsein* (Being-with) takes a central position in his analysis. *Mitsein* is simply a fact of *Dasein*'s existence. Being-with is the condition of the possibility of

being-with ontically, that is, in the actual social world. Not only are we essentially being-with-others in the same way that we are being-in-the-world, but we comport ourselves (comportment being a sort of Heideggerian version of intuitive relation) towards the Other with *Fürsorge* (concern-with). The authentic way of *Fürsorge* and of being-with-the-other is to free the other for their possibilities, as opposed to the inauthentic way of jumping-in and 'taking care' of their possibilities for them. One can make a direct comparison here with Fichte's I and not-I, but particularly with Hegelian intersubjectivity and the concept of recognition, which involves seeing the Other as a subject, and oneself as a subject interacting with that subject. The correct way to conduct oneself in social life directly relates to real-life applications of concepts in theoretical philosophy.

The rejection of metaphysics and the linguistic turn crossed the analytical–Continental divide. Wittgenstein, particularly in the *Philosophical Investigations*,[3] sketches out a view of human life that focuses strongly on language and language use, moving, as Paul Sheehan has it, from ideas to words.[4] Thus, like Heidegger and Lévinas, he rejects traditional metaphysics, and perhaps in particular a picture of the world and human existence that sees ideas as prior. Like the logical positivists, Wittgenstein might thus be thought of as taking philosophy away from any kind of roots in German Idealism. Yet there are idealist elements even in Wittgenstein's thought. Wittgenstein does not think that there can be any reality that remains completely independent of our perception, even if that is a view that is, by definition, linguistically conceived. Schopenhauer is certainly an important influence on the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*; the dualism of 'what can be said' and 'what can only be shown' provides a parallel with Schopenhauer's dualism of representation and the will. The later Wittgenstein has seemed to some commentators to adopt a method of immanent enquiry similar to that in Hegel's phenomenology, as well as to show some similarities with Hegel in his philosophy of language.[5] Once more, one finds traces of German Idealism where one might least expect them.

The Frankfurt School

Emerging shortly after the main flowering of early twentieth-century phenomenology, the Frankfurt School is clearly marked by the methodological and substantive influence of German Idealism. It is possible to discern four different phases of the School's existence, each of which constitutes a reaction to, and redevelopment of, different aspects of German Idealism. Initially

concerned with empirical and statistical work related to the foundation of a historical archive concerning the labour movement, the Institute for Social Research (founded in 1923) became, in the period before and during the Second World War, a forum for reactions to Hegelian thought and had as its aim the integration of the different disciplines within the social sciences. Max Horkheimer, who became the Institute's director in 1930, rejected what he saw as the fetishism of subjectivity, a reaction to the *Lebensphilosophie* of the time. He saw dialectics as a way of overcoming dichotomies, not a historical inevitability in the sense that Marx or Hegel understood it, thereby divorcing himself to some extent from the metaphysics of teleology. The work of the Institute crossed disciplinary boundaries and concerned itself in particular with psychoanalysis, trying to reconcile the works of Freud and Marx and reinterpret the work of both. In 1933, the Insitute was forced to move to Geneva as a result of Hitler's rise to power, and in 1935 to New York. Horkheimer's *Traditional and Critical Theory* (1937) was the Institute's informal manifesto on its arrival in the United States.

The roots of critical theory can be found in the mature philosophy of Kant, and in his use of the term 'Critique' to refer to an investigation that hopes to find the limits of a particular line or field of enquiry. Critique, in this sense, also has the connotation of overcoming some dogma that has come before. Critical theory, of course, is not just a school of methodological thought, but a movement of social criticism and social history. Moving against its Marxist roots, it is sceptical about seeing the ultimate source of, and reason for, social domination in any particular place. Thus, it also works against its Hegelian roots. Nevertheless, in its refusal to adopt any kind of metaphysical system, it echoes phenomenology.

Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) is pessimistic in tone, in contrast with the faith in human reason displayed by Kant's founding text of 1784 – the historical circumstances of its writing make this unsurprising. The arrival of Habermas in the Institute in 1956 was the beginning of a new phase of engagement with political reality which would culminate in a conflict with the German student movement of the 1960s. In 1996, Axel Honneth, arguably the last figure of the Frankfurt School, succeeded Habermas in his chair in Frankfurt. With his 1986 *Struggle for Recognition*, the School returned to direct engagement with Hegelian themes. With its close engagement with the practical and theoretical philosophy of Hegel and Kant, the existence of the Frankfurt School guaranteed the continued importance of German Idealism throughout the twentieth-century German-speaking world and beyond.

III. France: from existentialism to post-modernism

Existentialism and twentieth-century Marxism

Existentialism, as a movement committed to radical human freedom rather than the positive freedom espoused by classical German philosophy, does not initially seem as if it ought to have been affected by, much less be part of, the legacy of German idealism. Certainly Heidegger, an early existentialist by most definitions, was critical of Kant and Hegel in particular, mainly for the reason we have discussed: that he wanted to avoid metaphysics and metaphysical commitment. However, in Heidegger's writings on Kant, and in the last part of *Being and Time I* when he criticises Hegel's account of the experience of time, one receives the distinct impression that Heidegger is criticising one of his ancestors, someone from within the same tradition who shares some goals and methods, rather than someone with a totally alien approach. Heidegger's detailed concept of *Mitsein* cannot escape the legacy of Fichte and Hegel and when in the 1930s French philosophers began to draw on Heidegger, they began to draw on Fichte and Hegel too.

The story of the French twentieth-century reception of Hegel is a particularly instructive one, because it shows how a particular geographically – and, to a certain extent, ideologically – defined intellectual group can have its response to a particular thinker profoundly shaped by one translation and interpretation. (There is here an interesting parallel with the role of Coleridge and Carlyle in the nineteenth-century Anglo-American reception of Idealism.) Jean Hyppolite's lectures on the *Phenomenology* and Kojève's Marxist-influenced *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* shaped French responses, most importantly those of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, to Hegel, who at that particular time and place was the primary representative of German Idealist thought. Beauvoir's reading of Hegel initiated a series of feminist responses to Hegel that have continued, on the European continent, in Britain and the US, through different waves of feminism right up to the present day. Sartre's response to Hegel's social philosophy has been equally influential, inspiring discussions of the extent to which recognition can be a positive ethical principle. Although Sartre considered that it could not, and that the German Idealists were guilty of a kind of ontological optimism, many scholars working later have taken a different view and have pursued this line of enquiry.

The existentialist insight that existence precedes essence seems to work directly against the view of the human subject as self-conscious, for what

would constitute such a self if there are no fixed characteristics – even, for example, rational autonomy? The radical freedom – negative in the sense of Isaiah Berlin's 1958 lecture[6] – envisaged by the existentialist is directly at odds with the far more positive sense of freedom envisaged by Hegel and Fichte in particular. The existentialist rejects, as the route to non-self-fulfilment, the permanent bad faith of believing oneself condemned to perform a particular role; whereas for Hegel this rejection itself is a failure of development of self-consciousness, through failed recognition, for example. For the German Idealists, it is generally necessary to be in a community, even a Kantian community of otherwise undefined autonomous rational legislators, in order to be a fully functioning human subject. For many versions of existentialism, the opposite is true. Nevertheless, the existentialists' fascination with German Idealism is ever-present, and Sartre, Goldmann and Althusser return again and again to argue with Kant, Hegel and Marx.

Post-structuralism and post-modernism

Beginning in France, and quickly attracting much attention in the rest of Europe and beyond, post-modernism once more demonstrates the varying ways in which German Idealism continued to influence philosophy and social thought. Whilst 'post-modernism' is an exceptionally broad term – perhaps so broad as to lack any substantive meaning – what binds those thinkers who are seen as post-modern together is a scepticism about exhaustive and comprehensive theories, and the employment in their place of critical strategies and rhetorical practices. There is thus a clear link with phenomenology, and indeed post-structuralism – a close cousin of post-modernism, if not a kind of post-modernism itself – has been described as 'post-phenomenology'.[7] In one sense, it is possible to see post-modernism, and certainly post-structuralism, whose main concern is to overcome false dichotomies, as inheriting the aim of German Idealism to overcome false separations between subject and object. Alongside feminist thought, post-modernism and post-structuralism combine theoretical philosophy (of sorts, since they are generally suspicious of traditional epistemology and particularly ontology) with practical, often political concerns.

The term 'post-modernism' was not coined until 1979,[8] but the roots of the development clearly go much further back than this, at least to Heidegger, Lévinas and Wittgenstein. The key impulse for the development of post-modernism(s) is the rejection of metaphysics and the linguistic turn, two mid twentieth-century impulses which take place in continental Europe (and in

Britain, in the case of Wittgenstein) but the ripples of which are felt strongly enough across the Atlantic and elsewhere, and not just in philosophy, but also in theology and literary theory, so that post-modernism might be called a truly international and interdisciplinary movement.

The two most influential figures associated with post-modernism and post-structuralism, Foucault and Derrida, engaged particularly closely with two of the main figures of German Idealism, Kant and Hegel respectively. In the case of Foucault, this engagement came very early in his career, when he produced, as the second part of his doctoral process, a critical edition and translation of Kant's *Anthropology*. His reading of Hegel through the Marxist lens of Hyppolite and Kojève began in his days at the École normale supérieure. Later in his career, Foucault was heavily critical of Kant's Enlightenment project, with his essay, bearing the same name as Kant's original, published on the 200th anniversary of the publication of *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* Whilst he inverts much of Kant's reasoning, however, he remains convinced that the basic 'Sapere aude!' slogan is valid. Like many other post-modernists, Foucault aims, in some way, to reject the philosophy of the subject, and to move away from the concentration on consciousness. His own interest in Marxism, and his political commitments, come strongly into play here. Foucault wishes to dissolve the link, made by German Idealism and carried on strongly through Marxism, between self-consciousness (and a certain sort of self-knowledge) and freedom and, as Peter Dews puts it, 'to deny that there remains any progressive political potential in the ideal of the autonomous subject'.[9] Again, practical philosophy is leading theoretical philosophy, but here against the grain of German Idealism. In *The Order of Things* Foucault also engages critically with Fichte's work, which he sees as a possible way out of the confusion between the empirical and the transcendental he perceives in Kant. Once more, a philosophical movement – if post-modernism can be called that – defines itself in relation to the great thinkers of German Idealism.

Hegel's influence on that other great figure of post-modern thought, Jacques Derrida, can hardly be overstated. He studied Hegel with Jean Hyppolite and, although he never completed his thesis (provisionally entitled 'The Ideality of the Literary Object'), Hegel remained a strong influence on him for the whole of his career. This reaches its peak in his 1974 *Glas*, which presents a reading of Hegel alongside one of Jean Genet. Derrida, like many of his French counterparts, is keen to undermine the philosophy of the self-knowing subject, which is at the heart of German Idealism. Hegel, according to Derrida, by means of the sublation stage of the dialectic, transforms everything into Heideggerian *Vorhandenheit* and identifies the

subject with the world. Genuine otherness is therefore, to return to a familiar objection to Hegelian ontology, impossible. The impossibility of difference (or *différance*) in Hegel is also at the root of the critique of Deleuze, who none the less remains affiliated to the Idealist tradition through his creative use of Bergson.

Post-modernism as a reaction to German Idealism has also been, and continues to be, an important strand in theology. Post-modern theology, like its philosophical counterpart and the philosophical forerunners of that counterpart, aims at the overthrowing of metaphysics. Perhaps even more so than post-modern philosophy, post-modern theology is an anti-Enlightenment phenomenon. It takes issue with the idea that reason is the way to enlightenment, and that individuals are autonomous and separable from their social and historical contexts. A decisive move in post-modern theology was taken in the 1990s by John Milbank, who saw theology as conceding too much ground to transcendental philosophy, and Kantian metaphysics in particular, and seeks to revive traditional doctrines in the face of perceived ontological aggression by the secular sciences.

IV. Anglo-America: from McTaggart to McDowell

Neo-Hegelianism

The very beginning of the twentieth century in the English-speaking world saw the latter generation of neo-Hegelians, most notably J. M. E. McTaggart, reinterpreting Hegel's views for a new century. Their version of Idealism was strongly monist, that is, they believed that apparently discrete objects in fact formed part of one overarching subject. McTaggart's most important contribution to the legacy of German Idealism was his 1908 'The Unreality of Time', in which he argues that our traditional notion of time is incoherent and that time is therefore an illusion.[10] He introduces the A and B series of time – the A series, which McTaggart states is contradictory, being our everyday ideas of past, present and future, and the B series ordering moments in time from earlier to later. These terms and concepts continued to be used in the philosophy of time for many decades, and are still sometimes used as a basis for argument today.

As part of what might be termed this third generation of British Idealists, R. G. Collingwood proposed a reform, rather than a rejection, of metaphysics, moving it from ontology to an enquiry about the conditions which would enable us to cognise reality.[11] Although he rejected the Idealist label, perhaps as a way of distancing himself from the epistemological

realism of F. H. Bradley, Collingwood was carrying on the Idealist project in his own direction and the transcendental argument concerning conditions of possibility is recognisable from post-Kantian Idealism. With Collingwood Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford until 1941 – when the chair passed to Gilbert Ryle, who was a key figure in ordinary language philosophy – British Idealism remained an important strand of thought. By then, British Idealism had already for decades been divided into Absolute Idealists (Bradley and Bosanquet, in particular) and Personal Idealists, who rejected what they saw as a theological focus in Idealist monism which threatened to subsume man into God. This criticism foreshadows one made much later, by Michael Theunissen in 1991.[12] Amongst the Personal Idealists, one might count Andrew Pringle-Pattison, Hastings Rashdall, C. C. J. Webb, Josiah Royce and McTaggart.

The analytic turn

G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell are said to have spearheaded the revolt against Idealism, and indeed their work precipitated a fundamental shift in the philosophy of the English-speaking world. Whilst they might in fact have owed more to German Idealism than they would acknowledge, Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' (1903) and Russell's 'On Denoting' (1905) were seen to strike a blow at the heart of the German Idealist project and its prospects for continuation, casting Idealist theories in the role of weird and wonderful, ultimately pointless 'metaphysics', freeing philosophy from its Idealist shackles and leaving those rebelling feeling 'as if . . . escaped from a hot house onto a windswept headland'.[13] Moore and Russell defended, against the prevailing Idealism, a thoroughgoing common-sense realism, rejecting metaphysical 'systems' and expressing discussion of reality in terms of meanings and propositions. Moore argued in 1925 for common-sense propositions, and a common-sense view of the world, which he sees as built into our ordinary language.[14] The philosopher's task is not to call these common-sense propositions into question with the help of some metaphysical system, but to analyse them. Thus, the term 'analytical philosophy' was born.

It is a further question, of course, whether common-sense propositions derive directly from the 'real' in some way, or ideal, and precisely how Moore's argument about common-sense propositions might relate to a discussion of the *a priori* (with which he concerns himself in his 1898 dissertation). Russell's original extreme realism was softened after his *Principles of Mathematics* and by the time 'On Denoting' appeared he no longer claimed that denoting phrases had to pick out something in the real world.

Later in Russell's career, around 1913, he developed a new type of monism, neutral monism, which posits the existence of a single substance which is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical. This is elucidated most clearly in his *Theory of Knowledge*.[15]

It is certainly a wild over-simplification to claim that Idealist philosophy and its Continental successors are concerned with the meaning of being whereas their analytical counterparts from Moore and Russell onwards are concerned with the meaning of meaning. With his neutral monism, Russell shows that he is interested in the nature of the physical and the mental, just as Idealists were and are. Moore, in his seminal *Principia Ethica*, brings his linguistic philosophy to bear on the meaning of goodness, and demonstrates that the new analytical philosophy was interested in practical philosophy in much the same way as the German Idealists. The basic philosophical questions have not changed, and early analytical philosophy, like so much else in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, can be defined as a reaction to, but not destruction of, Idealist principles and methods.

Communitarianism

In the sphere of political thought, the most prominent representative, in the latter half of the twentieth century, of ideas inspired by German Idealism has been Charles Taylor, whose 1989 work *Sources of the Self* returned strongly to Idealist themes such as selfhood, the source of the good, freedom and embeddedness in nature. As such, it was a significant contribution to the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century debate about transcendentalism and naturalism, two opposing forces which held the main figures of German Idealism in their sway, even if they tended much more towards the transcendental position. On the one hand, the transcendentalist argues for a non-naturalistic understanding of the world and a focus on a human *transcendens*, with experience being a cognitive phenomenon, whereas naturalism on the other hand sees human experience simply as the human subject's interaction with the natural world, with theory and practice being extensionally the same. Taylor's aim in *Sources of the Self* is to look for the sources of our identity, a task which involves looking for a first cause of phenomena like freedom. As such, although it does not directly talk about German Idealist philosophers in detail, the work opens up the debate about transcendentalism and naturalism which goes on to shape discussion about German Idealism, and rival historical movements such as empiricism, and their relation to current philosophy and political thought.

This debate was preceded, in the late twentieth century, by that between liberalism and communitarianism, in which Taylor was also a major figure. One version of the story casts the liberal, Kant-inspired (perhaps neo-neo-Kantian) John Rawls against the communitarian, Hegel-inspired (perhaps neo-neo-Hegelian) Taylor. Communitarianism developed as a reaction to the liberalism of the 1970s and 1980s in particular, which it saw as presenting human individuals as atomised and unrelated to other individuals. This mirrors the claim that Kantian ethics in particular do not take proper account of the complexity of human individuals, presenting them instead with a simple, contentless calculus with which to make ethical decisions. This criticism might be thought to extend to Kantian theoretical philosophy as well, which, on one level, sees humans as autonomous reasoners without any other substantial sources of value. Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1971) develops a procedural account of justice which involves deliberation and decision-making by de-personalised individuals between the 'veil of ignorance', that is, taken completely out of their position in society and stripped of their personal characteristics. In this way, Rawls's methodology is deeply neo-Kantian. Taylor and his communitarian counterparts, amongst them the Hegel-inspired Alasdair MacIntyre, argue *contra* Rawls that beliefs and values are formed and developed in the community, which cannot be taken as a mere collection of atomistic individuals. Taylor's communitarian views reflect Hegel's account of civil society. There is an extent to which Rawlsian liberalism is, contrary to the US usage of the term, seen as providing a foundation for a centre-right, small-state politics, whereas communitarianism is seen to correspond to the left of the political spectrum, with more substantial state involvement in society. Equally, liberalism of this kind can, on a simplified view, be seen as shoring up a negative view of freedom as opposed to the positive view expounded by communitarianism. Thus, German Idealist influences pervade a key modern debate in practical and theoretical philosophy, as well as live political concerns along the main Western axis of political thought.

John McDowell, in his *Mind and World* of 1994, started off a line of argument that proposes a third way between transcendentalism and naturalism – a way which is termed 're-enchanted nature'. This continuation of the metaphysics of the subject argues for the existence of objective values, but not ones that are 'in' the world – rather, they emerged in a shared way and as a result of our responses to the world. This might give a theoretical basis to some forms of communitarian thought, and reaches back to a Hegelian account of community, a Husserlian account of the intersubjective constitution of reality, and perhaps a Kantian metaphysics.

v. International feminism

German Idealism's relationship with politics and epistemology (and the political corollaries of epistemology) is seen particularly well in the case of feminist thought. Much feminist reaction to, and appropriation of, concepts and ideas from German Idealism centres around reinterpretations of Kant's original Copernican insight. The legacy of German Idealism for feminist thought has generally been conditioned by movements from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries whose particular consequences for feminist thought have driven the discussion further in ways which go beyond feminism itself. Moving the human subject into the foreground, as German Idealism does, and imbuing it with the ability to construct its own reality, as reactions to German Idealism such as Husserlian phenomenology and existentialism did, has naturally ignited a whole range of discussions around objectification, alienation, autonomy and freedom. These discussions do not limit themselves to the strictly philosophical realm, but also involve areas of central concern to political thought and the philosophy of religion. As well as traditional areas of practical philosophy, and their even more practical counterparts, feminist philosophy and thought in general has been concerned with the epistemological and ontological insights of German Idealism. More than many other disciplines (or, perhaps more accurately, cross-disciplinary fields), feminist thought has displayed a strong cross-fertilisation between practical and theoretical elements. Indeed, this is often a source of criticism and sceptical approaches to feminism. How can the language we use, our grammar, our concepts of how knowledge works and the underlying structure of our world be responsible for concrete injustices in our current society? Equally, how is it possible or permissible for philosophers and other theorists to use perceived concrete injustices as reasons to make particular arguments at the most theoretical level? German Idealism, particularly Kant's later work, such as the third Critique and *On Perpetual Peace*, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (but also the *Phenomenology*), and Fichte's work in general, also transcends the distinction between practical and theoretical philosophy, made explicitly particularly in contemporary Continental scholarship, but also observed in the Anglo-American world. In transcending the subject–object dichotomy, German Idealism, and those movements strongly influenced by it, cannot but alter the shape of the society in which its proponents live, or must at least attempt to do so. For feminist thought, of course, the practical impulse might be prior to the theoretical commitment, but nevertheless the same applies.

The best-known feminist engagement with German Idealist thought came in the 1940s, with Simone de Beauvoir's appropriation of the master–slave dialectic.[16] Influenced by, and influencing, Sartre's existentialist discussion of Hegel, Beauvoir's psychological reconstruction of the master–slave dialectic casts the woman in the putative role of slave, although in fact she considers that women are refused even the most basic pre-recognition that would allow them to enter into the master–slave dialectic, which ultimately leads Spirit on its journey to self-consciousness. Women are merely objectified by men, and are not even allowed to assume the role of the slave. More generally, recognition studies based on the work of Hegel (and, to a lesser extent, of Fichte) have focused on recognition as a potential positive concept in practical philosophy, with failure to recognise seen as a potential aggressive and discriminatory act. This has also featured in discussions in the philosophy of race, and in disability studies. Beauvoir's work has influenced much feminist analysis in the latter part of the twentieth century, most notably the work of Judith Butler, whose discussion of the social self focuses closely on Hegel's concept of self-consciousness.[17] Beauvoir's influence, and an engagement with various aspects of Hegel's thought which goes far beyond his dialectic of self-consciousness and the master–slave relationship, have been prominent on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Continental and Anglo-American worlds. Julia Kristeva, for example, engages with Hegel's work on a strongly methodological level, taking his dialectical method, reinterpreting it and supplanting it with her own, which has strong links to psychoanalysis and concepts of the embodied self.[18] Her concerns recall a general feeling within feminist philosophy, both analytical and Continental, that the traditional philosophical canon which grounds many of their subject's assumptions (empiricism and realism for analytical philosophy, Idealism for Continental philosophy), and the twentieth-century successors of those respective traditions (logical positivism, anti-realism and naturalism for the analytical world, phenomenology, existentialism and post-modernism for the Continental world) all pay insufficient attention to the body, and the extent to which our own particular, situated, embodied experience shapes our relation to the world and to others. Of course, feminism is not the only field in which such concerns are raised, and the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is generally accepted to constitute an exception to the rule. Nevertheless, whilst in analytical circles cognitive scientists, neuroscientists and philosophers work together in a range of projects on the details of embodied experience, in more traditionally Continental fields it is those involved with feminist thought who are most obviously

attentive to bodily experience as a framework for, or central feature of, conscious experience.

This concern with bodily experience is often combined with a commitment to anti-foundationalism which, for its adherents, makes Idealism a particularly attractive alternative, when compared with empiricism, as a starting point for modern philosophy. In Hegel scholarship, this is an extremely current issue, with feminist thinkers such as Catherine Malabou considering how Hegel's substance and subject demonstrate what she calls 'plasticity', that is, a capacity both to receive form and to give form to its own content.[19] Whilst anti-foundationalism has a particular appeal for those who oppose traditional dichotomies, as well as those who feel that traditional metaphysics takes insufficient account of gender difference, it is argued for (and, of course, has arguments made against it, for example, by Edward Said[20]) by a wide variety of people, for a whole range of what are very often explicitly practical reasons. Amongst the German Idealists, Hegel is of course the most obvious thinker around whom an anti-foundationalist account can be constructed, but he is not the only one. The important neo-Kantian scholar Wilfred Sellars was a critic of foundationalist empiricism, a position which drew him into an engagement with German Idealism in general – arguably, the same might be said of Robert Brandom.[21] Thus, we see an intersection between Continental feminist philosophy and traditional analytical epistemology, albeit with both lines of enquiry motivated by rather different considerations.

Similar epistemological and ontological concerns shape the reaction to German Idealism in recent feminist philosophy of religion. Here, again, Hegel is the key figure, although some of what interests scholars in this field also applies to Schelling, and Kant also featured prominently in the work of Pamela Anderson.[22] Much work in this field aims at a synthesis of a Kantian preoccupation with moral Enlightenment ideals and self-regulative reason (and a move away from a desire for the certainty of an empirically existing divine being) with a Hegelian-inspired proposal that desire itself be taken seriously as an epistemological phenomenon. The aim in this discussion is to balance the importance of emotion and religious experience, including shared religious experience, with a concept of rational autonomy that might be seen as protecting against traditionally gender-linked concepts of religious duties and virtues. It is therefore unsurprising that German Idealism, which provides both of these elements, is particularly fertile ground for feminist philosophers of religion.

Of particular importance in the Anglo-American world for feminist thought are Kantian injunctions against objectification. The most

important twentieth-century American feminists – Catherine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Sally Haslanger and Martha Nussbaum – have all written about the potential safeguards offered by this formulation of the Categorical Imperative in the context of sexual and general societal objectification of women, and about the gender-equalising effect of the Kantian kingdom of ends.[23] Another important Anglo-American strand of German Idealism's influence on feminist thought is directly linked to Richard Rorty's concept of irony, which is a radical and practically oriented anti-foundationalist concept outlined in detail in his *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*.[24] Seyla Benhabib considers this philosophical approach, which makes use of the idea of a 'final vocabulary' of beliefs which the individual considers to be non-contingent, to be particularly important for societal change.[25] Underlying Rorty's pragmatic analysis, which combines elements of practical and theoretical philosophy, are the Hegelian concepts of the concrete and the universal.

German Idealists' practical philosophy itself is a key area of concern for feminist thinkers in both Europe and North America, and has been so throughout the period of feminist concern with German Idealism. If it is true that German Idealism is the first philosophical movement to allow us to account properly for social relationships, it seems quite natural that it should be the question of marriage that has most exercised feminist philosophers in their reading of Hegel and Kant in particular. Criticism of Hegel and Kant for, respectively, claiming that the wife disappears into her husband's self-consciousness, and that marriage is simply a contract for reproduction, has been as forceful as rehabilitative interpretations that see either Kant or Hegel as unwittingly building a basis for a positive feminism and, in particular, a feminist account of marriage. Luce Irigaray's reading of Hegel's discussion of the ethical life makes a case for a positive ethical account of the couple, with this unit as a positive ethical model.[26] Sex difference would then, she argues, be included at the very source of ethics and of life. Equally, Kant's conception of marriage as a contract, rather than a contract to transcend the point of contract, along with the attendant safeguards of rational autonomy and treatment as an end and not merely a means, has been seen by feminists as a way of protecting against the gender asymmetry in marital, and perhaps other, relationships. The question of freedom in general remains thorny in the context of feminism's relationship with German Idealism, with feminist thinkers in turn attracted and repelled by the concepts of being free only in the other, and of being fully autonomous in the Kantian sense. The fascination continues, with German Idealism being more central to feminist discussions than ever.

Notes

1. Giovanni Gentile, *Theory of the Mind as Pure Act* (London: Macmillan, 1922; Italian original, 1903).
2. Georg W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Kritische Ausgabe / Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie: Orientalische Philosophie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), 96 (B375).
3. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
4. Paul Sheehan, 'Postmodernism and philosophy', in S. Connor (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 20–42.
5. Michael N. Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 208.
6. I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty: an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
7. C. Davis, *Levinas: an introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 8.
8. J. F. Lyotard, *La Condition Postmoderne* (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1979).
9. P. Dews, 'Power and subjectivity in Foucault', *New Left Review* 144 (1984), 148–52, at 149.
10. J. E. McTaggart, 'The unreality of time', *Mind* 17 (1908), 457–74.
11. G. Robin, *Collingwood: an essay on metaphysics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940).
12. M. Theunissen, 'The repressed intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right', *Hegel and Legal Theory*, ed. D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (London: Routledge, 1991), 3–63.
13. B. Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1995).
14. G. E. Moore, *A Defence of Common Sense* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1925) .
15. B. Russell, *Theory of Knowledge: the 1913 manuscript* (London: Routledge, 1992).
16. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
17. J. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).
18. J. Kristeva, 'Negativity: Rejection', *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, ed. Dennis King Keenan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 327.
19. Cf. C. Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: plasticity, temporality and dialectic*, trans. Lisabeth During (New York and London: Routledge, 2005); C. Malabou, *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: dialectic, destruction, deconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
20. E. W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
21. R. B. Brandom, *Between Saying and Doing: towards an analytic pragmatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
22. P. S. Anderson, 'Life, death and (inter) subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 60 (2006), 41–59.
23. For a full account of these discussions, see E. L. Papadaki, 'Sexual objectification: from Kant to contemporary Feminism', *Contemporary Political Theory* 6 (2007), 330–48.
24. R. Rorty, *Irony, Contingency and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
25. Seyla Benhabib, 'On Hegel, women and irony', in P. J. Mills, *Feminist Interpretations of GWF Hegel* (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1996), 25–44.
26. L. Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Introduction: Idealism in the natural sciences and philosophy

Karl Ameriks

The very nature of German Idealism militates against sharply separating the many different fields in which it has had an immense impact.[1] For obvious practical reasons, however, the essays in this volume on philosophy restrict themselves as much as is feasible to relatively pure and foundational issues, and so they refrain from directly engaging the more concrete social, aesthetic and religious topics that are treated in the other volumes of *The Impact of Idealism*. In addition, the essays that focus on science restrict themselves to the legacy of Idealist philosophy in a few of the most significant developments of recent centuries, and they do not attempt to review all the sciences in which Idealism has been influential. Each of the essays shows how a core philosophical notion is illuminated by a number of different writers, and typically in a way that reveals how the basic ideas of some important recent discussions can be understood as a reaction to a sequence of thought that goes back to more than one of the original Idealists.

Science and Idealism

In his review of developments in the mathematical and physical sciences Michael Friedman reconstructs the twists and turns by which Kant's notion of an *a priori* framework of constitutive and regulative principles led to Hermann Cohen's and Ernst Cassirer's neo-Kantian model of science as a 'converging sequence of conceptual structures' aimed at the construction of a 'universal invariant theory of experience'. A major step in this development was Hermann von Helmholtz's call to return to the spirit of Kant's work by moving beyond the letter of a merely Euclidian and Newtonian conception of space and physical objects and towards a broader theory of the universal

forces of attraction and repulsion. Friedman argues that this step was anticipated by Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, which played an important catalytic role in early nineteenth-century science by indicating how the notion of opposing fundamental forces could be fruitfully expanded to the domain of electro-chemistry.[2]

With regard to Idealism's impact on biology, Robert Richards uses convincing pictures as well as words to show how the inspiration for many of the key ideas in the development of evolutionary theory, such as the notion of an archetype, goes back to Goethe's scientific work in morphology and his appreciation of Kant's and Schelling's discussions of the purposive form of organic phenomena.[3] Richards argues that the notion of purposive form was central in the considerable impact of Schelling and Gustav Carus on the anatomist Richard Owen, and then of Alexander von Humboldt and William Whewell – who were both directly influenced by Goethe and the Idealists – on Charles Darwin. The notion of purpose was excised, however, in Ernst Haeckel's late nineteenth-century philosophy of life, which was largely responsible for the growing popularity of a more mechanistic conception of evolution.[4]

A similar genealogy, with competing Idealist and broadly mechanistic strands, can be provided for the new nineteenth-century 'science' of depth psychology. As Sebastian Gardner demonstrates, its central notion of the unconscious is hardly the autonomous invention of Sigmund Freud, for its roots can be traced to the Romantics, Carus, Eduard von Hartmann and many others, all the way back to Schopenhauer, Schelling, Maimon and Fichte.[5] Gardner also assesses the post-Freudian reaction to the notion of the unconscious in the work of philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernst Tugendhat, Odo Marquard and the psychoanalyst Hans Loewald.[6] An instructive common feature of these three essays on philosophy of science and Idealism is that, from the start, they all reject the unfortunate stereotype, still prominent in many circles, of German Idealism as an essentially subjectivistic or anti-scientific philosophy.

Christian Emden's discussion of Nietzsche's views on teleology shows that Nietzsche's stance on this issue precedes his study of Darwin and goes back to an early sympathy with Kant's position. For Kantians, in contrast to nineteenth-century followers of the tradition of *Naturphilosophie*, the teleological structure of life is at most a regulative feature that our understanding brings to the world rather than something that can be scientifically or philosophically demonstrated. Nietzsche 'naturalises' Kant by drawing attention to how our teleological judgements about the world issue from our own

'biological organisation' and a general tendency to project causes to satisfy our needs. Like Kant, however, Nietzsche concludes that we also cannot understand ourselves in merely mechanical or accidental terms; our 'path dependent development' provides an 'accumulated treasure' of value that our species cannot do without.

As a group, these essays do more than reveal extensive causal connections and substantive similarities between earlier Idealist philosophies and many later versions of naturalist scientific approaches. The sequence of these essays shows the pivotal role that Idealist thinkers played in what is sometimes regarded as the multi-stage Copernican humiliation of humanity in modernity, namely, its self-taught lesson that cosmologically, biologically and psychologically our species, just like the individual human being, is neither at the centre of nature nor in control of its fate.

Idealism on the Continent

A more purely philosophical approach to the status of the human mind is explored in essays by Robert Hanna, Daniel Dahlstrom and Gary Gutting, which can be characterised as focusing, in chronological order, on more and more radical versions of Continental Idealism's development of the notion of phenomenology. Hanna discusses the Kantian roots and contemporary significance of the concept of intentionality, which was first explored in detail in the late nineteenth-century work of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. The central notions of their work continue to be of international significance through their influence on Roderick Chisholm, Dagfinn Føllesdal and other major figures in logic, metaphysics and analytic philosophy of mind. None the less, for various reasons the approach of these original phenomenologists does not dominate many of the better-known strands of thought concerned with Idealism. In part this is due to the fact that most of their work has a very abstract character and was published almost a century later than that of the original Idealists. Moreover, Brentano and Husserl were somewhat on the fringe of mainstream German philosophy.[7] Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a wide-scale acceptance of phenomenology, however, has been the presumption, in many quarters, that its central 'descriptive' focus on an ideal realm of meaning, in contrast to explanations in terms of physical causation, makes it fundamentally subjectivistic, even though the original phenomenologists insisted that this realm concerns 'the things themselves' and cannot be reduced to the psychological contents of a mere sequence of private sensations. Hanna's essay goes along with this presumption to some extent, but

he argues that there is in any case a clearly objective and promising version of Idealism that phenomenology could have developed out of the resources of Kant's transcendental philosophy.[8]

The ambiguities of the notion of 'idealism' are also central in Daniel Dahlstrom's account of the development of Heidegger's thought. The first part of Heidegger's main work, *Being and Time* (1927), is presented as a tracing out of the 'hermeneutical-phenomenological' structures of our experience, the realm of what Heidegger calls 'Dasein'. In so far as these structures are taken to be temporal, basic and *a priori*, their defining concepts are in many ways like the schematised categories of Kant's transcendental philosophy. In so far as the tracing of these structures involves a phenomenological method, Heidegger's book also exhibits indebtedness to Husserl's focus on intentionality – although from the start Heidegger understands 'intentionality' in a much more practical and historical sense than is explicit in Kant or Husserl. A special feature of Dahlstrom's essay is its use of material from Heidegger's later phase that has only recently been made available and that documents Heidegger's radical turn away not only from all forms of idealism but also the Western metaphysical tradition in general. That tradition, ever since Plato's stress on the notion of 'eidos' (or 'idea'), allegedly leads to a basic orientation on the representational capacity of human beings and a reductive interest in focusing on entities that are exhausted by what can be made 'present'.

Gary Gutting's essay explores the influence of the notion of phenomenology in the French response to the German tradition. He focuses on the impact, on the later twentieth-century philosophers Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, of the contrasting interpretations of Hegel offered by Jean Wahl (1929) and Jean Hyppolite (1946). These interpretations bring out the fact that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is more than a static analysis of features of perception; it is a dynamic uncovering of all the main stages in the dialectical development of human rationality and society. Each interpreter tends to highlight a different aspect of the conflicts inherent in this dialectic. Wahl stressed the religious phenomenon of alienation as treated in the *Phenomenology*'s section on 'unhappy consciousness', but by 1933 the Paris lectures of Alexandre Kojève and the newly uncovered writings of the early Marx led to a concentration on Hegel's notion of the master/slave conflict and the historical struggle for mutual recognition. Whereas all these discussions focused on the 'existential' and incomplete nature of our finite consciousness, Hyppolite's second major study, *Logic and Existence* (1953), pointed out the significance of Hegel's treatment of language and logic, and his commitment to a final phase described as 'absolute knowledge'. Rather

than trying to resolve the tension between the existentialist and rationalist legacy of Idealism, Hyppolite's successors, Foucault and Deleuze, each in their own fashion, productively combined an interest in both subjectivity and system – albeit in ways that moved them further and further from the pure methods and grand narratives of the phenomenological tradition and towards concrete studies of historical institutions, with a focus on 'contingent causal relations, not ideal rational connections'.

Idealism in Great Britain

The philosophical impact of Idealism in Scotland and England is explored in essays by David Fergusson, Robert Stern and Peter Hylton. Fergusson primarily reviews the period from the 1850s to the 1920s in Scotland; Stern assesses what is perhaps the most vibrant legacy of Idealism in England, namely, the contrasting late nineteenth-century practical philosophies of Thomas Hill Green and Francis Bradley; and Hylton argues that, whereas in Germany the origins of analytic philosophy lie in work by Frege and his followers (a group that eventually included Carnap and others heavily influenced by neo-Kantianism) that reacted to Kant and was only in part critical of him, in England its origins lie in theoretical arguments by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore that were meant as a total rejection of idealism in general, and of what they took to be the especially pernicious holism of Bradley's Idealism in particular.

David Fergusson's richly detailed account shows that although in Scotland Hegel's central notion of an all-inclusive system met with considerable resistance in the early nineteenth century, after the mid century there was a dramatic increase in the number of translations and followers of Idealism. Although for a long time Idealism was opposed because it was regarded as a threat to religious orthodoxy, many later writers began to turn to its notion of spirit as a prime resource for protecting the cultural interests of humanity by combating the rise of materialism. In addition, the Idealist movement was strengthened by a tradition of close ties between Glasgow and Oxford, and the promotion of Scottish Idealists such as William Wallace and J. B. Baillie to prominent positions in England. Edward Caird, Henry Jones and Edward's brother, John, all argued influentially for Idealism as a holistic philosophy with spiritual qualities that could do justice to religion – although in many ways the metaphysics of their Idealism appears to resemble Spinozism more than Presbyterianism. Later, the work of figures such as A. S. Pringle-Pattison and Norman Kemp Smith was typical of a growing strand

of thought in Scotland that was more concerned with Kant than Hegel and put an anti-holistic stress on the independence of individual persons.

The tension between Kantian and Hegelian forms of Idealism is also discussed by Robert Stern, who offers a systematic reconstruction of the different accounts of the fundamental notion of obligation in the practical philosophies of Green and Bradley.[9] Stern argues that, contrary to common interpretations, these philosophers do not account for obligation simply in terms of our participating in a social role that constitutes our very identity as agents. It is true that Hegel subscribes to a version of what can be called a 'social command theory' (which has a wide variety of advocates in contemporary philosophy), but only in so far as it is understood that what grounds one's obligations is membership in a certain kind of group. Hegel stresses that this group must now be understood in terms of the institutions governed by a modern rational state, and hence moral obligation is not a matter of just whatever personal idiosyncrasy or peculiar social role a person might happen to identify with – for example, as a reactionary, terrorist or Mafioso. Stern points out that whereas Bradley can be understood as accepting a version of Hegel's account of obligation, Green has a quite different view, one closer to Kant's. Green departs somewhat from Kant by characterising morality in terms of the desirability of a particular kind of life, but this is something that he calls the 'absolute' desirability of the basic end of self-realisation, which is independent of any particular contingent desires. For Green, just as for Kant, we are 'hybrid' beings whose sensible and rational interests do not necessarily coincide, and so the absolute end of self-realisation always stands in contrast to 'other impulses' that we have. This explains why a moral command should strike us, as Kant says, as a 'categorical imperative', that is, as an obligation in principle independent of all particular sensible desires (even though in fact it might often lead to the same objects as those desires). Stern's account also reinforces a reading of Kant's moral theory that combines it with an objective account of value,[10] and thus it can provide a foundation for Idealist practical philosophy that is at least not vulnerable to common objections of subjectivism or relativism.

Peter Hylton's essay discloses how, perhaps surprisingly, it was not initially the allegedly troublesome relation of Idealism to natural science or practical life that caused its sudden decline in early twentieth-century philosophy but rather its incompatibility with some quite abstract although supposedly evident epistemological doctrines. This difficulty led to Idealism's ostensible 'refutation' by Moore and Russell in the Cambridge sea change at the end of the nineteenth century, and to Idealism's

philosophical eclipse until its remarkable renaissance in the later twentieth century. Hylton points out that in their 'very earliest work' (1897 and 1898), even Russell and Moore were still defending various Idealist doctrines. At first, their turn away from Idealism stressed objections to what they took to be its overly psychological approach – a somewhat peculiar tactic given that Bradley associated this approach with empiricism, and his *Logic* contains the famous remark, 'in England at all events we have lived too long in the psychological attitude'.[11] Failing to grant that any idealists allowed for a significant distinction between a mental act and its object, the Cambridge anti-idealists espoused the extreme opposite position of a Platonic Atomism. According to this position, knowledge is basically a matter of direct and passive acquaintance with a realm of separate objects entirely external to the mind. Moore at first takes these objects – 'the ordinary objects of the world' – to be complexes of concepts, that is, propositions or 'facts'. Russell offers a parallel treatment of logic: its knowledge consists in acquaintance with universals. Hylton's perspicacious account reveals how the manifold difficulties with this approach set much of the agenda for later analytic philosophy. In the end, one might claim that it was not so much the specific epistemological or metaphysical content of early analytic philosophy that made it so revolutionary and influential, but rather (as Wittgenstein remarked about Frege) something about it that is very difficult to explain but easy to recognise upon acquaintance, namely, an extraordinarily direct and step-by-step style of argumentation.

Idealism in the New World

The final two essays in this volume bring the philosophical story of Idealism's impact to a full circle. The German philosopher Dina Emundts explains the deep similarities and incidental differences in the relation of Hegel's Idealism to American Pragmatism, especially with respect to Charles Sanders Peirce's mid nineteenth-century system and its complex notion of experience as the definitive domain of meaning and justification. Robert Pippin focuses on Idealism's key notion of reason, which provides a 'form' for what is to be judged or done, and which is now at the centre of much contemporary philosophy, theoretical as well as practical, analytic as well as Continental. The prominence of this notion can best be understood in terms of a series of considerations that go back to what might be called the normative naturalism (or 'non-reductive materialism') of Wilfrid Sellars's influential mid twentieth-century writings – writings that, as Pippin's account reveals, have direct

connections with the common core of the doctrine of autonomy in Kant and Hegel and Idealism's general rejection of the 'myth of the given'.

Emundts begins by reviewing the underlying concern with concrete experience that can be found in the work of William James and John Dewey as well as that of their predecessor, Peirce. Peirce's relation to the Idealists, however, is the most direct one and worthy of the closest systematic attention, although it is complicated by Peirce's contention that Hegel has an overly 'intellectual' version of phenomenology. Supposedly, Hegel needs to be corrected by a new phenomenology that would leave a place for more elementary levels of pure feeling and reaction, something not captured as such by our concepts. Although it is true that a later discussion or attempted description of this level inevitably becomes involved with concepts and relations, Peirce stresses that this does not mean that the original experience is itself lived through in terms of concepts and relations. Emundts suggests that Peirce could have accepted even more of Hegel's system if he had seen that Hegel did not really mean to deny the existence of a 'pre-conceptual' level of experience, but simply had numerous reasons for stressing 'movements' within the realm of concepts. She also proposes that even Hegel's logic does not mean to reduce everything to concepts, but rather aims to criticise the very idea that one can make sense of a notion of pure concepts (or laws) that has nothing at all to do with experience or real things. In this and several other ways, Emundts argues very effectively that one could build an even closer relationship than the pragmatists themselves realised is possible between their own basic position – if only properly developed – and Hegel's Idealism.

Robert Pippin's essay is concerned with the fundamental and distinctive feature of human life as a matter of being 'responsive' to reasons in a way that cannot be accounted for simply in terms of physical inputs or imposed psychological likes and dislikes. Although he traces to Kant's three *Critiques* the first stress on a language of spontaneity or freedom throughout the spheres of our theoretical, practical and aesthetic experience, he notes that many readers have been perplexed by Kant's suggestion that this spontaneity is a matter of reason's 'imposition' of form. He points out, however, that Kant actually does not commit himself, either theoretically or practically, to an absurd notion of imposition in some kind of constantly active and psychological manner. Pippin finds an appropriate contemporary way to express Kant's point in Wilfrid Sellars's account of perceptual judgement as an apperceptive action that makes a 'claim' with a normative standing, and yet in such a way that it is not initially arrived at 'on purpose' – as those

who overly intellectualise experience might presume. Moreover, as John McDowell has noted, one can fill out Sellars's view by saying that human perceptions have a built-in 'openness to correction' (generated through the cultural acquisitions of our 'second nature') that puts them on a different level than even the best trained behaviour of less complex animals.[12] A similar model can be offered for what happens in the generally pre-reflective process called 'leading our lives in the proper sense'. Pippin focuses here on patiently laying out Kant's specific notion of the form of reason because it especially influenced Sellars and is relevant as the first Idealist model of this type. This model was expanded, however, in much fuller institutional and historical detail by later Idealist thinkers such as Hegel – a development that readers can follow elsewhere in the *Impact of Idealism* as well as in Pippin's numerous other writings.[13]

Notes

1. I use the capitalised term 'Idealism' as an abbreviation for German Idealism, understood broadly as a movement originating with Kant and taking definitive shape in the work of his immediate successors, Fichte, Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel. The non-capitalised term 'idealism' designates a broader tradition going back to Plato and includes such diverse modern systems as those of Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume, which have in common a non-materialist ontology that is based in subjectivity but lacks a doctrine of human autonomy.
2. Helmholtz was a philosopher-physicist who first taught in Königsberg and was critical of the post-Kantians, although his father was a friend of Fichte's son in Berlin. Cohen was Cassirer's teacher in Marburg and, like him, an expert not only in the exact sciences but also ethics, aesthetics and religion.
3. The considerable influence of Goethe's scientific work is also documented in Eckart Förster, *The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: a systematic reconstruction* (2011), trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).
4. Ernst Haeckel, a prolific professor of botany in Jena, was one of the most popular writers of his era as well as one of the many advocates then of a form of 'scientific' racism. Carus was a physician and anatomist in Dresden who not only was close to Goethe but also had studied painting under Caspar David Friedrich, and thus had a superb appreciation for purposive form in both nature and art.
5. Hartmann was a private scholar whose bestseller, *Philosophy of the Unconscious: speculative results according to the inductive method of the natural sciences* (1868), gained, like Haeckel's work, an enormous following outside academic philosophy.
6. Loewald was a French-born psychoanalyst who, like so many of Heidegger's brilliant Jewish students, eventually needed to flee west from Freiburg, and ended up, like Freud's daughter Anna, as a highly influential teacher in New Haven – he at Yale's medical school and she at the law school. Yale was also the first haven in the United States for Ernst

Cassirer, and he helped to make that university one of the major outposts of Idealism at the end of the twentieth century, somewhat as Harvard had been at the beginning.

7. Brentano was a controversial Catholic scholar who taught primarily in Vienna, where he had to give up not only his priesthood but also his professorship and citizenship when he decided to get married. Husserl studied under Brentano but at first worked primarily in mathematics. He had a Czech and Jewish background, which eventually left him abandoned by his most famous younger associate, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was never Husserl's student but had just started working as an assistant when, in 1916, Husserl, who was born in 1859, accepted a call to Freiburg that finally provided him with a regular full professorship.
8. For arguments concerning even stronger realist strands throughout the Idealist tradition, see my 'Husserl's Realism', *Philosophical Review* 86 (1977), 598–619; 'Introduction: interpreting German Idealism', in Karl Ameriks (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–17; *Kant's Elliptical Path* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012); 'History, Idealism, and Schelling', *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism* 10 (forthcoming).
9. Green was named Whyte's Professor in Moral Philosophy at Oxford in 1878 but died in 1882 at the age of forty-six. Bradley's main work in this area, *Ethical Studies*, was published in 1886.
10. On realism in Kant's ethics, see my *Interpreting Kant's Critiques* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), ch. 11.
11. F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic* (1883) (London: Oxford University Press, 1922, 2nd edn), vol. I, 2.
12. See McDowell, *Having the World in View: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009). McDowell's path from his early work as an Oxford scholar in ancient philosophy to his current position as a successor of Sellars in Pittsburgh is indicative of the spread of Idealism in recent years. Sellars came to Pittsburgh from Yale, where among his students were the pragmatists Richard J. Bernstein and Richard Rorty. Later, one of Rorty's students was Robert Brandom, a Sellarsian advocate of pragmatic Idealism who is also at Pittsburgh. See, e.g., his *Perspectives on Pragmatism: classical, recent, & contemporary* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989) was the son of the American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973), who had family roots in Canada and Glasgow and was a leading advocate of evolutionary naturalism.
13. See, e.g., Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian variations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and *Hegel on Self-Consciousness: desire and death in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

1

Philosophy of natural science in Idealism and neo-Kantianism

MICHAEL FRIEDMAN

The project of transcendental philosophy, as originally conceived by Kant, essentially involved an explanation of how purely intellectual concepts can necessarily apply to our (human) sense experience of the natural world. Kant's project also involved an explanation of how pure mathematical concepts can necessarily apply to this same experience, where such an explanation is conceived in a distinctive way. The pure intellect, for Kant, is modelled on the Leibnizian conception of logic, whereas the faculty of pure sensibility is modelled on the Newtonian conception of space and time. Mathematics then necessarily applies to our sense experience in so far as the pure forms of our sensibility – space and time – are themselves the primary sources of pure mathematical knowledge. However, this does not yet show that all natural objects presented to us within these forms of sensibility are also necessarily subject to both pure mathematics and the pure concepts of the understanding; and it is precisely this, for Kant, which is shown in the Transcendental Deduction by demonstrating that there is a necessary harmony or interdependence between the pure intellect, on the one side, and both pure and empirical intuition, on the other.[1] It is only this necessary harmony between two initially independent faculties that fully explains how synthetic *a priori* knowledge is possible, for Kant, and, in particular, how mathematical natural science (Newtonian physics) is possible.

Yet a rejection of Kant's sharp separation of the faculties of the mind into understanding and sensibility is characteristic of post-Kantian German idealism – as well as of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism founded by Hermann Cohen and developed, especially, by Ernst Cassirer. This was part and parcel, as is well known, of a more general effort to overcome all of Kant's most fundamental dichotomies or 'dualisms', including the notorious dichotomy between phenomena and noumena. How this effort is implicated

in the ongoing attempts to revise Kant's philosophy of natural science in the light of the revolutionary new developments in the sciences themselves throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries is the main topic of this essay.

Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling and *Naturphilosophie*

Let us begin with the fundamental Kantian distinction between constitutive *a priori* principles of the faculty of understanding and merely regulative *a priori* principles of the faculty of reason. Regulative *a priori* principles of reason essentially involve purely intellectual representations – like those of God and the soul, for example – which can never be instantiated in our (human) experience of nature. By contrast, constitutive *a priori* principles of the understanding result from the application of purely intellectual representations – the categories – to our spatio-temporal sensibility and yield necessary conditions for all objects of experience; they are therefore necessarily instantiated in our (human) experience of nature. The pure concepts or categories of substance, causality and community, for example, are necessarily realised in our experience by a system of causally interacting conserved entities distributed in space and time – a system for which massive bodies interacting in accordance with Newtonian universal gravitation acting immediately at a distance provide Kant with his primary model. Indeed, one of the main points of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* is to explain how the general constitutive principles of experience of the first *Critique* are further specified or articulated to provide an *a priori* 'metaphysical' foundation for precisely this Newtonian model.

Yet Kant's general constitutive grounding of experience, even as extended into 'the special metaphysic of corporeal nature'[a] in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, leaves much of the natural world still unaccounted for. This work, as Kant himself emphasises, only provides *a priori* insight into the most general properties and powers of all matter in general and as such (properties such as mass, gravity, impenetrability and elasticity) and leaves even the property of cohesion for a physical and empirical rather than an *a priori* and metaphysical treatment.[2] Accordingly, Kant here assigns the problem of further specifying the general concept of matter as such into particular species and subspecies – the problem of what he calls 'the specific variety of matter'[b] in the General Remark to Dynamics – for the further

a. 'Besondere Metaphysik der körperlichen Natur.'
b. 'Specifischen Verschiedenheit der Materie.'

development of empirical physics and chemistry. Moreover, in the Preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations*, Kant famously denies scientific status to chemistry and asserts that, at least at present, 'chemistry can be nothing more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine, but never a proper science'.[c,3]

How, then, is the more empirical study of nature, such as chemistry, to proceed? It is here that Kant invokes the regulative use of reason and, in particular, the idea of the complete systematic unity of all empirical concepts and principles under the *a priori* constitutive concepts and principles already generated by the understanding. In particular, the idea of systematic unity guides our process of inquiry in the more empirical and inductive disciplines, without constitutively constraining it, as we successively ascend from lower-level empirical concepts and principles towards higher-level concepts and principles. The goal of this process is an ideal complete empirical science of nature in which all empirical concepts and principles are constitutively grounded in the pure categories and principles of the understanding – an ideal we can only successively approximate but never actually attain. Moreover, the paradigmatic application of the regulative use of reason, in the period of both the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the first *Critique*, is precisely to contemporary chemistry. Kant sees this chemistry – primarily Stahlian phlogistic chemistry as supplemented by the new discoveries in pneumatics but not yet including Lavoisier – as a purely empirical or experimental art guided by the regulative use of reason towards an entirely unspecified and indeterminate future state of affairs in which the experimental results in question are finally grounded in the fundamental forces of matter in a way we are not yet (and perhaps never will be) in a position to anticipate.[4]

Moreover, as is well known, Kant, in the *Critique of Judgement*, extends the doctrine of the regulative use of reason to what he now calls the faculty of reflective judgement, and he now applies this faculty, in particular, to the case of biology. The problem here, in a nutshell, is that all matter in general and as such – all matter as the object of our outer senses in space – is essentially lifeless. This, in fact, is how Kant interprets the law of inertia, which, in turn, is itself constitutively grounded by a further specification of the *a priori* principle of causality articulated in the first *Critique*.[5] Biology, the study of life, can therefore never be a science in the strict sense for Kant; it can never be constitutively grounded in the fundamental forces of matter. The best we can do, in this case, is to extend the doctrine of the regulative use of reason

c. 'Chemie nichts mehr als systematische Kunst oder Experimentallehre, niemals aber eigentliche Wissenschaft werden kann.' GS, iv, 471.

via the teleological idea of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) – an idea which already arises for reflective judgement in general as it guides our inductive ascent from particular to universal towards the ideal infinitely distant goal of a complete systematic unity of nature. And this idea can now be applied to particular objects of nature or 'natural products' (*natürliche Produkte*, i.e., living organisms) in so far as they are conceived, by reflective judgement, as themselves purposively organised. But such a mode of conception is in no way constitutive of these objects themselves; it is rather a merely regulative device for guiding our empirical inquiry into living organisms as far as it may proceed.

From the point of view of post-Kantian idealism, however, we are now left with a quite intolerable scepticism concerning most of the phenomena of nature. For only very few of these phenomena, as we have seen, are actually constitutively grounded in the *a priori* principles of the understanding; and, for the rest, we have at best the otherwise entirely indeterminate hope that they *may* be constitutively grounded some day, as in the case of chemistry, for example. In the case of biology, moreover, the situation is far worse, for we shall never achieve, according to Kant, a genuine constitutive grounding of the properties and behaviour of even a single blade of grass. It would appear, then, that the vast majority of natural phenomena are not, and most likely never will be, objectively or constitutively grounded at all, and our claims to have rational or objective knowledge of nature are accordingly cast into doubt.[6] For the post-Kantian idealists, therefore, the very enterprise of transcendental philosophy – the attempt to give an *a priori* or rational foundation for the totality of our knowledge and experience – must be radically reconceived. And it is in precisely this context, I believe, that the decisive contribution made by Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* is best understood.

For Schelling, transcendental philosophy, the story of how human reason successively approximates to a more and more adequate picture of nature, has a necessary counterpart or dual, as it were, in *Naturphilosophie*, the story of how nature itself successively unfolds or dialectically evolves from the 'dead' or inert matter considered in statics and mechanics, to the essentially dynamical forms of interaction considered in chemistry, and finally to the living or organic matter considered in biology. Since nature, on this view, dialectically unfolds or successively evolves in a way that precisely mirrors the evolution or development of our rational conception of nature (and, of course, *vice versa*), it follows that there is no possible sceptical gap between nature itself and our conception of it, or, in Kantian terminology, between

the constitutive domain of the understanding and the merely regulative domain of reason and reflective judgement. All the phenomena of nature – including, in particular, both chemical and biological phenomena – are rationally or objectively grounded in the same way.

The key to Schelling's conception is a dialectical extension and elaboration of Kant's original dynamical theory of matter, according to which the fundamental property of filling a space to a determinate degree results from a balance or equilibrium between the two fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion. From Schelling's point of view, this theory of the most general properties of all matter as such (which embraces, therefore, even the 'dead' or inert matter considered in statics and mechanics) has already introduced an essentially dialectical and evolutionary element into nature, in so far as the dynamical constitution of matter in general proceeds from the positive reality of expansive force (repulsion), through the negative reality of contractive force (attraction), to the limitation or balance of the two in a state of equilibrium. Yet this equilibrium, for Schelling, is only a temporary first step, for we now know, as Kant himself did not, that chemistry can be dynamically grounded by a dialectical continuation or extension of this same progression – as we proceed, more specifically, from the magnetic, through the electrical, to the chemical (or galvanic) forms of the basic or original dynamical process grounded in the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion.[7] And, once we have gone this far, it is then a very short step (particularly in view of the newly discovered parallel interconnections among electrical, galvanic and biological phenomena) to view biology, too, as a further dialectical continuation of the same dynamical process. Biology, too, can be a science, for all rational science, as Kant did not see, is grounded in a single dynamical evolutionary dialectical progression. The whole of nature, in this sense, is at once both rational and alive;[8] and this means, in particular, that there actually is life – objectively, not merely regulatively – in even the very simplest forms of organised matter.[9]

Schelling's entrancing vision is fuelled by a number of dramatic new discoveries in electro-chemistry. In particular, the invention of the voltaic pile (1800) had led to the discovery of current electricity or galvanism, and current electricity, in turn, had led to the discovery of the electrolytic decomposition of water – whereby oxygen and hydrogen separate out from the water and accumulate, respectively, at the positive and negative poles inducing the electrolytic current. Oxygen and hydrogen were thereby associated with negative and positive electricity, respectively, and this suggested an especially close link between electrical forces and the fundamental chemical

forces involved in combustion. Schelling, along with many other researchers at the time, took this as evidence for the electrical nature of chemical affinities quite generally.[10] Finally, the well-known parallels between electrical and magnetic forces suggested that magnetism, too, is essentially implicated in chemical interactions (including galvanism) and, more specifically, that what Schelling called the basic or original form of the dynamical process is further differentiated, at the level immediately following that of Kant's two fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion in general, into magnetism, electricity and chemical forces (including galvanism).[11]

It is precisely here, for Schelling, that we can unite the concept of matter in general as conceived in Kant's original dynamical theory (the 'dead' matter considered in statics and mechanics) with matter as conceived by *Naturphilosophie* – as an inexhaustible source of rational life. It is in precisely this context that we can view chemistry, in Schelling's words, as a dialectical 'middle term' between mechanism, on the one side, and biological (ultimately rational) living purposiveness, on the other.[12] Indeed, even the inert matter considered in statics and mechanics is already at least potentially alive, since Kant's dynamical theory had shown that the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion are necessary to all matter in general and as such, and we have just seen that the original or primary dynamical process governed by these two forces must necessarily evolve or develop into first chemical and then biological forms of external nature. In the end, it is precisely by rejecting the fundamental Kantian contention that all matter in general and as such is essentially lifeless that Schelling, from his point of view, finally overcomes any possibility of a sceptical gap between our rational conception of nature and nature itself.[13]

We can deepen our appreciation of both the sceptical gap Schelling finds here in the Kantian philosophy and Schelling's efforts to overcome it if we note that Kant himself, very late in his career, attempted to extend his dynamical theory of matter into chemistry.[14] This attempt is visible in unpublished materials from the years 1796–1803 collected in the *Opus postumum* (the very years during which Schelling was first developing his system of *Naturphilosophie*), and it involves a new projected work Kant entitles *Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics* (*Übergang von den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik*). By 'physics' Kant here means the more empirical or inductive branches of natural science in which the general empirical concept of matter articulated in the *Metaphysical Foundations* is further specified into a variety of species and subspecies, and Kant has particularly in mind the new anti-phlogistic system of chemistry

recently developed by Lavoisier. Kant now holds, contrary to the *Metaphysical Foundations*, that chemistry has thereby finally entered on the secure path of science, but it has not done so by discovering an elementary force law underlying chemical interactions. Rather, what Lavoisier has achieved is a new type of essentially physical chemistry, based on the central role of oxygen in combustion and the recently developed caloric theory of heat. Kant now attempts to provide an *a priori* foundation for this new science by presenting what he calls an aether deduction: an *a priori* proof that there is a universally distributed aether or caloric fluid, constituted by a perpetual oscillatory interaction between the two fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion, filling all of space. This universally distributed aetherial medium is supposed to provide an *a priori* grounding for the central theoretical construct of Lavoisier's new chemistry (the caloric fluid or matter of heat) and, at the same time, to serve, in a way that had long been familiar in eighteenth-century matter theory, as the medium or vehicle for light, electricity and magnetism as well. In this way, the totality of forces or powers of nature – including, above all, the specifically chemical forces – are, at least in principle, systematically unified.

The *a priori* representation in question – a universally distributed caloric fluid or aetherial medium – is, by the standards of Kant's critical philosophy, an extremely peculiar one. As a continuum of forces providing a basis for the further specification of the concept of matter in general, it is a discursive or conceptual representation; as a space-filling continuum, providing what Kant calls a perceptual 'realisation' (*Realisierung*) of the pure intuition of space, it is a sensible or intuitive representation. Moreover, and by the same token, as an *a priori* principle for the further specification of the concept of matter in general, it is a constitutive representation; as the ultimate ground for the systematic unity of all of the forces of matter, it is a regulative representation. It is in this way, in fact, that the 'top-down' constitutive procedure of the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the first *Critique* has a necessary intersection, as it were, with the 'bottom-up' regulative procedure of the faculties of reason and reflective judgement; and it is in precisely this way, accordingly, that the sceptical problems arising from the doctrine of the regulative use of reason that so vexed the post-Kantian idealists are finally resolved for Kant himself.[15]

It is important to see, however, that Kant's own solution stopped considerably short of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, and, although Kant was right on the verge of the scientific and philosophical situation addressed by Schelling,

he did not and could not take the decisive step. Kant had already considered the problem of extending the dynamical theory of matter into chemistry, and, at the same time, he had already subjected the fundamental distinction between constitutive principles and regulative principles to a radical reconceptualisation. But the crucial new developments in chemistry, electricity, magnetism and biology that provided the fertile empirical soil on which *Naturphilosophie* took root were in fact unknown to him. Kant, to the best of my knowledge, never engaged with even the electro-static and magneto-static work of Coulomb, to say nothing of the electro-chemical researches arising from the voltaic pile. The central idea of *Naturphilosophie* in its application to chemistry – that chemical forces are at bottom electrical in nature – never occurred to Kant; and, as a result, the idea that one could extend the dynamical theory of matter by conceiving magnetic, electrical and galvanic forces as a further dialectical development of the original dynamical process governing the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion was entirely foreign to Kant's own final attempt to solve the problem of a 'transition from the metaphysical foundations to physics'. Moreover, although there may be room, with considerable stretching and straining, to find a place in Kant's theoretical philosophy for a representation that combines both constitutive and regulative aspects, there is no room at all for the grand *naturphilosophisch* vision of nature as a whole as the evolutionary dialectical development of a single (and ultimately divine) rational life. For this idea, of course, entails the total *Aufhebung* of all of Kant's most fundamental distinctions, along with the critical philosophy itself.

That Kant himself, at the end of his career, was right on the verge of the scientific and philosophical situation addressed by Schelling further underscores and illuminates the precise sense in which *Naturphilosophie* and the organic conception of nature represent a perfectly intelligible and very insightful response to a combination of deep internal problems afflicting Kant's original system, on the one side, and revolutionary new scientific developments at the turn of the century, on the other. Despite the fact, moreover, that his dialectical evolutionary model of magnetic, electrical and chemical or galvanic phenomena did not manage to survive into the second half of the nineteenth century (let alone into the twentieth), Schelling's speculative physics did in fact fruitfully guide the experimental and theoretical work of the principal founders of electro-chemistry and electro-magnetism in the first half of this century.[16] And it was able to do this, in spite of the shortcoming we might perceive in it today, precisely because the new

empirical situation at the turn of the century demanded the exploration of non-Newtonian physical ideas, while, at the same time, the Kantian philosophical system, at the very end of the eighteenth century, had pushed such Newtonian ideas to their outermost philosophical limits. A new philosophy of nature, like Schelling's, which, as we have said, insightfully responds simultaneously to both the deep internal tensions emerging in Kant's philosophical system and the new empirical results, was therefore, in this specific historical context, precisely what was then needed.

Hermann von Helmholtz and the origins of neo-Kantianism

Yet the nineteenth century, as it developed further, fairly exploded with breathtaking new developments involving a succession of deep and lasting transformations in both the sciences and philosophy. The most important initial step beyond *Naturphilosophie* and post-Kantian idealism was taken by Hermann von Helmholtz, one of the most remarkable minds of his era, who made fundamental contributions to energetics, physiological psychology, the foundations of geometry, electricity and magnetism, and scientific epistemology. Helmholtz came to be identified, in particular, as one of the leaders of the emerging neo-Kantian 'back to Kant!' movement, and his celebrated address, 'On Human Vision' ('Über das Sehen des Menschen'), delivered at the dedication of a monument to Kant at Königsberg in 1855, became one of the primary intellectual models of this movement. Helmholtz begins by asking himself, on behalf of his audience, why a natural scientist like himself (at the time a professor of physiology at Königsberg) is speaking in honour of a philosopher. This question only arises, he says, because of the current deplorable climate of enmity and mutual distrust between the two fields – a climate which is due, in Helmholtz's opinion, to the speculative system of *Naturphilosophie* that Schelling and Hegel have erected wholly independent of, and even in open hostility towards, the actual positive results of the natural sciences. What Helmholtz is now recommending, by contrast, is a return to the close co-operation between the two fields exemplified in the work of Kant, who himself made significant contributions to science (in his nebular hypothesis of 1755) and, in general, 'stood in relation to the natural sciences together with the natural scientists on precisely the same fundamental principles'.[d,17]

d. 'In Beziehung auf die Naturwissenschaften mit den Naturforschern auf genau denselben Grundlagen.' H. Helmholtz, *Vorträge und Reden*, i (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1903), 88.

As we have just seen, the charge that Helmholtz – and, following him, the rest of the neo-Kantian movement for a scientific philosophy – levelled against the *Naturphilosophie* of the early nineteenth century is fundamentally unfair. Nevertheless, it is also true that Helmholtz himself had an important new weapon up his sleeve: namely, his own formulation of the principle of the conservation of energy in his great monograph, 'On the Conservation of Force' (*Über die Erhaltung der Kraft*), published in 1847.[18] In the introduction to this work, he describes 'the ultimate and proper goal of the physical natural sciences as such' as beginning with an 'experimental part', where one seeks to describe 'the individual natural processes' by 'general rules . . . which are obviously nothing but universal generic concepts through which all of the appearances belonging thereto are comprehended', and proceeding to a 'theoretical part . . . which seeks, by contrast, to find the unknown causes of the processes from their visible effects; it seeks to conceptualise them in accordance with the law of causality'.[e] This procedure aims eventually to discover the 'ultimate unalterable causes' lying at the basis of all the appearances:

> We are compelled and justified in this task by the principle that every alteration in nature *must* have a sufficient cause. The proximate causes that underlie the appearances of nature can themselves be either unalterable or alterable; in the latter case the same principle compels us to seek for other causes of this alteration in turn, and so on, until we finally arrive at the ultimate causes that act in accordance with an unalterable law, and which, therefore, bring about at every time, under the same external relations, the same effect. The final end of the theoretical natural sciences is thus to discover the ultimate unalterable causes of natural processes.[f]

e. 'Eine wesentlichere Bedeutung für den letzten und eigentlichen Zweck der physikalischen Naturwissenschaften überhaupt . . . experimentellen Theils . . . die einzelnen Vorgänge in der Natur . . . allgemeine Regeln . . . sind offenbar nichts als allgemeine Gattungsbegriffe, durch welche sämmtliche dahin gehörige Erscheinungen umfasst werden . . . theoretische Theil derselben sucht dagegen, die unbekannten Ursachen der Vorgänge aus ihren sichtbaren Wirkungen zu finden; er sucht dieselben zu begreifen nach dem Gesetz der Causalität.' H. Helmholtz, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, i (Leipzig: Barth, 1882), 12–13; R. Kahl (ed.), *Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1971), 3.

f. 'Wir werden genöthigt und berechtigt zu diesem Geschäfte durch den Grundsatz, dass jede Veränderung in der Natur eine zureichende Ursache haben müsse. Die nächsten Ursachen, welche wir den Naturerscheinungen unterlegen, können selbst unveränderlich sein oder veränderlich; im letzteren Falle nöthigt uns derselbe Grundsatz nach anderen Ursachen wiederum dieser Veränderung zu suchen, und so fort, bis wir zuletzt zu letzten Ursachen gekommen sind, welche nach einem unveränderlichen Gesetz wirken, welche folglich zu jeder Zeit unter denselben äusseren Verhältnissen dieselbe Wirkung hervorbringen. Das endliche Ziel der theoretischen Naturwissenschaften ist also, die letzten unveränderlichen Ursachen der

And the possibility of reducing all of the appearances of nature to this basis, in accordance with the law of causality, is then 'the condition for the complete conceptualisability of nature'.[g]

Thus it is clear that when Helmholtz, in his 1855 lecture on human vision, says that Kant stood 'together with the natural scientists on precisely the same fundamental principles', the main principle he has in mind is Kant's formulation of the principle of causality.[19] Indeed, the salience of Kant's particular formulation of the principle of causality becomes even clearer when we note that the ultimate unalterable causes mentioned in the introduction to 'On the Conservation of Force' turn out to comprise a system of masses interacting with one another solely through time-independent (constant or 'unalterable') central forces of attraction and repulsion depending only on the distances between them. And the main burden of the monograph that follows is then to contribute to this programme by showing that the phenomenological principle of the conservation of energy – the principle, as Helmholtz phrases it, that a perpetual motion machine (of the first kind) is impossible – is equivalent to the theoretical principle that all actions in nature are in fact reducible to ultimate forces of attraction and repulsion in this way. The principle of the conservation of energy is thereby shown, in particular, to involve a more specific realisation of Kant's general principle of causality corresponding, in this respect, to Kant's own more specific realisation of his 'transcendental' principles of the understanding in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

For Helmholtz, accordingly, all the manifold phenomena of nature – mechanical, thermal, chemical, electro-magnetic and biological – among which we see energy transferred, and in which we see the total quantity of energy conserved, are ultimately explained by an underlying system of invisible and unalterable masses governed by fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion closely modelled on Kant's original dynamical theory of matter;[20] and Helmholtz is then in a position to use Kant's theory to make a number of important points against Schelling's dialectical extension of it. First, and most importantly, it follows that Kant's original theory is entirely capable, in principle, of comprehending all the new discoveries appealed to by Schelling. Second, and as a corollary, there is no need at all to incorporate life or any 'vital principle' into the fundamental forces of matter. On the

Vorgänge in der Natur aufzufinden.' Helmholtz, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, i, 13; *Selected Writings*, 4.

g. 'Die Bedingung der vollständigen Begreiflichkeit der Natur.' Helmholtz, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, i, 16; *Selected Writings*, 6.

contrary, by adopting attractive and repulsive forces as fundamental, we thereby attain a unity of all the forces and powers of nature that is completely different in kind from the organic or teleological unity envisioned by *Naturphilosophie* – in so far as the underlying constancy of the total quantity of 'force' is now conceived as a reflection of the priority and foundational status of purely mechanical 'force'.[21] Third, and finally, it follows that no essentially non-Newtonian physical principles are required after all, for Newtonian central forces of attraction and repulsion, obeying only the principles of Newtonian mechanics, suffice, in the end, to explain all the phenomena governed by the new principle of the conservation of energy.[22]

In this context, then, Helmholtz takes the main point of Kant's principle of causality to be that of licensing an inference from the observable phenomena or appearances to the 'ultimate unalterable causes' of these 'visible effects' – an inference from the observable phenomena to their unobservable causes.[23] However, by the time Helmholtz adds supplementary notes to his monograph in 1881, he has clearly abandoned this view. In the very first note, in particular, Helmholtz corrects the above-cited sentence, where the law of causality is said to lead us to 'unknown causes' from their 'visible effects', as follows: 'The philosophical discussion in the introduction is more strongly influenced by Kant's epistemological views than I would now like to recognise as correct. I only made it clear to myself later that the principle of causality is actually nothing other than the presupposition of the lawlikeness of all the appearances of nature.'[h,24] The principle of causality cannot serve, as Helmholtz understood Kant in 1847,[25] as an *a priori* justification for postulating unknown, invisible objects behind the observable appearances. On the contrary, lawlikeness is now a fundamental principle governing the appearances themselves.[26]

This important shift in Helmholtz's thinking was mediated by the further articulation of what he called an 'empiricist' theory of space-perception in his monumental *Handbook of Physiological Optics*, first appearing between 1856 and 1867.[27] Although he had declared his allegiance to such a theory, and his opposition to 'nativism', in 1855, the theory did not acquire a clear articulation until 1865–1866.[28] The basic idea is that our ability to see objects around us in space, as localised at particular places, is not an innate capacity

h. 'Die philosophischen Erörterungen der Einleitung sind durch Kant's erkenntnistheoretische Ansichten stärker beeinflusst, als ich jetzt noch als richtig anerkennen möchte. Ich habe mir erst später klar gemacht, dass das Princip der Causalität in der That nichts Anderes ist als die Voraussetzung der Gesetzlichkeit aller Naturerscheinungen.' Helmholtz, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, i, 68; *Selected Writings*, 49.

of either our consciousness or our nervous apparatus. Rather, this ability is itself gradually learned or acquired – as we learn or acquire our native language, for example – by a process of 'unconscious inductive inference' (*unbewussten induktiven Schlussfolgerung*) based on regularities or associations among our sensations. For example, my ability to localise a perceived table in three-dimensional space is in no way directly given by simple visual or tactual sensations; it rather requires (unconscious) knowledge of a large number of regularities among such simple sensations, generated as I move around the table, reach out and touch it, and so on. In this sense, the ability to see objects in space is primarily an affair of the understanding, and '[t]he fundamental principle of the empiricist view is [that] *sensations are signs for our consciousness, where learning to understand their meaning is left to our understanding*'.[i,29]

By the same token, therefore, the process of learning to localise objects in space is closely analogous to the conscious procedure of inductive inference characteristic of natural science. Indeed, except for the fact that the former inferences are unconscious, the analogy is perfectly exact: 'Now the same great significance that experiment has for the security of our scientific convictions, it has also for the unconscious inferences of our sensory perceptions. Only in so far as we bring our sense organs, in accordance with our own willing, into various relations to the objects, do we learn securely to judge about the causes of our sensations, and such experimenting takes place from the earliest childhood on, without interruption, throughout the whole of life.'[j] We thus learn or acquire the complicated system of regularities among initially isolated and fragmentary sensations, which, as a system, first constitutes the perception of an object in space, by the very same procedure, and in accordance with the very same causal or inductive principle, that we self-consciously employ in scientific inference.[30] Hence, since the primary role for the causal or inductive principle here is precisely to secure our grasp of regularity or lawlikeness on the side of our perceptions, it no

i. '[D]er Hauptansatz der empiristischen Ansicht ist: *Die Sinnesempfindungen sind für unser Bewußtsein Zeichen, deren Bedeutung verstehen zu lernen unserem Verstande überlassen ist*.' H. Helmholtz, *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, 3rd edn (Leipzig: Voss, 1910), 433.

j. 'Dieselbe große Bedeutung nun, welche das Experiment für die Sicherheit unserer wissenschaftlichen Überzeugungen hat, hat es auch für die unbewußten Induktionen unserer sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen. Erst indem wir unsere Sinnesorgane nach eigenem Willen in verschiedene Beziehungen zu den Objekten bringen, lernen wir sicher urteilen über die Ursachen unserer Sinnesempfindungen, und solches Experimentieren geschieht von frühester Jugend an ohne Unterbrechung das ganze Leben hindurch.' Helmholtz, *Optik*, 28; English translation: *Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics*, ed. James P. C. Southall (Menasha, Wis.: George Banta, 1925), 30–31.

longer functions as a bridge to another, 'hidden' realm existing behind our perceptions.[31]

Helmholtz's work on the psycho-physiology of space-perception was inextricably connected, as well, with his mathematical contributions to the foundations of geometry, developed mainly in the years 1866–1870. These contributions resulted in what we now know as the Helmholtz-Lie theorem, and they paved the way, in turn, for the mature statement of his epistemological position in 'The Facts in Perception' (*Die Tatsachen in der Wahrnehmung*), first presented as a public lecture in 1878.[32] For the upshot of this theorem, for Helmholtz, is that the same regularities in our sensations, on the basis of which we acquire the ability to localise objects in space, also give rise to the representation of space itself. The voluntary actions of our bodies that allow us to localise objects by moving towards, away from and around them, also make possible a precise mathematical construction of the very three-dimensional space within which this process of localisation takes place. In this way, space does not serve as the locus of mind-independent objects existing behind the veil of perception, but rather as a 'subjective *form of intuition*' in the sense of Kant – so that 'space will also appear to us sensibly, clothed with the qualities of our sensations of motion, as that through which we move, through which we can gaze forth'; it is thus the '*necessary* form of our external intuition . . . because we comprehend precisely that which we observe as spatially determined as the external world'.[k,33] The world of objects in space is truly 'external' only in the sense of being *spatial*, and space itself is a construction, erected entirely on the basis of our inductively acquired ability perceptually to localise objects.

Helmholtz's mathematical work was directly inspired by Bernhard Riemann's creation of what we now call the general theory of manifolds in his *Habilitationsvortrag* of 1854, 'On the Hypotheses which Lie at the Basis of Geometry' (*Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zugrunde liegen*), Helmholtz's goal, in particular, was to derive Riemann's underlying assumption or 'hypothesis' – that the line-element or metric is infinitesimally Euclidean – from what Helmholtz took to be the fundamental 'facts' generating our perceptual intuition of space. Since our representation of space, as we

k. 'Subjektive *Form der Anschauung* . . . uns der Raum auch sinnlich erscheinen [wird], behaftet mit den Qualitäten unserer Bewegungsempfindungen, als das, durch welches hin wir uns bewegen, durch welches hin wir blicken können . . . die *notwendige* Form der äußeren Anschauung . . . weil wir eben das, was wir als räumlich bestimmt wahrnehmen, als Außenwelt zusammenfassen.' P. Hertz and M. Schlick (eds), *Hermann v. Helmholtz: Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie* (Berlin: Springer, 1921), 117; H. Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, eds and trans. Robert Cohen and Yehuda Elkana (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), 124.

have seen, arises kinematically, from our experience of moving up to, away from and around the objects thereby localised, the space in question must satisfy a condition of 'free mobility' (*Bewegungsfreiheit*) permitting arbitrary continuous motions of rigid bodies; and from this condition, in turn, we can then derive the Pythagorean form of the line-element.[34] Finally, since the Riemannian metric thereby constructed has what we now call a group of rigid motions or isometries mapping any point onto any other, the only possible geometries we can construct in this way are the three classical geometries of constant curvature: hyperbolic (constant negative curvature), elliptic (constant positive curvature) and Euclidean (constant zero curvature).[35]

But it now follows, for Helmholtz, that specifically Euclidean geometry is not built into what he takes to be the essential or necessary character of space, given by the condition of free mobility. The particular propositions of Euclidean geometry, as Helmholtz now argues explicitly in his 1870 lecture 'On the Origin and Significance of the Axioms of Geometry' (*Über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der geometrischen Axiome*), 'are not included in the general concept of a three-dimensional extended magnitude and the free mobility of the bounded structures contained in it[; t]hey are not *necessities of thought*, which flow from the concept of such a manifold and its measurability, or from the most general concept of a rigid structure contained therein and its freest mobility'.[l] Indeed, it follows from Helmholtz's theory of the origin of our spatial intuition that the particular propositions of Euclidean geometry are also not necessities of intuition. For we can now imagine, for example, the series of sensations we would have if we were to find ourselves moving around in a space of constant negative curvature, and such a series of sensations, on Helmholtz's theory, would constitute an intuition of space:

> We can picture to ourselves the view of a pseudospherical world going in all directions, just as well as we can develop its concept. We can therefore also not admit that the axioms of our geometry are grounded in the given form of our faculty of intuition, or are in any way connected with such [a form].[m]

l. 'Nicht in dem allgemeinen Begriff einer ausgedehnten Größe von drei Dimensionen und freier Beweglichkeit der in ihr enthaltenen begrenzten Gebilde eingeschlossen sind. *Denknotwendigkeiten*, die aus dem Begriff einer solchen Mannigfaltigkeit und ihrer Meßbarkeit, oder aus dem allgemeinsten Begriff eines festen in ihr enthaltenen Gebildes und seiner freiesten Beweglichkeit herfließen, sind sie nicht.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 17; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 17.

m. 'Wir können uns den Anblick einer pseudosphärischen Welt ebensogut nach allen Richtungen hin ausmalen, wie wir ihren Begriff entwickeln können. Wir können deshalb auch nicht zugeben, daß die Axiome unserer Geometrie in der gegebenen Form unseres

Since the axioms of Euclidean geometry are not built into the most general necessary conditions underlying our spatial intuition, Kant's theory of the origin of these axioms in our 'necessary' and 'transcendental' intuition of space is incorrect, and they emerge rather as *merely* empirical facts about the actual behaviour of our measuring instruments.

Nevertheless, Kant's insight that space is a 'subjective form of intuition' rather than an ordering of things in themselves existing behind the veil of appearances continues to be correct, for, as Helmholtz conceives it, 'the most essential features of spatial intuition'[n] – including free mobility and therefore constant curvature – are derived from the same original lawlike experiences of bodily motion on which our ability to localise objects in space depends. In this sense, as Helmholtz famously puts it, 'space can be transcendental without the axioms [i.e., the axioms of specifically Euclidean geometry – MF] being so'.[o,36] And it follows, just as it does for Kant, that we can now give a solution to the 'fundamental problem' (*grundlegende Problem*) of epistemology which does not involve a relation of correspondence or representation between our perceptions and mind-independent objects existing behind our perceptions.[37] For that to which our representations finally correspond are lawlike patterns taking place within (and, indeed, constituting) the space of our form of intuition:

> I return to the discussion of the first original facts of our perception. We have, as we have seen, not only changing sense impressions that come upon us without our doing anything for this purpose, but we perceive during our own continuing activity, and we thereby achieve an acquaintance with the *enduring existence* of a lawlike relation between our [motor] innervations and the becoming present of various impressions from the current range of presentables. Each of our optional motions, whereby we modify the manner of appearance of the object, is to be considered as an experiment, through which we test whether the lawlike behaviour of the appearance lying before us – *that is, its displayed enduring existence in a determinate spatial ordering* [my emphasis] – has been correctly apprehended.[p]

Anschauungsvermögens begründet wären, oder mit einer solchen irgendwie zusammenhingen.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 22; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 23.

n. 'Subjektive Form der Anschauung . . . die essentiellsten Eigenschaften der räumlichen Anschauung.'

o. 'Transzendental sein, ohne daß es die Axiome sind.'

p. 'Ich kehre zurück zur Besprechung der ersten ursprünglichen Tatsachen unserer Wahrnehmung. Wir haben, wie wir gesehen, nicht nur wechselnde Sinneseindrücke, die über uns kommen, ohne daß wir etwas dazu tun, sondern wir beobachten unter fortdauernder

In other words, the correspondence of our sensations to enduring external objects in space is now simply equated with their characteristic lawlikeness: 'What we can find unambiguously and as fact, however, without hypothetical interpolation, is the lawlike in the appearance. From the first step on, when we perceive the objects lingering before us distributed in space, this perception is the recognition of a lawlike connection between our motions and the sensations thereby occurring.'[q]

Accordingly, Helmholtz formulates the Kantian contrast between appearances and things in themselves, as he now understands it, as a distinction between 'the actual' (*dem Wirklichen*) and 'the real' (*dem Realen*): 'We have in our language a very happy designation for that which influences us, standing behind the change of appearances, namely "the actual". Here only the action is expressed; it lacks the secondary reference to enduring existence as substance that the concept of the real includes.'[r] Since, as we have just seen, what 'stands behind' the change of appearances is the enduring existence of lawlike relations among our sensations – and, indeed, '[t]he lawlike is thus the essential presupposition for the character of the actual'[s] – it follows that we thereby know the actual but not the real: 'I do not need to explain to you that it is a contradiction in terms to represent the real or Kant's "thing in itself" via positive determinations, but without taking it up into the form or our representing. This is often discussed. But what we can achieve is an acquaintance with the lawlike ordering in the realm of the actual, to be sure only presented in the sign system of our sense impressions.'[t] This last clause,

eigener Tätigkeit, und gelangen dadurch zur Kenntnis des Bestehens eines gesetzlichen Verhältnisses zwischen unseren Innervationen und dem Präsentwerden der verschiedenen Eindrücke aus dem Kreise der zeitweiligen Präsentabilien. Jede unserer willkürlichen Bewegungen, durch die wir die Erscheinungsweise der Objekte abändern, ist als ein Experiment zu betrachten, durch welches wir prüfen, ob wir das gesetzliche Verhalten der vorliegenden Erscheinung, d. h. ihr vorausgesetztes Bestehen in bestimmter Raumordnung richtig aufgefaßt haben.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 128; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 135–36.

q. 'Was wir aber unzweideutig und als Tatsache ohne hypothetische Unterschiebung finden können, ist das Gesetzliche in der Erscheinung. Von dem ersten Schritt an, wo wir vor uns weilende Objekte im Raume verteilt wahrnehmen, ist diese Wahrnehmung das Anerkennen einer gesetzlichen Verbindung zwischen unseren Bewegungen und den dabei auftretenden Empfindungen.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 130; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 138.

r. 'Wir haben in unserer Sprache eine sehr glückliche Bezeichnung für dieses, was hinter dem Wechsel der Erscheinungen stehend auf uns einwirkt, nämlich: "das Wirkliche". Hierin ist nur das Wirken ausgesagt; es fehlt die Nebenbeziehung auf das Bestehen als Substanz, welche der Begriff des Reellen, d. h. des Sachlichen einschließt.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 132; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 140.

s. '[D]as Gesetzmäßige ist daher die wesentliche Voraussetzung für den Charakter des Wirklichen.' *Ibid.*

t. 'Daß es eine Contradictio in adjecto sei, das Reelle oder Kants "Ding an sich" in positiven Bestimmungen vorstellen zu wollen, ohne es doch in die Form unseres Vorstellens

as we have seen, does not mean that 'the sign system of our sense impressions' somehow corresponds to a mind-independent realm existing behind the appearances, for what Helmholtz here calls 'the realm of the actual' consists precisely of the lawlike relationships existing within the appearances themselves.[38]

Helmholtz's mature scientific epistemology therefore represents a rather deep transformation of central doctrines of Kant's critical philosophy. For, in the first place, Helmholtz explicitly borrows the overriding importance of the principle of causality from Kant, and, moreover, he continues to view it as an expression of the fundamental character of our conceptual faculty. To be sure, this principle, for Helmholtz, has more a regulative than a constitutive character: as the 'condition for the complete conceptualisability of nature', it sets up what Kant would call a regulative ideal akin to the ideal of complete systematic unity.[39] Nevertheless, as we have seen, a blurring of the sharp line between Kantian constitutive and regulative principles becomes increasingly characteristic of the entire post-Kantian period – beginning with the 'post-critical' work of Kant himself.[40]

In the second place, however, Helmholtz's explicit appropriation of the conception of space as a 'necessary' and 'subjective' form of our perception of external objects is perhaps even more striking. Indeed, geometry becomes applicable to both space and external objects, just as it does for Kant, by subjecting our outer perceptions to the *a priori* demands of our conceptual faculty – for Helmholtz, as we have seen, by successfully subjecting such outer perceptions to the requirement of thoroughgoing lawlikeness.[41] To be sure, Helmholtz, unlike Kant, is conversant with non-Euclidean geometries, and so Helmholtz, in particular, famously argues against the Kantian view that specifically Euclidean geometry expresses the '*necessary*' form of our external intuition. On the contrary, 'the most essential features of spatial intuition' include only the much more general geometrical property required by Helmholtz's condition of free mobility: the property of constant curvature common to all three classical cases of hyperbolic, elliptic and Euclidean geometry.[42] Nevertheless, as we have also seen, Helmholtz's mature epistemology continues to emphasise what is arguably the most fundamental feature of Kant's conception of space as the form of our perception of external objects: namely, that such objects are only properly 'external' in so far

aufzunehmen, brauche ich Ihnen nicht auseinanderzusetzen. Das ist oft besprochen. Was wir aber erreichen können, ist die Kenntnis der gesetzlichen Ordnung im Reiche des Wirklichen, diese freilich nur dargestellt in dem Zeichensystem unserer Sinneseindrücke.' Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 132; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 140–41.

as they are thereby located in space, and, accordingly, they are sharply to be distinguished from any truly mind-independent objects that might exist behind the 'appearances' entirely independently of our '*necessary* form of external intuition'.

The most important divergence between Helmholtz and Kant does not concern particular points of doctrine at all but arises from the radically different intellectual contexts within which their respective doctrines are formulated. Helmholtz, even more so than Schelling, worked in a vastly different intellectual world from Kant's – one in which the empirical sciences, in particular, had taken on a dramatically new and entirely unforeseen systematic reconfiguration. Not only had striking connections begun to emerge between mechanics, chemistry, electricity and magnetism, and biology, but the principle of the conservation of energy had also established a precise lawlike relationship comprehending all of these domains, whereby a single measurable quantity of 'force' is interchangeable among them and, as a whole, quantitatively conserved in all such transformations of form. Moreover, a new experimental science of psycho-physics had been founded by Gustav Fechner and developed, among others, by Helmholtz's teacher Johannes Müller, and the practitioners of this new science understood themselves, quite understandably, to be standing on the threshold of a profound intellectual breakthrough in which the physical sciences, the life sciences and the emerging new science of the mind were all to be comprehended within a single unified scientific framework. Helmholtz himself was one of the greatest of these practitioners, and his epistemological doctrines – including both his overriding emphasis on the principle of causality and his conception of space as a form of external intuition – were entirely framed, as we have seen, by his characteristic 'empiricist' viewpoint in the psycho-physiology of sense perception. Helmholtz's scientific epistemology and his empirical scientific practice were in this way inextricably intertwined, and his distinctive epistemological doctrines, despite their explicit (and, as we have seen, rather deep) indebtedness to Kant, thereby took on a 'naturalistic' (and, indeed, 'psychologistic') cast quite incompatible with Kant's own conception of 'transcendental philosophy'.[43]

Ernst Cassirer and the Marburg School

We observed above that a rejection of Kant's sharp separation of the faculties of the mind into understanding and sensibility is characteristic of post-Kantian German idealism and that this is no less true of the Marburg

School of neo-Kantianism founded by Hermann Cohen. Indeed, one of the fundamental ideas of Cohen's *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1871, 1885^2) is that the separation between two faculties of the mind delineated in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique* is a remnant of the pre-critical doctrine of the *Inaugural Dissertation*, where the critical theory of the transcendental schematism of the understanding has not yet been articulated. But this sharp separation must be re-evaluated and revised, according to Cohen, when we arrive at the truly critical doctrine of the Transcendental Analytic, according to which all 'synthetic unity', including that of space and time, is due ultimately to the understanding.[44]

Cohen then reinterprets Kant's 'transcendental method' as one that begins with the 'fact of science' – the existence of the mathematical sciences in their modern, post-seventeenth-century form – and seeks their ultimate preconditions or presuppositions by a regressive argument. Kant himself had performed this task for the fundamentally Newtonian mathematical sciences of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and our new task, as Cohen sees it, is to generalise and extend transcendental philosophy so as to embrace the main developments in the mathematical sciences that had occurred since Kant's time. In particular, in the light of our principled rejection of Kant's distinction between two independent cognitive faculties, we are now in a position to avoid the idea that the pure forms of sensibility, space and time, have their own *a priori* structure – the structure of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian space and time – given independently of the synthesising activities of the understanding: other geometries than Euclid's, and other structures of space and time than Newton's, are therefore perfectly possible products of the *a priori* synthesising activities of thought.

Moreover, for Cohen and the Marburg School more generally, there is no longer an independent contribution of empirical or *a posteriori* sensibility either: there is no independent 'manifold of sensations' that is simply given, entirely independently of the synthesising activity of thought. What there is, instead, is an essentially dynamical, temporal and historical process of active 'generation' (*Erzeugung*), as the mind successively characterises or determines the 'real' that is to be the object of mathematical natural science in a continuous serial process. The 'real' itself – the true empirical object of mathematical natural science – is in no way independently given as something separate and distinct from this synthesis of thought; rather, it is the necessary endpoint or limit towards which a never-completed serial process of successive determination is converging: the 'real' empirical object is not 'given' (*gegeben*), but 'set as a task' (*aufgegeben*).[45]

This 'genetic [*erzeugende*] conception of knowledge' is the most characteristic contribution of the Marburg School. And, whereas Cohen himself had modelled the epistemological process in question on the methods of the infinitesimal calculus,[46] his most important student, Ernst Cassirer, provided a more abstract and contemporary version modelled on the recent developments in modern mathematics and mathematical logic associated with Hilbert and Richard Dedekind, and also with the early works of Frege and Russell.[47] In particular, in *Substance and Function* (1910), Cassirer conceives the epistemological process described by the genetic conception of knowledge as the historical evolution of a series or sequence of abstract mathematical formal structures ('systems of order' – *Ordnungssysteme*), which is itself ordered by the abstract formal relation of approximate backwards-directed inclusion. Thus, for example, if we decide that a non-Euclidean geometry is a better representative of physical space than Euclidean geometry, the new mathematical structure contains the old (Euclidean) one as a continuously approximated limiting case as we consider ever smaller spatial regions. But in empirical science, unlike pure mathematics, our further development of such structures has no finite endpoint in principle, and the final object of empirical theorising can only emerge, as before, as the ideal endpoint or limit structure towards which all earlier members of the series are continuously converging. Although this final limiting structure is only a regulative ideal in the original Kantian sense[48] it nevertheless constitutes the characteristic 'general serial form' (*allgemeinen Reihenform*) of our empirical mathematical-physical theorising and, at the same time, bestows on this theorising its characteristic form of objectivity: despite all historical variation and contingency, there is still a continuously converging progression of abstract mathematical structures framing, and making possible, all our empirical knowledge.

Cassirer thereby arrives at a new interpretation of the synthetic *a priori* as well. Contrary to the original Kantian conception, even the most fundamental principles of Newtonian mechanics 'need not be taken as absolutely unchanging dogmas'. Such temporarily 'highest' principles of experience – at a given stage of scientific theorising – may evolve into others, and, in this case, even our most general 'functional form' for the laws of nature would undergo a change. Yet such a transition never entails that 'the one fundamental form absolutely disappears while another arises absolutely new in its place'. On the contrary:

> The change must leave a determinate stock of principles unaffected; for it is solely for the sake of securing this stock that [this change] is

> undertaken in the first place, and this shows it its proper goal. Since we never compare the totality of hypotheses in themselves with the naked facts in themselves, but can only oppose *one* hypothetical system of principles to another, more comprehensive and radical [system], we require for this progressive comparison an ultimate constant *measure* in highest principles, which hold for all experience in general. What thought demands is the identity of this logical system of measure throughout all change in that which is measured. In this sense, the critical theory of experience actually aims to construct a *universal invariant theory of experience* and thereby to fulfil a demand towards which the character of the inductive procedure itself ever more clearly presses.[u]

And what this means, for Cassirer, is that we must form the idea of a set of ultimate or limiting scientific principles such that all previous stages of scientific theorising can be viewed as approximate special cases of precisely these ultimate principles.

It is at this point – and only at this point – that we can actually specify the content of the 'universal invariant theory of experience', and so there is no way, in particular, that we can determine the specific content of such ultimate principles in advance:

> [For example,] the validity of a spatio-temporal dependency between the elements of what happens as such, which expresses itself in the *universal causal law*, remains untouched by every change in the *particular* causal laws. The goal of critical analysis would be attained if it succeeded in establishing in this way what is ultimately common to all possible forms of scientific experience – in conceptually fixing those elements that are preserved in the progress from theory to theory because they are the conditions of each and every theory. This goal

u. 'Nicht als schlechthin unveränderliche Dogmen gelten . . . die eine Grundgestalt absolut verschwindet, während eine andere an ihrer Stelle absolut neu entsteht . . . Die Veränderung muß einen bestimmten Bestand von Prinzipien unangetastet lassen; denn lediglich die Sicherung dieses Bestandes ist es, um derentwillen sie überhaupt unternommen wird und die ihr das eigentliche Ziel weist. Da wir niemals den Inbegriff der Hypothesen an sich mit den nackten Tatsachen an sich vergleichen, sondern stets nur *ein* hypothetisches System von Grundsätzen einem anderen, umfassenderen und radikaleren, gegenüberstellen können, so bedürfen wir für diese fortschreitende Vergleichung ein letztes konstantes *Maß* in obersten Grundsätzen, die für alle Erfahrung überhaupt gelten. Die Identität dieses logischen Maßsystems bei allem Wechsel dessen, was dadurch gemessen wird, ist es, was der Gedanke fordert. In diesem Sinne will die kritische Erfahrungslehre in der Tat gleichsam die *allgemeine Invariantentheorie der Erfahrung* bilden und damit eine Forderung erfüllen, auf welche die Charakteristik des induktiven Verfahrens selbst immer deutlicher hindrängt.' E. Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik* (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1910), 355–56; English translation: *Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, trans. William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1923), 268.

> may never be completely attained at any given stage of cognition; nevertheless, it remains as a *demand* and determines a fixed direction in the continual unfolding and development of the system of experience itself.
>
> The strictly limited objective meaning of the '*a priori*' appears clearly from this point of view. We can only call those ultimate *logical invariant*s *a priori* that lie at the basis of every determination of a lawlike interconnection of nature in general. A cognition is called *a priori*, not because it lies in any sense *before* experience, but rather because, and in so far as, it is contained in every valid judgement about facts as a necessary *premise*.[v]

Just as the object of natural scientific knowledge is the never fully realised ideal mathematical structure towards which the entire historical development of science is converging, so the *a priori* form of scientific knowledge, for Cassirer, can only be determined as that stock of 'categorial' principles which, viewed from the perspective of the ideally completed developmental process, are seen to hold (retrospectively, as it were) at every stage. For example, we do not know, at any given stage, what the particular content of spatial geometry (Euclidean or non-Euclidean) or our mechanical theory of motion (Newtonian or non-Newtonian) must be, but we can now venture the well-supported conjecture that some or another such spatio-temporal structure must be present at every stage.

The example of spatio-temporal structure turns out to be particularly apt and revealing. Although *Substance and Function* appeared prior to the formulation of Einstein's general theory of relativity, Cassirer's next important contribution to scientific epistemology, *Einstein's Theory of Relativity* (1921), is devoted to precisely this revolutionary new theory. For Cassirer, in

v. '[W]ie z. B. die Geltung einer räumlich-zeitlichen Abhängigkeit der Elemente des Geschehens überhaupt, die sich im *allgemeinen Kausalgesetz* ausspricht, von jeder Änderung in den *besonderen* Kausalsätzen unberührt bleibt. Das Ziel der kritischen Analyse wäre erreicht, wenn es gelänge, auf diese Weise das letzte Gemeinsame aller möglichen Formen der wissenschaftlichen Erfahrung herauszustellen, d. h. diejenigen Momente begrifflich zu fixieren, die sich im Fortschritt von Theorie zu Theorie erhalten, weil sie die Bedingungen jedweder Theorie sind. Dieses Ziel mag auf keiner gegebenen Stufe des Wissens vollständig erreicht sein: als *Forderung* bleibt es nichtsdestoweniger bestehen und bestimmt in der stetigen Entfaltung und Entwicklung der Erfahrungssysteme selbst eine feste Richtung. Der streng begrenzte sachliche Sinn des "a priori" tritt in dieser Betrachtungsweise deutlich hervor. Apriorisch können nur jene letzten *logischen Invarianten* heißen, die jeder Bestimmung naturgesetzlicher Zusammenhänge überhaupt zugrunde liegen. Eine Erkenntnis heißt a priori, nicht als ob sie in irgend einem Sinne *vor* der Erfahrung läge, sondern weil und sofern sie in jedem gültigen Urteil über Tatsachen als notwendige *Prämisse* enthalten ist.' Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff*, 357; *Substance and Function*, 269.

particular, the fact that Einstein now replaces the spatial geometry of Euclid with a much more general spatio-temporal geometry of variable curvature in no way implies the collapse of a properly-understood 'critical' theory of the *a priori*: 'For the "*a priori*" of space, which [physics] asserts as the condition of every physical theory, does not include, as has been shown, any assertion about a determinate particular structure of space, but is concerned only with the function of "spatiality in general", which is already expressed in the general concept of the line-element *ds* as such – entirely without regard to its more particular determination.'[w] Thus, according to the generalised conception of the line-element derived from Riemann,[49] we postulate only that space is *infinitesimally* Euclidean (the metric continuously approximates to Euclidean geometry as the regions under consideration grow ever smaller); and, more generally, we can view the space-time structures arising in the transition from Newtonian physics to Einstein's theories of relativity as a converging sequence, in Cassirer's sense, whose last member, at the present moment (circa 1921), is the space-time structure of general relativity.[50] It is this structure, for Cassirer, which then presents us with our current best candidate for an ultimate spatio-temporal invariant: namely, the infinitesimally Minkowskian space-time metric on the basis of which Einstein erects his general theory.

It is instructive, at this point, to consider an important criticism put forward by Moritz Schlick, the founder and guiding spirit of the soon to be established Vienna Circle of logical empiricists. In particular, in his review of Cassirer's relativity book appearing in 1921 – *Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of Modern Physics?* (*Kritizistische oder empiristische Deutung der neuen Physik?*) – Schlick decisively rejects Cassirer's neo-Kantian attempt to reinterpret the Kantian *a priori* in the context of the general theory of relativity.[51] Schlick's main argument, against Cassirer, is that the general theory of relativity has not only overthrown the particular geometry of Euclid and the particular mechanics of Newton; rather, it is no longer clear, on the basis of this theory, that *any* particular geometrical or mechanical statements are fixed and unrevisable. Accordingly, Schlick challenges Cassirer to produce specific examples of such synthetic *a priori* principles,[52] and he concludes that Cassirer has very little of a definite character to say.[53]

w. 'Denn das "Apriori" des Raumes, das sie als Bedingung jeder physikalischen Theorie behauptet, schließt, wie sich gezeigt hat, keine Behauptung über eine bestimmte einzelne Struktur des Raumes in sich, sondern geht nur auf jene Funktion der "Räumlichkeit überhaupt", die sich schon in dem allgemeinen Begriff des Linienelements *ds* als solchen – abgesehen von seiner näheren Bestimmung – ausdrückte.' E. Cassirer, *Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie. Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen* (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1921), 101; *Substance and Function*, 433.

As we have seen, however, what Schlick entirely misses here is that Cassirer is simply not attempting to delineate these kinds of synthetic *a priori* principles – whose content we can now precisely specify as fixed and forever unrevisable. Cassirer's version of the *a priori* is not constitutive in the original Kantian sense but purely regulative:[54] we can only specify the determinate content of the 'universal invariant theory of experience' at the forever unreachable endpoint of scientific theorising; and Cassirer's talk of 'spatiality in general', in this context, is intended only to represent our best current conjecture concerning what the content of this ideal endpoint might actually be. Yet it does not follow that Cassirer's conception is therefore entirely without force. For, using the overarching ideal of continuous convergence towards a limit structure, we can then reasonably require – again purely regulatively – that the direction we pursue next will be continuously connected, by just such a convergent process, with where we are right now. In particular, given that general relativity has now emerged in precisely this way from our preceding space-time structures, we can reasonably require that its space-time metric should continue to be preserved,[55] in the same approximative sense, in future theories. Cassirer's purely regulative version of the synthetic *a priori* thereby guides scientific inquiry without constitutively constraining it by fixed unrevisable principles, but it does guide scientific inquiry none the less.

Lying behind this issue between Schlick and Cassirer about the status of the synthetic *a priori* is a deeper issue concerning how abstract mathematical structures relate to concrete empirical reality in the first place. For Schlick, a theory in mathematical physics is defined, purely formally, by a system of 'implicit definitions' modelled on Hilbert's axiomatisation of Euclidean geometry; and, since such a system of 'implicit definitions' is initially completely 'uninterpreted', it must then be somehow related to or co-ordinated with an independently existing empirical reality. This comes about, for Schlick, when a purely abstract and intrinsically unintuitive mathematical structure acquires a relation of 'designation' (*Bezeichnung*) or 'co-ordination' (*Zuordnung*) with subjective experiences: directly given objects of intuition or 'acquaintance' (*Kennen*) rather than genuine objects of 'knowledge' (*Erkennen*). Indeed, as mere objects of intuition and acquaintance, the experiences in question are entirely unconceptualised, amounting merely to fleeting and subjective 'images' (*Vorstellungen*) rather than stable and objective 'concepts' (*Begriffe*). Objective concepts, for Schlick, are given only by formal systems of 'implicit definitions', and objective conceptual knowledge of empirical reality therefore only arises through a relation of co-ordination: a purely formal mapping between an abstract mathematical structure, on the

one side, and something wholly subjective, unconceptualised, and ultimately ineffable, on the other.[56]

This kind of picture of a direct epistemic confrontation between conceptual thought and unconceptualised empirical reality ('in itself') is precisely what the genetic conception of knowledge characteristic of the Marburg School is most concerned to avoid; and it is for precisely this reason, in particular, that empirical reality, on this view, is 'set as a task' (*aufgegeben*) completed only at the forever unattainable ideal endpoint of empirical inquiry. This is also why Cassirer, in the passage from *Substance and Function* quoted above, argues that, '[s]ince we never compare the totality of hypotheses in themselves with the naked facts in themselves, but can only oppose *one* hypothetical system of principles to another, more comprehensive and radical [system], we require for this progressive comparison an ultimate constant *measure* in highest principles, which hold for all experience in general'. For Cassirer, the empirical reality to which our conceptual thought corresponds is defined only by a sequence of theoretical systems in which one such system is continually superseded by a 'more comprehensive and radical' system, and the only relation of 'co-ordination' (*Zuordnung*) we can then set up is between a more comprehensive conceptual structure occurring later in the sequence and a less comprehensive structure occurring earlier.[57] And, by the same token, since the only way in which we can define empirical reality in the first place is by means of precisely such a continuously converging sequence of conceptual structures, we must maintain a purely regulative version of the synthetic *a priori* in accordance with what Cassirer calls the 'universal invariant theory of experience'.

Notes

1. For further discussion see M. Friedman, 'Transcendental philosophy and mathematical physics', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 34 (2003), 29–43.
2. See GS iv, 518.
3. Compare *ibid.* 470–1.
4. It is no accident, therefore, that examples from contemporary (phlogistic) chemistry play a central role in Kant's discussion of the regulative use of reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the first *Critique*: see, e.g., A645–46/B673–74, A562–63/B680–81. For further discussion of Kant's conception of chemistry in this period see M. Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), ch. 5.
5. Kant's remark to his statement of the law of inertia in the Mechanics of the *Metaphysical Foundations* emphasises precisely its connection with lifelessness – viz., the non-existence

of any *internal* principle of change. See, in particular, the conclusion of this remark, *ibid*. 544.

6. My formulation of this sceptical problem is indebted to the discussion of Salomon Maimon's post-Kantian scepticism in P. Franks, 'What should Kantians learn from Maimon's skepticism?' in G. Freudenthal (ed.), *Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 200–32, although Franks himself does not emphasise, as I do, the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles; he instead formulates what I take to be essentially the same problem by means of a distinction between scientific judgements and everyday or 'ordinary' judgements.
7. Frederick Beiser discusses the connection between geometrical construction and Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* in part IV, ch. 4, §2 of F. Beiser, *German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, 1781–1801* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
8. See Schelling *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, SSW ii, 54; *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, trans. E. Harris and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 40: 'Finally, if we comprehend nature as a single whole, then *mechanism*, i.e., a past-directed series of causes and effects, and *purposiveness* [*Zweckmäßigkeit*], i.e., independence of mechanism, simultaneity of causes and effects, stand opposed to one another. In so far as we now unite these two extremes, an idea of a purposiveness of *the whole* arises in us – nature becomes a circle that returns into itself, a self-enclosed system.'
9. See SSW ii, 46–47; *Ideas*, 35: 'This philosophy must admit, therefore, that there is a graduated development [*Stufenfolge*] of life in nature. Even in mere organised matter there is *life*, but only life of a limited kind.'
10. An especially important electro-chemical researcher of the time was Johann Ritter, who had encountered Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* at Jena and then was a close friend and collaborator of Han Christian Oersted (see the following note): for further discussion and references see M. Friedman and A. Nordmann (eds), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-century Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).
11. I argue in detail in Friedman and Nordmann, *The Kantian Legacy*, that Oersted's experimental discovery of electro-magnetism – that an electric current or galvanic circuit is surrounded by a magnetic field – was in fact decisively influenced by Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* (to which he was first introduced by Ritter: see note 10 above). The key idea which inspired Oersted, as he himself explains, is that the forces acting in the galvanic circuit are intermediate between those active in magnetism and (static) electricity, respectively, in so far as they are less 'bound' than the former but more 'bound' than the latter: a direct magnetic effect of electrical forces should therefore be sought in the action of the galvanic circuit.
12. See SSW ii, 187; *Ideas*, 149: 'Therefore, already in the chemical properties of matter there actually lie the first, although still completely undeveloped seeds of a future system of nature, which can unfold into the most varied forms and structures, up to the point . . . where the necessary and the contingent, the mechanical and the free, separate from one another. Chemical phenomena constitute the middle term between the two. It is this far, then, that the principles of attraction and repulsion actually lead, as soon as one considers them as principles of a *universal system of nature*.'
13. Schelling is here self-consciously returning to precisely the 'hylozoism' Kant explicitly rejects: compare note 5 above. This essentially biological or organic conception of nature

then entails the overcoming of all scepticism in the sense that the closing of the circle implicated in notes 8 and 12 above (embracing both mechanism and teleology) means that transcendental philosophy and *Naturphilosophie* – spirit and nature – are ultimately identical, in so far as nature itself gives rise to both life in general and conscious or rational life in particular. See SSW ii, 56; *Ideas*, 42: 'Nature should be the visible spirit, spirit the invisible nature. It is *here*, therefore, in the absolute identity of spirit *within* us and nature *outside* us, that the problem of how a nature outside us is possible must be solved.'

14. I can present only a brief outline here. For further details and references see Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, ch. 5; Friedman and Nordmann, *The Kantian Legacy*.
15. In the *Opus postumum* Kant goes so far as to say that, if the 'transition' project he is now embarked on cannot be successfully completed, then there is a fundamental 'gap' in the critical system. For the importance of this idea see E. Förster, 'Is there "a gap" in Kant's critical system?', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 533–55; for further discussion see Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, chapter 5; E. Förster, *Kant's Final Synthesis: an essay on the* Opus postumum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
16. Aside from the work of Ritter and Oersted mentioned in notes 10 and 11 above, this also included such seminal figures as Humphrey Davy and Michael Faraday – both of whom were strongly influenced by Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* through the mediating influence of Samuel Coleridge. For discussion of Davy and Faraday see L. Pearce Williams, *Michael Faraday: a biography* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1965), and the same author's *The Origins of Field Theory* (New York, NY: Random House, 1966).
17. See Helmholtz, *Vorträge und Reden*, i (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1903), 88. For discussion of Helmholtz's place in the neo-Kantian 'back to Kant!' movement, see E. Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge: philosophy, science, and history since Hegel*, trans. W. Woglom and C. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950). See also D. Cahan (ed.), *Hermann von Helmholtz: philosopher and scientist* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992) and the same editor's *Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993) for useful overviews of Helmholtz's many contributions. My own most detailed discussion of Helmholtz, on which I am drawing here, is 'Helmholtz's *Zeichentheorie* and Schlick's *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*: early Logical Empiricism and its nineteenth-century background', *Philosophical Topics* 25 (1997) 19–50.
18. I cite this work using page numbers from both the reprinting in H. Helmholtz, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, vol. I (Leipzig: Barth, 1882) and the translation in Russell Kahl (ed.), *Selected Writings of Hermann Von Helmholtz* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1971).
19. Compare Helmholtz's statement in that lecture: 'Hence the investigation of sense perception leads us on also to that knowledge already found by Kant, that the proposition, "no effect without a cause," is a law of our thinking given prior to all experience.' H. Helmholtz, *Vorträge und Reden*, i, 116.
20. In particular, Helmholtz gives an argument for the conclusion that all forces must be resolvable into fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion, which is precisely parallel to Kant's argument for the same conclusion in the note to the second explication of the Dynamics of the *Metaphysical Foundations*. See 'On the conservation of force'

(*Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, 15; Kahl, *Selected Writings*, 5) and compare *Metaphysical Foundations* (GS iv, 498–99).

21. Thus Helmholtz, in this respect, entirely agrees with Kant's anti-hylozistic view that the law of causality, instantiated in matter, is ultimately equivalent to 'mechanical' lifelessness: compare notes 5 and 13 above, together with the paragraphs to which they are appended. Helmholtz makes only a few brief remarks on organic nature at the end of his memoir on the conservation of energy. However, his later 1869 lecture on 'The aim and progress of physical science' (translated in Kahl, *Selected Writings*) includes a lengthy criticism of all attempts to inject a 'life-soul' or 'vital force' into nature and explicitly appeals to Darwin's theory of evolution to argue against intrinsic purposiveness or teleology in nature.
22. Helmholtz gradually came to realise that a reduction to (time-independent) Newtonian central forces of attraction and repulsion does not succeed in the case of electricity and magnetism, and, accordingly, that his claim that conservation of energy implies an exclusive reduction to such Newtonian forces is incorrect (compare note 26 below). Helmholtz therefore abandoned his reliance on Wilhelm Weber's action-at-a-distance theory in his own work on electricity and magnetism, and instead became the leading advocate on the Continent of Maxwell's field theory.
23. Helmholtz's 1855 lecture generalises this to the more basic inference to the existence of an external world: Helmholtz, *Vorträge und Reden*, 1, 115–16. This passage is then immediately followed by the sentence quoted in note 19 above.
24. In Kahl *Selected Writings*, however, the first sentence is grossly mistranslated so as to have Helmholtz saying that he *still* considers 'Kant's epistemological insights' to be correct.
25. And 1855: compare note 23 above.
26. Helmholtz's note goes on to suggest that he was also earlier mistaken in separating *matter* too sharply from the *forces* or *laws* in accordance with which it acts – and so he here appears, more generally, to be rejecting the *a priori* theory of matter he had borrowed from Kant as well. It seems likely that Helmholtz's movement away from this position was closely connected with his realisation that electro-magnetic forces cannot be assimilated to 'unalterable' central forces, and thus that the fundamental equivalence he had tried to set up between phenomenological energy conservation, on the one side, and a reduction to masses and central forces, on the other, does not in fact hold good (see notes 2–4 from 1881; and compare note 22 above). This particular route from phenomenological lawlikeness to 'ultimate unalterable causes' lying behind the appearances was therefore closed.
27. I cite this work by page numbers of volume III of the third (1910) edition and the English translation of this edition (*Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics*, ed. James P. C. Southall [Menasha Wisconsin: George Banta, 1925]), respectively. The most extended defence of Helmholtz's 'empiricist' theory is found in §26, 'On perceptions in general'. The second (1896) edition drastically revises this section by incorporating much of the content of Helmholtz's famous 1878 lecture, 'The facts in perception', to be discussed below. The third edition is a posthumous reprinting of the first, and gives the page numbers of the original edition in the margins.
28. For the development and basic ideas of Helmholtz's theory I largely follow the lucid and balanced account in G. Hatfield, *The Natural and the Normative: theories of spatial perception*

from Kant to Helmholtz (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), ch. 5. Hatfield is particularly careful to distinguish the 'empiricist'/'nativist' debate in the psycho-physiology of perception from the traditional 'empiricist'/'rationalist' debate in modern epistemology: see his Appendix A. I also agree with Hatfield in seeing a gradual 'retreat' from the early position of 1855: see 208–14.

29. Helmholtz, *Optik*, 433, *Treatise*, 533. An earlier passage makes the connection with the (conceptual) faculty of understanding more explicit (*Optik*, 21, *Treatise*, 23): 'The representation of a spatially extended body, e.g., a table, includes a mass of individual observations. There lies comprised therein the entire series of images that this table would provide me if I were to consider it from various sides and from various distances, if I were to lay my hands successively on the various points of its surface. Such a representation of a particular individual body is thus actually already a *concept*, which comprehends under itself an infinite number of particular intuitions following one another in time, all of which can be derived from it, just as the generic concept "table" in turn comprehends within itself all particular tables and expresses their common characters.'
30. The connection with the perception of space, as mediated by bodily motion, is indicated shortly after the passage last quoted (*Optik*, 26, *Treatise*, 29): 'Of the greatest importance, finally, for the fixity of our conviction in the correctness of our sensory perceptions are the tests that we undertake by means of the optional motions of our body. There thereby arises the same kind of fixed conviction, relative to merely passive observation, that we gain in scientific investigations through the experimental method. The proper ultimate ground, through which all our consciously executed inductions receive the power of conviction, is the law of causality.'
31. Compare the earlier discussion, quoted in note 29 above, concerning the localisation of a table in space. If we compare the talk about 'concept[s]' and 'generic concept[s]' in this passage with the remarks about 'general rules' and 'universal generic concepts' in the passage from the introduction to the monograph on energy quoted in the paragraph to which note 18 above is appended, it seems clear that the inductive regularities in question lie wholly on the side of the 'appearances'. (And it also seems to follows, accordingly, that it is no longer a 'condition for the complete conceptualisability of nature' that we find 'ultimate causes' behind the 'appearances' – for 'general rules' and 'universal generic concepts' are found precisely on the side of the 'appearances'.)
32. Compare note 27 above.
33. All quotations from 'The facts in perception' – and from 'On the origin and significance of the axioms of geometry' (see below) – are taken from P. Hertz and M. Schlick (eds), *Hermann v. Helmholtz: Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie* (Berlin: Springer, 1921), translated in Robert Cohen and Yehuda Elkana (eds), *Hermann von Helmholtz: epistemological writings* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977): in this case, from Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 117; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 124.
34. This result, as originally sketched by Helmholtz, was later proved by Sophus Lie within his theory of continuous groups. For the work of Helmholtz and Lie see R. Torretti, *Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), §3.1. For a philosophically and mathematically sophisticated discussion of Helmholtz and Riemann see H. Stein, 'Some philosophical prehistory of general relativity', in J. Earman, C. Glymour and J. Stachel (eds), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, viii (Minneapolis, Minn.: Minnesota University Press, 1977), 3–49, §§VI, VII.

35. For a discussion of Helmholtz's results in the context of his theory of space-perception see J. Richards, 'The evolution of empiricism: Hermann von Helmholtz and the foundations of geometry', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 28 (1977), 235–53.
36. This is the title of Appendix 2 to 'The facts in perception': see Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 140–42; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 149–52. For further discussion see again Friedman, 'Helmholtz's *Zeichentheorie*', especially note 56.
37. Helmholtz formulates this 'fundamental problem' at the beginning of 'The facts of perception' as follows (Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 111; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 117): 'What is truth in our intuition and thought? In what sense do our representations correspond to actuality?'
38. Comparing the passage just quoted with the closely related passage quoted at the end of the paragraph to which note 37 above is appended, it follows that 'the lawlike ordering in the realm of the actual' is the same as 'the lawlike in the appearance'. Moreover, both passages should be compared with the passage from 1881, to which note 24 above is appended, where Helmholtz formulates the principle of causality as 'nothing other than the presupposition of the lawlikeness of all the appearances of nature'. For further discussion of Helmholtz's 'sign theory' (*Zeichentheorie*) of perception in this context see Friedman 'Helmholtz's *Zeichentheorie*'.
39. See the paragraph to which note 4 above is appended.
40. See the paragraph to which note 15 above is appended, together with the preceding and following paragraphs. For more on the distinction between mathematical and dynamical principles, in the context of Kant's argument in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, see Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, ch. 4, §II.
41. In this sense, there is also a counterpart of the Kantian conception of the schematisation of the intellect in terms of sensibility in Helmholtz: by subjecting our sensations to the condition of free mobility (an especially fundamental kind of lawlikeness), we ensure the application of geometry to our outer perceptions (see note 37 above). In Kant himself, however, the situation is considerably more complicated: for further discussion see Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, 197–203; Friedman, 'Geometry, construction, and intuition in Kant and his successors', in G. Scher and R. Tieszen (eds), *Between Logic and Intuition: essays in honor of Charles Parsons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 186–218, at 197–99; and Friedman, 'Transcendental philosophy'.
42. See note 35 above, together with the paragraph to which it is appended. For further discussion see again Friedman, 'Geometry', where I explain, in particular, how we can extend the procedure of straight-edge and compass construction to all three classical geometries of constant curvature.
43. For a balanced discussion of the interpenetration of 'naturalistic' and 'normative' (or 'transcendental') elements in Helmholtz's thought see again Hatfield, *The Natural and the Normative*: compare note 28 above. Kant makes clear the irrelevance of empirical psychology to the discipline he here calls 'transcendental logic' (another name for 'transcendental philosophy' in this context) in an important passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A54/B78): 'As pure logic [this discipline] has no empirical principles, and hence borrows nothing (as one sometimes persuades oneself) from psychology, which thus has no influence at all on the canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain entirely a priori.' (Of course Kant does not mean by 'psychology' the same thing Helmholtz does.)

44. For Kant himself, by contrast, the very idea of transcendental philosophy is inseparable from his sharp distinction between understanding and sensibility. The main task of the Transcendental Analytic, in the metaphysical and transcendental deductions, is then to show that and how the two *a priori* faculties of pure understanding and pure sensibility are necessarily interrelated; and it is precisely this 'synthetic' or progressive argument which then distinguishes the characteristic method of the first *Critique* from the 'analytic' or regressive method of the *Prolegomena*.
45. This terminology is explicitly borrowed from Kant's 'regulative' solution to the antinomies of pure reason in §VIII of the chapter on the antinomies in the first *Critique*, and, more generally, it reflects the fact that the Marburg School, in accordance with another prominent trend in post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, is thereby reconceiving Kant's sharp distinction between regulative and constitutive principles as well.
46. Here see especially H. Cohen, *Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte* (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1883); and, for further discussion, see A. Richardson, '"The fact of science" and critique of knowledge: exact science as problem and resource in Marburg neo-Kantianism', in Friedman and Nordmann, *The Kantian Legacy*, 211–26.
47. For further details about Cassirer, and his relation to Cohen, see M. Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), and M. Friedman, 'Ernst Cassirer and the philosophy of science', in Gary Gutting (ed.), *Continental Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71–83, upon which I am drawing here.
48. Compare note 45 above.
49. See the paragraph to which note 35 above is appended.
50. Thus, we might conceive the sequence in question as beginning with the decomposition of the four-dimensional manifold of spatio-temporal events into Newtonian absolute (Euclidean) space plus absolute time ($E^3 \times T$), progressing from there to the structure of what we now call neo-Newtonian or Galilean space-time corresponding to the late nineteenth-century concept of an inertial frame; then progressing to the structure of Minkowski space-time corresponding to the Lorentz (rather than Galilean) transformations between inertial frames characteristic of special relativity; and finally progressing to the new variably curved space-time structure of general relativity containing the (flat) structure of Minkowski space-time as a limiting (infinitesimal) special case.
51. Einstein explicitly applauded this anti-Kantian polemic in a well-known letter to Schlick: 'I have not read anything so perceptive and true in a long time.' For discussion see J. A. Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna station*, ed. Linda Wessels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 10; D. Howard, 'Realism and conventionalism in Einstein's philosophy of science: the Einstein–Schlick correspondence', *Philosophia Naturalis* 21 (1984), 619–29.
52. See Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 100; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 325: '[A]nyone who asserts the critical theory must, if we are to give him credence, actually indicate the a priori principles that must constitute the firm ground of all exact science . . . We must therefore require a declaration of the cognitions, for example, whose source is space. The critical idealist must designate them with the same determinateness and clarity with which Kant could refer to the geometry and 'general doctrine of motion' that were alone known and recognised at his time.'
53. For example, Schlick quotes from the above passage of Cassirer's on 'the function of "spatiality in general" . . . entirely without regard to its more particular determinations',

and complains that this formulation is 'hardly satisfactory[; f]or what complex of axioms is it that is supposed to be comprised in this assertion?': Hertz and Schlick, *Helmholtz*, 101; Helmholtz, *Epistemological Writings*, 326.

54. Compare note 45 above.
55. Compare note 50 above.
56. Here Schlick takes himself to be following Helmholtz's celebrated 'sign theory' of perception (compare note 38 above, together with the paragraph to which it is appended), according to which our perceptions do not picture or resemble external reality but only correspond to it by a relation of 'co-ordination' (*Zuordnung*). For a discussion of Helmholtz and Schlick on this matter see again Friedman, 'Helmholtz's *Zeichentheorie*'.
57. Cassirer, like Schlick, appeals to Helmholtz's 'sign theory' for the relation of 'co-ordination' in question. However, the true significance of this theory, for Cassirer, consists in a denial of what he calls the 'copy theory of knowledge' (correspondence with independently existing 'things in themselves') in favour of (his version of) a 'critical' theory. For further discussion see again Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways*, 'Ernst Cassirer', and also T. A. Ryckman, '*Conditio sine qua non*: *Zuordnung* in the early epistemologies of Cassirer and Schlick', *Synthese* 88 (1991), 57–95.

2

The impact of German Idealism and Romanticism on biology in the nineteenth century

Robert J. Richards

> All art should become science and all science art;
> poetry and philosophy should be made one.[a]
>
> Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Fragmente*, 115

Many revolutionary proposals entered the biological disciplines during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, theories that provided the foundations for today's science and gave structure to its various branches. Cell theory, evolutionary theory and genetics achieved their modern form during this earlier time. The period also saw a variety of new, auxiliary hypotheses that supplied necessary supports for the more comprehensive theories. Ideas in morphology, embryology, systematics, language and behaviour began to proliferate. These scientific developments forced a reconceptualisation of nature and the place of human beings therein. The legacy for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been a materialisation and mechanisation of the most fundamental processes of life. From our current perspective, it is easy to look back and assume that the foundational ideas of our contemporary science must have had the same character as they now seem to manifest. I think a closer inspection of biological science of this earlier period will reveal a discipline whose philosophic assumptions are quite different from those of its present incarnation. This becomes especially vivid when we focus on the contributions of German Idealism and Romanticism to the biology of the earlier dispensation.[1]

Idealism and Romanticism might seem the very antitheses of the kind of empirical biology of the early period, especially the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin, who, it is usually assumed, banished ideas of purpose and finality from nature, the kind of ideas cultivated by the Idealists

a. Alle Kunst soll Wissenschaft, und alle Wissenschaft soll Kunst werden; Poesie und Philosophie sollen Vereinigt sein.

and Romantics.[2] These latter philosophical movements have been thought stagnant and reeking tributaries of the main currents that led to the modern era in science. I will argue that, on the contrary, certain fundamental ideas flowing through the main channels of biological science originated from what seem from our present vantage to be tainted sources. These sources were both direct and indirect. It was, after all, Alexander von Humboldt, disciple of Goethe and friend of Schelling, who inspired Darwin to embark on his five-year voyage, and the young Englishman's conception of nature bore the mark of his German predecessor. In what follows, I will describe some of the major features of this Romantic contribution to the biology of the nineteenth century and also suggest how those same sources finally caused a bend in the stream, channelling it towards materialism and mechanism.

Romanticism in German biology

Romanticism and Idealism in Germany

The early German Romantics are canonically constituted by the group of individuals in the orbit around the poet and scientist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, such individuals as the historians and literary figures the brothers Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, the poet Friedrich von Hardenberg, known as Novalis, the philosopher Friedrich Schelling, the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, and the galvanising spirit, the redoubtable Caroline Michaelis-Böhmer-Schlegel-Schelling, whose surnames track only a portion of her romantic alliances. Philosophically they were idealists of one form or another, but were distinguished from other idealists of the period by their emphasis on poetry and aesthetic expression as another mode for understanding reality. In this approach they were especially influenced by Immanuel Kant, particularly the Kant of the Third Critique. One might also widen the circle just a bit to include Alexander von Humboldt, the scientist and adventurer, and Carl Gustav Carus, the anatomist and painter, both disciples of Goethe and decisive in spreading the ideals of the movement. I will trace out some of the multiple ways the conceptions of this group gave substantial form to the biology of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially to evolutionary biology.

The contribution of Kant

While virtually no one would be inclined to think of Kant as a Romantic, his critical idealism became foundational to the philosophical and

scientific project of the Romantics. In his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant maintained that aesthetic judgement and the judgement characteristic of biological science, teleological judgement, had a similar structure. They were judgements of the purposive character of beautiful objects and of organic beings. Such judgements, according to Kant, consisted in attributing the existence of the object, whether an artistic product or a natural creature, to the *idea* of the whole object of interacting parts.[3] In aesthetic judgement, the idea resided in the unconscious nature of the artist, there directing the creative activity through aesthetic feeling. In judgements about living creatures, according to Kant, the naturalist had to reduce, as much as possible, their structure and behaviour to mechanistic law, since valid science could only exist in virtue of a system of laws by which the forms and functions of objects could be explained. One ultimately discovered, however, that the forms and functions of living creatures required more than a mechanistic account. There were features of life that escaped reduction of the whole to its parts. Rather, the naturalist had to appeal to the structure of the whole organism to explain features of its parts, that is, he had to assume the parts were organised according to a plan or design of the whole:[4] the functioning of the vertebrate eye, for instance, could be partly explained by the mechanical process of refraction, that is, the bending of light rays as they passed through the variously dense media of cornea, aqueous humour, lens and vitreous humour on to the retina. But the Snell–Descartes law could not explain why the various media were placed where they were in the eye. By exploring the whole structure of the eye, the naturalist would come to understand the purpose of the disposition of the parts, namely, to produce a coherent image on the retina. It is as if the design of the whole were the effective cause of the arrangement of the parts, as if, in Kant's terms, an *intellectus archetypus* had so constructed living creatures.[5] Yet we could not employ teleological accounts to provide an objective understanding of nature; at best they could only be regulative, that is, heuristic suggestions about where we might look for mechanistic laws.

Of course, machines can have designs that require us to comprehend the whole to understand the various functions of the parts. But biological organisms display telic features that no machine – at least of Kant's time – could manifest. The organs of creatures grow and repair themselves, with each organ acting reciprocally as means and end of the other organs; moreover, the whole creature can reproduce itself through generation.[6] These properties not only require the assumption of a plan as their cause – and an intelligence behind the plan – but the plan must be realised over time.

In the mid 1780s, Kant critically reviewed his one-time student Johann Gottfried Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menchenheit*, which was just appearing in several volumes. He found Herder's proto-evolutionary ideas 'so monstrous that reason shudders before them'.[b] Yet when the anthropologist and comparative anatomist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach advanced similar ideas, Kant found them not to be an affront to reason, but, as he said admiringly, 'a daring adventure of reason'.[c] It could be, Kant speculated, that the structure of a simple organism might be mechanically deformed to produce a more advanced creature. The osteological structure of, for instance, a more primitive organism, say a fish, might have vertebrae mechanically altered to shape the bones of a skull, the ribs moulded into a pelvic girdle, etc. Kant thought, however, that evidence failed to support this possibility; moreover, if one were to suppose such transformations in the history of life, one would still have to reject any supposition about the simplest creatures having been spontaneously generated from the inorganic. There could be, as he said, no Newton of the grass blade.[7] For Kant this ultimately meant that biology could not be a science (*Naturwissenschaft*) but at best a descriptive discipline (*Naturlehre*), since we had no way of reconciling final causes with mechanical causes.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Charlotte von Stein said of her friend Goethe's musings over the proto-evolutionary notions in Herder's *Ideen* that something interesting always flows from his imagination. What stimulated him, according to von Stein, was the thought that 'we were first plants and animals, though what nature will further stamp out of us will remain unknown'.[d] Goethe would find support for these fancies especially in his discussions with his protégé the young philosopher Friedrich Schelling.

Goethe's poetry, novels and science were pivotal for the early Romantics, and there is every good reason to classify his work, despite the many moods of his mind and the usual demurs of scholars, as the quintessence of the Romantic. His nature poetry, the novel that made him famous – *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* – his gothic love story, *Faust*, and his conception of

b. 'so ungeheuer . . . daß die Vernunft vor ihnen zuruckbebt', KW vi, 792, cp. 795–96.
c. 'Ein gewagtes Abenteuer der Vernunft', KW v, 539.
d. 'Herders neue Schrift macht wahrscheinlich, daß wir erst Pflanzen und Thiere waren; was nun die Natur weiter aus uns stampfen wird, wird uns wohl unbekannt bleiben'. Charlotte von Stein to Karl Ludwig Knebel (1 May 1784), in Heinrich Düntzer, ed., *Zur deutschen Literatur und Geschichte: Ungedruckte Briefe aus Knebels Nachlass*, 2 vols. (Nürnberg: Bauer und Raspe, 1858), i, 120.

the unity of science and art would urge this view. He himself admitted to Peter Eckermann, his Boswell, that his friend Schiller had convinced him that he was indeed a Romantic.[8] Moreover, since Friedrich Schlegel, the founding spirit of the early Romantic movement, took Goethe's poetry as the very model of the Romantic, virtually by definition Goethe had to be a Romantic.[9] Finally, he moved philosophically precisely in the direction of his young protégé Schelling, the architect of a philosophical Romanticism, the path of which led back to Kant's Third Critique.

Goethe embraced the Third Critique because it seemed to unite his two passions, art and biological science. But like Schelling, and as a result of many conversations with the young philosopher, he became more Kantian than Kant. First, he assumed in a quite general way that aesthetic judgement and teleological judgement were two avenues to the underlying structures of nature. That is, he came to hold that the artist had to comprehend the essential forms, the archetypes, in order to render natural objects in poetry or painting in the most exquisite way; indeed, the artist in composing a beautiful work in the light of these archetypes was exercising the same creative power as nature when she produced living organisms.[10] Kant held that attributions of purposiveness in the explanation of natural kinds could only be regulative strategies for coming to grips, as best one could, with living organisms. Such attributions were not to be regarded as constitutive of the operations of nature; only, as it were, heuristic modes of understanding. Goethe, under the tutelage of the young Schelling, thought that if we were compelled to explain vital structures, employing ideas of purpose, then biological accounts were no different from explanations that employed mechanical causation, which the possibility of experience required us to postulate. We could, then, formulate laws of life with as much justification as we could laws governing the apparently inorganic.

I just referred to the 'apparently inorganic', since one of the principal theses of the German Romantics, at least those influenced by Schelling, was that all of nature was organic and had to be understood ultimately from that point of view. Nature, whether living or the apparently inert, had to be conceived as a complex whose parts were adjusted to one another as both means and ends; and its operations had ultimately to be regarded as dependent on the idea of the whole. But as Kant had shown, the design of the whole had to be attributed to intelligence, to mind. In Schelling's formulation, 'nature should be visible mind [*Geist*], mind invisible nature'.[e] Schelling's

e. 'Die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur seyn.' Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta'scher Verlag, 1857) (hereafter SSW), ii: 56.

thesis conformed to Goethe's long-held predilection for Spinoza, according to whom nature and mind were two attributes of the same underlying substance: it was *Deus sive Natura* – God and nature were one. As a result of the interaction between Goethe and Schelling, the mentor's philosophy became more idealistic and the protégé's more objective. Both came to hold that nature herself was creative and acted according to ideas.

Goethe's greatest impact on the science of the nineteenth century came not from his publications in optics and colour theory, which failed to achieve the scientific recognition he desired, but from the science that he created, morphology. That science found expression in his *Metamorphose der Pflanzen* and in the three volumes of essays travelling under the title *Zur Morphologie*. Goethe's work in morphology, in Hermann von Helmholtz's estimation, made the path easy in Germany for the reception of Darwin's evolutionary theory later in the century.[11] In his little book *Versuch, die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären*, published in the same year as Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790, Goethe argued that the various parts of the plant – roots, stem, leaves, petals, sexual organs – all had to be understood as transformations of an underlying *Bauplan* or archetype, a structure he symbolised by calling it the ideal leaf. In the essays in *Zur Morphologie*, published in the 1820s, but with most written earlier, he expanded the notion of the archetype to animals, maintaining that comparative analyses of animal structures indicated comparable transformations. He came to hold, for instance, what was called 'the vertebral theory of the skull', a conception resulting from both his anatomical studies and a chance observation in Venice. This theory maintains that the vertebrate skull is really composed of six transformed vertebrae, just as the parts of a plant are composed of the transformed leaf. Goethe generalised the idea to suggest that the limbs, pelvic girdle, ribs and skull are to be understood as modifications of an underlying archetypal structure.[12]

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

Goethe was the civil administrator for Duke Carl August of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, and the individual most responsible for luring to the small provincial university of the Saxon duchies at Jena many of the philosophic, artistic and scientific luminaries of the period, including Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Friedrich Hegel and the young philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling.

Goethe was initially reluctant to bring Schelling to Jena, since he did not trust the young prodigy's idealistic tendencies and French Revolutionary

sympathies. However, he was won over by Schelling's acumen, displayed when the philosopher spoke knowingly of the Geheimrat's papers on optics. They became good friends, with Goethe acting as a surrogate father, especially when Schelling fell into a deep depression over the death of a young woman – indeed, he was accused of murdering her. In summer of 1798, Goethe began struggling with Schelling's treatise *On the World-Soul* (*Von der Weltseele*) and shortly thereafter mentioned that he detected the book's propositions to be 'incorporated into the eternal metamorphosis of the external world'.[f] After the publication of Schelling's *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, he and Goethe met frequently in November 1798 to discuss the character of *Naturphilosophie*; the impact of these discussions seems to have redirected Schelling's idealism towards what ultimately became, with oxymoronic designation, his ideal-realism, the kind of Spinozistic objectivism that would cause a rift with Fichte but bind him tightly to Goethe. Interaction with the young philosopher also caused Goethe to see that his morphology could be grounded in Schelling's kind of idealistic metaphysics. In any case, a brief time after their meetings, Schelling added a long introduction to the *Entwurf* in which he argued the necessity of experimental observation and empirical measure to establish natural laws in the study of life.

If nature and God were the same – that is, the identity of nature and mind – then nature could not ultimately be reducible to mere inert, mechanical processes. The creativity and moral features of nature need not be imposed from without by a beneficent God, but should be regarded as original endowments of nature herself. 'The objective world', in Schelling's happy epigram, would be 'the original, though unconscious, poetry of mind [*Geist*]'.[g]

Schelling argued that the structures of nature would result from an evolutionary process, a *dynamische Evolution* he termed it. In the previous literature, the Latin *evolutio* referred to the embryological doctrine of preformationism, that is, the hypothesis that the embryo already contained all the adult structures and simply had to unroll, or evolve, during gestation. The term 'dynamische' seems to suggest a temporal unfolding. Given his identification of mind with nature, Schelling's conception of evolution would thus have two features: a kind of rational dialectic in which the full development of a *Gattung* (i.e., a species or larger taxonomic group) would already have

f. 'Schellings Weltseele beschäftigte unser höchstes Geistesvermögen. Wir sahen sie nun in der ewigen Metamorphose der Außenwelt abermals verkörpert'. Goethe, *Tag- und Jahres-Hefte 1798*, in *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens* (Münchner Ausgabe), ed. Karl Richter *et al.*, 21 vols. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985–98), xiv: 58.

g. 'Die *objektive Welt* ist nur die ursprüngliche, noch bewußtlose *Poesie des Geistes*'. SSW, ii: 349.

achieved its full development in the idea; and a temporal expression in empirical nature. Taking direct aim at Kant in his demur about a 'daring adventure of reason', Schelling asserted that it was a 'vintage delusion' to hold that 'organisation and life cannot be explained from natural principles'. One only needed to cultivate that sense of reason as an adventure:

> One could at least take one step towards explanation if one could show that the stages of all organic beings have been formed through a gradual development of one and the same organisation. – That our experience has not taught us of any formation of nature, has not shown us any transition from one form or kind into another (although the metamorphosis of many insects . . . could be introduced as an analogous phenomenon) – this is no demonstration against that possibility. For a defender of the idea of development [*Entwickelung*] could answer that the alteration to which the organic as well as the inorganic nature was subjected . . . occurred over a much longer time than our small periods could provide measure.[h]

Schelling attributed his understanding of the possibility of such dynamic evolution to Goethe. In a letter to his mentor, after his mental breakdown, he confessed that

> the metamorphosis of plants, according to your theory, has proved indispensable to me as the fundamental scheme for the origin of all organic beings. By your work, I have been brought very near to the inner identity of all organised beings among themselves and with the earth, which is their common source [*gemeinschaftlicher Stamm*]. That earth can become plants and animals was indeed already in it through the establishment of the dynamic basic organisation, and so the organic never indeed arises since it was already there. In future we will be able to show the first origin of the more highly organised plants and animals out of the mere dynamically organised earth, just as you were able to show how the more highly organised blooms and sexual parts

h. 'Es ist ein alter Wahn, daß Organisation und Leben aus Naturprincipien unerklärbar seyen. . . . Es wäre wenigstens Ein Schritt zu jener Erklärung gethan, wenn man zeigen könnte daß die Stufenfolge aller organischen Wesen durch allmähliche Entwicklung einer und derselben Organisation sich gebildet habe.–Daß unsere Erfahrung keine Umgestaltung der Natur, keinen Uebergang einer Form oder Art in die andere, gelehrt hat – (obgleich die Metamorphosen mancher Insekten, . . . als analogische Erscheinungen wenigstens angeführt warden können) – ist gegen jene Möglichkeit kein Beweis; denn, könnte ein Vertheidiger derselben antworten, die Veränderungen, denen die organische Natur, so gut als die anorgische, unterworfen ist, können . . . in immer längern Perioden geschehen, für welche unsere kleinen Perioden . . . kein Maß abgeben.' Schelling, *Von der Weltseele*, in SSW, ii, 348–49.

> of plants could come from the initially more lowly organised seed leaves through transformation.[i]

Schelling's remark that the 'organic never arises since it was already there' was another swipe at Kant, who contended that a conceptual obstacle to any transformational theory would be the impossibility of spontaneous generation, that is, the development of the organic out of the inorganic. From Schelling's point of view, organicism was the fundamental property of the objective world. Schelling's theory of dynamic evolution caused the great historian of philosophy Kuno Fischer, when he was rector at Jena in the 1860s, to remind Ernst Haeckel that Lamarck and Darwin were not the first to advance a theory of the evolution of species.[13]

Carl Gustav Carus

The theory of the archetype became a central notion of Goethean morphology, and it was instrumental in converting Schelling to a theory of Spinozistic identity. Goethe's theory was further advanced and made more available to biologists through the efforts of his disciple Carl Gustav Carus, who refined the theory in his *Von den Ur-Theilen des Knochen- und Schalengerüstes* (1828). In this work, Carus illustrated the archetypal unity of the vertebrates (Figure 2.2), and showed how the entire vertebrate frame could be generated from the features of a single vertebra. And that vertebra could be idealised even further. Much like a new Copernicus, he demonstrated how that physical emblem could be understood as composed of geometrical spheres (Figure 2.1). Here was an effort to show, *contra* Kant, that natural history could be made into an objectively mathematical science, to show, in Kant's terms, that a *Naturlehre* could become a *Naturwissenschaft*. Under this latter guise the theory of the archetype crossed the Channel and played a crucial part in the development of British morphology, especially in the work of Joseph Henry Green, Richard Owen and Charles Darwin.

i. 'Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen nach Ihrer Darstellung hat sich mir durchgängig als Grundschema alles organischen Entstehens bewährt, und mir die innere Identität aller Organisationen unter sich und mit der Erde, welche ihr gemeinschaftlicher Stamm ist, jezt schon sehr nahe gebracht. Daß die Erde Pflanzen und Thier werden konnte, war freilich in sie schon durch die dynamische Grundorganisation gelegt, und so entstand freilich das Organische niemals, sondern war immer schon da. Doch werden wir künftig den ersten Ursprung der höher organisirten Pflanzen und Thiere aus der bloß dynamisch organisirten Erde ebenso zeigen können, wie Sie die höher organisirten Blüthen und Geschlechtstheile der Pflanzen aus den ersten niedriger organisirten Samenblättchen durch Verwandlung konnten hervorgehen lassen.' Schelling to Goethe (26 January 1801), in F. W. J. Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmans, 3 vols. to date (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1962–), i, 243.




Figure 2.1 A vertebra as decomposable into ideal spherical forms; from Carl Gustav Carus, *Von den Ur-Theilen des Knochen- und Schalengerüstes* (1828).

Alexander von Humboldt

Alexander von Humboldt – another reader of Kant, disciple of Goethe and friend of Schelling – helped spread the influence of German Romanticism beyond central Europe. During the late 1790s, he and Goethe




Figure 2.2 Illustrations of the vertebrate archetype (fig.1) and of an ideal vertebra (fig.3); from Carl Gustav Carus, *Von den Ur-Theilen des Knochen- und Schalengerüstes* (1828).

performed many dissectional observations and conducted experiments in animal physiology at Jena. Humboldt was interested particularly in the new theories of animal electricity advanced by Luigi Galvani, Alessandro Volta and Johann Wilhelm Ritter. Humboldt became convinced, in support of Galvani and in opposition to Volta, that animals could endogenously generate their own electrical current; indeed, one could construct a voltaic pile not only of metals of alternating mineral character, but also of animal muscles freshly excised. This suggested that the vital fluid flowing through the nerves was electrical in character and internally produced. Humboldt proposed that life itself consisted in the balance of forces within the organism – electrical, magnetic, caloric – that resisted dissolution. His view was consistent with that of Schelling, who maintained that the entire economy of nature depended upon a balance of these imponderable fluids. Humboldt published the results of his research in his two-volume *Essays on the Irritation*

of the Muscular and Nervous Fibre (*Versuche über die gereizte Muskel- und Nervenfaser*) (1797–1799). But even before the second volume could appear, the ever-restless Humboldt had embarked on a travel of adventure and research to the New World.

Humboldt spent some five years in South and Central America, travelling up and down the Orinoco River, with a concluding trip to Philadelphia and Washington, DC to meet Thomas Jefferson. He wrote of his adventure in a large seven-volume account, translated into English as *Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent, during the Years 1799–1804*. Darwin read the first several volumes while at Cambridge University, and the tales of exotic climes and wild Indians grew in his imagination until desire conquered improbability. When the chance to embark on a comparable journey arose, he overcame the many obstacles to make it happen. With the reluctant acquiescence of his father, Darwin signed on, in 1831, with *HMS Beagle* as ship's naturalist and companion to the mercurial Captain, Robert FitzRoy. Like Humboldt's own journey, Darwin's lasted almost five years. He brought Humboldt's *Personal Narrative* and several more of the German's works as his companions on a trip that would make the intellectual world forget its original inspiration. But Darwin did not forget. Later, in 1845, he asked his friend Joseph Hooker, who was visiting the ailing Humboldt in Paris, to convey his 'most respectful and kind compliments, and say that I never forget that my whole course of life is due to having read and re-read as a youth his "Personal Narrative"'.[14]

Humboldt's lush descriptions of the jungles and plains of the upper part of South America so enraptured the young Darwin that when he experienced the reality for himself, he could not help but interpret it through the eyes of his predecessor. A few weeks after disembarking in Bahia, Darwin penned in his diary that: 'from what I have seen Humboldts glorious descriptions are & will for ever be unparalleled . . . He like another Sun illumines everything I behold.'[15]

Behind Humboldt's glorious descriptions lay a theory about nature derived from Kant and Goethe, which he more explicitly expressed in his five-volume *Kosmos*. Like Kant, he understood the laws of nature to form an intricate balance in which the principles from quite diverse sciences – astronomy, chemistry, botany and zoology – formed a patterned whole displaying 'a common, lawful, and eternal bond that runs through all of living nature'.[j] This assumption of balanced lawfulness throughout nature, in Kant's view,

j. 'Ein gemeinsames, gesetzliches und darum ewiges Band die ganze lebendige Natur umschlinge.' Alexander von Humboldt, *Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung*, 5 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1845–1858), i, 9.

resulted from a regulative judgement but one of aesthetic character. We aesthetically sense the tessellated complex of laws of nature and, like an artist, continue to weave new laws into the matrix. For Humboldt, this meant that the naturalist's

> descriptions of nature can be sharply delimited and scientifically exact, without being evacuated of the vivifying breath of imagination. The poetic character must derive from the intuited connection between the sensuous and the intellectual, from the feeling of the vastness, and of the mutual limitation and unity of living nature.[k]

This conception of the union of science and art became so completely absorbed by Darwin that, upon receipt of the scientific diaries he sent back to England during the voyage, his sister Caroline reproved him gently for using Humboldt's 'phraseology . . . [and] the kind of flowery French expressions which he uses, instead of your own simply straight forward & the more agreeable style'.[16] But, as I will relate in a moment, Humboldt's mode of conception had an even greater impact on Darwin's own representations of the operations of nature.

The influence of German Romanticism and Idealism on British biology

There are numerous ways German Romanticism and Idealism shaped British biology in the nineteenth century. I will focus on only five principal modes: archetype theory, nature as an organic and creative power, living nature as governed by law, the aesthetics of science and nature as a moral power.

Archetype theory: Green, Owen and Darwin

Joseph Henry Green, friend of Coleridge and Hunterian lecturer at the Royal College of Surgeons, had studied in Germany, where he cultivated the most exacting kind of anatomical knowledge. He was a devoted reader of the works of Goethe and Schelling especially, and he brought to British shores the theory of the archetype. Drawing on the 'objective idealism of Schelling', Green construed an archetype as

k. 'Naturbeschreibungen, . . . können scharf umgrenzt und wissenschaftlich genau sein, ohne daß ihnen darum der belebende Hauch der Einbildungskraft entzogen bleibt. Das Dichterische muß aus dem geahndeten Zusammenhange des Sinnlichen mit dem Intellectuellen, aus dem Gefühl der Allverbreitung, der gegenseitigen Begrenzung und der Einheit des Naturlebens hervorgehen.' *Ibid.*, ii, 74.

> a causative principle, combining both power and intelligence, containing, predetermining and producing its actual result in all its manifold relations, in reference to a final purpose; and realised in a whole of parts, in which the Idea, as the constitutive energy, is evolved and set forth in its unity, totality, finality, and permanent efficiency.[17]

Being British, however, he located archetypal ideas in the mind of God and not simply in the depths of nature. He did, however, follow Schelling's theory of dynamic evolution, maintaining that new species appeared over time, each advancing towards the realisation of organism in its manifold varieties, the perfection of which was the appearance of the human form.

Richard Owen, certainly the most famous and influential biologist in England in the first half of the nineteenth century, succeeded Green as Hunterian lecturer and then Hunterian Professor at the Royal College of Surgeons. He was a scientific worker of prodigious ability and an ego to match. Darwin depended on this authority after returning from the *Beagle* voyage to aid in sorting his vertebrate specimens and in writing their descriptions for the multi-volume catalogue depicting the scientific results of the voyage. The two naturalists would later have a falling out after Owen published anonymously a scurrilous review of the *Origin of Species*, in which he accused Darwin of weak-mindedness and asserted that, after all, Richard Owen had first laid out the convincing evidence for species change.[18]

Owen focused his work on the anatomy of vertebrates and was the first to provide a systematic description of a class of extinct, giant lizards, giving it the taxonomic name *Dinosauria.* It was Owen who made archetype theory well known in Britain through his *Report on the Archetype* in 1847 and his *On the Nature of Limbs* two years later. In working out his ideas he was in debt to Schelling and Carus in particular, but he advanced considerably on them, especially in developing the idea of 'homology'. Owen maintained, comparably to Schelling and Carus, that one could perceive a common plan uniting the various and greatly divergent vertebrate organisms. For this basic idea he borrowed heavily from Carus's *Von den Ur-Theilen des Knochen- und Schalengerüstes*, as a comparison of their respective illustrations of the vertebrate archetype suggests (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).

Both maintained that the different vertebrate skeletons were essentially a series of vertebrae whose processes had altered to form limbs, ribs, pelvis and head. For example, if one considered the claw of a mole and the wing of a bat (Figure 2.4), it is clear that the bones of the limbs, though modified for different purposes, none the less have the same topological arrangement, which Owen referred to in his Germanophilic way as their 'Bedeutung'.





Figure 2.3 Illustration of the vertebrate archetype (top right) and its teleological modifications in various vertebrate species; from Richard Owen's *On the Nature of Limbs* (1849).

The *Bedeutung* of the limb, for instance, allowed the researcher to compare the limb bones of one vertebrate to those of another of a different species and establish what Owen called their homologous relationship – namely, that they could be referred to the same pattern in the archetype of the limb. According to Owen, then, the plan of all the vertebrates was contained in an ideal structure, much like Goethe's ideal leaf.

Owen initially conceived of the archetype as more than a model or plan by which to understand the relationships that might exist among the vertebrate species. The archetype, as the Romantics had suggested, was a creative power, one that constrained another, expanding vital power, to produce the structures of vertebrate creatures:

> Besides the ἰδεα, organising principle, vital property or force, which produces the diversity of form belonging to living bodies of the same materials . . . there appears also to be in counter-operation during the building up of such bodies the polarising force pervading all space.[19]



6

tusely pointed paddle or oar; without other apparent joint than that which unites it to the body it has to propel: a joint permitting that degree of rotation with the oblique stroke that makes the movement of the oar most effective.

The instrument for burrowing, such as the Mole presents (fig. 2), is not very different in form and character

Fig. 2.

External form and skeleton of the fore-limb of the Mole (*Talpa Europæa*).

from the fin; but being destined to displace a denser element than water, it is shorter in proportion to its breadth, and much stronger: it resembles the fin in consisting, seemingly, of but one segment or joint, and being moveable as a whole only where it is set on to the trunk. The free border, however, instead of being smooth and thin, is notched, and armed with a row of hard, tooth-like, horny

were so denominated from a loose appreciation of this analogy, and convenience obviously suggests their retention in an arbitrary sense. To attempt to change the application of these names from a supposed more accurate appreciation of the analogical resemblance, argues either a mind more subservient to nomenclature than zealous for the advancement of the science of Nature; or an ignorance of the distinct systems to which the skeletons of the limbs of Articulates and Vertebrates owe their origin.

7

points, adapted for scraping and throwing back the soil. With such rapidity does the mole effect this purpose*, that it may literally be said to 'swim through the earth.'

The third form of limb or locomotive member here exhibited (fig. 3), offers a striking contrast to the burrowing

Fig. 3.

External form and skeleton of the wing of the Bat.

trowel we were last contemplating. It is a thin, vastly expanded sheet of membrane, sustained, like an umbrella, by slender rays, and flapped by means of these to and fro

* Prof. Bell, History of British Quadrupeds, p. 96, 8vo, Van Voorst.

Figure 2.4 Homologous limb structures in mole and bat; from Richard Owen's *On the Nature of Limbs* (1849).

In this conception it is not too difficult to detect Schelling's comparable expanding and contracting polarising powers. In Owen's formulation, the expanding ideational force adjusts the skeletons of vertebrates to their different environments, and the contracting force (which he calls the archetype) restricts the basic pattern of bones to maintain homologous relations among the vertebrates.

Owen's enemies had little difficulty in detecting the *naturphilosophisch* assumptions behind these postulated vital forces, atheistical assumptions that seemed to suggest that nature herself had creative power. Two years later Owen made amends for this heterodox tendency. In his highly influential book *On the Nature of Limbs* (1849), he collapsed the vital forces into one, which he simply denominated 'the archetype': it answered 'to the "idea" of the Archetypal World in the Platonic cosmogony, which archetype or primal pattern is the basis supporting all the modifications of such part [as the limb] for specific powers and actions in all animals possessing it'.[20] If the archetype were a kind of Platonic ideal, it might more easily be identified, as Green had

done, with ideas in the mind of God. In the conclusion to his book, Owen reiterated a conception that had hardly severed its connection to the German Romantic tradition:

> We learn from the past history of our globe that she [i.e., Nature] has advanced with slow and stately steps, guided by the archetypal light, amidst the wreck of worlds, from the first embodiment of the Vertebrate idea under its old Ichthyic vestment, until it became arrayed in the glorious garb of the Human form.[21]

To casual appearance, Owen's conclusion seems to endorse the German Idealist notion of a creative transmutation of species. But Owen had already introduced into his Hunterian lecture of 1837 the kind of distinction that he thought made a crucial difference. He maintained that species did progressively replace one another over vast stretches of time, moving from primitive fishes to modern man, but that this was not a genealogic development; rather, it was, he suggested, simply the work of the Divine hand that introduces into nature ever more developed species guided by a developmental ideal. He dismissed the notion of the 'transcendental school' that one species arose out of another, following the pattern of embryonic development. He recognised that 'the doctrine of transmutation of forms during the Embryonal phases is closely allied to that still more objectionable one, the transmutation of species'.[22] After Darwin's triumph, Owen attempted to retrieve his own scientific fortunes by discovering in his early work that he actually had argued for the transmutation of species.

During the *Beagle* voyage, Darwin had remained orthodox in both his biological views and his religious convictions. It was only after his return, in cataloguing his specimens at the British Museum, that he began to suspect that species changed over time. During his period of early theorising, he immersed himself in vast quantities of geological, zoological and botanical literature. It is fair to say, I believe, that the theory established in *The Origin of Species* some twenty years later arose as much out of his voluminous reading as out of his observations on the *Beagle* and subsequent experimental work. Owen's conception of the archetype became a linchpin for Darwin's theory, but in this case he brought that theory back closer to its Romantic moorings.

When Darwin finished Owen's *On the Nature of Limbs*, he pencilled a note on the back flyleaf: 'I look at Owen's Archetypes as more than idea, as a real representation as far as the most consummate skill & loftiest generalisation can represent the parent form of the Vertebrata.'[23] Darwin interpreted the archetype not as an idea in the mind of God, but as the form of the progenitor

of the particular species. Thus contemporary vertebrates, he supposed, have limbs with digits because their ancient ancestors, after they crawled out of the sea, initially developed the tetrapod limb. Here, as in other instances, the connection with German Romanticism is indirect, but quite traceable. But on the matter of the archetype, there are more direct routes back to Germany.

Darwin became familiar with Goethe's morphological ideas from two different sources: from William Whewell, who wrote about the subject in his *History of the Inductive Sciences*, which Darwin read in the summer of 1838; and from the account provided by M. F. G. Pictet's article 'On the Writings of Goethe relative to Natural History', which Darwin read in January, 1839.[24] Commenting on that latter article in his *Notebook E*, Darwin construed Goethe's theory of the vertebrate skull as substantiating his own historical interpretation of the archetype: 'The head being six metamorphosed vertebrae, the parent of all vertebrate animals. – must have been some molluscous ≪bisexual≫ animal with a vertebra only & no head. – !'[25] The notion that the vertebra constituted the type of the higher animals also appears in the *Origin of Species*, where Darwin compared it to Goethe's botanical view that all of the parts of a plant were 'metamorphosed leaves'.[26] But this engagement with Goethe only begins to reveal Darwin's connections with German Romanticism.

Darwin's debt to German Romanticism

The creative force of nature

I have already indicated the ways in which Darwin, during his voyage, perceived nature through Humboldtian eyes. At the conclusion of his *Journal of Researches of H.M.S. Beagle* (1839) – a book that brought Humboldt himself to recognise a kindred spirit – Darwin affirmed his overriding debt: 'as the force of impression frequently depends on preconceived ideas, I may add that all mine were taken from the vivid descriptions in the Personal Narrative which far exceed in merit anything I have ever read on the subject'.[27] Inspired by Humboldt, Darwin began to attribute to nature powers that had been reserved to a transcendent God.

Whewell's mediation of German thought

A stimulus to this transfer was provided by the Master of Trinity College and extraordinary polymath, William Whewell, who was one of a small

cadre in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century to read German science and philosophy. Whewell's friendship with Samuel Taylor Coleridge seems to have led him to German literature as well; he translated some of Goethe's poetry into English. Whewell's three-volume *History of the Inductive Sciences* appeared shortly after Darwin had returned from his *Beagle* voyage. Probably because Darwin knew Whewell from his student days, he read the biological sections of Whewell's third volume with alacrity in the summer of 1838. In his book, Whewell sought to trace the history of the various natural sciences from their earliest period right up to his own time, which thus required an account of German contributions; by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries those contributions had already become quite substantial. Whewell's considerations of the nature of science reflected his reading of Kant and the company of German Idealists from Fichte, Schelling, and Goethe to Hegel, the latter of whom he derided.

Following Kant, Whewell demanded the strict separation of science from theology. Science operated on the basis of empirical evidence and rational inference, which yielded explanatory laws, whereas theology depended on revelation and hope, which succoured a faith in 'things not seen'. Science explored the causal framework of nature and the principles of its operation; theology unveiled the spiritual forces that erected the framework and authored its laws. Though the natural sciences were based on observation and experience, they none the less required certain *a priori* concepts like space, time, causality, resemblance and so on; these ideas were not derived from experience but from the mind's own activity. In the process of induction, these *a priori* ideas organised facts through what Whewell called 'colligation'. In the history of science, when the meaning of such fundamental ideas as space, number, equality, addition and the like became explicit, the self-evident proposition of mathematics immediately followed. This quasi-Kantian conception fuelled Whewell's famous dispute with John Stuart Mill over the *a priori* status of the natural sciences and mathematics. Whewell still differed from Kant in holding that fundamental ideas not only derived from the mind's activity but that they offered accurate depictions of a nature that did not lie completely shrouded beneath a phenomenal veil. More in the spirit of Kant's followers, like Schelling, Whewell believed that the fundamental ideas that operated in contemporary science came to explicit consciousness only in the development of the sciences throughout their history. This feature of Whewell's epistemology – the notion of historical development being requisite for the temporal unfolding of fundamental ideas – reflects his deep engagement with German Idealism.

One of those necessary ideas that came to fruition quite early in the history of science was that of *purpose*, especially as required for understanding biological organisms. It was not, however, simply a Kantian regulative idea; rather, in harmony with the views of Schelling and Goethe, Whewell asserted that purposive principles were reflective of the real structure of organisms and functioned as necessary constituents of the science of zoology. The position was reinforced by the ways in which the great French zoologist George Cuvier utilised the conception of purpose as foundational for biological science.

Cuvier instantiated the concept of purpose in two principles that dominated biological thought in the first half of the nineteenth century, principles that Darwin would also employ, though giving them a different foundation. They were: *correlation of parts* and *the conditions of existence*. The correlation of parts was a version of Kant's notion that the parts of organisms acted reciprocally as means and ends in respect of one another, and that to understand these interactions a concept of the whole was required. The conditions of existence indicated that organisms fit into their environments as a key into a lock – that is, the parts functioned in relation to the ends determined by the creature's surroundings. Should the environment change radically, creatures would of necessity become extinct and their specific type would vanish from the living. These two principles of purposiveness in nature were simply not reducible to any mechanistic laws. Nor could the naturalist breach the fast boundary between science and theology to give teleological principles an account. In this respect, Whewell fully endorsed Kant's constraint on biology as a science: there could be no Newton of the grass blade.

The Kantian idea of purpose, Whewell argued, complemented the idea of the unity of type (his version of the theory of the archetype). He thought Goethe had shown the effectiveness of this concept in botany, where the ideal leaf designated the type of all plants. He recognised the shrewd way Goethe extended the concept of type to animals, especially in the case of the vertebrate skeleton. The concept of type allowed the anatomist to recognise the fundamental architecture uniting extinct creatures with those yet living; the differences among creatures exhibiting a common pattern could be scaled according to a measure of progressive complexity, from simplest marine organisms fossilised in rocks even high in the mountains to the most complex organism extant in the contemporary period, namely, man.

The fossil evidence, according to Whewell, did indicate the extinction of ancient organisms and their replacement by progressively higher creatures. But this did not allow any inference of the sort made by Lamarck, namely

of a genealogical transmutation of species. Cuvier had shown that over long periods of time no fundamental alteration of species had occurred: mummies of humans, cats and deer from Egyptian tombs remained recognisably the same as their living embodiments in Paris and in the woods around the city; moreover, the 'conditions of existence' would have prevented fundamental species change. Both fact and theory thus argued that '*species have a real existence in nature* and a transmutation from one to another does not exist'.[28] Since the scientist could not appeal to scripture for the needed miracles to explain the progressive replacement of species and since lawful physical causes did not avail to explain either the design of species or their progressive replacement, rational inquiry into the origin of species was forestalled. Theology might well provide an answer to the question of the origin of species, as Whewell thought it did; but science would have to remain mute. From a scientific point of view, the matter remained 'shrouded in mystery, and [was] not to be approached without reverence'.[29]

The mystery of mysteries: the Origin of Species

When Darwin read Whewell in the summer of 1838, he had already become convinced that species changed over time. His conviction, though, hardly placed him outside the bounds of orthodoxy. Naturalists had recognised that vast numbers of species had become extinct. Charles Lyell, the geologist from whom Darwin said half his ideas came, had argued that over immense stretches of time extinct species had to be replaced in order to maintain the balance of nature. Moreover, the progressive replacement of species seemed ever more evident, as Whewell had claimed. Darwin's grandfather Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck had both attempted to explain progressive advance, but their theories were mostly dismissed with prejudice. Whewell claimed that no scientific account of species advance was possible, though theology would suggest that the Divine hand stood behind the trajectory of species. Whewell's analysis amounted to a challenge: Could a naturalist discover laws that would explain the teleological structure of organisms and their progressive advance over time? Could there be a Newton of the grass blade?

Darwin opened his first transmutation notebook, in the spring of 1837, and for the next five years kept some seven or so notebooks detailing his thinking about the species question. In 1842 and 1844 he worked out his burgeoning ideas in two essays that sketched a theory that seemed to meet Whewell's challenge: an explanation of progressive change according to natural law. Finally, in 1856, Darwin began to work on a manuscript that

would eventually appear in 1859 as *On the Origin of Species*. Let me briefly turn back to the notebooks and essays to trace out what I see as the distinctive signs of the echoing impact of German Romanticism on the formulation of his theory of species change. I have already mentioned the role of the archetype in Darwin's thinking, and the way in which he began attributing creative power to nature herself. Now I wish to show how his formulation of the principle of natural selection allowed him to conceive nature as having a specific telos, namely, human beings as moral creatures. I think Darwin believed he could accomplish this while yet meeting Whewell's challenge of explaining this teleological trajectory in terms of natural law. I will add, as if it were not already obvious, this is not the usual conception of Darwin's accomplishment.

Through the thicket of entries in his early notebooks, one can detect Darwin attempting to formulate hypotheses by which to explain the progressive development of species. Just about the time he finished with Whewell's three volumes, in the late summer of 1838, he picked up Thomas Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population* – for 'amusement', he recalled – wherein he found the kind of treatment of demographic phenomena that seemed to meet Whewell's requirement for a scientific study. Malthus had suggested that the rise and fall of human populations conformed in a mathematically precise way to the sufficiency of food production. As is well known, reading Malthus furnished Darwin, as he said in his *Autobiography*, with 'a theory by which to work'.[30]

Indicative of the way Darwin thought about the processes of nature is the rough construction of the principle that in time became natural selection. He described the moment of original discovery this way:

> Even the energetic language of Decandoelle does not convey the warring of the species as inference from Malthus . . . Population in increase at geometrical ratio in FAR SHORTER time than 25 years – yet until the one sentence of Malthus no one clearly perceived the great check amongst men . . . One may say there is a force like a hundred thousand wedges trying [to] force . . . every kind of adapted structure into the gaps in the oeconomy of Nature.[31]

What here began as a quasi-mechanistic conception was immediately transformed by Darwin into a teleological rendering: 'The final cause of all this wedging, must be to sort out proper structure & adapt to change. – to do that, for form, which Malthus shows, is the final effect, (by means however of volition) of this populousness, on the energy of Man.'[32] Darwin, like

Whewell, deployed the necessary notion of purpose in discussing biological phenomena.

The appeal to final causes in this instance might be thought simply a *façon de parler*, something the careful historian need not take seriously. After all, most scholars have contended that Darwin's new theory completely banished teleology from modern biology. If we are talking about Darwin's legacy, then I believe that is true; but it is not true of the theory that appears in the *Origin of Species*. I think it is quite clear that during the almost two decades prior to the publication of Darwin's book, the concept of final causality played a fundamental role in the construction of his theory. Whewell, in the wake of Kant, made telic considerations simply part of the standard repertoire of the naturalist's understanding of life, and Darwin accepted that requirement.

A salient example of Darwin's usage of teleological notions, and there are many, came shortly after the Malthus episode, from early November 1838, when he was tackling a problem that still intrigues biologists: Why is there sexual generation instead of the more simple asexual modes? Darwin understood the role of sex as requiring a teleological explanation. He wrote in his *E Notebook*:

> My theory gives great final cause of sexes: for otherwise, there would be as many species, as individuals . . . if all species, there would not be social animals . . . which as I hope to show is the foundation of all that is most beautiful in the moral sentiments of the animated beings. If man is one great object, for which the world was brought into present state. – & if my theory be true then the formation of sexes rigidly necessary.[33]

This is a perfectly teleological explanation: sex came to exist for the purpose of producing social animals; and social animals came to exist for the purpose of ultimately producing moral animals, namely us. Quite clearly, then, Darwin proposed that his theory recognised 'man as the one great object for which the world has come into existence' – that is, the one great purpose or end for which the world came to be.

At the conclusion of the *Origin of Species*, Darwin summarised his accomplishment. From the laws that he had established in his 'long argument', particularly natural selection, 'the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals directly follows'.[34] Of course, the highest animal is the human, with its moral nature. If one does an archaeology of Darwin's texts, the intellectual stratigraphy

reveals the sources of his assertion about 'the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving':

(4) 1859 (*Origin*):	'the most *exalted object*, which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows'.[35]
(3) 1844 (*Essay*):	'... the most *exalted end* which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the creation of the higher animals, has directly proceeded'.[36]
(2) 1842 (*Essay*):	'... the *highest good*, which we can conceive, the creation of the higher animals has directly come'.[37]
(1) 1838 (*E Notebook*):	'... man is *one great object*, for which the world was brought into present state'.[38]

The orthodox, mechanistic interpretation of Darwin's principle of natural selection has obscured the roots of his conception. But the flower manifests its origins as well. In his essays of 1842 and 1844, which provided the schemata for the *Origin of Species*, Darwin conceived the operations of natural selection in quite mentalistic terms, as if nature herself were endowed with mind.

After indicating that the human breeder selects the best of his flocks, segregates them from the rest and brings the chosen together for mating, Darwin asked himself the question:

> [In nature] is there any means of selecting those offspring which vary in the same manner, crossing them and keeping their offspring separate and thus producing selected races: otherwise as the wild animals freely cross, so must such small heterogeneous varieties be constantly counter-balanced and lost, and a uniformity of character preserved?[39]

So the question is: What in nature does the selecting? The issue is especially acute, since, as Darwin here recognised, not only do certain favoured organisms have the advantage, but there must be a way of segregating them from the larger flock and then bringing them together for mating. Without segregation and then arranged mating, the favourable variations would be swamped out by the average and unfavourable traits of likely mates, those living in the vicinity of the favoured organism. After recognising the swamping problem, Darwin immediately brought a model of natural selection to the fore. What needs to be stressed is that Darwin, in the essays, was also explaining to himself how his principle would solve the swamping problem.

> Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to perceive differences in the outer and innermost organisation quite imperceptible to man, and with forethought extending over future centuries to watch with unerring care and select for any object the offspring of an organism produced under the foregoing circumstances; I can see no conceivable reason why he could not form a new race . . . adapted to new ends. As we assume his discrimination, and his forethought, and his steadiness of object, to be incomparably greater than those qualities in man, so we may suppose the beauty and complications of the adaptations of the new races and their difference from the original stock to be greater than in the domestic races produced by man's agency.[40]

When Darwin was trying to work out for himself the features of natural selection, he chose, not a mechanical model, but a model of a very powerful mind, a selector with preternatural 'forethought' and 'discrimination', who picks out organisms because of their 'beauty and complications of . . . adaptations' and does so with 'unerring care'. And like the domestic breeder, this natural selector would segregate favoured individuals and prevent backcrosses to the rest of the group. The move from an intervening Deity to nature as the creative poetry of mind was complete by the early 1840s.

In the public expression of his theory, Darwin retained this appeal to mind in nature. When describing the actions of natural selection in the *Origin of Species* he did so in images both consonant with the model first articulated more than two decades before, a model that a Goethe or Schelling could well embrace:

> Man can act only on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends . . . Can we wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far 'truer' in character than man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship?[41]

No machine of Darwin's acquaintance could penetrate to the inner fabric of organisms or act on 'every shade of constitutional difference'. Only a powerful mind could do that. Darwin portrayed natural selection as a powerful intellectual force. And we should notice that this force acts only for the good

'of the being which she tends'. This is a phrase repeated several times in the *Origin*, with greatest resonance in the penultimate paragraph: 'And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.'[42] In our contemporary understanding, natural selection does not work for the good of each being; it destroys most beings; it eliminates them. The model Darwin deployed in his theory was that of a benign moral force, one that had the perfection of human beings as a goal.

In answer to the challenge of Whewell, Darwin argued that the origin of species could be explained by a law, namely, that of natural selection. The progressive development of creatures need not lie wrapped in mystery. But the force that Darwin placed at the centre of his theory answered to a higher kind of intellect. He wrote to his friend Asa Gray shortly after the publication of the *Origin*: 'I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance.' Thus behind the law of natural selection Darwin found an *intellectus archetypus*.

Conclusion

The impact of the German Idealist and Romantic movement on biology in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was profound. The scientifically inclined Romantics such as Schelling and Goethe found resources in Kant to reconstruct biology as both a teleologically structured science and one that met the requirements of objective demonstration. Their convictions about the creative power of nature penetrated across the channel to alter conceptions among the more empirically minded British, finally giving even Darwin's theory the tinge of the Romantic. In the later 1860s, Darwin became less sanguine about any higher powers in the universe; and though he could not believe that the trajectory of nature, with its astounding beauty and evolved patterns, resulted from mere chance, he could not embrace any idea of a transcendent mind, even one shorn of the traditional majesty of religion. His theory, none the less, was forged in the heat provided by the likes of Humboldt and Goethe, and its structure retained that emboss.

Perhaps no figure did more to disguise the provenance of Darwin's theory than his German disciple Ernst Haeckel. Haeckel maintained that Darwin's conception of nature was materialistic and the operations of natural selection mechanically causal. The great historian of biology Erik Nordenskiöld observed that more people learned of evolutionary theory at the turn of the

twentieth century through Haeckel's voluminous writings than from any other source, including Darwin's own work.[43] If Haeckel is largely responsible for stamping Darwin's theory as mechanistic and materialistic, as I believe he is, there is some sweet Romantic irony in that. Haeckel was devoted to Goethe and he was willing to embrace Goethe's monism, declaring that the stuff of nature had both a mental and a material side. But in most of his more popular works, it was only the mechanistic side that he stressed. And perhaps rightly, since today that is surely the metaphysics underlying contemporary biology.

Notes

1. The argument of this essay is based on my *The Romantic Conception of Life: science and philosophy in the age of Goethe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and *The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the struggle over evolutionary thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
2. That Darwin eliminated teleological considerations from biology has become the orthodox assumption, as testified to by the likes of Stephen Jay Gould, Daniel Dennett and a host of modern scholars. See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 122; and Daniel Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 133.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in *Werke*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 6 vols (Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1957) (hereafter KW), 5: 298–99 (A32, B32).
4. *Ibid.*, 483–88 (A285–91, B289–93).
5. *Ibid.*, 526 (A346–47), B350–51). Kant first introduced the conception of an *intellectus archetypus* in a letter to Marcus Herz, his former student. Such an intellect would in its very conceiving be creative of the object of its representation, while an *intellectus ectypus* had its representations produced by the object. Our intellect was neither completely creative nor completely receptive. See Kant to Marcus Herz (21 February 1772), in *Briefwechsel von Immanuel Kant in drei Bänden*, ed. H. E. Fischer, 3 vols (Munich: Georg Müller, 1912), 1: 119.
6. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 486 (A288–89, B292–93).
7. *Ibid.*, 516 (A334, B338).
8. Johann Peter Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens*, 3rd edn (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1987), 350 (21 March 1830).
9. I have discussed the evidence for classifying Goethe as Romantic in my *Romantic Conception of Life*, 457–60.
10. Goethe works out this conception in an essay he wrote just after his two-year stay in Italy. See his 'Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Styl', in *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens* (Münchner Ausgabe), ed. Karl Richter *et al.*, 21 vols (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985–1998), 3.2: 186–91. See also his *Italienische Reise* (6 September 1787), in *Sämtliche Werke*, 15: 478: 'Diese hohen Kunstwerke sind zugleich (als) die höchsten Naturwerke von Menschen nach wahren und natürlichen Gesetzen hervorgebracht

worden. Alles Willkürliche, Eingebildete fällt zusammen, da ist die Notwendigkeit, da ist Gott.' ('These great works of art are comparable to the great works of nature; they have been created by men according to true and natural laws. Everything arbitrary, imaginary collapses. Here is necessity, here is God.')

11. Hermann von Helmholtz, *Goethes Vorahnungen kommender naturwissenschaftlicher Ideen, Rede, gehalten in der Generalversammlung der Goethe-Gesellschaft zu Weimar den 11. Juni 1892* (Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1892), 30–33.
12. Goethe, 'Das Schädelgerüst aus sechs Wirbelknochen auferbaut', in *Sämtliche Werke*, 12: 359.
13. Kuno Fischer, *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling*, 2 vols: vol. 6 of *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1872), 2: 448.
14. Charles Darwin to Joseph Hooker (10 February 1845), in *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin*, 18 vols to date, ed. Frederick Burkhardt *et al.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–), 3: 140.
15. Charles Darwin, *Beagle Diary*, ed. R. D. Keynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 42 (entry for 28 February 1832).
16. Caroline Darwin to Charles Darwin (28 October 1833), in *Correspondence of Charles Darwin*, 1: 345.
17. Joseph Henry Green, *Vital Dynamics: The Hunterian oration before the Royal College of Surgeons in London, 14th February 1840* (London: William Pickering, 1840), xxv–xxvi. The dynamical aspect of Green's theory followed the path into 'objective Idealism' laid by Schelling (pp. xxix–xxx). He also cited Goethe, Oken, Spix and Carus as developing the archetype theory that he himself was further elaborating (pp. 57–58).
18. Richard Owen, 'Darwin on the Origin of Species', *Edinburgh Review* 11 (1860), 487–532.
19. Richard Owen, *Report on the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton*, in *Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (London: Murray, 1847), 339–40.
20. Richard Owen, *On the Nature of Limbs* (London: Van Voorst, 1849), 2–3.
21. *Ibid.*, 86.
22. Richard Owen, *Richard Owen's Hunterian Lectures, May–June 1837*, ed. Phillip Sloan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 192.
23. Back flyleaf of Darwin's copy of Richard Owen's *On the Nature of Limbs*, held in manuscript room of Cambridge University Library.
24. M. F. G. Pictet, 'On the writings of Goethe relative to natural history', *Annals of Natural History* 2 (1839): 313–22.
25. Charles Darwin, *Notebook E*, MS 89, in *Charles Darwin's Notebooks, 1836–1844*, ed. Paul Barrett *et al.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 420.
26. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (London: John Murray, 1859), 436.
27. Charles Darwin, *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited by H.M.S. Beagle* (London: Henry Coburn, 1839), 604.
28. William Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences, from Earliest to Present Times*, 3rd edn, 3 vols (London: Parker & Son, [1837] 1857): 3: 478. The changes in the subsequent editions are marked in separate sections. The main text is that of the first edition of 1837.
29. *Ibid.*, 476.

30. Charles Darwin, *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*, ed. Nora Barlow (London: Collins, 1958), 120.
31. Darwin, *Notebook D* MS 134e–135e, in *Charles Darwin's Notebooks*, 374–75.
32. Darwin, *Notebook D* MS 135e, in *ibid.*, 375.
33. Darwin, *Notebook E* MS 48–49, in *ibid.*, 409.
34. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 490.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Charles Darwin, *The Foundations of the Origin of Species: two essays written in 1842 and 1844*, ed. Francis Darwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 254.
37. *Ibid.*, 52.
38. Darwin, *Notebook E* MS 49, in *Charles Darwin's Notebooks*, 409.
39. Darwin, *Essay of 1842*, 5.
40. Darwin, *Essay of 1844*, 85.
41. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 83–84.
42. *Ibid.*, 489.
43. Erik Nordenskiöld, *The History of Biology*, trans. Leonard Eyre, 2nd edn (New York: Tudor, 1936), 515.

3

The unconscious: transcendental origins, Idealist metaphysics and psychoanalytic metapsychology

SEBASTIAN GARDNER

The psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious, over a century after its insertion into the epicentre of late modern intellectual life, continues to cast a spell and stir controversy; even those unpersuaded of the truth of psychoanalytic claims, or sceptical of its therapeutic value, recognise in the idea of the unconscious expounded by Freud a fascinating conceptual object.

The historical origins of psychoanalysis have been investigated intensively.[1] The picture which emerges from the major studies is of a huge diversity of confluent historical sources, inclusive of philosophers in the Idealist tradition – Schelling, Romantic *Naturphilosophen*, Schopenhauer, Gustav Carus, Eduard von Hartmann – but also numerous figures outside it, such as Hermann von Helmholtz and others in nineteenth-century experimental psychology, along with a great number of natural and human scientists from other disciplines. It is notable, moreover, that if we restrict our attention to the more local, biographical influences on Freud, then the latter camp predominates overwhelmingly: those who taught Freud or with whom he had professional associations in the early part of his career – Ernst Brücke, Josef Breuer, Theodor Meynert, Jean-Martin Charcot, Wilhelm Fliess – were, like Freud, trained physicians whose conception of organic functioning had been thoroughly purged of vitalism and other Romantic and Idealistic elements. Brentano, who provided Freud with direct exposure to philosophy, stood opposed to the Idealist orientation.[2] To the extent that we concentrate on Freud's proximate intellectual background, we will thus be led to regard psychoanalysis as a late, albeit somewhat exceptional, development within the nineteenth-century German psychological tradition, exhibiting certain affinities with Romantic Idealism but fundamentally disjoined from classical German philosophy. Patricia Kitcher has made a detailed historical case in support of such a view.[3]

The logical nature of psychoanalysis makes this, furthermore, a very natural view to take. Psychoanalysis is an empirical discipline indifferent to the questions of justification and the foundational issues which occupy philosophers, a form of individual and social psychology orientated towards the causal explanation of affective and conative phenomena, exhibiting pronounced naturalistic traits; on all counts, then, an utterly different creature from the systems of Idealism.

One fundamental consideration that should incline us none the less to consider seriously the possibility of a deep underlying connection with Idealism, lies in Freud's own development. In his first attempt at a theory of the mind, the 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (*Entwurf einer Psychologie*) of 1895, Freud drew on exclusively materialist and mechanist concepts. In this work Freud developed a model of mental functioning based on the bare idea of flows of energy along neural pathways, the total quantity of energy being determined by external stimuli and motor discharge, and its distribution across the mental apparatus by variation in the capacities of different types of neuron to impede its transmission.[4]

Clearly, had Freud stuck with these austere resources, psychoanalysis would never have been born: its development presupposes, not necessarily abandonment of materialism at some level, but the admission of properties of a type not countenanced in the 'Project'.[5] And this change in Freud's outlook cannot be regarded as a minor ontological relaxation. Once intentionality and unreduced mental content are admitted, the restrictive methodology appropriate to neural hypotheses must be abandoned, and the entire history of philosophical reflection on the nature of the mind, and so of human subjectivity in its most general respects, assumes direct relevance. Freud's recognition that the discovery of the unconscious had transported him across an intellectual boundary and set him in the mainstream of humanistic Western thought shows itself everywhere in his writings, and is not contradicted by his continued insistence on the scientificity of psychoanalysis. The recurrent preoccupation with psychoanalysis on the part of philosophers who have no positive orientation towards scientific psychology – Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas, along with (post-)analytic contemporaries such as Richard Wollheim, Donald Davidson and Jonathan Lear, to mention just a few – shows that the humanistic construal of Freud, as it has been called, is not a marginal view. It is therefore a safe conclusion that psychoanalysis contains elements that, at the very least, invite a non-naturalistic construal. The question whether psychoanalytic theory draws from Idealist sources is thereby thrown open.

In a ground-breaking study, Odo Marquard has suggested that, even before we come to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and the other nineteenth-century figures standardly cited as anticipators of Freud, we find a deep connection of psychoanalysis with the original Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental project: a complex but linear narrative, Marquard argues, allows us to locate psychoanalysis in a line of descent from problems facing transcendentalism at its inception, and this is reflected in Freud's extensive borrowing of *Gedankenfiguren* from the Idealists.

Some specific aspects of Marquard's version of the historical story seem to me questionable, but I think his basic claim is correct.[6] What I want to offer here is an account of the connection of transcendentalism with psychoanalysis less ambitious than Marquard's, but which agrees in tracing the philosophical genealogy of psychoanalysis back to classical German philosophy. My particular concern is to not lose sight of the fact that Freud's concerns are essentially non-philosophical, and to avoid recasting psychoanalysis as a general theory of the subject masquerading as empirical psychology, a temptation to which much philosophical writing on psychoanalysis has succumbed.[7] The central idea which I will try to make plausible is that the basic conceptual image underpinning the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and determining the contours of psychoanalytic theorising is originally the work of post-Kantian Idealists: though Freud deploys this conceptual image to non-philosophical ends, it cannot be grasped adequately without reference to the history of philosophy. Talk of conceptual image is admittedly nebulous, but I will try to make it sufficiently definite for the claim to hold interest.

1. Kantian origins: the transcendental unconscious

i.

It has been suggested that Kant himself opens a door to the unconscious, in consequence of the profound modification to the Cartesian view of the mind involved in Kant's theory of self-knowledge, which tells us that awareness of what is in the mind is not immediate but involves supplementary conceptual operations – in other words, that mental contents are not conscious *per se*, in and of themselves, but need to be *made* conscious.[8]

The importance of this point should not be exaggerated, however. Kant is more accurately described as concerned not with the relation of mental

content to consciousness as such, but rather with the relation of *objective* mental content – cognition of objectivity – to *self*-consciousness, and in whatever way we interpret Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, its main theses have no direct bearing on the existence or non-existence of the unconscious: even if Kant is required to grant the possibility, or even to affirm the actuality, of representations 'in' us which are nothing 'to' or 'for' us (A120),[9] he is not committed to denying that those non-objective representations are accompanied by some species of consciousness, nor that they play a causal role in non-cognitive sectors of mental life.[10]

A closer approximation to the unconscious is provided, it may be suggested, by Kant's theory of synthesis, when this is read in transcendental-psychological rather than purely logical terms. Again, caution is required. Even if Kant's agencies and acts of synthesis are construed realistically, it remains the case that non-conscious synthetic activity manifests itself directly in conscious mental life – necessarily so, since otherwise there could be no reason for positing its existence. There is consequently a good sense, vital to the epistemological purposes which drive the theory of synthesis, in which synthetic activity is *implicitly present* to consciousness, in a sense not very different from that in which the faculty of memory and acts of recall are implicitly present whenever something is remembered. The yield of the theory of synthesis as regards the concept of the unconscious is thus, at most, not much greater than what we find in Leibniz's doctrine of *petites perceptions*. To underline this point about the relative remoteness of synthetic activity from the concept of the unconscious, it may be observed that on several recent accounts the logical space occupied by Kant's theory of synthesis corresponds to that of cognitive psychology[11] – an indication that (irrespective of whether the proposed naturalisation of Kant is sound) the theory lies closer to the properly sub-personal than it does to the unconscious.[12]

The third respect in which a hint, though again it is no more than that, of a conception of the unconscious may be detected in Kant lies in his claim concerning the necessary limit of self-knowledge. Relevant here is not Kant's thesis of the unknowability of the noumenal self, but the claim which that thesis presupposes, concerning the structure of self-consciousness: namely, that it is impossible to know the self as thinking subject. Famously, Kant states in the Paralogisms that '[t]hrough this I or He or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X... recognised only through the thoughts that are its

predicates' (A346/B404).[a] Kant defends this claim on the basis that any attempt to cognise the self *qua* subject of thought can only 'turn in a constant circle, since we must always already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times in order to judge anything about it' (A346/B404);[b] the self *qua* subject of thought is that '*through*' which any object is cognised, and it is claimed 'I cannot cognise as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognise an object at all' (A402).[c] Kant's denial of cognition of the transcendental subject is not of course equivalent to any positive affirmation of an unconscious, but the notion that self-consciousness contains an aporia – implied by Kant's affirmation of the necessity of the *representation* of oneself as '= X', in the absence of any *given* occupant of the place-holder – is plainly relevant.

The concept of the unconscious cannot, therefore, be ascribed a direct Kantian origin, even though we can detect in the contexts just described the seeds of, pointers to, relevant later developments.

ii.

The situation changes, however, when we turn to the development of Kant's ideas about mental content and its conditions by his early contemporaries; these take us considerably closer to the dynamic unconscious. The first to be considered is Fichte.[13]

The Theoretical Part of the *Wissenschaftslehre* takes the place of Kant's theory of synthesis in giving an account of the preconditions of empirical consciousness in the form of a complex theory of mental acts. It amounts, however, to a very different kind of theory.[14] The thickly multi-layered, oppositional structure of Fichte's account of the absolute I's positing and counter-positing – in which elements are cross-related in horizontal structures, identified without reference to determinate types of representation, and form genetic series in which later forms displace their predecessors – is set at a vastly greater distance from the surface of conscious mental life than the synthetic structures postulated by Kant, meaning that there is

a. 'Durch dieses Ich oder Er oder Es (das Ding), welches denkt, wird nun nichts weiter als ein transscendentales Subject der Gedanken vorgestellt = X, welches nur durch die Gedanken, die seine Prädicate sind, erkannt wird.' *Kant's gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1900). (hereafter GS), i/3, 265.

b. 'In einem beständigen Cirkel herumdrehen, indem wir uns seiner Vorstellung jederzeit schon bedienen müssen, um irgend etwas von ihm zu urtheilen.' GS i/3, 265.

c. 'Ich dasjenige, was ich voraussetzen muß, um überhaupt ein Object zu erkennen, nicht selbst als Object erkennen könne.' GS i/4, 250.

no comparable sense in which Fichte's structures are implicitly present in consciousness: we cannot be thought to, as it were, *see* the I's positings in empirical consciousness, in the way that we can be thought to discern Kant's syntheses in the conceptually shaped sensible given. This is a direct consequence of Fichte's greater philosophical ambition: natural consciousness must, Fichte thinks, not merely be underwritten as regards its claims to knowledge, but must allow its complete sufficient ground to be brought to light. Hence the greater depth of Fichtean transcendental grounds and their inaccessibility to natural consciousness.

Among the important features distinguishing Fichte's theory from Kant's is the new role Fichte assigns to productive imagination, which extends the sense in which, for Fichte, transcendental grounds are screened off from empirical consciousness. In a way that recalls early modern rationalism, and that had enormous inspirational value for the German Romantics, Fichte introduces the idea that the transition to empirical consciousness, because it involves an abrupt discontinuity which has no conceptual solution, must be effected by imagination.[15] Imagination, according to Fichte, is the faculty responsible for the conversion of purely rational structure into the kind of mental content that an empirical subject can recognise as its own. On Fichte's analysis, experience depends upon an interplay and 'clash' of opposed (finite and infinite) components, but this is possible, he argues, only if the 'boundary' between them is *represented positively*, and this is something which no purely intellectual function can do: mere thought can grasp them only as contradicting and so as cancelling one another. Productive imagination thus steps in, giving phenomenologically concrete, intuitable form to a structure which thought can grasp only as a relation of irreconcilable mutual exclusion; Fichte draws an analogy with the way in which instants of light and darkness can be given in experience as alternating only if the boundary between them is extended into a temporal instant.[16] By relating to itself through the medium of imagination – which entails, in Fichte's full story, representing oneself in space and time – the I is able to grasp itself as distinct from its objects and to figure as an object for itself.

On Fichte's account, the contribution of productive imagination, along with all other aspects of the movement from absolute I-hood to empirical self-consciousness, covers its tracks: as Fichte never ceases to emphasise, the standpoints of life and philosophical reflection are distinct, and how things appear from the one is an inversion of the way in which they appear from the other.[17] To the extent that the transcendental standpoint expresses itself in empirical self-consciousness, it does so obliquely, in the

form of moral consciousness. The genetic sequence which produces empirical self-consciousness gives rise also to the existence of the subject as a purposive practical being, the ultimate object of whose striving is the restoration of the full reflexivity of the absolute I: our vocation, represented in the terms of natural consciousness, is to fulfil the moral law, but expressed transcendentally, it is to achieve complete self-determination. Morality thus comprises, so to speak, unconscious knowledge of the absolute I.

One way of understanding Fichte's alterations to Kant, helpful for present purposes, is to regard the *Wissenschaftslehre*'s theory of the I's positings as reinterpreting, and eliminating, the aporia that Kant locates in self-consciousness. Fichte agrees with Kant that the subject of thought is not given objectually within empirical self-consciousness, but denies that it is thereby rendered unknowable: philosophical insight into the self-positing I is knowledge of the '= X' that Kant locates in self-consciousness.[18]

iii.

Though, for Fichte, the transcendental grounds of ordinary mental life are invisible to the non-philosophical subject, and the standpoints of life and of philosophy cannot be occupied simultaneously, the relation between the two remains expressly rational in character and is open to full philosophical comprehension. This epistemologically optimistic claim is upheld, as we will see, in Schelling's earlier philosophy.

Not all post-Kantians affirm this self-transparency, however. The supposition that it is possible to grasp the transcendental grounds of ordinary consciousness through the application of philosophical reason, as distinct from merely knowing that such grounds must exist, is challenged in different ways by Maimon and the early German Romantics.

Maimon denies that Kant's theory of cognition, or Reinhold's reworking of it, succeeds in its aim of establishing the necessary conformity of the sensible given to the conditions of the pure understanding: according to Maimon, Kant's transcendental theory leaves a gap between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of ordinary consciousness, which the Humean sceptic is free to exploit.[19]

The Idealist epistemology to which Maimon is led through his criticisms of Kant's transcendental Idealism postulates 'infinitesimals of sensation',

differential elements of perceptual cognition akin to Leibniz's *petites perceptions*, which belong to the subject *qua* passive. The synthesis of these elements proceeds without consciousness, and the rules which govern it are not given to our understanding, whence the appearance of an *a posteriori* sensible given.

Maimon's difference from Kant is therefore that, while Kant of course agrees that sensation represents a surd for our understanding, Maimon locates its ground *within* the subject, implying that the cognitive limitation which is constitutive of ordinary consciousness derives from a deficiency of self-understanding. In a fully perfected and self-transparent consciousness, the Kantian divisions between receptivity and spontaneity, and aposteriority and apriority, would be overcome, and such a subject would grasp itself as part of, and its power of cognition as depending on, an infinite mind or reason.

iv.

A sceptical conclusion similar to Maimon's was also reached – at a slightly later historical point, and through reflection not on Kant but on Fichte's endeavour to complete the transcendental task – by the early German Romantics, who put it to more radical use than Maimon (for whom Kant's shortcomings direct us back, in effect, to early modern rationalist doctrines).

Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank have illuminated greatly the importance for Romantic post-Kantians of the notion that the ground of consciousness, while not properly external to it and thus in some sense lying within it, is necessarily inaccessible to discursive reflection.[20] It lies at the root of Hölderlin's conception of the aesthetic as the proper mode of pursuing the task of philosophy once it has run up against the limits of discursivity, and of Friedrich Schlegel's elevation of irony to a position of philosophical supremacy, regulating our (necessarily ambivalent) attitude towards the possibility of a true and complete system of philosophy.

Most significant for our purposes, however, is Novalis's response to the *Wissenschaftslehre*.[21] For reasons which go back to Jacobi's thesis that an original relation to Being (*Sein*), anterior to all judgement, must be presupposed in order for thought to have any sort of meaning, Novalis rejects Fichte's claim that the concept of positing is adequate to expose the absolute ground of self-consciousness and consciousness of objects: positing involves structures of opposition and non-identity which, Novalis supposes, we can know to be alien to being as such.

The consequent problem of elucidating *Sein* prior to our (in absolute terms, defective) representation of it in predicative and identity statements, is handled by appeal to feeling (*Gefühl*). Because *Sein* is free from any objectual character, its manifestation within us must be similarly non-objectual, i.e., it must comprise a mode of consciousness which is not intentionally directed, which is as much as to say that it must have the character of feeling. At the same time, *Gefühl* must stand in some relation to our judgementally articulated consciousness, else it would fail to qualify as a transcendental ground. Novalis suggests that its relation to *Reflexion* – conceptually articulated consciousness – is that of content, *Stoff*, to *Form*. These two elements do not, however, conjoin on the comparatively straightforward hylomorphic model of Kant's epistemology. Their relation involves what Novalis calls a principle of '*ordo inversus*', whereby reflection reverses the true relations obtaining within the subject, forming a mirror image, so that when *Reflexion* takes up *Gefühl*, the *Sein* manifest in the latter is lost from view, while the status of being *something*, a '*Was*', is (mis)attributed to what has been formed conceptually.

Following a route different from Fichte's, Novalis has arrived at the idea that intentional, propositionally articulated consciousness as such is dependent on a source which, though it cannot be strictly determined as the being of either the I or that of the world, cannot be properly external to us, since it comes before us in the shape of feeling, a modification of our subjectivity. It thus approximates to the unconscious in one of its many possible senses. But whereas Fichte supposed it possible to step behind the scenes of natural consciousness and reverse its inverted image of reality – and Maimon affirms at least the possibility of absolute cognition – Novalis relinquishes altogether the idea of an achieved cognitive grasp of the unconscious ground of subjectivity. Novalis instead conceives our proper relation to this absolute ground as *practical*: it takes the form of seeking 'connection with the whole', 'enlargement' 'to a whole' of the subject's compass.[22] This might sound like Kant's account of the understanding proceeding under the regulative direction of reason, but what Novalis has in mind here is not the narrowly conceived natural scientific project of Kant but rather the 'romanticisation of the world' (*Romantisierung der Welt*), which subsumes enquiry into nature (in appropriately non-mathematical, *naturphilosophisch* forms).

In terms of our narrative, then, Novalis's innovation is to reconceive the unconscious as theoretically impenetrable and, for that reason, the motor of practical life.

v.

Fichte, Maimon and the German Romantics agree, therefore, in conceiving the empirical subject as defined by an *aporetic self-relation*: empirical subjectivity makes itself possible on the condition that its grounds, *while these yet lie in the subject itself*, are not given to, or represented within it. Their differences from one another concern the nature and significance of this limitation: Fichte regards it as a reflection of the dual absolute/empirical structure of the I, expressed in the infinite task of practical reason, and as capable of being made philosophically transparent; Maimon considers it a sceptical consequence of the impossibility of completing the transcendental task in Kant's manner, but again as comprehensible by *wissenschaftlich* means; while the German Romantics treat it as providing the basis for a variety of aesthetic projects, leading away from philosophical rationalism.

The transcendental project, Henrich has claimed, is staked on the idea of constructing a theory of the subject in which the subject can *recognise itself*: the transcendental image of the mind should be, or correspond to, the mind's own image of itself, for it specifies the conception under which the mind operates, deployed implicitly in order to make its operations possible.[23] This provides one measure of validation for the theory. But, as we have seen, it does not bind transcendental theory of the mind to affirming the subject's complete self-transparency: transcendental enquiry may uncover regions of opacity in the subject's apprehension of its own grounds, areas which necessarily figure for the subject as having reality and belonging to itself but impenetrable from the standpoint of natural consciousness. In this sense transcendental theory may affirm our confrontation with elements which are properly thought of as *mine*, as parts of *myself*, yet to which we are related, in part and to some degree, in something like the way in which we are related to the not-self.

The image of the subject as eclipsing, covering, veiling, etc., itself, is an original historical development.[24] The notion that we are merely *imperfect* – that we fail to know ourselves fully or to realise our final end – is of course not original. What is innovative in post-Kantian thought is the idea that subjectivity *as such* comprises limited reflexivity, that the operation whereby we open up to and produce ourselves as self-conscious beings, involves also a dimension or act of self-occlusion. And this conceptual figure, though not articulated in exactly such abstract and explicit terms by Freud, is put to work in the metapsychological picture of the mind as a self-concealing

structure, and again in the practical perspective of psychoanalytic therapy as a necessarily unending task of self-retrieval.

II. Nineteenth-century thought: the unconscious and nature

i.

The next, much longer chapter in the historical story encompasses a rich set of further developments originating in the final years of the eighteenth century and extending to the last decades of the nineteenth, defined by their commitment to understanding nature in positive Idealistic terms. Elaboration of an Idealistic metaphysics of nature beyond the Kantian-Fichtean, epistemologically orientated determination of nature as mere appearance, allows the subject, previously treated in isolation, to be set logico-genetically into a pre-existent order, on which basis a conception is formed of nature as *existing within us* in a sense denied by Kant and Fichte. This, in turn, facilitates the formation of new types of speculative hypotheses concerning the content of human motivation. It is here that the concept of the unconscious is for the first time formulated explicitly, and it figures in this development on the one hand as a way of conceiving nature itself and as a whole, and on the other as a way of conceiving the nature within the individual subject. The merely formal conception of the unconscious described in the previous section is here supplied with a determinate content.

ii.

The unconscious first appears as a technical philosophical concept in Part Three of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*, in the context of Schelling's theory of productive intuition.[25] The theory is intended to explain how it is possible for the self *qua* 'absolutely illimitable' activity to none the less intuit this activity *as* 'intuited', *Angeschautes*, not as 'intuitant', *Anschauendes*, and to thereby cognise itself as something limited.

To resolve this contradiction, Schelling argues, we must posit activity which is unconscious, un-intuited. The conscious thinking self that stands opposed to the products of its productive intuition is in reality united with them by an act of the self, but this act has no intuition of itself: 'thus the acting sinks, as it were, out of consciousness, and only the opposition remains *qua*

opposition therein'; the act is 'lost from consciousness'.[d,26] The finitisation of the self effected through unconsciousness – intelligence 'forgetting itself in its products' – creates a distinction 'between what comes from without and what comes from within'.[e,27]

Thus far, Schelling may seem to have merely restated the *Wissenschaftslehre* in slightly different terms, but the next stage of his argument shows his difference from Fichte. Schelling claims that the activity which binds the thinking self to its products 'must also emerge in the product',[f,28] leaving some trace of itself, and that it does so as *force*. Accordingly, under the heading of a 'deduction of matter',[g,29] Schelling steers transcendental theory towards *Naturphilosophie*: gravitation, electricity and the chemical process are each argued to correspond to a different component of the absolute synthesis of self-consciousness.[30] The difference from Fichte, then, is that the different stages in the transcendental Idealist genetic story which Fichte treats – at least some of the time, and whether or not consistently – as mere theoretical constructions, are accorded full reality by Schelling: earlier stages in the genetic story do not evaporate but *subsist*, and their continued existence *is* that of Nature in its determinate forms. The ambiguity surrounding the ontological status of the *Wissenschaftslehre*'s structures of positing is thus eliminated in favour of a metaphysical realism.

In addition to the theoretical aim of providing a fully systematic account of the possibility of objectivity, Schelling also pursues the project, which goes back to earlier eighteenth-century sources such as Rousseau and Herder, of achieving freedom and realising the Good through the recovery of a positive relation to Nature. The two elements, theoretical and practical, are tied together in Schelling's philosophy in a way that sets him in a direct line of descent from Spinoza and in opposition to Kant and Fichte: grasping our identity with the natural order, and the true nature thereof, holds the key on Schelling's view to a correct understanding of freedom, which is in turn a requisite of the conception of autonomy formulated (but inadequately grounded) by Kant.[31]

For Schelling, then, the concept of the unconscious points in two directions: as much as it, in Spinozistic and Freudian fashion, draws the human

d. 'Die Handlung geht also im Bewußtseyn gleichsam unter, und, nur der Gegensatz bleibt *als* Gegensatz im Bewußtseyn zurück . . . aus dem Bewußtseyn verschwindet.' SSW, iii, 433.

e. 'Wie die Intelligenz in ihren Produkten sich vergesse . . . die Unterscheidung zwischen etwas, das von außen, und etwas, das von innen kommt.' *Ibid.*, 430, 429.

f. 'Im gemeinschaftlichen Produkt muß . . . angetroffen werden.' *Ibid.*, 440.

g. 'Deduktion der Materie.' *Ibid.*, 440–50.

subject back into the natural order, so equally it reveals the spiritual potential of nature itself and leads to the affirmation that we stand at nature's metaphysical summit; the unconscious incorporates both a moment of absorption into nature, and of transcendence of it. The latter is importantly absent from Freud, a point to which I will return.

iii.

The Schellingian unconscious has no specific role in psychological explanation, and Schelling does not ascribe an unconscious to human subjects in an individuated, particularised form.[32] However, the conception of the individual human personality as formed out of and around a subsisting unconscious core evolved rapidly in Schelling's wake, in the work of followers such as Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert and Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler, and, in the following generation, Karl Gustav Carus and Gustav Theodor Fechner.

On display in this phase of the theory of the unconscious are a host of figures of thought characteristic of the Age of Goethe and Romanticism: the concepts of polarity, of conflicts of forces and their generation of new products, of Nature as a single organism, and so on. Though many of these had been theorised by Schelling, they are really the intellectual property of the age as a whole: the formalism of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* merges with Herder's expressivism and Goethe's conception of primal phenomena (*Urphänomene*),[33] amounting in all to a teleological recasting of Spinoza. In addition, themes previously explored chiefly in literary contexts, such as the demonic and abnormal – the sorts of phenomena on which Karl Philip Moritz's *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (*Magazine for Empirical Psychology*) focused with therapeutic intent – are absorbed into speculative theory.

The elaborate schemas of thinkers such as Schubert and Troxler are likely to strike us as arbitrary in their detail, but their ways of thinking about the mind's place in nature are readily intelligible in the light of the basic principles of German Idealism, and they show why the psychology of the *Naturphilosophen* necessitates a conception of the unconscious. Schubert conceives Nature as existing in essentially historical form, its upward development propelled by oppositions and the necessity of their resolution, with man's position lying on the border separating ontological strata, on the cusp of transfiguration, resulting in a doubling of the self. And since the mind is not merely embedded in nature as in a surrounding and supporting context – rather, nature holds sway *within* the subject – mental contents express the

sense or *meaning* of Nature: the mind is able to look through itself into the heart of Nature. Whence Schubert's striking conception, in his *Die Symbolik des Traumes* (*The Symbolism of Dreams*, 1862), of dream, delirium and kindred states as a *sui generis* pictorial mode of thinking, a 'hieroglyphic language' (*Hieroglyphensprache*) concerned with matters beyond the bounds of the individual self.[34] Reflecting the doubleness of man, we find in dreams both the 'night side' (*Nachtseite*) of 'Nature dreaming within us',[h] which is associated with man's soul (*Seele*), and intimations of the higher spiritual order to which man's spirit (*Geist*) is directed.[35]

In Troxler's system, the structure is highly similar – mental development conforms to a metaphysically predetermined order, of which rational conscious subjectivity represents only one moment, and oneiric states are cognitively privileged – but the spiritualistic tendency of Romantic psychology is more pronounced: man's deepest unconscious consists in his divinity, an ecstatic condition which may equally be described as *super*-consciousness. The concept of the unconscious here shows an ambiguity, which is completely consistent with the 'union of opposites' doctrine of Romanticism: if the unconscious comprises, as it were, the region across which the subject's reflexivity fails, then it may also be taken to correspond to, or to contain implicitly, the *completion* of reflexivity, the condition in which we truly *become ourselves*. Construed in this forward-looking way, the unconscious defines our *telos*.[36]

Notwithstanding his differences from Schelling and the more exuberantly Romantic forms of *Naturphilosophie*, Hegel's notion of the 'feeling soul' (*die fühlende Seele*), which receives an extended treatment in the section 'Philosophy of Spirit' in his *Encyclopaedia*,[37] also belongs in the present context.

The concept of the feeling soul refers, on the one hand, to a sublated moment of rational self-consciousness: it comprehends the person's 'intrinsically unconscious predisposition, temperament, etc.', as well as everything belonging to their character (all their 'ties and essential relationships'), and it exists for them in the form of underlying 'merely implicit material', distinct from the unfolding play of their consciousness.[38] But it can also exist either independently of rational subjectivity or in opposition to it, and in both cases we find it 'in its immediacy'. The first such case is that of the child *in utero*, passive and without its own individuality. The second is the *relapsed*

h. 'Die träumende Natur in uns.' G. H. Schubert, *Die Symbolik des Traumes*, 3rd edn (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1840), 20.

condition displayed in dreaming and, in an extreme form, in insanity, where there emerges an '*actually twofold* soul-life', with one side orientated towards objective reality and the other, broken away from it, towards the psychical, each of the two sides incorporating awareness of the other.[i,39]

Hegel's notion of psychical regression belongs to the conceptual armoury of Romanticism, but his account of how the psychic (*das Seelenhafte*) distinguishes itself in pathological cases from rational consciousness, and of how the partition is maintained, comes closer than any of his contemporaries to the Kleinian conceptualisation of psychic reality as an inner world. What limits Hegel, in terms of his degree of anticipation of Freud, is the absence of a substantial account of the *causes* of regression and partition.[40] Hegel's refusal to acknowledge a quasi-autonomous substrate sponsoring psychic reality is reflected in his comparison of the regressed, segregated feeling soul with mere states of reduced consciousness (dreaming and somnambulism). In Freud's terms, Hegel (like Pierre Janet) postulates only a 'second consciousness'.[41]

iv.

What is missing from Hegel – in terms of approximation to a psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious – is supplied by Schopenhauer.[42] The proto-Freudian character of Schopenhauer's conception of the human subject derives fundamentally – that is, even before we come to his insights concerning the importance of sexuality, superficiality of consciousness, savagery of conscience, and other such specific matters – from his asymmetric dualism of Will (*Wille*) and Representation (*Vorstellung*), in conjunction with his thesis of the intrinsic blindness of *Wille*. When this general metaphysical structure is applied to the individual subject, it entails that the subject's practical reason is not just a necessarily obedient, but also a necessarily *unwitting* slave of the passions: whatever I self-consciously set myself as an end cannot *be*, or adequately represent, the true motivating ground of my actions; to the extent that the ends at which I take myself to aim determine my actions, my having those ends, and their determining of my actions, are matters which transcend my practical reason. Motive force necessarily outstrips, and cannot be encapsulated within, the representations which it conditions.

Schopenhauer's conception of the intellect and sphere of consciousness as subordinate to and expressive of an underlying conative reality gives a new sense to the notion that subjectivity is essentially aporetic. At the root of this

i. 'Ein *wirklich zwiefaches* . . . Seelenleben.' HW, x, 138.

revolutionary development lies Schopenhauer's dissociation of expression, a concept central to all *naturphilosophisch* psychology, from rational articulation: when *Wille* expresses itself in the phenomena that it grounds – such as human actions – it does not thereby *fulfil* itself (in Hegel's terms: it does not, in assuming objectual form, achieve its truth, become actual or 'for-itself').[43]

v.

Exactly this dissociation of *Wille* from all rational structure is appealed to by Eduard von Hartmann in justification of the synthesis of Schopenhauer with Hegel proposed in his *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 1868).[44] The ideational component which is, Hartmann argues, problematically absent from Schopenhauer's account of *Wille* is supplied by Hegel's theory of the Idea (which in turn, through its marriage with the metaphysics of *Wille*, finds itself protected against Schelling's criticism that the Hegelian system is mere 'negative philosophy' without objective reality).

This might lead us to think that Hartmann's philosophy – since it affirms the reality of the differentiated object world, but bases it on will rather than conceptuality – must correspond to that of late Schelling, who is indeed Hartmann's main source of inspiration. Hartmann's great difference from late Schelling, however, is that he abandons entirely Schelling's apriorism, commitment to freedom, and residual transcendental orientation, in favour of what he maintains is a rigorously natural-scientific foundation – hence the work's sub-title, 'Speculative Results according to the Inductive-Scientific Method' (*Speculative Resultate nach inductiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Methode*). Hartmann argues that, by extrapolation from the data supplied by contemporary materialist and mechanistic life science we can infer, first, the existence of a *relative* unconscious within each individuated organism, and second, the ultimate unity and grounding of all relative unconscious-es in a single 'absolute' Unconscious, to be equated with a fusion of Schopenhauerian *Wille* and Hegelian Idea (*Idee*).

Hartmann's unconscious, like Schelling's, has no special connection with problems of human psychology. The key to Hartmann's inference to unconsciousness is that manifolds of causally convergent phenomena – for example, the various contributions of different bodily organs to the maintenance of a living being – are best explained by positing a single, end-directed cause, viz. a volition, which evidently cannot be conscious.[45] This type of inference to the best explanation is closely comparable to the justification Freud gives for the unconscious in his 1915 paper.[46] More broadly, Hartmann may be

regarded as setting a methodological model for Freud in the sense of showing that a systematic theory of the unconscious can present itself on inductive grounds, as a hypothesis forced on us by the facts of experience, and so claim *bona fide* scientific authority. Here Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious exhibits the kind of historical double allegiance of which, I will later suggest, we also find a residue in psychoanalysis: Hartmann belongs, as it were, at both ends of the nineteenth century, among those convinced of the inestimable value of the legacy of German Idealism, and at the same time in agreement with the late nineteenth-century scientific community that the proper method of enquiry into nature presupposes the rejection of all Idealism, vitalism and *Naturphilosophie*.

vi.

Whereas Hartmann preserves Schopenhauer's monistic metaphysics, and makes no significant original proposals regarding human psychology, Nietzsche does exactly the reverse, letting go the doctrine of trans-individual *Wille* and extending massively our conception of what sorts of psychological forces operate unconsciously and of the ways in which they condition consciousness.

The Freud–Nietzsche relation is a large topic, but it falls within the present purview only to the extent that Nietzsche relays or in some way bears on the legacy of Idealism, and this, like everything in Nietzsche, raises thorny interpretative questions.[47] What can be said is that, in whatever ways we interpret Nietzsche – whether as a positivist, or sceptical materialist, or Lange-inspired neo-Kantian, or metaphysician of the Will to Power – the great pieces of concrete psychological analysis in Nietzsche's texts, such as those in the *Genealogy of Morals*, are not presented as deriving from or as presupposing any anterior philosophical commitments, and that Nietzsche does not attempt to extract from his analyses any systematic psychological theory. There is in consequence nothing that can readily be called Nietzsche's model of the mind, and if we speak of Nietzschean psychology, it is a chiefly negative matter, defined by rejection of soul-substance, of a single referent for the I, of a power of free choice, of the autonomy of consciousness, and so on. This results in the curious situation that Nietzsche appears to be in possession of all the pieces needed to construct the psychoanalytic metapsychology, and even articulates some of its central propositions in informal, often metaphorical terms, while, as it were, declining to officially discover the unconscious.

The explanation for Nietzsche's having come to the brink of psychoanalysis but no further lies in the fundamentally practical orientation of his own project and Nietzsche's view of what this demands. On Nietzsche's view, systematic knowledge of the unconscious of the sort that Freud claims to deliver, and the accompanying supposition that, by fixing ourselves as objects of knowledge, we can come into full possession of ourselves, can only obstruct the radical task of self-transformation which Nietzsche believes necessary.[48]

Nietzsche's anti-systematic outlook reflects his criticism of the will to truth as expressed in modern science, but it can also be regarded as continuous with the notion that we saw in Novalis, of an essentially *expressive* – affective, aesthetic, practical – relation of empirical self-conscious existence to its unconscious ground. Novalis, however, did not *oppose* this expressive relation to a theoretical relation; on the contrary, the forms of practical activity by which we relate negatively to the Absolute include, for Novalis, philosophising and all manner of encyclopaedic cognitive pursuits. Nietzsche rejects this harmony of theoretical and practical reason. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the Dionysian is opposed to the Socratic, and in Nietzsche's later writings no connection of critical reflective practice with systematic cognition is restored.[49]

III. Psychoanalysis: between Idealism and Naturalism

i.

Classical German philosophy plays, I have suggested, a formative role in relation to psychoanalysis at several levels: in the provision of the basic conceptual image, formulated in the earliest phase of post-Kantianism, of the subject as constituted by incomplete reflexivity; in the general conception of the subject as rooted in and expressive of nature, developed in Romantic, *naturphilosophisch* strands of post-Kantian Idealism; and in concrete speculative claims concerning the content and character of human motivation, advanced by Schopenhauer and developed further by Nietzsche.

But we should also take stock of what has been discarded, and the most obvious, fundamental respect in which Freud differs from his Idealist precursors is in the reduction of the unconscious to a purely psychological phenomenon, without metaphysical significance – a result of the naturalisation of Nature in the course of the nineteenth century, the development of progressively more austere views of the fabric of the natural order, the triumph of which is reflected in Freud's 'Project for a Scientific Psychology'. In

this section I will argue that psychoanalysis' renunciation of Idealist metaphysical commitments has important consequences, which manifest themselves in conceptual problems facing psychoanalytic theory.

ii.

The heart of the issue is identified by Sartre, whom we may take as representing the standpoint of Idealism and articulating its concerns:

> By the distinction between the 'id' and the 'ego', Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I *am* the ego but I *am not* the id. I hold no privileged position in relation to my unconscious psyche. I *am* my own psychic phenomena in so far as I establish them in their conscious reality . . . But I *am not* those psychic facts, in so far as I receive them passively and am obliged to resort to hypotheses about their origin and true meaning . . . I can know myself only through the mediation of the other, which means that I stand in relation to my 'id', in the position of the *Other*.[50]

Sartre considers this conceptual situation paradoxical – and goes on to argue, in his famous criticism of Freud's hypothesis of a censor mechanism responsible for repression, resistance and other putative interactions between *Cs.* and *Ucs.*, that psychoanalytic explanations are either contradictory or empty.[51] The nub of Sartre's argument is that Freud, having on the one hand declared that the id, or *Ucs.*, is properly conceptualised as not-I, is on the other hand obliged to treat it as having all of the features that define I-hood. The inconsistency is concealed by verbal means, through the systematic ambiguity of psychoanalysis' theoretical terms.

Sartre does not deny that there is something profoundly puzzling in the psychological phenomena which comprise the core *explananda* of psychoanalysis: that a subject can lie to itself, work against its own purposes, disavow aspects of itself, and so forth, constitutes a deep conceptual problem. Sartre's complaint is that psychoanalytic theory fails to address squarely this problem of negative reflexivity: its partitive theoretical jargon tends to merely disguise the problem, and to the extent that Freud asks us to suppose that a mere causal process, the mechanical interaction of elements within the psychic aggregate, can provide its solution, the problem is simply lost sight of. To draw a relevant comparison: to suppose that the problem of self-consciousness can be solved simply by postulating a mechanism which causes representations of representations, is to fail to grasp what it involves.

The yield of Freud's theorising is consequently, Sartre alleges, the absurdity of positing a dimension of the self to which we are related as not-I.

The limitations of psychoanalytic theory's attempt to reduce the self to a configuration of metapsychological elements are spelled out very clearly by Ernst Tugendhat, who though not favouring German Idealism's solutions again takes its agenda of problems as a starting point:

> [I]t is striking that Freud not only does not refer to the ordinary way of talking about the 'I' but also does not even speak of a relation of oneself to oneself. The 'ego' is an objective power within the psychical reality, just like the 'id' and the 'superego'; the only difference is that in contrast to the latter it is an 'organisation' and has a synthetic function . . . Since Freud grasps not only (like Plato) sensuality and normative consciousness but also what he calls the ego as an objective power, the ego is reduced to an anonymous organisation with an integrative function. In so doing he discards precisely that aspect which was the basis for the orientation toward the expression *I*: the relation of oneself to oneself. Since Freud simply left this aspect out of consideration, he avoided the structural absurdities that result if one is intent upon understanding the relation of oneself to oneself in accordance with the traditional model of the subject–object relation. Hence, Freud's own theory of the ego has the advantage of not containing absurdities, and it has only the disadvantage that it is in no sense a theory of the relation of oneself to oneself. But such a theory would have to follow from his own assumptions as soon as one attempted to translate the substantives *id*, *ego*, and *superego* into terms that are behaviourally relevant, that is, as soon as one specifies the modes of being of the person for which the substantives stand. In the case of the term *ego* this would mean examining the relation of the person to himself, and without a concept of the relationship of oneself to oneself it does not appear possible to understand something like self-determination.[52]

Tugendhat's point, therefore, is that, although philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness was not on Freud's agenda and is nowhere claimed by Freud to be furnished by psychoanalytic theory, this does not absolve Freud. Implicitly, Freud supposes that the psychoanalytic theory of the ego resolves or successfully bypasses the problem of self-consciousness. But this, as Tugendhat says, is a mistake. Though it is true that all of the conceptual obscurities of German Idealist treatments of self-consciousness are blissfully absent from the psychoanalytic conception of the ego, at the end of the

day psychoanalytic attributions need to be translated into 'terms that are behaviourally relevant', i.e., grasped as 'modes of being of the person', and persons are entities defined by reflexivity.[53] Freud cannot, therefore, deny the reality of 'the relation of oneself to oneself', and so ought to have acknowledged the limitations of the metapsychology, that is, to have conceded that the psychoanalytic theory of the mind is dependent on a conceptual framework which is unaccountable in the sorts of terms officially recognised by Freud.

Essentially the same point is made from the opposite quarter, that of those who think that self-relations and modes of being of the person do not provide good metaphysical currency. Michael Moore writes:

> Freud's metapsychology and its theoretical unconscious is caught in a dilemma: the mentalistic vocabulary of persons in terms of which clinicians prompt patients to recapture unconscious wishes and so on is not a vocabulary in which it makes sense to construct a deep theory such as the metapsychology purports to be . . . the metapsychology should be seen as an exercise in homuncular functionalism . . . To construe the metapsychology as an exercise in homuncular functionalism provides a plausible enough insulation of the theory from any metaphysical embarrassment.[54]

The point at issue is helpfully formulated by employing the personal/sub-personal distinction. In terms of that distinction, psychoanalysis appears a kind of theoretical duck–rabbit, founded on a practice of systematic alternation between personal and sub-personal levels, which is what enables the sleight of hand which Sartre thinks can be found in psychoanalytic explanation: psychoanalysis is premised on a conceptual move from the level of the person as a whole to the sub-personal level, which it promises will yield far-reaching explanatory gains, but it ends up re-importing the personal level at the sub-personal, in its account of the actions of the sub-personal modules; and in any case it must return to the personal level in so far as it affirms that unconscious states belong to the *self* (they fall, in Nagel's phrase, within the boundaries of 'inner space'[55]). Moore's proposal is that the confusion be resolved once and for all by an all-out, rigorous sub-personalisation.

There is a great deal more to be said about all of this,[56] but for present purposes the issue can be said to come down to the following. Psychoanalysis leaves us unable to truly understand how its talk of mental parts and unconscious processes – all the bits and pieces which compose its model of the mind – are to be co-ordinated with our reflexive understanding, which it actively draws on, of ourselves as self-conscious self-determining

subjects. The problem arises because its decompositional analysis is cast in the terms of post-Idealistic naturalism, and those terms, which foreswear the (teleological, dialectical, etc.) conceptual forms of Idealism, are too spare to allow us to grasp the sum of mental parts posited in the metapsychology as forming the kind of whole with which we find ourselves presented in ordinary self-consciousness. And this situation has, as we have seen, a historical explanation: psychoanalysis retrieves from Idealism a conceptual form which provides its foundation, but not its accompanying metaphysical context.

iii.

Two further implications of psychoanalysis' abandonment of Idealism are worth noting.

The teleologically structured Nature of Idealism and Romanticism is permeated with normativity. When the unconscious is located within Nature so conceived, it too has direct normative import; even the anti-rationalism of *The Birth of Tragedy* treats the unconscious, the Dionysian, as a source of the Good. Given the transcendentalist origin of the unconscious, and the axiological motivation of Romantic Idealism, this is just what should be expected. There is, however, no similarly direct, conceptually transparent route from psychoanalytic explanation to any value commitment. Thus, whereas Idealism guarantees the unconscious a positive role in sustaining personal autonomy, the implications of psychoanalysis for self-determination are much less clear, despite the fact that it is presented by Freud as a major further step in the unfinished project of Enlightenment. The value-freedom of psychoanalysis has allowed it to serve, in Critical Theory and allied quarters, as a tool of social critique, but a large question mark hangs over its consistency with the Kantian ideals to which emancipatory theory characteristically appeals.

The second implication is connected closely with the first. When Nature is conceived Idealistically, persons can be allowed to merge with larger, impersonal objects; from the *naturphilosophisch* standpoint, grasping ourselves as individuals is consistent with knowing ourselves to be parts of supra-personal wholes, in which, furthermore, we can consider ourselves at home. The relation of the human subject to (the rest of) nature implied by psychoanalysis is starker and more alienated. The instinct theory that lies at the foundation of Freud's metapsychology asks us to recognise forces of nature at the foundation of our personalities, but the conceptual means provided by Romantic Idealism for grasping these as continuous with rational subjectivity have been eliminated, making the relation to instinctual force a confrontation with elements antagonistic to personality.[57] Psychoanalysis

requires us to avow the nature within us, but this nature, in its post-Idealistic conception, is too much like nature outside us for avowal to be really intelligible. Again, Sartre's insight that the conceptual demands of psychoanalysis are incongruent with subjective understanding proves well founded, and again a historical explanation is available.

iv.

Post-Freudian theory wrestles with the problems generated by Freud's grafting of materialist and mechanistic forms of explanation on to an Idealist conception of subjectivity.[58] The fracturing and pluralisation of psychoanalytic theory among Freud's successors, resulting in the quite extraordinary diversity of antagonistic schools of psychoanalytic thought (ranging from the position that psychoanalysis traffics in the species of narrative truth appropriate to edifying literary fictions, to the view that psychoanalytic explanations are meaningless unless neural referents supply them with a possibility of verification),[59] reflects the fact that psychoanalysis *in toto* incorporates more commitments than can be synthesised without readopting an Idealistic standpoint. A comprehensive review of post-Freudian developments is impossible here, but I want to cite one which supports this thesis and provides an especially clear illustration of the pressures operating within psychoanalytic thought.

The concept of sublimation occupies a crucial but uneasy place in the psychoanalytic edifice. It is, on the one hand, the concept which has the job of providing for the full transition from animality to the realm of art and culture, in short, to all that we value for its own sake and consider highest in humanity's collective achievements. The difficulty, however, is that Freud's account of this psychical function is extremely bare, so much so that the suspicion reasonably forms that sublimation is a mere dummy concept employed when contentful psychoanalytic explanation grinds to a halt in the face of mental phenomena too rich and complex to be accounted for in its terms.

A remarkable attempt to solve this problem is made in Hans Loewald's short book, *Sublimation*. What is most striking in Loewald's proposals – viewed in the light of the historical perspective I have been exploring – is the degree to which Loewald resorts to conceptual figures which manifestly bear the stamp of German Idealism and *Naturphilosophie*. The concept of sublimation originally elaborated by Freud assumes a conception of the ego defined by the function of defence, and identifies sublimation as a transformation of (sexual) instinct cued by inhibition of the original instinctual

aim, for which sublimation offers a substitute. Loewald very plausibly considers this inadequate to grasp the specific nature of the non-quantitative transformation involved in the sorts of phenomena for which sublimation is held to be responsible. Accordingly, following Winnicott, Loewald detaches the concept of instinct from that of discharge or diminution of excitation, thereby allowing instincts to have aims that transcend the mechanistic law of tension reduction which, according to Freud, rules the psychic apparatus.[60] Sublimatory instincts are, according to Loewald, directed towards 'restoration of unity . . . a *differentiated unity* (a manifold) that captures separateness in the act of uniting, and unity in the act of separating', 'reconciliation of the subject–object dichotomy'.[61]

This overhauling of Freudian theory, designed to give it explanatory grip on the vast field of human experience in which things are taken as valuable *per se* rather than as mere means to pleasure, appears to involve a complete shift of framework. If Loewald is right that it is necessary to postulate an irreducible, autonomous reflexive drive whose aim encompasses *value* – 'the value of the ego itself as a higher form of psychic organisation'[62] – in order to theorise the mental lives of rational subjects, then *Naturphilosophie* and Idealism are vindicated: at the base of human subjectivity lies a *Bildungstrieb*.[63] And this is indeed the lesson drawn by Loewald: psychoanalysis refers us, he says in his conclusion, to a *natura naturans* characterised by a subjectivity vaster than 'human individual mentation'.[64]

Few will follow Loewald down this road; his conclusion will instead be taken as showing the necessity of a consistently naturalistic construal of psychoanalysis, as *per* Moore's recommendation. Notwithstanding the long tradition within the philosophy of science repudiating Freud's claim that psychoanalysis meets the conditions of empirical knowledge,[65] numerous proposals to naturalise psychoanalysis have been made.[66] The question which this raises is whether a secure future for psychoanalysis lies in its unification with brain science, evolutionary theory, cognitive psychology and suchlike, or whether sloughing off the legacy of Idealism, cutting Freud fully loose from his non-naturalistic historical sources, would fail to leave behind anything recognisably psychoanalytic.

v.

The conceptual problems to which I have drawn attention in this section come to light when the metapsychology is subjected to philosophical scrutiny guided by a concern with themes prominent in post-Kantian philosophy, concerning the unity of the self and other strong candidates for apriority.

They do not, however, provide the basis for an objection to psychoanalysis' claim to furnish cogent and penetrating psychological insight. So long as we allow ourselves a sufficiently relaxed scheme of psychological explanation – which helps itself to the notion of mental partition, and to the idea that essentially different types of mental operation can interact coherently within the subject, without seeking to explain how they do so, or in what mental partition consists – the tensions can be reduced to a tolerable level, at least to the extent that it can be shown that psychoanalysis is at no significant disadvantage in comparison with common sense psychology. This allows us to reconstruct psychoanalysis as an extension of the latter, borrowing and modifying its forms of explanation.[67]

While this approach provides, I have just suggested, a holding solution to the philosophical problems faced by psychoanalysis, sufficient to validate its claim to psychological explanation, it does not of course represent the last word. For some time now, eliminativists in the philosophy of mind have been arguing that intentional psychology, or at any rate the particular version of it operative in common sense psychology, is incoherent, and if this assessment is justified, then the argument that psychoanalysis comprises an extension of common sense psychology merely passes the buck, and the conceptual problems of psychoanalysis must be regarded as exposing, in magnified form, concealed patterns of incoherence in our ordinary conceptual scheme. Exactly this thought is shared by Sartre, who aims at purifying our self-conception in a way that recalls Fichte's demand that we expunge from it all traces of 'dogmatism': Sartre's claim is in effect that psychoanalysis abets the naturalistic degradation of the subject, and that the demonstrable incoherence of Freudianism shows the need to expel the naturalistic elements present in common sense psychology from our image of the human subject. The controversies surrounding Freud's ideas play out in this way a familiar tension in late modernity, deriving from the necessity of honouring two sets of intellectual commitments, the one naturalistic and the other Kantian.

Notes

1. For a helpful synopsis, see Günter Gödde, 'Freud and nineteenth-century philosophical sources on the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and 'The unconscious in the German philosophy and psychology of the nineteenth

century', in Alison Stone (ed.), *Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth-Century Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).

2. See Freud's report of a discussion with Franz Brentano in 1875, quoted in Gödde, 'Freud and nineteenth-century philosophical sources', 266. Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), ed. Oskar Kraus and Linda L. McAlister, trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister (London and New York: Routledge, 1973), 103–09, contains a systematic critique, with reference to Hartmann, of the notion of unconscious mentality.
3. Patricia Kitcher, *Freud's Dream: a complete interdisciplinary science of mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). See also Henri Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: the history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), ch. 7, and Frank Sulloway, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: beyond the psychoanalytic legend* (London: Burnett Books, 1979).
4. The 'Project' treats 'psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction', 'Project for a scientific psychology' (1895), *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 24 vols (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–1974), I, 295. See Richard Wollheim's summary, *Freud*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1. Affirming that Freud's theory, though abandoned by him, was on exactly the right track, see Diego Centonze *et al.*, 'The *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895): a Freudian anticipation of LTP-memory connection theory', *Brain Research Reviews* 46 (2004), 310–14.
5. It is implied by Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, 449, that the change in Freud's intellectual identifications, with Goethe taking the place of Brücke, Meynert, etc., can be dated to November 1897.
6. Odo Marquard's brilliant study, *Transzendentaler Idealismus, romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalyse* (Köln: Dinter, 1987), deserves extended discussion, for which space does not allow, but I should say briefly what it encompasses and how my approach departs from his. On Marquard's account – in barest summary – transcendental philosophy undergoes a 'Depotenzierung': finding that it cannot make good on its claims for reason, it turns to nature in search of support, a strategy which can succeed only as long as an aesthetically grounded interpretation of nature can be sustained; and when this collapses, as modernity's progressive *Entzauberung* entails that it must, psychologism returns, in which movement psychoanalysis is born, reproducing in a different modality the original concepts of transcendental philosophy. Marquard's idea of a buried, strict logic to the historical development is extremely attractive, but it seems to me uncertain that a single intellectual current runs its course in the way he supposes. Neo-Kantianism seems to demonstrate the capacity of transcendentalism to survive the collapse of the aesthetically grounded view of nature. If, on the other hand, transcendentalism is identified with the *original* transcendental programme, then it must be regarded as simply extinguished, supplanted by an ascendant naturalism, contradicting Marquard's strong claim for the identity of transcendental with psychoanalytic concepts. My approach centres the connection of psychoanalysis with classical German philosophy on the subject's reflexivity, but does not construe psychoanalysis's appropriation of the concept of the unconscious forged in

the context of Idealism as a *logical* effect of a *Depotenzierung* of transcendental philosophy (however much it may presuppose it historically): the concept of the unconscious is generated by Idealism in *consequence* of attempts to follow through the transcendental programme beyond the point where Kant left it, but its reappearance in psychoanalysis is not connected *systematically* with the philosophical problems of transcendentalism. This plainer narrative is less engaging, but also easier to substantiate than Marquard's. In addition to Marquard, I have found Paul Redding, *The Logic of Affect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), which traces connections of Freud with German Idealism concerning the idea of a 'logic of affect', while paying close attention to the shift from Idealism to naturalism, extremely helpful.

7. As certain schools of psychoanalytic thought have done, pre-eminently Lacan's. Again, Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences* (London: Tavistock, 1974), 326, identifies psychoanalysis with an entire shift of 'episteme'. On my view, as will become clear, psychoanalysis does not have the metaphysically subversive character which neo-structuralist thinkers have ascribed to it, and is not positioned beyond and against the classical conception of the subject: in so far as it 'decentres the subject', the same view is found in early post-Kantian thinkers.
8. Some references to Kant appear in Freud – in particular, he draws a comparison of the unconscious with Kant's thing in itself ('The unconscious' (1915), *Standard Edition*, XIV, 171) – but as might have been expected in view of the prevalence of neo-Kantianism, Freud is chiefly interested in Kant *qua* epistemologist, in connection with the problem of how to warrantedly claim reality for unobservable entities. Situating Kant in relation to his predecessors on the topic of non-conscious ideas, see the editors' Introduction to Nicholls and Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious*. On Freud and Kant, see David E. Pettigrew, 'The question of the relation of philosophy and psychoanalysis: the case of Kant and Freud', *Metaphilosophy* 21 (1990), 67–88; Andrew Brook, 'Freud and Kant', in Man Cheung Chang and Colin Feltman (eds), *Psychoanalytic Knowledge* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Alfred I. Tauber, 'Freud's dreams of reason: the Kantian structure of psychoanalysis', *History of the Human Sciences* 22 (2009), 1–29.
9. Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), ed. and trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), §5, 23–26, discusses the 'immense' field of representations which we can be certain that we have, even though we are 'not conscious of them'. Kant classifies these, in rationalist language, as 'obscure' (*dunkele*) representations, and consigns them to 'physiological anthropology'.
10. In this connection, see Gerold Prauss, 'Freuds Probleme mit dem "Unbewußten"', in Reinhard Hiltschner and André Georgi (eds), *Perspektiven der Transzendentalphilosophie: im Anschluß an die Philosophie Kants* (München: Alber, 2002).
11. E.g., Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
12. Relevant here is C. C. E. Schmid's critique (noted in Manfred Frank, *Unendliche Annäherung. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 805, note 6) of the notion of 'bewußtseynslose Vorstellungen'. See Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, *Empirische Psychologie*, vol. I (Jena: Verlag der Crökerschen Handlung, 1791), 216–18, 281. Schmid only allows components of representations, and other items that fall short of the logical nature of a representation (i.e. relation to an object), to exist without

consciousness. It is significant that Schmid offers an earlier version of the psychologistic interpretation of Kant advanced later by Jacob Friedrich Fries, which may be cited as an example of non-Idealist Kantianism in which the concept of the unconscious has no place, and that Schmid was later subjected to harsh criticism by Fichte.

13. On Fichte and the unconscious, see the excellent study in Elke Völmicke, *Das Unbewusste im Deutschen Idealismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), ch. 3.
14. The question of its ontological status, as with Kant's theory of synthesis, need not be decided here, and for present purposes we may again proceed on the basis of a realistic reading.
15. Fichte, *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (1794–1795), in *The Science of Knowledge, with the First and Second Introductions*, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 187–88, 193–94, 200–01.
16. *Ibid*., 187–208.
17. *Ibid*., 207–08. Natural reflection stops at the understanding, and if it were aware of the work of imagination, would (mistakenly) consider empirical reality 'deception'.
18. This is, of course, a very coarse statement of Fichte's position, sufficient only to draw the basic contrast with Kant. As shown by *The System of Ethics* (1798), ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45–46, Fichte too preserves a limit (of sorts) to self-knowledge; but it is pushed further back than in Kant.
19. Salomon Maimon, *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz (London: Continuum, 2010).
20. See Dieter Henrich, *Der Grund im Bewusstsein: Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–1795)* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), and Manfred Frank, *Unendliche Annäherung. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997).
21. Frank, *Unendliche Annäherung*, Vorlesungen 32–33.
22. Novalis, *Fichte Studies* (1795–1796), trans. and ed. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Group V, no. 566, 167–68 (summer 1796). Concerning the unconscious in Romantic aesthetics, see Rüdiger Görner, 'The hidden agent of the self: towards an aesthetic theory of the non-conscious in German Romanticism', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
23. This is also, significantly, the characterisation applied by Richard Wollheim to Freudian theory: see 'The mind and the mind's image of itself', in *On Art and the Mind: essays and lectures* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
24. Perhaps the notion surfaces at an earlier point – in Rousseau, *Sturm und Drang* and the early stirrings of Romanticism. But its explicit theoretical articulation remains the achievement of German philosophy.
25. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)*, trans. Peter Heath, intro. Michael Vater (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 74ff. On Schelling's concept of the unconscious, see Völmicke, *Das Unbewusste im Deutschen Idealismus*, ch. 4, and Andrew Bowie, 'The philosophical significance of Schelling's conception of the unconscious', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
26. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 77. In recovering this act, art finds its place in Schelling's system: works of art exemplify the unity of conscious and unconscious

factors in the constitution of reality; without their exhibition of this unity, philosophy cannot grasp it adequately. Odo Marquard, 'Über einige Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Therapeutik in der Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts', in *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), explores the analogy of psychoanalytic therapy with the role of art in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*.

27. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 74, 75.
28. *Ibid.*, 82.
29. *Ibid.*, 82–91.
30. *Ibid.*, 83ff.
31. *Ibid.*, 581–82, regards morality as dependent on nature as conceived in his *Naturphilosophie*, and declares contradictory Kant's conception of self-determination as pure self-legislation proceeding without any constraint or ground beyond the individual's power of reason: *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere* (1804), in *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling, 14 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–1861), VI, 538–40.
32. An unconscious mind within the individual person (of a sort) is affirmed by Schelling in his later writings (see Edward Allen Beach, *Potencies of God(s): Schelling's philosophy of mythology* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 53–54), chiefly in connection with his metaphysical theory of the grounds of evil, but this involves a broad change of philosophical context and a corresponding shift in view, whereby the unconscious is associated with (positive, intrinsic) irrationality. For the sake of preserving a relatively linear narrative, as well as reasons of space, I leave aside the unconscious in Schelling's later philosophy (for brief discussion of which, see Beach, *Potencies of God(s)*, ch. 3).
33. On Goethe's own involvement with the concept of the unconscious, see Angus Nicholls, 'The scientific unconscious: Goethe's post-Kantian epistemology', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
34. Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, *Die Symbolik des Traumes* (1814 [1862]), 4th edn (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1862), 8.
35. *Ibid.*, 19–20.
36. On Schubert, Troxler and later figures, see Albert Béguin, *L'Âme romantique et le rêve. Un essai sur le romantisme allemand et la poésie française*, 2nd edn (Paris: Éditions José Corti, 1946). On Carus and Fechner, discussion of whom I omit for reasons of space, see Matthew Bell, 'Carl Gustav Carus and the science of the unconscious', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*, and Michael Heidelberger, 'Gustav Theodor Fechner and the unconscious', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
37. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind* (1830/1842), trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, with revisions and commentary by Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §§403–06; most relevant are the Zusätze to §405, 90–92, and §406, 98–99, and the later §408.
38. *Ibid.*, 90.
39. In the Zusatz to §406, Hegel calls this, because of its independence, 'the *real* subjectivity of the feeling soul', as opposed to the '*formal* subjectivity of life' exhibited in dreaming, foetal life and ordinary rational life (*ibid.*, 98). On this topic, see Daniel Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), ch. 5.

40. This comes to the fore in Hegel's discussion of insanity in the Zusatz to §408 (*Philosophy of Mind*, 116–21).
41. Freud, 'The unconscious' (1915), *Standard Edition*, XIV, 170.
42. For a brief summary of the striking points of convergence, see Sebastian Gardner, 'Schopenhauer, will and the unconscious', in Christopher Janaway (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 376–80. In more detail, see Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Freud. La philosophie et les philosophes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976), pt. II, Christopher Young and Andrew Brook, 'Schopenhauer and Freud', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 75 (1994), 101–18, and Christopher Janaway, 'The real essence of human beings: Schopenhauer and the unconscious will', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
43. The full story – with Book IV of *The World as Will and Representation* taken into account – is more complicated, but for present purposes this characterisation is sufficient.
44. For a sketch of Hartmann's views, see Sebastian Gardner, 'Eduard von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
45. Hartmann gives a clear account of his methodology, aims and relation to his predecessors in the Introduction to the work.
46. See Freud, 'The unconscious', XIV, 169.
47. The relation of Freud and Nietzsche is dissected in Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Freud and Nietzsche*, trans. Richard L. Collier (London: Continuum, 2000); see also Martin Liebscher, 'Friedrich Nietzsche's perspectives on the unconscious', in Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*.
48. Nietzsche's practicalism also helps to explain the very considerable differences between Freud and Nietzsche at the level of their respective substantive psychological claims: Nietzsche's conclusions are different, because his psychological enquiry is dominated by a specific set of *explananda* determined by his agenda of morality critique.
49. In the view of some commentators, the Nachlaß passages on the Will to Power do represent such an endeavour, and if this is correct, then a Nietzschean theory of the unconscious was presumably in the offing. My own view, however, is that Nietzsche's Will to Power doctrine remains primarily aesthetically orientated, on a par with the semi-fictionalist employment of Idealist metaphysics in *The Birth of Tragedy*.
50. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology* (1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1958), 50–51.
51. *Ibid.*, 53–54.
52. Ernst Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), 131–32.
53. Klaus Düsing, *Selbstbewußtseinsmodelle. Moderne Kritiken und systematische Entwürfe zur konkreten Subjektivität* (München: Fink, 1997), 36–39, puts the point well: though Freud does not address the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, his structural theory is an implicit criticism (continuous with that of Ernst Mach) of classical theories of the self; which commits Freud, again implicitly, to the adequacy of a reductionist naturalistic account of the self.
54. Michael Moore, 'Mind, brain and unconscious', in Peter Clark and Crispin Wright (eds), *Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 148, 154, 156. There are many versions of the cognitive psychological approach to psychoanalysis: see, e.g., Margaret

Boden, 'Freudian mechanisms of defence: a programming perspective', in Richard Wollheim (ed.), *Philosophers on Freud: new evaluations* (New York: Aronson, 1977); Matthew Hugh Erdelyi, *Psychoanalysis: Freud's cognitive psychology* (New York: Freeman, 1985); and Kitcher, *Freud's Dream*. Kitcher's reservations about psychoanalysis concern the prematurity of the naturalistic, sub-personal interdisciplinary synthesis which she regards it as attempting.

55. See Thomas Nagel, 'The boundaries of inner space', *Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969), 452–58.
56. I explore this issue at greater length in 'Psychoanalysis and the personal/sub-personal distinction', *Philosophical Explorations* 3 (2000), 96–119.
57. Exactly this state of affairs is affirmed by Schopenhauer, under the heading of the conflict of (consciousness of) individuality with (the Idea of) the species.
58. Their focus has been in particular on Freud's theory of instinct or drive, *Trieb*, regarded as the node of transition from the somatic to the psychological.
59. For a helpful survey of developments, see John Gedo, *The Evolution of Psychoanalysis: contemporary theory and practice* (New York: Other Press, 1999).
60. Hans Loewald, *Sublimation: inquiries into theoretical psychoanalysis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), ch. 2.
61. *Ibid.*, 24, 20. See also the discussion in Jonathan Lear, *Love and its Place in Nature: a philosophical reconstruction of psychoanalysis* (London: Faber, 1990), ch. 5.
62. Loewald, *Sublimation*, 42.
63. Loewald affirms a close relation between the higher products of sublimation and their lower corporeal prototypes (*ibid.*, 13–14, 33–34), but it is hard to understand how, without a *naturphilosophisch* context, it can be more than contingent. The (re)turn of psychoanalytic theory to *Naturphilosophie* is a rare occurrence, but Sandor Ferenczi's *Thalassa: a theory of genitality* (1924), trans. H. A. Bunker (London: Karnac, 1989), provides an early precedent.
64. Loewald, *Sublimation*, 79–80. More precisely, though Loewald considers that this metaphysics *coheres* with his construal of psychoanalysis, it is not clear whether he would accept that it is also *required* by it, as I am urging. Some writing on psychoanalysis does explore the connection with the Idealist legacy. Marquard's view is referred to above. James Hopkins, 'Synthesis in the imagination: psychoanalysis, infantile experience and the concept of an object', in James Russell (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Richard Wollheim, 'The good self and the bad self: the moral psychology of British Idealism and the English school of psychoanalysis', in *The Mind and Its Depths* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), draw parallels of psychoanalytic concepts with those of Idealism. Several Hegelian reconstructions of psychoanalytic thought have been proposed, however: see Barry Opatow, 'Drive theory and the metapsychology of experience', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 70 (1989), 645–60, Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, David Snelling, *Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and the Origins of Meaning: pre-reflective intentionality in the psychoanalytic view of the mind* (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2001), Jon Mills, *The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's anticipation of psychoanalysis* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), and Wilfried Ver Eecke, *Denial, Negation, and the Forces of the Negative: Freud, Hegel, Lacan, Spitz, and Sophocles* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006). The view that psychoanalytic thought requires an injection of non-naturalistic philosophy is evidenced also by Binswanger's attempt to reconstrue psychoanalysis as *Dasein* analysis.

65. Beginning with Popper, but at greatest length in Adolf Grünbaum, *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
66. A huge number of chiefly North American psychoanalytic theorists might be cited here. Benjamin Rubinstein has been an especially influential proponent of the view that psychoanalysis should reconceive itself as 'protoneurophysiology'. A sophisticated version may be found in James Hopkins, 'Psychoanalysis, representation, and neuroscience: the Freudian unconscious and the Bayesian brain', in Aikaterini Fotopoulou, Donald Pfaff and Martin A. Conway (eds), *From the Couch to the Lab: trends in psychodynamic neuroscience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
67. This argument is developed in my *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). There are several versions of the extension view, the original formulation of which is due to Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins. Marcia Cavell, *The Psychoanalytic Mind: from Freud to philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), argues that psychoanalysis can be freed from its conceptual difficulties through the adoption of a Davidsonian construal of the ordinary conception of mind and meaning. For a different account, see Jonathan Lear, *Love and its Place in Nature*, and *Freud* (London: Routledge, 2005).

4

Nietzsche, Kant and teleology

Christian J. Emden

The life sciences, in the nineteenth century as much as today, have to operate with the assumption that something like 'life' actually exists. Living things have a metabolism, at least potentially so, which incorporates material from their environment and transforms such material into energy. In principle, living things have the ability to grow and reproduce, although this is not a necessary characteristic. Life, it seems, has something to do with change; it exhibits a dynamic of development that includes its own decay. Philosophical discussions of organic life, thus, inevitably encounter the problem of teleology. This certainly has been the case in German Idealism's encounter with living things and their developmental history – from Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's notion of a *Bildungstrieb*, or formative drive, to the discussions of organic development by Kant, Hegel and Schelling. At the same time, Kant already pointed out, quite rightly, that the presumed directedness of development in nature can only be regarded as a regulative principle. Teleology could not seriously be considered constitutive of nature. Nevertheless, even though animal morphology and cell theory, as much as natural selection and evolutionary theory, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards largely rejected teleological models of nature on empirical grounds, it is not difficult to see that many of the explanatory models of these new life sciences continued to rely on the language of teleology. Organs and organisms performed specific functions. Biological traits were the outcome of specific law-governed and causal relationships. Beehives were built to perfection. Against this background, Friedrich Nietzsche regarded teleology and causation as the two most problematic aspects of the natural sciences in the nineteenth century. To be sure, it seems counter-intuitive to assume that Nietzsche adopted a position that could reasonably be labelled teleological. This is particularly obvious in his mature philosophical thought. One

of the most central statements in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (*The Gay Science*, 1882–1887), for instance, directly rejects any teleological understanding of the natural world: 'The total character of the world . . . is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, organisation, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called.'[a, 1]

Teleology, then, would constitute a fundamental error, perhaps the most far-reaching and consequential error to be found in the tradition of philosophical thought:

> Man [*der Mensch*] as a species does not constitute any progress in comparison to any other animal. The entire realm of animals and plants does not develop from something low to something higher . . . But everything [develops] at the same time, and one on top of the other and disorderly and in competition with each other.[b]

It seems at first sight that Nietzsche, in this passage, adopts a position that runs counter to Darwinism. It is questionable, however, whether things really are as clear-cut as some recent commentators have suggested.[2] Darwin, of course, is no teleologist and, not unlike Nietzsche, he hinted at the dynamic complexity of evolutionary development in *On the Origin of Species* (1859): 'no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and infinite complexity of the coadaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with their physical conditions of life.'[3] Evolution and natural selection do not imply teleology. Nietzsche will have been aware of this, but in *Der Antichrist*, written in 1888, he nevertheless remarked: 'I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for *power*.'[c] It is not entirely far-fetched, then, to ask whether Nietzsche's understanding of life in terms of an expansion of power over time suggests that he reintroduces teleological arguments in his later writings – even though he seems to have rejected teleological models of natural and human history already after his reading of Kant in the late 1860s.[4] To answer this question, we initially need to return both to his earlier writings and to Kant's discussion of teleology

a. 'Der Gesammt-Charakter der Welt ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos, nicht im Sinne der fehlenden Notwendigkeit, sondern der fehlenden Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten heissen.' GaS 109; KG V/2, 146.

b. 'Der Mensch als Gattung stellt keinen Fortschritt im Vergleich zu irgend einem anderen Their dar. Die gesammte Thier- und Pflanzenwelt entwickelt sich nicht vom Niederen zum Höheren . . . Sondern Alles zugleich, und übereinander und durcheinander und gegeneinander.' KG VIII/3, 14 [133].

c. 'Das Leben selbst gilt mir als Instinkt für Wachsthum, für Dauer, für Häufung von Kräften, für *Macht*.' A 6; KG VI/3, 170.

before it is possible to gain a better understanding of Nietzsche's arguments about teleology in his more mature work. From Nietzsche's perspective, we shall see, processes in nature are neither teleological nor are they entirely contingent. This is the lesson he learns from Kant's discussion of teleology and causality as much as from the context within which much of his ideas develop, characterised by the intersection between neo-Kantian philosophy and the new life sciences of the nineteenth century.

1. Problems with purpose

In Spring 1868, Nietzsche's interests underwent a remarkable shift. Immersed in a research project on Democritus of Abdera and ancient Greek materialism that he had begun in 1867, he recognised that some of the most fundamental questions he dealt with could not be answered properly within the framework of classical scholarship. As a result, he began to undertake a more concerted effort towards a philosophical dissertation, focusing among other things on Kant and the problem of teleology in contemporary natural philosophy.[5] Nietzsche's title for this series of notes, 'Teleology since Kant' (*Die Teleologie seit Kant*), hints at a fairly ambitious philosophical project that he eventually had to abandon; it also circumscribes a field of knowledge that continued to be of crucial importance for much of his later, more mature work.[6]

Nietzsche's remarks about the implications of Kant's discussion of teleology for the contemporary life sciences seem often somewhat vague. It is not difficult to see, however, that his reading of Kant was largely shaped by Friedrich Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (*History of Materialism*, 1866) and by Kuno Fischer's celebrated *Immanuel Kant* (1860).[7] Not surprisingly, his approach to the problem of teleology mainly repeated the central Kantian assumption of teleology as a mental construct projected onto nature.[8] As far as any philosophically informed account of organic life was concerned, it was simply impossible to dispense with teleological principles, even though the explanatory value of teleology was quite limited.[9] Purposiveness is a formal principle, belonging to the observer's power of judgement, rather than to the objects observed. Moreover, Kant warned quite explicitly that 'teleology cannot find a complete answer for its inquiries except in a theology',[d] and issues of theology remained outside the purview of either

d. 'Daß also die Teleologie keine Vollendung des Aufschlusses für ihre Nachforschungen, als in einer Theologie, findet.' CPJ, 269 [B 335]; KW, X, 350.

philosophy or natural history. By 1868, Nietzsche praised Kant's 'beautiful remarks against the theological point of view',[e] fully endorsing an attempt to think about purpose in nature without any reference to the supernatural. Teleology was able to at least describe aspects of biological life that flatly resisted those mechanical models of nature, in particular the laws of motion, that shaped the Newtonian framework of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781–1787).[10]

At a time when the new life sciences, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, grasped for explanatory models that could accurately describe the complexity of living organisms, mechanical explanations increasingly came to be seen as deficient. Michael Foster, for instance, pointed out that individual physiological functions, such as hearts pumping blood, could certainly be described along the lines of mechanical models, but any such description would necessarily have to ignore the way in which the heart, its valves, arteries, etc. are dependent on a wide range of other physiological functions, morphological preconditions and external factors, such as an organism's adaptation to changes in climate.[11] The body emerged as a dynamic system of interrelated and mutually dependent functions that seemed to escape mechanical explanation along the lines of a straightforward concept of causality. Nietzsche took this problem one step further: it was questionable whether causality could be found in the organic world at all.[12]

Kant's remarks, in the Third Critique, about the inevitability of a teleological description of the organic world remain connected to central arguments of the First Critique, especially the so-called Analogies of Experience. If the task of teleological descriptions is to gain empirical cognition of the intrinsic character of the organic world, it can only be successful if it proceeds along the lines of the Analogies of Experience, as Nietzsche pointed out.[13] The Analogies of Experience, Kant noted in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, seek 'to bring the existence of appearances under rules *a priori*' and therefore have to be regarded as '*regulative*' principles: 'if a perception is given to us in a temporal relation to others . . . it cannot be said *a priori which* and *how great* this other perception is, but only how it is necessarily combined with the first, as regards its existence, in this *modus* of time'.[f,14] Shifting the perspective from Kant's Newtonian concept of nature to the life sciences of the

e. 'Schöne Worte gegen den theolog. Standpunkt.' KG I/4, 62 [5] and [57].

f. 'Wenn uns eine Wahrnehmung in einem Zeitverhältnisse gegen andere . . . gegeben ist: so wird a priori nicht gesagt werden können: *welche* andere und wie *große* Wahrnehmung, sondern, wie sie dem Dasein nach, in diesem Modo der Zeit, mit jener notwendig verbunden sei.' CPR, 297 [B 222]; KW, III, 218.

nineteenth century, this would mean, for instance, that empirical evidence of the different developmental stages of a species cannot be understood as evidence for the development of this species according to a plan in nature. Such evidence merely establishes relations in time; it establishes development as a regulative principle.[15]

The understanding of nature and of natural laws that Kant derived from the Newtonian framework of the First Critique are indeed compatible with his later remarks, in the Third Critique, about teleology as an absolutely necessary and indispensable maxim.[16] This maxim belongs to reflective judgement, guiding the formation of our concepts about nature by seeking higher laws. There is, however, a crucial difference between Kant's earlier perspective and his remarks in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of Judgement*, 1790): he begins to recognise that teleological judgements are restricted to the world of living things.[17] This leads to the antinomy of teleological judgement: on the one hand, everything must be judged according to mechanical laws, since it is only the latter that guarantee scientific certainty; on the other hand, not everything really can be judged according to such mechanical laws.[18] The inevitable conflict between these principles threatens the systematic unity of nature Kant stipulated in the First Critique.[19]

Nature and natural laws only come into existence through *a priori* cognitive principles – the synthetic principles of pure understanding – that make things out there observable as law-governed. As soon as we approach nature, we have already accepted the principle of causality, even though this does not mean that there are indeed necessary empirical laws in nature. Nietzsche aptly commented: 'The purposiveness of the organic world, the lawfulness of the inorganic world are brought into nature by our faculty of understanding.'[g] Without rules and laws nothing would be observable:

> That there are principles anywhere at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure understanding, which is . . . itself the source of the principles in accordance with which everything (that can even come before us as an object) necessarily stands under rules, since, without such rules, appearances could never amount to cognition of an object corresponding to them.[h]

g. 'Die Zweckmäßigkeit des Organischen, die Gesetzmäßigkeit des Unorganischen ist von unserm Verstande in die Natur hineingebracht.' KG I/4, 62 [7] .

h. 'Daß überhaupt irgendwo Grundsätze stattfinden, das ist lediglich dem reinen Verstande zuzuschreiben, der . . . selbst der Quell der Grundsätze, nach welchem alles (was uns nur als Gegenstand vorkommen kann) notwendig unter Regeln stehet, weil, ohne solche, den Erscheinungen niemals Erkenntnis eines ihnen korrespondierenden Gegenstandes zukommen könnte.' CPR, 283 [B 197–98]; KW, III, 201.

If teleology is to be taken seriously as a necessary maxim for our understanding of living things, then this can only be the case because it is the product of the principles of pure understanding.[20] Developmental processes in nature, especially with regard to organic life, have to be seen as governed by some kind of order – even if such order remains a regulative principle. This, it seems, was one of the lessons Nietzsche drew from his reading of Kant.[21]

In his own discussion, Kant drew on a wider intellectual field that brought together the life sciences and philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century.[22] While Hermann Samuel Reimarus claimed that the goal-directedness of animal drives was innate and that purposive development among animals and humans merely confirmed divine predestination, Blumenbach, one of Kant's main interlocutors, held the view that the *Bildungstrieb*, as belonging to the so-called 'living forces' (*Lebenskräfte*), emerged in 'organised matter' (*organisierte Körper*).[23] For Kant, however, the *Bildungstrieb*, being the '*principle* of an original *organisation*' (*Prinzip einer ursprünglichen Organisation*), remained inscrutable and could only be accepted as a kind of regulative fiction that described phenomena of emergence without recourse to theology or any prime mover.[24] It was this broader intellectual field that extended well into the immediate context of Nietzsche's own interest in the question of teleology, both during the late 1860s and the 1880s. There was, in many respects, a straight line from Blumenbach's work on the *Bildungstrieb* to the studies by Wilhelm Roux, Ernst Haeckel and Carl von Nägeli on embryology, animal morphology and evolutionary theory.[25] This line had a complementary development in the shift from Kant's critical project to the Nature Philosophy (*Naturphilosophie*) of German Romanticism, which also influenced the philosophical framework of evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century. Even though the arrival of Darwinism in the midst of this shifted the focus from the internal developmental laws of organisms to natural selection, Darwinism itself did not constitute a radical break with the past, a revolutionary rupture in the history of the life sciences. Rather, Darwin's theory continued, refined and transformed a body of knowledge that had already been in place since the later eighteenth century. This also explains why, from Nietzsche's perspective, Kant and Darwin could not seriously be separated; they described the parameters within which the problems of development in nature had to be negotiated.

It is often claimed that Darwin eliminated the problem of teleology from the life sciences by introducing an explanatory model for evolution that is empirically verifiable and conceives of evolution in terms of functions instead of goals. Nevertheless, theories of generation, selection and adaptation

introduced teleological models of growth and inheritance into the discourse of evolutionary thought, and even those who supported Darwin's evolutionary theory, such as Lange, discovered in the German reception of Darwinism a tendency to employ teleological language and argument.[26]

Darwin's own references to the increasing perfection of organisms are more than mere figures of speech and a prominent example for Nietzsche's suspicion that the biological sciences of the nineteenth century were unable to escape the metaphysical language of teleology: 'the structure, for instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak, and tongue' could not be attributed to 'mere external conditions', but was the result of a long-term process whose function it was to allow the woodpecker 'to catch insects under the bark of trees', while the function of the 'cell-making instinct' of honey bees was the latter's ability to build 'their cells of the proper shape to hold the greatest possible amount of honey, with the least possible consumption of precious wax in their construction'.[27] But Darwin also explicitly denied that natural selection would ever produce something akin to 'absolute perfection': 'Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle for existence.'[28]

The conclusions Darwin drew from these observations suggest that evolutionary development was not to be understood as random and arbitrary, but variation was part of the programme: 'all organs and instincts are, in ever so slight a degree, variable, – and lastly . . . there is a struggle for existence leading to the preservation of each profitable deviation of structure or instinct.'[29] Darwin might have been highly critical of a notion of teleology in terms of a simple goal-directed drive, but it is not necessary to understand teleology in this way.[30] Indeed, Lange's conclusion from his discussion of Darwin demanded the separation of 'purposiveness' (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), in terms of biological functions, from a strong teleological programme, while Otto Caspari repeatedly pointed out that the theory of evolution did not entail any teleological argument, or at least should not do so.[31]

Nietzsche's early notebooks clearly show that he was aware of such questions in the biological sciences even before he began to understand in more detail the possible philosophical implications of Darwinism and the German tradition of the life sciences. He clearly had no intention of returning to pre-Kantian ideas about teleology.[32] If teleology was supposed to be a reasonable explanatory model at all, its central claim had to be reformulated: what had traditionally been described as purpose would have to be recast in terms of biological functions, that is, the only purpose the feature of an organism

could have was that it contributed to the survival of the organism as a whole. In late 1870, Nietzsche thus came to replace his earlier references to a purpose in nature with the notion of necessity.[33] Once he had achieved this, the road was open to naturalise Kant's account of teleology and causality, and Nietzsche turned neo-Kantian.

II. Naturalising Kant

There was no shortage of philosophical approaches that adopted teleological principles deep into the nineteenth century. Lorenz Oken, writing in the context of German Romantic *Naturphilosophie*, defined the latter explicitly as 'the science of the eternal transformation of God into nature' (*Wissenschaft von der ewigen Verwandlung Gottes in die Welt*), so that any account of the evolution of matter from atoms to complex organic beings – what Oken termed 'history of the generation of the world' (*Weltzeugungsgeschichte*) – always had to defer to 'God' as representing 'the whole' (*das Ganze*).[34] Even though references to supernatural forces began to wane among philosophical accounts of the organic world, Jakob Friedrich Fries, who attacked German Romanticism while teaching at Jena and was critical of Hegel's Idealism, continued to stipulate the existence of causal formative drives and 'morphotic processes' (*morphotische Processe*) that could be observed across all natural phenomena, from the formation of crystals and minerals to the growth of plants and the development of animal life.[35] Johannes Müller emphasised that all processes within living organic matter had to be understood as governed by a purpose, which causally organised the constituent parts of any given organism into a viable and robust whole.[36] Unlike Kant's notion of purpose, Müller's organising force was not a merely regulative fiction – it was causality as a natural kind.

It is precisely against this background, with Darwin on the horizon, that Nietzsche, throughout his published writings as much as in his notebooks, continued to deliver a sustained attack on any strong programme of teleology that returned to pre-Kantian assumptions about causality and causation. He continually, and often in polemical terms, criticised philosophical speculation about '*superfluous* teleological principles', as he put it in 1886 in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*.[i] There simply was 'no purpose' and certainly 'no hidden guidance by reason' to be found in the history of nature and humanity but merely one basic 'precept': 'chance, chance, chance' (*Zufall*,

i. '*Überflüssigen* teleologischen Principien.' BGE 13; KG VI/2, 21.

Zufall, *Zufall*), as he noted impatiently at the beginning of 1880, emphasising that such contingent events could be rather 'beneficial' to historical development as a whole.[j] Any talk of nature in a way that did not adhere to the Kantian framework he had already outlined in his early notes carried clear religious and theological connotations.[37] Even Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will appeared as 'a theology in disguise' (*verkappte Theologie*).[38] Indeed, as Nietzsche could not but note with some amusement: 'Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, Strauß – all of them theologians.'[k]

It is crucial that Kant does not appear on this list. Throughout the 1880s, much of Nietzsche's thought about the organic world continued to operate within a Kantian framework – however critical of Kant he often appeared to be. At the beginning of 1880, he noted that the problematic notion of a purpose in nature only comes into existence on the basis of the Analogies of Experience, repeating his much earlier reflections from 1868. As such, the notion of purpose shared central characteristics with the notion of causality, which also could not be conceived of in terms of a natural kind.[39] Since we always tend to speculate about 'some alleged spider of purpose . . . which is lurking behind the great spider's web of causality',[l] as he wrote in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (*On the Genealogy of Morality*, published in 1887), it should also be possible to reject strong teleological explanations of development in nature by casting doubt on a reified notion of causality.

Nietzsche's discussion of causality has led some commentators to assume that he holds an essentially Humean position.[40] Causality, on this account, is neither a phenomenon of the external world, nor can it be regarded as an *a priori* principle of the understanding: the causal relation between things 'is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular aspects are constantly conjoined with each other'.[41] We can only speak of causality if there is a 'necessary connexion', but all the 'necessity' we see is merely a connection of extremely high probability.[42] Nietzsche's presumed radicalisation of this Humean line of argument, which leads him to deny the existence of any type of causal relationship, has been taken to run counter to Kant's emphasis on the *a priori*

j. 'Grundsatz: in der gesamten Geschichte der Menschheit bisher kein Zweck, keine vernünftige geheime Leitung, kein Instinkt, sondern Zufall, Zufall, Zufall – und mancher günstige.' KG V/1, 1 [63].

k. 'Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, Strauß – alles Theologen.' KG VII/2, 26 [8].

l. 'Zu irgend einer angeblichen Zweck- und Sittlichkeits-Spinne hinter dem grossen Fangnetz-Gewebe der Ursächlichkeit.' *Genealogy of Morality* III: 9; KG VI/2, 375.

conditions of causality.[43] Hume, of course, also featured prominently in some of the histories of philosophy Nietzsche consulted, and the interest in Hume among contemporary German philosophers had as much to do with the rise of neo-Kantian thought as with philosophy's encounter with the natural sciences during the middle of the nineteenth century: Hume represented the crucial step from early modern metaphysics to Kant's critical project.[44] Echoing such general neo-Kantian trends, Nietzsche clearly devoted more intellectual energy to Kant than to Hume, and his reading of Kant had a more lasting effect on the epistemological framework within which he sought to come to terms with the problem of causality.

We should be cautious, then, with some of Nietzsche's proclamations, when he asserted, for instance, that Kant was 'the *biggest calamity* of recent philosophy'.[m] Nietzsche remained almost at all times in the vicinity of those neo-Kantians who sought to rescue Kant from the consequences and implications of his own metaphysical commitments. He should be seen as an example for the return to Kant in the later nineteenth century, so aptly described by Wilhelm Windelband: 'Understanding Kant means moving beyond him' (*Kant verstehen, heißt über ihn hinausgehen*).[45] Moving beyond Kant implied taking the shortcomings of Kant's critical project seriously. From Nietzsche's perspective, this meant above all that the critical project had to face the life sciences after 1800, that is, the empirical knowledge they produced as much as the changing theoretical outlook within which they operated.

The way in which Nietzsche began to naturalise Kant becomes particularly apparent if we return to the Analogies of Experience in the First Critique. In the First Analogy, Kant points to the need to ground the apprehension and perception of appearances, which take place in time and are therefore always changing, in something that itself does not undergo any change. There must be a 'substratum of everything real' (*Substrat alles Realen*), that is, we have to assume 'substance' (*Substanz*). The empirical representation of time – that events occur, whatever these events are – requires some form of determination since time itself cannot be perceived.[46] In the Second Analogy, he stipulates that the empirical world, the manifold of appearance, can only be experienced as occurring in time if we assume a 'relation of cause and effect' (*Verhältniß der Ursache und Wirkung*), while the Third Analogy argues that the succession of events must be complemented by the 'principle of simultaneity' (*Grundsatz des Zugleichseins*), that is, substances in space

m. 'Ich spreche vom *größten Unglück* der neueren Philosophie – von *Kant*.' KG VIII/3, 18 [14].

interact with one another.[47] Substance, succession and simultaneity, then, circumscribe the field in which any knowledge about the world has to take place, and Kant's emphasis on spatial and temporal relations refers to life within a thoroughly Newtonian universe.

It is crucial to recognise that Kant's Analogies of Experience are not constitutive of particular intuitions but are regulative principles without which we could not make any valid relational statements about the world.[48] As such, the Analogies of Experience make both metaphysical and epistemological claims: metaphysically speaking, they posit the coexistence of objects in space prior to, and independent of, our knowledge about these objects, while on an epistemological level they imply that there must be an order of knowledge prior to our apprehension of objects and events in space.[49] Kant's critical project ties in well with Nietzsche's philosophical naturalism as it appears, for instance, in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (*Beyond Good and Evil*), which claims that our knowledge of the external world is a product of our biological organisation, 'the product of our organs', from molecules and kidneys to brain functions. Moreover, our sense organs 'are *not* appearances in the way Idealist philosophy uses that term'.[n] Nietzsche's naturalism presumes the metaphysical claim that there is something out there, albeit not Kantian things in themselves beyond experience. Whatever is out there can only be articulated through concepts of experience, abbreviations, signs, language, etc.[50] Causality, for Nietzsche, falls into the latter category, and this is the lesson he draws from Kant's emphasis on the Analogies of Experience as merely regulative principles that govern our knowledge of things.

Nietzsche is far from denying the usefulness of causality. Although for him causality is neither a natural kind nor an *a priori* rule of the understanding, he notes 'we want there to be a *reason why* we are in a particular state', or why a particular event occurs: 'The memory that unconsciously becomes activated in such cases is what leads us back to earlier states of the same type and the associated causal interpretation', and over time 'a particular causal interpretation comes to be *habituated*'.[o] What certainly sounds like a Humean argument is, however, credited to Kant. As Nietzsche wrote in the fifth book of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*:

n. 'Dass die Sinnesorgane *nicht* Erscheinungen sind im Sinne der idealistischen Philosophie.' BGE 15; KG VI/2, 23.

o. 'Wir wollen einen *Grund* haben, uns *so und so* zu befinden . . . Die Erinnerung, die in solchem Falle, ohne unser Wissen, in Thätigkeit tritt, führt frühere Zustände gleicher Art und die damit verwachsenen Causal-Interpretationen herauf . . . So entsteht eine *Gewöhnung* an eine bestimmte Ursachen-Interpretation.' TI VI: 4; KG VI/3, 86.

> Let us recall . . . *Kant's* colossal question mark that he placed on the concept of 'causality' – without, like Hume, doubting its legitimacy altogether: he started much more cautiously to delimit the realm in which this concept makes any sense whatsoever (and to this day we have not yet come to terms with this marking out of the boundaries).[p]

Naturalising Kant leads Nietzsche to claim that perception cannot be separated from cognition. Furthermore, perception and cognition are always already shaped by physiological and biological conditions.

The central question, then, is not whether Nietzsche follows Hume or Kant, but how Nietzsche positions himself vis-à-vis the neo-Kantian intellectual field of the nineteenth century by combining central aspects of Hume's and Kant's discussion of causality. That he is unable to accept the way in which Kant has to rely on *a priori* laws, and therefore cannot accept causality as a synthetic judgement *a priori*, does not have to imply that Nietzsche rejects Kant *tout court*.[51] For Kant's synthetic judgements *a priori* to function here, the understanding certainly has to be able to connect and relate different things and events that occur in space and time, but this is not all that the mind can do. Reason – as Nietzsche wrote in a long, albeit fragmentary, discussion of Kant in his notebooks from late 1886 or early 1887 – must possess '*formative powers*' (*formgebende Vermögen*), whose origins, once God and innate ideas are excluded, have to be of a physiological, or biological, kind.[52] It is, in short, biological organisation that provides for whatever Kant calls reason. As a regulative principle, causality is grounded in our physiological make-up.

Seen from this perspective, causal descriptions of the world should only be able to gain normative force within the context of our practical interaction with what we regard as the world. Causality and causation remain useful not because they are manifestations of universal laws, but because they possess an evolutionary function: they are 'comforting' (*beruhigend*), in that they answer the question as to why events occur, and they provide a 'feeling of power' (*Gefühl von Macht*), in that they allow for the conceptual control of the world out there.[53] The metaphysical need is, above all, an evolutionary need, and our repeated talk of purposes and causality in nature is an 'accessory effect of *needs*'.[q]

p. 'Erinnern wir uns . . . an *Kant's* ungeheures Fragezeichen, welches er an den Begriff "Causalität" schrieb, – nicht dass er wie Hume dessen Recht überhaupt bezweifelt hätte: er begann vielmehr vorsichtig das Reich abzugrenzen, innerhalb dessen dieser Begriff überhaupt Sinn hat (man ist auch jetzt noch nicht mit dieser Grenzabsteckung fertig geworden).' GaS 357; KG V/2, 280.

q. '*Begleit-Erscheinung der Bedürfnisse*.' KG VII/1, 24 [7].

III. 'All development is emergence'

As soon as causality emerges as a merely regulative principle, strong teleological claims lose their normative force. Nietzsche shared this assessment with other philosophers who sought to take the life sciences seriously without adopting a reductionist materialism. For Lange, teleology was undoubtedly one of the main characteristics of German Idealism, a kind of *Schwärmerei*, which featured prominently in the popular philosophical reception of Darwin – even though Darwin's own account of evolution seemed to flatly contradict such a strong programme of teleology in terms of a purpose inscribed in nature.[54] After all, Darwin himself had noted quite explicitly that there simply was 'no fixed law of development causing all the inhabitants of a country to change abruptly, or simultaneously, or to an equal degree'.[55]

Much like Lange, Otto Caspari directly criticised teleological thinking as the most problematic aspect of Idealism and viewed with great scepticism the way in which contemporary philosophers and biologists alike – from Karl Ernst von Baer to Gustav Teichmüller and Gustav Theodor Fechner – unwittingly reactivated teleological models in order to explain large-scale evolutionary processes.[56] This return of teleology also highlighted the hidden relationship between Idealism and materialism: the idea that evolutionary processes were marked by some kind of purposiveness and the notion that development in nature was purely accidental were equally metaphysical.[57]

Caspari was directly concerned with the philosophical import of evolutionary theory and, thus, with the need to establish an explanatory model able to account for long-term as well as large-scale developmental processes. While development in nature had no overall purpose, the fact that species, varieties and traits continued to develop, and that specific traits were maintained over many generations, might indeed explain their function within a specific context. Nature had 'no purpose and no goal beyond the overall process that occurs in each and every moment of the present', but 'within a specific and limited framework (*Rahmen*)' the constituent 'parts' of nature exhibit 'a kind of directedness (*Zielstrebigkeit*) toward a point of culmination' after which the forms of nature 'either become simplified or grow exponentially and become more complicated'.[r,58] Change occurred, albeit not across

r. 'Wir ersehen aus diesen Worten, daß das Universum . . . keinen Zweck und kein Ziel über den Gesammtproceß hinaus, der sich in jedem Augenblicke der Gegenwart abspielt, zu verfolgen im Stande ist. . . . Was *Theile* . . . daher aufweisen: nämlich innerhalb eines bestimmten und begrenzten Rahmens eine Art von Zielstrebigkeit zu einem Höhepunkt, von dem herab die aufgestiegene Welle wieder sinkt, mit welchem Sinken und Steigen sich die Formen entweder vereinfachen oder potencieren und compliciren und umgekehrt.'

all forms of organic life at the same rate and to the same degree. As Darwin himself had suggested, there were laws of variation, even though these laws could not be subsumed under a general law of development.[59] Furthermore, development in one context was always constrained by other developmental processes in the same way in which the complex interdependence of organic life effectively prevented the development of certain traits for certain species.[60] Despite the seeming randomness of evolutionary processes, some developments were simply 'unlikely and impossible' (*unwahrscheinlich und unmöglich*) – pigs with wings, one might say, felines with three eyes, or purple cows.[61]

Caspari's criticism of a strong programme of teleology was a direct attack on popular philosophical misconceptions of Darwin.[62] Evolutionary processes could not be regarded as straightforward developments: contingency and randomness, disturbances and imperfections, had to be seen as crucial ingredients of evolution and, as he stipulated, might even be the driving forces of evolutionary processes.[63] The conservation of order within nature was always undermined by '*constraints* and *disturbances*' (*Hemmungen und Störungen*), whereas the lack of such contraints ultimately led to the extinction of any given species.[64]

Against this background, it becomes more obvious why Nietzsche, after his outspoken attack on teleology, seemed to reintroduce teleological descriptions during the 1880s, as in the case of his understanding of evolution as growth and '*expansion of power*' (*Machterweiterung*) as opposed to a mere '"struggle for existence"' (*Kampf um's Dasein*).[65] This idea does not leave the Kantian framework behind. Kant's description, in the Third Critique, of the products of nature in terms of a '*self-organising being*' (*selbst organisierendes Wesen*), together with his claim that the organic world is characterised, for us, by 'a self-propagating formative power' (*eine sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft*), reappears in Nietzsche in post-Darwinian terms.[66] In this respect, Nietzsche's naturalism does not require a strong teleological commitment. As long as evolution simply implied that things in the natural and social worlds 'develop *out of each other*' (*sich aus einander entwickeln*), as he noted in reference to Hegel, the assumptions of directional trends, of path-dependent development, appeared not altogether unreasonable.[67] In this respect, he seemed to accept a counterfactual account of causation, which simply states that if an event, practice or phenomenon in the past had been different, a present event, practice or phenomenon 'would have differed accordingly'.[68]

The question is whether such a model of describing processes in nature, or the emergence of normative order, involves a genetic fallacy.[69] In a decisive

passage in the second essay of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Nietzsche clearly seeks to distance his project from such a genetic fallacy:

> [T]here is no more important proposition for all kinds of historical research than that which we arrive at only with great effort but which we really *should* reach, – namely that the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are *toto coelo* separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of *overpowering*, *dominating*, and in turn, overpowering and dominating consist of reinterpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former 'meaning' and 'purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. No matter how perfectly you have understood the *usefulness* of any physiological organ . . . you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged: uncomfortable and unpleasant as this may sound to more elderly ears, – for people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp.[s]

If the use of something needs to be differentiated from its history, then it also is obvious that the function something might have in the present must be separated from any function it might have had in the past. Utility is historically variable.[70] The historical perspective of Nietzsche's philosophical project leaves open the possibility that the purpose of something in the present will have been very different from its purpose in the past. Most importantly, however, he appears less interested in the possible causal link

s. '[V]ielmehr giebt es für alle Art Historie gar keinen wichtigeren Satz als jenen, der mit solcher Mühe errungen ist, aber auch wirklich errungen *sein sollte*, – dass nämlich die Ursache der Entstehung eines Dings und dessen schliessliche Nützlichkeit, dessen thatsächliche Verwendung und Einordnung in ein System von Zwecken toto coelo auseinander liegen; dass etwas Vorhandenes, irgendwie Zu-Stande-Gekommenes immer wieder von einer ihm überlegenen Macht auf neue Ansichten ausgelegt und umgerichtet wird; dass alles Geschehen in der organischen Welt ein *Überwältigen*, *Herrwerden* und dass wiederum alles Überwältigen und Herrwerden ein Neu-Interpretieren, ein Zurechtmachen ist, bei dem der bisherige "Sinn" und "Zweck" nothwendig verdunkelt oder ganz ausgelöscht werden muss. Wenn man die *Nützlichkeit* von irgend welchem physiologischen Organ . . . noch so gut begriffen hat, so hat man damit noch nichts in Betreff seiner Entstehung begriffen: so unbequem und unangenehm dies älteren Ohren klingen mag, – denn von Alters her hatte man in dem nachweisbaren Zwecke, in der Nützlichkeit eines Dings, einer Form, einer Einrichtung aus deren Entstehungsgrund zu begreifen geglaubt, das Auge als gemacht zum Sehen, die Hand als gemacht zum Greifen.' GM II: 12; KG VI/2, 329–30.

between the past and present use of something. Rather, his main concern is the process of transformation itself, and examining the use or function of something in the present simply does not allow for a proper understanding of this transformation.

At the same time, we need to be cautious with regard to Nietzsche's use of terms such as 'overpowering' and 'dominating'. These terms are merely metaphorical descriptions of evolutionary processes, which tend to elude conceptual clarity because we are already part of these processes. The metaphors Nietzsche employs 'consist', as he notes, in something else, that is, they describe the continuous process of transformation that characterises whatever we regard as normative in any given context:

> [E]very purpose and use is just a *sign* that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea of a use function; and the whole history of a 'thing', organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random. The 'development' of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its *progressus* towards a goal, still less is it a logical *progressus*, taking the shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the same thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures.[t]

Nietzsche's reference to organs, development and adaptation render it more than obvious that he understood the processes he sought to grasp as

t. 'Aber alle Zwecke, alle Nützlichkeiten sind nur *Anzeichen* davon, dass ein Wille zur Macht über etwas weniger Mächtiges Herr geworden ist und ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion aufgeprägt hat; und die ganze Geschichte eines "Dings", eines Organs, eines Brauchs kann dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen-Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und Zurechtmachungen sein, deren Ursachen selbst unter sich nicht im Zusammenhange zu sein brauchen, vielmehr unter Umständen sich bloss zufällig hinter einander folgen und ablösen. "Entwicklung" eines Dings, eines Brauchs, eines Organs ist demgemäss nichts weniger als sein progressus auf ein Ziel hin, noch weniger ein logischer und kürzester, mit dem kleinsten Aufwand von Kraft und Kosten erreichter progressus, – sondern die Aufeinanderfolge von mehr oder minder tiefgehenden, mehr oder minder von einander unabhängigen, an ihm sich abspielenden Überwältigungsprozessen, hinzugerechnet die dagegen jedes Mal aufgewendeten Widerstände, die versuchten Form-Verwandlungen zum Zweck der Vertheidigung und Reaktion, auch die Resultate gelungener Gegenaktionen.' GM II: 12; KG VI/2, 330–31.

natural processes, and it makes little sense to decouple history from nature. But the irreducibly metaphorical quality of his language also emphasises that this naturalism has as its point of reference an uncertain and fluid conception of nature – a conception that undergoes change every time we, as natural agents, intervene in a world of which we are already part.[71] Even Nietzsche's own project cannot escape the fact that philosophy is already embedded in 'physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life',[u] as well as in our conception of this way of life, as he put it in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. As a consequence, he sought to shift the emphasis from explanation to description, even though the latter remains inherently limited, as he argued in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: 'We call it "explanation," but "description" is what distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and science. We are better at describing – we explain just as little as our predecessors.'[v]

Description might not fall into the trap of a naïve understanding of causality, but it still has to operate with the language of metaphysics. Indeed, this becomes painfully obvious in his account of organic life as an 'organisation' (*Ausgestaltung*) of the 'will to power':

> Assuming . . . we could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and find that it even solved the problem of procreation and nutrition (which is a single problem); then we will have earned the right to clearly designate *all* efficacious force as: *will to power*. The world seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its 'intelligible character' – would be just this 'will to power' and nothing else.[w]

The will to power appears in this passage as a metaphysical principle par excellence, and Martin Heidegger's insistence that Nietzsche should be understood as the last metaphysician seems to some extent correct – at least at first sight.[72] It is important to point out, however, that Nietzsche is quite attentive to the metaphysical language he invokes. Even though metaphysics

u. 'Physiologische Forderungen zur Erhaltung einer bestimmten Art von Leben.' BGE 3; KG VI/2, 11.

v. '"Erklärung" nennen wir's: aber "Beschreibung" ist es, was uns vor älteren Stufen der Erkenntniss und Wissenschaft auszeichnet.' GaS 112; KG V/2, 150.

w. 'Gesetzt . . . dass man alle organischen Funktionen auf diesen Willen zur Macht zurückführen könnte und in ihm auch die Lösung des Problems der Zeugung und Ernährung – es ist Ein Problem – fände, so hätte man damit sich das Recht verschafft, *alle* wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als: *Wille zur Macht*. Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren "intelligiblen Charakter" hin bestimmt und bezeichnet – sie wäre eben "Wille zur Macht" und nichts ausserdem.' BGE 36; KG VI/2, 51.

remains an illusion, it is, after all, a rather useful one. An acknowledgement of the evolutionary utility of such illusions goes to the heart of Nietzsche's philosophical project:

> We do not consider the falsity of a judgement as itself an objection to a judgement; this is perhaps where our new language will sound most foreign. The question is how far the judgement promotes and preserves life, how well it preserves, and perhaps even cultivates, life. And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgements (which include synthetic judgements *a priori*) are the most indispensible to us, . . . To acknowledge untruth as a condition of life: this clearly means resisting the usual value feelings in a dangerous manner; and a philosophy that risks such a thing would by that gesture alone place itself beyond good and evil.[x]

The illusion of the *a priori*, as that most basic tenet of Kant's critical philosophy, is useful precisely because it allows for the preservation and cultivation of life, and 'life', in this context, carries clear biological overtones: metaphysics belongs to the realm of the 'physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life'. Metaphysics is part of our biological make-up.[73] As Liebmann noted: it is not possible to escape metaphysics; the latter has to be understood 'not as science, but as a – (perhaps unsolvable) – postulate and problem'.[y]

That Nietzsche's philosophical project cannot truly escape the language of the normative world it seeks to describe is the reason why he continues to argue against teleology without being able to give up the language of teleology. We are to some degree trapped in teleology.[74] It is in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* that he outlined this problem when he noted that, rooted in the philosophical tradition, we tend to lack any 'knowledge' with regard to the status of our normative claims about the world because any such knowledge is already bound up with normative claims: 'when we catch it for

x. 'Die Falschheit eines Urtheils ist uns noch kein Einwand gegen ein Urtheil; darin klingt unsre neue Sprache vielleicht am fremdesten. Die Frage ist, wie weit es lebenfördernd, lebenerhaltend, Art-erhaltend, vielleicht gar Art-züchtend ist; und wir sind grundsätzlich geneigt zu behaupten, dass die falschesten Urtheile (zu denen die synthetischen Urtheile a priori gehören) uns die unentbehrlichsten sind . . . Die Unwahrheit als Lebensbedingung zugestehn: das heisst freilich auf eine gefährliche Weise den gewohnten Werthgefühlen Widerstand leisten; und eine Philosophie, die das wagt, stellt sich damit allein schon jenseits von Gut und Böse.' BGE 4; KG VI/2, 12.

y. 'Nicht als Wissenschaft, sondern als – (vielleicht unlösbares) – Postulat und Problem.' Otto Liebmann, 'Platonismus und Darwinismus,' *Philosophische Monatshefte* 9 (1874), 441–72, at 468 [original emphasis].

a moment we have forgotten it the next: we misjudge our best power and underestimate ourselves just a bit, we contemplative ones.[z]

Seen from this perspective, development in nature would have to be understood in terms of path-dependent development: things do not teleologically evolve towards specific outcomes, but they evolve from something. Nietzsche's model, then, is 'evolution from' in Thomas Kuhn's sense.[75] We have seen that Nietzsche clearly rejects as untenable a strong version of teleology and he also is sceptical of a strictly Kantian model of teleology. At the same time, he must assume that the common temporality of the natural and social worlds is path dependent, albeit in a very specific way.

As this concept is currently discussed, path dependence certainly implies a number of characteristics that Nietzsche would not be able to accept. Although processes, for instance, are seen to be triggered by contingent events, they are currently also regarded as subject to a fairly strong and surprisingly unproblematic model of causality. Such processes are self-reinforcing to such an extent that they increasingly become resistant to change and it is possible to predict the outcomes of a development in probabilistic ways.[76] In contrast to this rather rigid understanding of path dependence, Nietzsche's conception of development in nature is much looser and emphasises the role of contingency. In this respect, it shares some general features with the way in which path dependence is used in historical conceptions of epistemology and the history of science at large.[77] In the same manner in which the development of experimental systems and ensembles in the life sciences is inherently open even though 'bottlenecked', the development of living things is, for Nietzsche, conditioned by the past and yet generates unprecedented events. Path dependence, in this sense, is connected to 'differential reproduction': developments are an ongoing 'chain of events' through which the material conditions, and thus the viability, of such processes are maintained, while the lack of strong causal links generates unpredictable outcomes that are constrained merely by their own past.[78] In a paradoxical way, the past has to be understood here as 'the trace of something that had not (yet) occurred'.[79]

If this is a fair description of Nietzsche's perspective on the temporality of nature, it entails three substantive claims. First, whatever organic drives and social practices can be found in the present, including those drives and practices that make up our moral framework, they have formed over time

z. 'Gerade dieses Wissen aber fehlt uns, und wenn wir es einen Augenblick einmal erhaschen, so haben wir es im nächsten wieder vergessen: wir verkennen unsere beste Kraft und schätzen uns, die Contemplativen, um einen Grad zu gering.' GS 301; KG V/2, 220.

and are themselves the diffuse site of emergence, or *Entstehungsherd*, of future drives and practices. Second, current drives, and the normative claims they lead to, are not merely the effect of past drives and normative commitments, but rather the entire history of such drives and their respective normative commitments shape the possible consequences of current drives and the value of the normative commitments we hold.[80] By the same token, Nietzsche will third have to assume that current drives, biological traits and the normative order of present social practices also exclude an infinitely wide range of possible developments: much like pigs, human beings are unlikely to grow wings, nor will they abandon violence. The lack of wings, as much as the use of violence, has served human beings rather well.

As a consequence, Nietzsche stipulated in 1881 that the function of any particular biological trait consisted in the preservation and robustness of the species as a whole, which he described as the *Gattungs-Zweckmäßigkeit* of such traits.[81] Path-dependent development still had to rely on the regulative idea of some form of causation, which showed why evolutionary development was not completely random but nevertheless marked by contingency:

> [N]ot everything is unpredictable, undetermined! There are laws which remain *true beyond* the standard of the *individual*! Indeed, *another* result *could* have emerged! . . . The individual . . . as the *most complicated* fact of the world, the *highest coincidence*.[aa]

At any given time, an individual organism could, in principle, develop in an infinite number of ways, giving rise to completely random forms, while in reality, and in historical hindsight, individual organisms have developed in a fairly limited number of ways.[82] Nietzsche, thus, began to conclude that there is something akin to necessity in nature: ‘Let us believe in absolute necessity in the universe, but let us be wary of asserting that any law, be it even a primitive mechanical law derived from our experience, governs it and is its perennial attribute.’[bb]

Whether teleology can really be naturalised in this manner might be an open question, but it provided Nietzsche with a better understanding of why the metaphysical claims with which we tend to order the world, and the normative commitments in the realm of morality that came along with them,

aa. ‘[E]s ist nicht alles unberechenbar, unbestimmt! Es giebt Gesetze, die *über* das Maaß des *Individuums* hinaus *wahr* bleiben! Es hätte ja ein *anderes* Resultat sich ergeben *können*! Das Individuum . . . als die *complicirteste* Thatsache der Welt, der *höchste* Zufall.’ KG V/2, 11 [72].

bb. ‘Glauben wir an die absolute Nothwendigkeit im All, aber hüten wir uns, von irgend einem Gesetz, sei es selbst ein primitiv mechanisches unserer Erfahrung, zu behaupten, dies herrsche in ihm und sei eine ewige Eigenschaft.’ KG V/2, 11 [201].

were of crucial importance and belonged to the natural history of what it means to be human: 'That which we now call the world is the outcome of a host of errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another in the course of the overall evolution of the organic being, and are now inherited by us as the accumulated treasure of the entire past – as treasure: for the *value* of our humanity depends on it.'[cc] Needless to say, the legacy of Kant and German Idealism was part of this treasure.

Notes

1. The writings of Friedrich Nietzsche are quoted in the text according to the following editions and abbreviations: A = *The Anti-Christ: a curse of Christianity*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–67; quoted according to section. BGE = *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); quoted according to section. HA = *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); quoted according to volume and section. GM = *On the Genealogy of Morality*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); quoted according to essay and section. GaS = *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); quoted according to section. KG = *Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke*, founded by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Norbert Miller, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–); quoted according to volume and page number. The *Nachlaß* is quoted according to volume and fragment number. TI = *Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo*, 153–229; quoted according to chapter and section. The writings of Immanuel Kant are quoted in the text according to the following editions and abbreviations: CPJ = *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). CPR = *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). KW = *Werkausgabe*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 11th edn (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990).
2. See, for instance, Dirk A. Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), as well as Gregory Moore's 'Nietzsche and evolutionary theory,' in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 517–31, and *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21–55. In contrast, see Werner Stegmaier, 'Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution', *Nietzsche-Studien* 16 (1987), 264–87. On the ambivalence of Nietzsche's relationship to Darwin and Darwinism, see Andreas Urs Sommer, 'Nietzsche mit

cc. 'Das, was wir jetzt die Welt nennen, ist das Resultat einer Menge von Irrthümern und Phantasien, welche in der gesammten Entwickelung der organischen Wesen allmählich entstanden, in einander verwachsen [sind] und uns jetzt als aufgesammelter Schatz der ganzen Vergangenheit vererbt werden, – als Schatz: denn der *Werth* unseres Menschenthums ruht darauf.' HA I: 16; KG IV/2, 33.

und gegen Darwin in den Schriften von 1888', *Nietzscheforschung* 17 (2010), 31–44; Aldo Venturelli, 'Genealogie und Evolution: Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit dem Darwinismus', in *Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte bei Nietzsche*, ed. Silke Richter, trans. Leonie Schröder (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 238–56; and Keith Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life: perspectives on Nietzsche and the transhuman condition* (London: Routledge, 1997), 85–122.

3. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (London: John Murray, 1859), 109.
4. Compare, for instance, Günter Abel, *Nietzsche: Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr*, 2nd edn (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 120–25, and Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 162–73, which come to diametrically opposed conclusions. My own approach is closer to John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11–66.
5. KG I/4, 62 [3]–[57]. See, in particular, R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche's Critiques: the Kantian foundations of his thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 83–94, and Elaine P. Miller, 'Nietzsche on individuation and purposiveness in nature', in Pearson, *A Companion to Nietzsche*, 58–75, at 62–64.
6. KG I/4, 62 [6].
7. See, for instance, Kuno Fischer, *Immanuel Kant: Entwicklungsgeschichte und System der kritischen Philosophie* (Mannheim: Bassermann, 1860), II, 549–63 and 629–65.
8. KG I/4, 62 [7]. See CPJ, 269 (B 334); KW, X, 349–50.
9. CPJ, 68 [B xxvii]; KW, X, 89.
10. See Michael Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 160–61 and 167–68.
11. See Michael Foster, *Lehrbuch der Physiologie*, trans. N. Kleinenberg, intro. W. Kühne (Heidelberg: Winter, 1881), 155–56 and 178.
12. KG I/4, 62 [41].
13. *Ibid.*, [4]. Nietzsche's subsequent understanding of the Analogies of Experience will have been influenced by Kuno Fischer, *Kant's Vernunftkritik und deren Entstehung*, 2nd edn, rev. (Heidelberg: Bassermann, 1869), 400–25.
14. For a fuller discussion, see Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an interpretation and defense*, rev. and enl. edn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004), 229–73, and Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 207–76.
15. CPR, 298 [B 222]; KW, III, 218.
16. CPJ, 269 [B 335]; KW, X, 350.
17. CPJ, 233–34 [B 269–70] and 253–54 [B 306–07]; KW, X, 306 and 332. While in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* purposiveness falls under the three main regulative ideas (the soul, the unity of nature and God), in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* purposiveness becomes a separate regulative principle that pertains to reflective judgement. See the insightful discussion in Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: an interpretation of the Critique of Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 29–37 and 90–95.
18. CPJ, 258–59 [B 313–15]; KW, X, 335–36.
19. See, however, Paul Guyer, 'Organisms and the unity of science', in *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: selected essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 86–111, at 92–99.
20. CPR 320 [A 216]; KW, III, 246–47.
21. KG I/4, 62 [3].

22. On this broader European context, see Peter Hanns Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005), 159–97.
23. See Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's *Über den Bildungstrieb* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1789), 24–25, and *Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1781), 12–13, and Hermann Samuel Reimarus, *Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere, hauptsächlich über ihre Kunsttriebe: Zum Erkenntniß des Zusammenhanges der Welt, des Schöpfers und unser selbst*, 2nd edn (Hamburg: Bohn, 1762), 359–400.
24. CPJ, 292 [B 379]; KW, X, 381. On Kant's reading of Blumenbach, see in particular Robert Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life: science and philosophy in the age of Goethe* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 229–37, and Brandon C. Look, 'Blumenbach and Kant on mechanism and teleology in nature: the case of the formative drive', in Justin E. H. Smith (ed.), *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 355–73.
25. See, for instance, Wilhelm Roux, *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus: Ein Beitrag zur Vervollständigung der mechanischen Zweckmässigkeitslehre* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1881); Ernst Haeckel, *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Form-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie* (Berlin: Reimer, 1866); and Carl von Nägeli, *Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1884).
26. See Lynn K. Nyhart, *Biology Takes Form: animal morphology and the German universities, 1800–1900* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 105–42. For Lange's remarks, see his *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart* (Iserlohn: Baedeker, 1866), 401. Two prominent examples of misunderstanding Darwin's theory along the lines of teleology are Eduard von Hartmann, *Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus: eine kritische Darstellung der organischen Entwickelungstheorie* (Berlin: Duncker, 1875), 109–15 and 148–77, and Albert von Kölliker, 'Über die Darwin'sche Schöpfungstheorie', *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Zoologie* 14 (1864), 174–86, at 175.
27. Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 3 and 224.
28. *Ibid.*, 200–1 and 206. See Timothy Shanahan, *The Evolution of Darwinism: selection, adaptation, and progress in evolutionary biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 103–04 and 238–39.
29. Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 459.
30. On Darwin's highly ambivalent view of teleological models, see Marjorie Grene and David Depew, *The Philosophy of Biology: an episodic history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 208–15.
31. See Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 405, and Otto Caspari, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge: Gesammelte philosophische Aufsätze* (Breslau: Trewendt, 1881), 122–24, 130–31 and 136.
32. KG I/4, 62 [37].
33. KG III/3, 5 [83].
34. Lorenz Oken, *Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie* (Jena: Frommann, 1809), I, vii.
35. Jakob Friedrich Fries, *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode betrachtet: Ein Versuch* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1822), 661–69.
36. Johannes Müller, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen für Vorlesungen* (Koblenz: Hölscher, 1833–1840), I, 18–19.
37. KG V/2, 11 [16].
38. KG V/1, 4 [310].

39. *Ibid.*, 1 [127].
40. See the remarks in Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 30–46, and Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 216–17.
41. David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 27 (IV. 1).
42. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd edn, rev. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 77 (I. iii. 2) and 88 (I. iii. 6). Hume's remarks on necessity are particularly vexing, since they seem to run counter to his assumption that causality needs to be based on inference from past experience. See Helen Beebee, *Hume on Causation* (London: Routledge, 2006), 75–107.
43. KG VII/1 24 [36]; KG VIII/3, 14 [81], [98] and [145]. See, for instance, Tracy B. Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, exp. edn (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988), 69–70.
44. See Fischer, *Kant's Vernunftkritik und deren Entstehung*, 37–45; Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart, III: Die Neuzeit* (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1866), 121–26; Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 145, 237–43 and 258–64.
45. Wilhelm Windelband, 'Vorwort', in *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1884), vi.
46. CPR, 300–01 [B 225–26]; KW, III, 220–21.
47. CPR, 305 [B 234] and 316 [B 256]; KW, III, 227 and 242.
48. CPR, 298 [A 180]; KW, III, 219.
49. See Eric Watkins, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 200–01.
50. GaS 354; KG V/2, 272–75.
51. Christoph Cox, *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999), 181, is incorrect when he notes that Nietzsche's critique of causality is, above all, a critique of Kant.
52. KG VIII/1, 7 [4].
53. TI VI: 5; KG VI/3, 87.
54. See Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 392–94, 401–02 and 519. George J. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 90–111, describes Lange's position as 'materio-idealism'.
55. Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 314.
56. See Caspari, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge* (Breslau: Trewendt, 1881), 83–84, 95 and 116. Caspari refers in particular to Karl Ernst von Baer, *Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaften* (St Petersburg: Schmitzdorff, 1876); Gustav Theodor Fechner, *Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwickelungsgeschichte der Organismen* (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1873); and Gustav Teichmüller, *Darwinismus und Philosophie* (Tartu: Mattiesen, 1877).
57. See Caspari, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge*, 122–24 and 130–31.
58. *Ibid.*, 117.
59. See Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 131–70 and 313–14.
60. See Caspari, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge*, 118–20 and 151, as well as Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 74–75.
61. Caspari, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge*, 125 and 473–76.

62. See *ibid.*, 225–37.
63. See *ibid.*, 91, 94 and 179–84.
64. *Ibid.*, 126. See also Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 315.
65. GaS 349; KG V/2, 267. See Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 26–35.
66. CPJ, 245–46 [B 292–93]; KW, X, 322.
67. GaS 357; KG V/2, 280. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik* in Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (eds), *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, vol. 8 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), HW, ix, 502–16 (§368, Zusatz). An English translation of HW, based on a different manuscript, is Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature, being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. A. V. Miller, foreword J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 417–28 (§370, Zusatz).
68. See the discussion of causal functions in Ruth Garrett Millikan, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: new foundations for realism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), 18 and 20.
69. See Christian J. Emden, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 266–68, and Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002), 169–70 and 174–76.
70. KG VII/2, 26 [174].
71. GaS 301; KG V/2, 219–20.
72. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. David Farrell Krell, Joan Stambaugh and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1979–1987), III, 3–10, and IV, 96–149.
73. BGE 3; KG VI/2, 11. See also GS, preface 2; KG V/2, 16.
74. The problem has not disappeared. See, for instance, Robert Cummins, 'Neo-teleology', in André Ariew, Robert Cummins and Mark Perlman (eds), *Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 157–72.
75. Thomas S. Kuhn, 'The road since *Structure*', in *The Road since Structure: philosophical essays, 1970–1994, with an autobiographical interview*, ed. James Conant and John Haugeland (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 90–104, at 96.
76. See Scott E. Page, 'Path dependence', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (2006), 87–115.
77. See William H. Sewell Jr., 'Three temporalities: toward an eventful sociology', in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245–80, at 263–64, and Andrew Pickering, 'Explanation and the mangle: a response to my critics', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 30 (1999), 167–71, at 168–69.
78. See Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's *Toward a History of Epistemic Things: synthesizing proteins in the test tube* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 74–78.
79. *Ibid.*, 178.
80. See, along similar lines, Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 34, 45 and 76.
81. KG V/2, 11 [122].
82. *Ibid.*, [98].

5

Transcendental idealism, phenomenology and the metaphysics of intentionality

ROBERT HANNA

What makes my representation of him into a representation of *him*?[a]

L. Wittgenstein

1. Introduction

Sometimes, fundamental philosophical influences simply go unacknowledged, although, when finally pointed out, they seem as obvious as the nose on your face. As a case in point, in this essay I argue that German Idealism has had a fundamental but unacknowledged impact on contemporary philosophy of mind and cognition, via the concept of *intentionality*. More specifically, I trace, unpack and then critically evaluate this impact by looking at how the theory of intentionality that is built into Kant's transcendental idealism fundamentally influenced two central figures in the Phenomenological tradition, Brentano and Husserl.

What is mind, or the mental? Three classical answers to that question are that

(i) mind is *rationality*, i.e., a creature's sensitivity-to-reasons and freely-willed guidedness-by-principles;
(ii) mind is *consciousness*, i.e., subjective experience, and;
(iii) mind is *intentionality*.[1]

Intentionality, in turn, is *the 'aboutness' of the mind*, *the 'of-ness' of the mind* or *the directedness of mind to objects*.[2] Here the notion of an 'object' is very broadly construed so as to include existing or non-existing individuals,

a. 'Was macht meine Vorstellung von ihm zu einer Vorstellung von *ihm*?' L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 177e.

properties, relations, facts, temporal events, spatial locations, other minds, and also one's own mind (including one's own intentionality), as possible targets of intentionality; and acts, states or processes of intentionality can include all sorts of cognitive or conative activities and psychological attitudes, e.g., perception, memory, thinking, apperception or self-consciousness, judgement, belief, knowledge, rational intuition, logical reasoning, desire, love, hate, fear, and so on.

The contemporary concept of intentionality, it is usually held, derives from one or both of two philosophical sources: *first*, from the Aristotelian–Scholastic tradition,[3] and *second*, from the Phenomenological tradition, beginning with Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, and continuing on through Husserl, early Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.[4] Intentionality is also a central concept in the Analytic tradition, starting with Frege's theory of sense-determined reference, both linguistic and perceptual,[5] and Russell's theory of acquaintance, singular reference and singular thought,[6] and continuing on through Wittgenstein both early[7] and late,[8] Peter Geach,[9] Roderick Chisholm,[10] John Searle,[11] Daniel Dennett,[12] Jerry Fodor,[13] Fred Dretske[14] and many others.

In my opinion, there are four basic philosophical problems about intentionality:

(1) *The Metaphysical Problem*: What explains the relationship between (1i) intentional *acts*, *states or processes*, (1ii) their intentional *contents* and (1iii) their intentional *objects*?
(2) *The Consciousness Problem:* What is the relationship between intentionality and *consciousness*, and are they (2i) separable facts (a.k.a. Separatism) or (2ii) mutually inseparable facts (a.k.a. Anti-Separatism)?
(3) *The Two Kinds of Intentionality Problem*: Is there an essential difference between
    (3i) *referential* intentionality (a.k.a. 'essentially non-conceptual' intentionality)[15] and
    (3ii) *propositional* intentionality (a.k.a. 'conceptual' intentionality), and if so, what accounts for this essential difference, and what is the nature of the relationship between the two kinds of intentionality?
(4) *The Naturalising Intentionality Problem*: Can intentionality be explanatorily or ontologically *reduced* to non-mental natural or physical facts?

For the purposes of this essay, and to keep things relatively simple, I want to concentrate exclusively on the *first* basic problem about intentionality, *The Metaphysical Problem*, and also to focus exclusively on the *early* part of the

Phenomenological tradition, namely Brentano and Husserl. But if I am correct, then my conclusions will also have important implications for the other three basic problems about intentionality, for the rest of the Phenomenological tradition, and for the Analytic tradition's treatment of intentionality alike.

The gravamen of The Metaphysical Problem about intentionality is captured perfectly by Wittgenstein's question, quoted as the epigraph of this essay: *Was macht meine Vorstellung von ihm zu einer Vorstellung von ihm?*, i.e., What explains the relationship between the mental *representations* that are constitutive of the intentional acts, states or processes and intentional contents of intentionality on the one hand, and *their intentional objects* on the other hand? Against the backdrop of that question, I will argue for these three claims.

First, the theory of intentionality worked out in the early Phenomenological tradition by Brentano and Husserl fundamentally flows from Kant's *transcendental idealism*.

Second, the theory of intentionality worked out by Brentano and Husserl in the early Phenomenological tradition also fails to solve The Metaphysical Problem by virtue of their adopting two arguably *false* versions of idealism in their respective attempts to solve The Problem, namely:

(1) *subjective or phenomenal idealism* (Brentano), and
(2) what I call *strong transcendental idealism* (Husserl).

Third, arguably, The Metaphysical Problem *can* be solved, by reconsidering and reworking Kant's transcendental idealist theory of intentionality, and by defending what I call *weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism*.

II. Transcendental idealism and the metaphysics of intentionality: the conformity thesis

In my opinion, the theory of intentionality in the Phenomenological tradition to which Brentano and Husserl centrally belong, in fact originally flows directly from *Kant*'s theory of cognition or *Erkenntnis*, and not from Scholastic philosophy, which is at most a remote influence on Brentano's concept of intentionality, despite his explicit use of Scholastic terminology. For Kant, cognition or *Erkenntnis* is conscious objective mental 'representation' or *Vorstellung* (CPR A320/B376–377).[16] In turn, he grounds his epistemology and his metaphysics alike on the theory of objective *Vorstellung*. This is explicitly stated in his famous letter to Marcus Herz in 1772:

> [I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title 'The Limits of Sense and Reason'. I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology and (2) metaphysics, but only with regard to its nature and method . . . As I thought through the theoretical part, considering its whole scope and the reciprocal relations of its parts, I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. I asked myself: What is the ground of the reference of that in us which we call 'representation' ('*Vorstellung*') to the object?[b]

In the nineteenth-century neo-Kantian tradition and the early Analytic tradition, Kant's *Erkenntnistheorie* was flattened out into *epistemology*, i.e., the theory of justified true belief and responses to scepticism.[17] But *Erkenntnistheorie*, or the theory of cognition, in *Kant's original sense* focuses basically on the nature of the various *acts/states/processes*, *contents* and *objects* of conscious objective mental representation, and tries to explain how mental representation in precisely this sense is *possible*. Now a theory of cognitive content is also a theory of *meaning*, i.e., a *semantics*. So Kant's *Erkenntnistheorie* is essentially a *cognitive semantics*.[18]

According to Kant, then, the central fact about the rational human mind is its capacity to represent, or *vorstellen*, which is to say that

(i) the rational human mind has something *X* 'to put before' (*stellen . . . vor*) it,
and
(ii) that which puts *X* before the rational human mind is a mental representation (*Vorstellung*).

Our mental representational capacity cannot be further explained – it is simply a primitive fact about us:

b. '[N]un machte ich mir den Plan zu einem Werke welches etwa den Titel haben könnte: *Die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft*. Ich dachte mir darin zwei Theile, einen theoretischen und praktischen. Der erste enthielt in zwei Abschnitten 1. Die Phaenomenologie überhaupt 2. Die Metaphysik, und zwar nur nach ihrer Natur u. Methode . . . Indem ich den theoretischen Theil in seinem ganzen Umfange und mit die wechselseitigen Beziehungen aller Theile durchdachte, so bemerkte ich: daß mir noch etwas wesentliches mangele, welches ich bei meinen langen metaphysichen Untersuchungen, sowie andre, aus der Acht gelassen hatte und welches in der That den Schlüssel zu dem ganzen Geheimnisse, der bis dahin sich selbst noch verborgenen Metaphysik ausmacht. Ich frug mich nehmlich selbst: auf welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung desienigen was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand?' Correspondence 10: 129–30.

> What representation (*Vorstellung*) is cannot really be explained. It is one of the simple concepts that we necessarily have. Every human being knows immediately what representation is. Cognitions and representations are of the same sort . . . Every representation is something in us, which, however, is related to something else, which is the object. Certain things represent something, but we represent things.[c]

Mental representations, in turn, can be either conscious or non-conscious (CPR A78/B103). The primary cognitive role of consciousness (*Bewußtsein*) is to contribute subjective integrity, or a well-focused and uniquely egocentric organisation, to a mental representation (CPR B139). A conscious mental representation is thus an 'idea' in the broadest possible sense. *Subjective* conscious mental representations are internal or immanent to consciousness – i.e., internal or immanent to what Kant calls 'inner sense' (CPR A43/B49) – and lack fully determinate form or structure. *Objective* conscious mental representations, by contrast, are determinate ways of referring the mind to any sort of objects (i.e., some topic or target of the mind – what the representation is *about* or *of* or *directed to*), including the self considered as an object, as in self-consciousness or 'apperception' (CPR B68). Objects of conscious mental representation also include existent or non-existent objects, and actual or possible objects. In short, cognition in Kant's sense, i.e., conscious objective mental representation, is essentially what the early Phenomenologists and Analytic philosophers later call *intentionality*.

For Kant, every conscious objective mental representation has both

(i) a 'form' (*Form*)
and
(ii) a 'matter' (*Materie*) or 'content' (*Inhalt*) (CPR A6/B9) (LL (Jäsche Logic) 9:33).

The form of an objective conscious mental representation is its *intrinsic structure*. Correspondingly, Kant argues in the Transcendental Aesthetic (CPR A19–49/B33–73) that all sensory perceptions have intrinsic *spatial and temporal* form or structure, and he argues in the 'Metaphysical Deduction' sections of the Transcendental Analytic (CPR A64–83/B89–116, and

c. 'Was die Vorstellung sey, kan eigentlich gar nicht erkläret werden, es ist einer von den einfachen Begriffen, die wir nothwendig haben müssen. ein jeder Mensch weiß unmittelbahr, was Vorstellung ist. Erkenntniße und Vorstellung sind einerley . . . jede Vorstellung ist etwas in uns, das aber sich beziehet auf etwas anderes, welches das Object ist. Gewiße Dinge stellen etwas vor, wir aber stellen uns Dinge vor.' LL (Blomberg Logic) 24: 40.

B159) that all judgements have intrinsic *logical* form or structure. *Materie* is qualitative sensory content. *Inhalt* by contrast is *representational content*: this is also what Kant calls the 'sense' or *Sinn* of an objective conscious mental representation, and its 'meaning' or *Bedeutung* (CPR A239–240/B298–299) as well. The content, sense or meaning of an objective conscious mental representation is the *information* (*Kenntnis*) (CPR B ix) that the cognising mind has about its objects. Since the same object can be represented in different ways, there is a many-to-one relation between mental contents (senses, meanings) and their corresponding objects. This doctrine was later recapitulated and reworked by Frege, in an explicitly linguistic context, as the distinction between 'sense' (*Sinn*) and 'reference' (*Bedeutung*).[19]

Unfortunately, Kant also sometimes uses the term 'form' to refer to purely psychological components of our use or grasp of an objective conscious mental representation (LL (Blomberg Logic) 24: 40). 'Form' in this Kantian sense is somewhat similar to what Descartes called the 'formal reality' of an idea. More precisely, however, the Kantian 'form' of an objective conscious mental representation is what nowadays, with a terminological nod to the Phenomenological tradition, we would call *cognitive phenomenology*.[20] Nevertheless, *the very idea* of cognitive phenomenology had already been discovered and significantly developed by Kant one hundred years before Brentano. In any case, Kantian cognitive phenomenology includes

(i) the difference between clarity and unclarity, and between distinctness and indistinctness,
(ii) different subjective attitudes of all sorts, or what Locke called 'postures of the mind', including but not restricted to propositional attitudes, and
(iii) our direct conscious awareness of, and ability to distinguish between and generalise over, types of mental acts or mental operations of all different sorts (e.g., analysis, synthesis, memory, imagination, thought, judgement, etc.), which Kant calls 'reflection' (*Überlegung*) (CPR A260/B316) and which is somewhat similar to Locke's 'ideas of reflection'.

Conscious mental representations can be either subjective or objective, but in either case they are necessarily accompanied by 'sensations' (*Empfindungen*). The 'matter' or phenomenal content of sensations – or what we would now call 'phenomenal characters' – are qualitative intrinsic properties of all

conscious representations. More precisely, however, sensation is 'the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, in so far as we are affected by it' (CPR A19–20/B34), or in other words, a sensation together with its content is nothing but the subject's direct response to endogenously or exogenously caused changes in its own state. Endogenously caused sensations are 'subjective sensations' (CPJ 5:206) or feelings, and exogenously caused sensations are 'objective sensations', such as the sensations that accompany the perception of external objects (CPJ 5: 206).

An objective conscious mental representation is also known as an *Erkenntnis*, and this Kantian usage is essentially equivalent with the use of the term 'cognition' in contemporary cognitive psychology. But in the B edition of the first *Critique* (see, e.g., at CPR Bxxvi, n.) Kant also uses the notion of cognition or *Erkenntnis* in a narrower sense to mean an objective conscious cognition *of an actual or possible object of rational human sense perception*, *an actual or possible empirical object or empirical state-of-affairs*: namely, to mean *an empirically meaningful or objectively valid judgement*.[21] This narrower notion of cognition or *Erkenntnis* then directly contrasts with the notion of mere *thinking* or *Denken*, which is a conscious conceptual mental representation of any sort of object whatsoever, whether or not it is an object of actual or possible rational human sense perception.

So according to Kant, and in relation to this narrower sense of cognition, there are two essentially different kinds of *intentional object*:

(1) *cognisable objects*, or 'thick' objects,
and
(2) *merely thinkable objects*, or 'thin' objects.

As to the merely thinkable or thin objects, Kant explicitly points out that

> Once I have pure concepts of the understanding, I can also think up objects that are perhaps impossible, or that are perhaps possible in themselves but cannot be given in any experience since in the connection of their concepts something may be omitted that yet necessarily belongs to the condition of a possible experience (the concept of a spirit), or perhaps pure concepts of the understanding will be extended further than experience can grasp (the concept of God).[d]

d. 'Habe ich einmal reine Verstandesbegriffe, so kann ich auch wohl Gegenstände erdenken, die vielleicht unmöglich, vielleicht zwar an sich möglich, aber in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden können, indem in der Verknüpfung jener Begriffe etwas weggelassen sein kann, was doch zur Bedingung einer möglichen Erfahrung notwendig gehöret (Begriff eines Geistes) oder etwa reine Verstandesbegriffe weiter ausgedehnet werden, als Erfahrung fassen kann (Begriff von Gott).' CPR A96.

It is crucial to understand what Kant means by saying that 'I can also think up objects that are perhaps impossible.' This does *not* mean that he can think up objects that are *analytically*, *conceptually or logically impossible*, since he explicitly says that analytic, conceptual and logical consistency is a necessary condition of all thinkability and of all thinkable objects:

> I can *think* whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities.[e]

Therefore what Kant must mean when he says that 'I can also think up objects that are perhaps impossible' is that it is possible to think *synthetic a priori impossible* objects, i.e., objects that are analytically, conceptually and logically self-consistent, and thereby *merely thinkable*, and thereby conceivable, yet nevertheless also inherently *uncognisable*, because they cannot be given via any actual or possible sensible intuition, and thus are *humanly unintuitable*:

> The transcendental use of a concept in any sort of principle consists in its being related to things *in general* and *in themselves;* its empirical use, however, in its being related merely to *appearances*; i.e., objects of a possible *experience*. But that it is only the latter that can ever take place is evident from the following. For every concept there is requisite, first, the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in general, and then, second, the possibility of giving it an object to which it is to be referred. Without this latter it has no sense (*Sinn*), and is entirely empty of content (*Inhalt*), even though it may contain the logical function for making a concept out of whatever sort of *data* there are.[f]

Kant's fundamental distinction between cognisable or thick intentional objects on the one hand, and merely thinkable or thin intentional objects on

e. 'Aber denken kann ich, was ich will, wenn ich mir nur nicht selbst widerspreche, d.i. wenn mein Begriff nur ein möglicher Gedanke ist; ob ich zwar dafür nicht stehen kann, ob im Inbegriffe aller Möglichkeiten diesem auch ein Objekt korrespondiere oder nicht.' CPR Bxxvi n.

f. 'Der transzendentale Gebrauch eines Begriffs in irgend einem Grundsatze ist dieser: daß er auf Dinge *überhaupt* und *an sich selbst*, der empirische aber, wenn er bloß auf *Erscheinungen*, d.i., Gegenstände einer möglichen *Erfahrung*, bezogen wird. Daß aber überall nur der letztere stattfinden könne, ersiehet man daraus. Zu jedem Begriff wird erstlich die logische Form eines Begriffs (des Denkens) überhaupt, und denn zweitens auch die Möglichkeit, ihm einen Gegenstand zu geben, darauf er sich beziehe, erfordert. Ohne diesen letztern hat er keinen Sinn, und ist völlig leer an Inhalt, ob er gleich noch immer die logische Funktion enthalten mag, aus etwanigen Datis einen Begriff zu machen.' CPR: A238–39/B298.

the other, thus corresponds directly to his equally fundamental distinction between

(1*) sensory appearances or *phenomena*,
and
(2*) things-in-themselves or '*noumena*, that only the pure understanding can think' (CPR A251), i.e., 'possible things, which are not objects of our sense at all, and [are called] beings of the understanding (*Verstandeswesen*) (*noumena*)' (CPR 306).

What I want to do now is to spell out the metaphysical foundations of Kant's cognitive semantics, i.e., his metaphysics of intentionality, which he calls *transcendental idealism*. According to Kant, a mental representation is *transcendental* when it is either part of, or derived from, our non-empirical (hence *a priori*) innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities (CPR A11/B25) (Prol 4: 373n.). Then Kant's transcendental idealism or TI can be formulated as a two-part philosophical equation:

TI = *(1) Representational Transcendentalism* + *(2) Cognitive Idealism*.

(1) *Representational Transcendentalism* = Necessarily, all the forms or structures of rational human cognition are generated *a priori* by the empirically triggered, yet stimulus-underdetermined, activities of our innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities (= cognitive competences, cognitive faculties, cognitive powers).
(2) *Cognitive Idealism* = Necessarily, all the proper objects of rational human cognition are nothing but sensory appearances or phenomena (i.e., mind-dependent, spatio-temporal, directly perceivable, manifestly real objects) and never things-in-themselves or noumena (i.e., mind-independent, non-sensible, non-spatio-temporal, real essences constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties) (CPR A369 and Prol 4: 293–94, 375).

Now (1) + (2) also = Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' in metaphysics:

> Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to

> establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus . . . ,[g]

which I will rationally reconstruct as *The Conformity Thesis*:

> It is *not* the case that rational human minds passively conform to the objects they cognise, as in classical Rationalism and classical Empiricism. On the contrary, necessarily, all the proper objects of rational human cognition conform to – i.e., they have the *same* form or structure as, or are *isomorphic* to – the forms or structures that are non-empirically generated by our innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities. So necessarily the essential forms or structures of the manifestly real world we cognise are *mind-dependent*.

Put now in terms of the theory of intentionality, and the familiar metaphysical dependency relation of strong supervenience,[22] what Kant's TI implies is that necessarily all the facts about *the essential formal or structural properties of the manifestly real objects of intentionality* strongly supervene, with synthetic *a priori* necessity, on all the *a priori* facts about *the acts*, *states or processes of intentionality*, when those are taken together with all the *a priori* facts about *the contents* of intentionality.[23] Or otherwise put, in virtue of *The Conformity Thesis*, Kant's TI says that *all the essential formal or structural facts about manifestly real intentional objects are synthetically* a priori *necessarily determined by all the* a priori *facts about intentionality*, *according to the formal specifications of the Transcendental Aesthetic*, *the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories*, *the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, *the Transcendental Schematism of the Categories*, *and the schematised Principles of Pure Understanding*. And that, bounded in a nutshell, is Kant's transcendental idealist solution to The Metaphysical Problem about intentionality.

In this way, all versions of Kant's TI hold that the manifestly real world we cognise conforms to the non-empirical forms or structures of our innately specified cognitive capacities *in some modally robust sense*. Unfortunately for Kant scholars and contemporary Kantians, however, the positive formulation of TI at CPR xvi–xvii is not itself *perfectly* clear and distinct, and could, at least in principle, express any one of the four following versions:

g. 'Bisher nahm man an, all unsere Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten; aber alle Versuche, über sie a priori etwas durch Begriffe auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert würde, gingen unter dieser Voraussetzung zu nichte. Man versuche es daher einmal, ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen, daß wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten, welches so schon besser mit der verlangten Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt, die über Gegenstände, ehe sie uns gegeben werden, etwas festsetzen soll. Es ist hiemit eben so, als mit den ersten Gedanken des Kopernikus bewandt.' CPR Bxvi.

(i) there is a physical-to-mental *identity relation* between the innate mentalistic forms or structures of rational human sensibility, understanding and reason on the one hand, and the ontic forms or structures of manifest, apparent or phenomenal physical spacetime, together with the causal-dynamic relations between apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural objects and natural facts on the other;

(ii) there is a mental-to-physical *logical-supervenience-without-identity relation* between the innate mentalistic forms or structures of rational human sensibility, understanding and reason on the one hand, and the ontic forms or structures of apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural objects and natural facts on the other;

(iii) there is a mental-to-physical *isomorphism-without-either-identity-or-logical-supervenience relation* between the innate mentalistic forms or structures of rational human sensibility, understanding and reason on the one hand, and the ontic forms or structures of apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural objects and natural facts on the other;

or most weakly of all:

(iv) there is a physical-to-mental *strong modal actualist counterfactual dependency relation* between the innate mentalistic forms or structures of rational human sensibility, understanding and reason on the one hand, and the ontic forms or structures of apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between apparent, phenomenal or manifest natural objects and natural facts on the other, such that necessarily, if the manifest natural world actually exists, then if rational human cognisers *were* also to exist, then they *would* be able to know the ontic forms or structures of manifest natural spacetime veridically through essentially non-conceptual content (= intuition, *Anschauung*), and also *would* be able to know the causal-dynamic relations between manifest natural objects and natural facts veridically through concepts (*Begriffe*), judgements (*Urteile*) and inferences (*Vernunftschlüsse*).

My own view is that *the most philosophically defensible* thesis is the conjunction of (iii) and (iv), which I call *weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism* or WCTI. In turn, WCTI, it should be noted for later discussion, says that the

manifestly real world can exist even if no rational human minds actually *do* exist, and even if no minds of any kind have *ever* existed. But necessarily, the manifestly real world does not exist unless, were we to exist, we would be able to cognise it veridically to some extent.

Nevertheless, many Kantians are committed to what I call *strong transcendental idealism* or STI, which says:

(i) Things-in-themselves (a.k.a. 'noumena', or Really Real things, i.e., things as they could exist in a 'lonely' way, altogether independently of rational human minds or anything else, by virtue of their intrinsic non-relational properties) really exist and cause our perceptions, although rational human cognisers only ever perceive mere appearances or subjective phenomena.

(ii) Rational human cognisers actually impose the non-empirical forms or structures of their innate cognitive capacities onto the manifestly real world they cognise, i.e., necessarily, all the essential forms or structures of the proper objects of human cognition are literally *type-identical to* the *a priori* forms or structures that are non-empirically generated by our innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities.

(iii) Necessarily, if all rational human cognisers went out of existence, then so would the manifest real world they cognise.

But some other Kantians think that Kant's STI is objectively false and are committed instead only to the objective truth of Kant's WCTI, which says:

(i) Things-in-themselves are logically possible, but at the same time it is knowably unknowable and unprovable whether things-in-themselves exist or not, hence for the purposes of an adequate anthropocentric or 'human-faced' metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, they can be ignored (= *radical agnosticism and methodological eliminativism about things-in-themselves*).

(ii) Necessarily, all the proper objects of rational human cognition have the *same* forms or structures as – i.e., they are *isomorphic* to – the forms or structures that are non-empirically generated by our innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities, but at the same time those manifestly real worldly forms or structures are *not* literally type-identical to those *a priori* cognitive forms or structures (= *the isomorphism-without-type-identity thesis*).

(iii) It is a necessary condition of the existence of the manifestly real world that if some rational human animals *were* to exist in that world, then

they *would* veridically cognise that world, via either essentially non-conceptual (i.e., intuitional) content or conceptual content, at least to some extent (= *the counterfactual cognisability thesis*).

(iv) The manifestly real world has at some earlier times existed without rational human animals to cognise it veridically, and could exist even if no rational human animals existed to cognise it veridically, even though some rational human animals now actually exist in that world – e.g., I (R.H.) now actually exist in the manifestly real world – who do in fact cognise it veridically, at least to some extent (= *the existential thesis*).

Here is a slightly more precise formulation of WCTI's crucial thesis (iii):

> Synthetically *a priori* necessarily, anything that belongs to the manifestly real world is such that if some rational human animals *were* to exist in that world, then they *would* veridically cognise that thing, at least to some extent, via either essentially non-conceptual (i.e., intuitional) content or conceptual content.

Two Crucial Implications

(1) The counterfactual cognisability thesis holds even if no rational human animals actually exist, and even if no minds of any kind ever have existed.

(2) If anything is such that rational human animals are unable to cognise it veridically, via essentially non-conceptual (i.e., intuitional) content or conceptual content, at least to some extent – e.g., things-in-themselves – then that thing does *not* belong to the manifestly real world.

Having stated WCTI as carefully as I can, there are at least two significant philosophical questions that can still be raised about it.

The *first* question is the *historical* philosophical question of whether Kant's own TI should be understood as STI or instead as WCTI. My own view on this question, for what it is worth, is that Kant himself simply *oscillated between* STI on the one hand and WCTI on the other hand. Some Kant texts support one reading, and other Kant texts support the other reading. The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts in the first *Critique* mostly support the STI reading. But Kant's remarks about 'empirical realism', the Refutation of Idealism, and the Analytic of Principles more

generally (especially the Postulates of Empirical Thought), mostly support the WCTI reading.

The *second* question – and for me, the massively more important of the two questions – is the *objective* philosophical question of whether either STI or WCTI is in fact objectively true, or whether both are in fact objectively false. My own view on this question, again for what it is worth, is that STI is objectively *false*, whereas WCTI is objectively *true*. And here are my basic reasons for holding that STI is objectively false, and that WCTI is objectively true.

On the one hand, I think that it is clearly false that if all actual human minds including mine went out of existence, then the manifestly real world would necessarily go out of existence too. I think that it is clearly false that, e.g., the actual existence of Pike's Peak (a 14,000-foot mountain[24]) strictly depends on the actual existence of human minds including mine. Clearly, I think, Pike's Peak *can* exist even if everyone, including myself, does not actually exist, and in fact I think that Pike's Peak *actually existed millions of years before any conscious minds of any kind existed*, including of course the conscious minds of all rational human animals, obviously including mine. In this way a great many things, including mountains like Pike's Peak, exist *objectively* – e.g., shoes, ships, sealing wax, cabbages, kings, seas that do not boil and pigs without wings. They are, all of them, *neither* subjective (strictly dependent on individual minds) *nor* relative (strictly dependent on cultures or societies). They are all *moderately mind-independent*. So STI is clearly objectively false.

But on the other hand, I do also think that it is clearly objectively true that necessarily, if the manifestly real world were not veridically cognisable by some conscious rational animals like us, via either essentially non-conceptual (i.e., intuitional) content or conceptual content, at least to some extent, then the manifestly real world would not exist. The manifestly real world, in so far as it now actually exists in its moderately mind-independent way, could not be such that *it is inherently impossible for rational human animals to cognise it veridically*, *at least to some extent*; and the manifestly real world, in so far as it now actually exists in its moderately mind-independent way, could not be such that *its actual existence renders our conscious rational animal actual existence impossible*. How could that be the case, given the actual fact that the manifestly real world actually exists now in its moderately mind-independent state, given the other actual fact that we ourselves do actually exist now as rational human animals in the manifestly real world, and given the further actual fact that we do now veridically perceive and recognise, and thus essentially non-conceptually (i.e., intuitionally) veridically cognise, and also veridically conceptualise, some parts of the actual manifestly real world, e.g., our own living animal bodies in actual space and actual time?[25]

Therefore, necessarily, the actual existence of the manifestly real world does not render our conscious rational human animal actual existence in that world impossible. On the contrary, the actual existence of the manifestly real world *renders our conscious rational human animal actual existence in that world necessarily possible*.

One very striking implication of *The Conformity Thesis*, when it is interpreted *according to STI*, is that actual or possible cognisable or 'thick' objects – i.e., actual or possible empirical objects, objects of experience or manifestly real objects are literally *token-identical* with the mental contents of the objectively valid (empirically meaningful) and also objectively real (empirically true) empirical judgements that are used to represent them:

> You put the matter quite precisely when you say: 'The content of a representation is itself the object; and the activity of the mind whereby the content of a representation is represented is what is meant by "referring to the object".'[h,26]

But if, as I believe, STI is objectively false and on the contrary WCTI is objectively true, then *the token-identity thesis* is false, and *the isomorphism-without-token-identity-thesis* holds instead, according to which the content of a representation in an objectively valid or objectively real empirical judgement is *not* 'itself the object', even though the object *necessarily has the same form or structure as the content*. More simply put, Kant's WCTI says that, necessarily, the manifestly real world we really cognise is *pre-formatted for our cognition* – but it exists *outside our heads*, not *inside our heads*.

In sharp contrast to Berkeleyan subjective or phenomenal idealism:

(i) as a mind-dependence thesis, TI does *not* apply to *all* objects whatsoever – on the contrary, as a mind-dependence thesis, TI applies *only* to appearances or phenomena, and *never* to things-in-themselves or noumena;
(ii) TI does *not* say that the material external world is impossible – on the contrary, it holds that necessarily, if I am conscious of my own mental states in time, *then the material external world also exists in space*;
(iii) TI does *not* say that all the proper objects of all human cognition are *nothing but ideas in a phenomenally conscious mind* (i.e., objects existing merely in 'inner sense') – on the contrary, it holds that *all* material

h. 'Sie haben es ganz wohl betroffen, wenn Sie sagen: "Der Inbegriff der Vorstellungen ist selbst das Object und die Handlung des Gemüths, wodurch der Inbegriff der Vorstellungen vorgestellt wird, heisst sie auf den Object beziehen."' Correspondence 11: 314.

> external objects in space are *also* proper objects of human cognition (i.e., objects existing also in 'outer sense').

And in equally sharp contrast to Cartesian sceptical idealism, TI does *not* say that it is possible that nothing exists outside my own conscious states (i.e., inner sense): on the contrary, TI synthetically *a priori* entails *that necessarily some directly knowable material things actually exist outside my conscious states (i.e., inner sense) in space*, i.e., it synthetically *a priori* entails the *falsity* of both Berkeleyan subjective or phenomenal idealism and Cartesian sceptical idealism alike, and also the *truth* of empirical realism:

> [The empirical realist] grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need not be inferred, but is immediately perceived.[i]

> Every outer perception . . . immediately proves something real in space, or rather is itself the real; to that extent, empirical realism is beyond doubt, i.e., to our outer intuitions there corresponds something real in space.[j]

And this empirical realism is in fact the explicit two-part conclusion of Kant's Refutation of Idealism:

> [T]he consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.[k]

If I am correct, then obviously the objective falsity of STI and the objective truth of WCTI have direct implications for The Metaphysical Problem about intentionality. More specifically, it means that necessarily there are no intentional objects, including all real empirical objects in the actual world, that do not counterfactually conform to the non-empirically generated innately specified forms and structures of the spontaneous cognitive capacities of the rational human mind, yet all of these 'thick' intentional objects can exist even if we do not exist, and even if no minds of any kind ever have existed. I will come back to this fundamental point yet again in the concluding Section V.

i. '[Der empirische Realist] gestehet der Materie, als Erscheinung, eine Wirklichkeit zu, die nicht geschlossen werden darf, sondern unmittelbar wahrgenommen wird.' CPR A371.
j. 'Alle äußere Wahrnehmung . . . beweiset unmittelbar etwas Wirkliches im Raume, oder ist vielmehr das Wirkliche selbst und in so fern ist also der empirische Realismus außer Zweifel, d.i. es korrespondiert unseren äußeren Anschauungen etwas Wirkliches im Raume.' CPR A375.
k. '[D]as Bewußtsein meines eigenen Daseins ist zugleich ein unmittelbares Bewußtsein des Daseins anderer Dinge außer mir.' CPR B276.

III. Brentano, Phenomenology, and the metaphysics of intentionality

Phenomenology, according to its founder Franz Brentano in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), is 'descriptive psychology', and descriptive psychology is the *a posteriori* science of 'mental phenomena' or 'inner phenomena':[27]

> We must consider only mental phenomena in the sense of real states as the proper objects of psychology. And it is in reference only to these phenomena that we say that psychology is the science of mental phenomena.[l,28]

> 1. By [descriptive psychology] I understand the analysing description of our phenomena. 2. By phenomena, however, [I understand] that which is perceived by us, in fact, what is perceived by us in the strict sense of the word. 3. This, for example, is not the case for the external world . . . 5. Something can be a phenomenon, however, without being a thing in itself, such as, for example, what is presented as such, or what is desired as such. 6. One is telling the truth if one says that phenomena are objects of inner perception, even though the term 'inner' is actually superfluous. All phenomena are to be called inner because they all belong to one reality, be it as constituents or as correlates.[m,29]

This account clearly and contrastively refers back to Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first *Critique*, where Kant thoroughly criticises *Rational* Psychology, which fallaciously concludes that the mind is a simple substantial immortal Cartesian soul, or a subjective thing-in-itself, starting with the true premise that the rational human mind is self-conscious and synthetically unified (CPR 341–405/B399–432). In other words, Rational Psychology is the inherently problematic *a priori* science of mental *noumena*, whereas

l. 'Als eigentlichen Gegenstand der Psychologie werden wir nur die psychischen Phänomene in dem Sinn von wirklichen Zuständen anzusehen haben. Und sie ausschließlich sind es, in bezug auf welche wir sagen, die Psychologie sei die Wissenschaft von den psychischen Phänomenen.' F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874) (hereafter PeS), 130.

m. '1. Ich verstehe [unter 'deskriptiver Psychologie'] eine analysierende Beschreibung unserer Phänomene. 2. Unter Phänomenen aber [verstehe ich] das, was von uns wahrgenommen wird, and zwar im strengen Sinn der Worte wahrgenommen wird. 3. Dies ist zum Beispiel bei der Außenwelt nicht der Fall. 4. Um Phänomen zu sein, muß etwas in sich sein. Mit unrecht stellt man Phänomen in Gegensatz zum an sich Seienden. 5. Dagegen kann etwas Phänomen sein, ohne *ein Ding* an sich zu sein, wie zum Beispiel das Vorgestellte als solches, das Gewünschte als solches. 6. Wenn man sagt, Phänomene seien Gegenstände der inneren Wahrnehmung, so sagt man die Wahrheit, obwohl das "innere" eigentlich überflüssig ist. Alle Phänomene sind innere zu nennen, weil sei alle zu einer Realität gehören, sei es als Bestandteile, sei es als Korrelate.' F. Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982) (hereafter DP), 53.

descriptive psychology in Brentano's sense is the *a posteriori* science of mental or inner *phenomena*. In this way, the term 'Phenomenology' is obviously derived from the Kantian technical term 'phenomenon', which means *whatever appears to a rational human conscious sensory subject in inner sense or outer sense*.

Brentano also distinguishes between descriptive psychology or Phenomenology and what he calls 'genetic psychology':

> By calling the description of phenomena descriptive psychology one particularly emphasises the contemplation of psychical realities. Genetic psychology is then added to it as the second part of psychology . . . Physiology has to intervene forcefully in the latter, whereas descriptive psychology is relatively independent of it.[n,30]

In Brentano's terminology, genetic psychology is *physiological* psychology, or *naturalistic* psychology: namely, psychology whose object is the discovery of causal natural laws underlying mental phenomena. Phenomenology, by sharp contrast, according to Brentano, yields necessary, infallible, non-empirical truths about mental phenomena. Hence Phenomenology as 'empirical' descriptive psychology in Brentano's sense is not *Empiricist* psychology, but in fact a thoroughly *aprioristic* philosophical psychology, metaphysically grounded on the notion of a 'mental phenomenon', that specifically consists in a certain threefold denial of *Rational* (Cartesian) psychology, *Naturalistic* psychology, and also merely *Empiricistic* psychology alike.

Brentano presents five different characterisations of mental phenomena.

> *Characterisation 1* ➔ In terms of mental acts of *Vorstellung*.

According to Brentano's first characterisation, mental phenomena are mental acts in which something is directly 'presented' to a conscious sensory subject:

> Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of

n. 'Wenn man die Beschreibung der Phänomene deskriptive Psychologie nennt, so hebt man besonders die Betrachtung der psychischen Realitäten hervor. Zu ihr kommt dann als zweiter Teil der Psychologie die genetische Psychologie hinzu . . . In diese muß die Physiologie mächtig eingreifen, während die deskriptive Psychologie von ihr relativ unabhängig ist.' DP, 53.

> a general concept . . . Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.[o,31]

As we saw in Section II, the term *Vorstellung*, here translated by Rancurello *et al*. as 'presentation', was *also* used as a technical term by Kant, but is usually, and I also think far more accurately, translated by the English term 'representation'. And as we also saw in Section II, the verb *vorstellen* means 'to place something *X* (stellen) before (vor) a conscious subject'. In either Kant's or Brentano's usage of *Vorstellung*, there is no implication whatsoever that anything *intervenes* between the conscious subject and what is represented by that subject, or presented to that subject. Hence *Vorstellungen* or representations in either the Kantian or Brentanian sense are *not* to be understood as 'ideas' in the sense in which *indirect realists* use that notion. Kant, Brentano and correspondingly all other Phenomenologists in the Kant–Brentano tradition of the metaphysics of intentionality, are *direct realists*.

> *Characterisation 2* ➔ In terms of the distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena.

According to Brentano's second characterisation, the distinction between mental phenomena and *physical* phenomena, mental phenomena are either *Vorstellungen* or any phenomenon that is based on a *Vorstellung* (e.g., a judgement, or an emotion):

> [T]he term 'mental phenomena' applies to presentations as well as to all the phenomena that are based on presentations.[p,32]

Acts of *Vorstellung* are said to be mental acts in which an object *appears* to a conscious sensory subject:

o. 'Ein Bespiel für die psychischen Phänomene bietet jede Vorstellung durch Empfindung oder Phantasie; und ich verstehe hier unter Vorstellung nicht das, was vorgestellt wird, sondern den Akt des Vorstellens. Also das Hören eines Tones, das Sehen eines farbigen Gegenstandes, das Empfinden von warm oder kalt, sowie die ähnlichen Phantasiezustände sind Beispiele, wie ich sie meine; ebenso aber auch das Denken eines allgemeinen Begriffs . . . Ferner, jedes Urteil, jede Erinnerung, jede Erwartung, jede Folgerung, jede Überzeugung oder Meinung, jeder Zweifel – ist ein psychisches Phänomen. Und wiederum ist ein solches jede Gemütsbewegung, Freude, Traurigkeit, Furcht, Hoffnung, Mut, Verzagen, Zorn, Liebe, Haß, Begierde, Willen, Absicht, Staunen, Bewunderung, Verachtung, usw.' PeS, 103.

p. '[M]it dem Namen der psychischen Phänomene bezeichnen wir die Vorstellungen, sowie auch alle jene Erscheinungen, für welche Vorstellungen die Grundlage bilden.' PeS, 104.

> As we use the verb ‘to present’, ‘to be presented’ means the same as ‘to appear’.[q,33]

Physical phenomena, by contrast, are passive, externally generated sense data:

> Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a colour, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odour which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.[r,34]

Characterisation 3 ➔ In terms of intentionality.

According to Brentano’s third characterisation, mental phenomena are mental acts in which an intentional object is immanently contained, i.e., *acts of intentionality*, and these are essentially different from physical phenomena:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.[s,35]

q. ‘Wie wir das Wort “vorstellen” gebrauchen ist “vorgestellt werden” so viel wie “erscheinen”.’ PeS, 106.
r. ‘Beispiele von physichen Phänomenen dagegen sind eine Farbe, eine Figur, eine Landschaft, die ich sehe; ein Akkord, den ich höre; Wärme, Kälte, Geruch, die ich empfinde; sowie ähnliche Gebilde, welche mir in der Phantasie erscheinen.’ PeS, 104.
s. ‘Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstands gennant haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl, nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehaßt, in dem Begehren begehrt usw. Diese intentionale Inexistenz ist den psychischen Phänomenen ausschließlich eigentümlich. Kein physisches Phänomen zeigt etwas Ähnliches. Und somit können wir die

It should be particularly emphasised here that in-existence is *immanent containment*, not *non*-existence.

Characterisation 4 ➔ In terms of inner perception.

According to Brentano's fourth characterisation, mental phenomena occur in inner consciousness and are perceived only in inner consciousness, which is immediate, infallible, self-evident and solipsistic:

> Another characteristic which all mental phenomena have in common is the fact that they are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible . . . Besides the fact that it has a special object, inner perception possesses another distinguishing characteristic: its immediate, infallible, self-evidence.[t,36]

> [I]t is obvious that no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual.[u,37]

Furthermore, *only* inner perception is immediate, infallible and self-evident; by contrast, external perception is inferential, fallible and dubitable:

> Of all the types of cognition of the objects of experience, inner perception alone possesses this characteristic . . . Moreover, inner perception is not merely the only kind of perception which is immediately evident: it is really the only perception in the strict sense of that word. As we have seen, the phenomena of so-called external perception cannot be proved true and real even by means of indirect demonstration . . . Therefore, strictly speaking, so-called external perception is not perception.[v,38]

psychischen Phänomene definieren, indem wir sagen, sie seien solche Phänomene, welche intentional einen Gegenstand in sich enthalten.' PeS, 115–16.

t. 'Eine weitere gemeinsame Eigentümlichkeit der psychischen Phänomene ist die, daß sie nur im inneren Bewußtsein wahrgenommen werden, während bei den physichen nur äußere Wahrnehmung möglich ist . . . Allein die innere Wahrnehmung hat, abgesehen von der Besonderheit ihres Objektes, auch noch anderes, was sie auszeichnet; namentlich jene unmittelbare, untrügliche Evidenz.' PeS, 118–19.

u. '[I]st es offenbar . . . daß kein psychisches Phänomen von mehr als einem einzigen wahrgenommen wird.' PeS, 119.

v. '[U]nter allen Erkenntnissen der Erfahrungsgegenstände ihr allein zukommt . . . Ja noch mehr! Die innere Wahrnehmung ist nicht bloß die einzige unmittelbar evidente; sie ist eigentlich die einzige Wahrnehmung im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes. Haben wir doch gesehen, daß die Phänomene der sogenannten äußeren Wahrnehmung auch auf dem Wege mittelbarer Begründung sich keineswegs als wahr und wirklich erweisen lassen . . . Die sogenannte äußere Wahrnehmung ist also streng genommen nicht eine Wahrnehmung.' PeS, 119.

Moroever, only mental phenomena *really exist*. By contrast, physical phenomena have a merely phenomenal and intentional existence:

> We said that mental phenomena are those phenomena which alone can be perceived in the strict sense of that word. We could just as well say that they are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really exist. Colour, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence.[w],[39]

> *Characterisation 5* ➔ In terms of the unity of the mental.

And according to Brentano's fifth characterisation, mental phenomena are not simple items, yet they always appear to us as a unity or whole, while physical phenomena may appear as disconnected or as a mere aggregate:

> Mental phenomena, which we perceive, in spite of their multiplicity, *always* appear to us *as a unity*, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same time, do not always appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon.[x],[40]

Finally, Brentano explicitly holds that the *primary* characterisation of mental phenomena – i.e., the most philosophically informative characterisation – is *in terms of intentionality*, i.e., according to *Characterisation 3*:

> that feature which best characterises mental phenomena is undoubtedly their intentional in-existence.[y],[41]

It should be obvious by now that philosophically there is a great deal going on in Brentano's five different characterisations of mental phenomena. But for our purposes, here are the five crucial points about those characterisations.

First, Brentano's mental phenomena are essentially the same as the contents of what Kant earlier called 'inner sense', and what William James later called 'the stream of consciousness' or 'stream of thought'.[42]

w. 'Wir sagten, die psychischen Phänomene seien diejenigen, von welchen allein eine Wahrnehmung im eigentlichen Sinne möglich sei. Wir können ebensogut sagen, sie seien diejenigen Phänomene, welchen allein außer der intentionalen auch eine wirkliche Existenz zukomme. Erkenntnis, Freude, Begierde bestehen wirklich; Farbe, Ton, Wärme nur phänomenal und intentional.' PeS, 120.

x. '[D]ie psychischen Phänomene, die jemand wahrnimmt, ihm trotz aller Mannigfaltigkeit *immer als Einheit* erscheinen, während die physischen Phänomene, die er etwa gleichzeitig wahrnimmt, nicht in derselben Weise alle als Teilphänomene eines einzigen Phänomens sich darbieten.' PeS, 127.

y. 'Dasjenige Merkmal, welches die psychischen Phänomene unter allen am meisten kennzeichnet, ist wohl ohne Zweifel die intentionale Inexistenz.' PeS, 127.

Second, mental phenomena are occurrent apparent facts about the human activity of consciously representing objects, which Brentano (explicitly following the Scholastics) dubbed *intentionality*. But despite Brentano's use of the Scholastic *term* 'intentionality', it is clear that *the very idea of intentionality* is fundamentally derived from Kant's cognitive semantics. According to Brentano, intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition of mental phenomena.[43] Conversely, the presence of mental phenomena before the mind is a necessary and sufficient condition of intentionality. Therefore the very idea of intentionality in Brentano's sense is necessarily equivalent to Kant's doctrine of *inner sense* and his corresponding doctrine of *specifically subjective phenomena*.

Third, another necessary and sufficient condition of mental phenomena is *inner perception*, which is an immediate, infallible, self-evident knowledge about intentional facts.[44] Brentano's notion of inner perception in turn corresponds to what Kant called 'empirical apperception' (CPR B132), with the crucial difference that, unlike Brentano, Kant does not suppose that empirical apperception is either immediate (because for Kant it is always mediated by concepts), infallible (because for Kant it is merely contingent cognition), or certain (because for Kant it is merely empirical cognition).

Fourth, according to Brentano, every act of intentionality – every mental phenomenon – has an intentional object or 'immanent objectivity'. Intentional objects in turn have the ontological property of 'in-existence' or *existence-in*, which means that their being necessarily depends on the being of the act of intentionality itself. So for Brentano the act of intentionality literally *contains* its intentional objects as intrinsic contents. Consequently, an intentional object in Brentano's sense *cannot* also exist outside the mind, as a thing-in-itself or noumenon. An intentional object in Brentano's sense is therefore necessarily equivalent to Kant's notion of *an appearance of inner sense*, i.e., a *specifically subjective appearance*.[45]

Fifth, when an intentional object is represented spatially or by means of what Kant called 'outer sense', whether or not it is represented as actually extended in space (as, e.g., in the case of the visual experience of colour, which sometimes is directed proximally to phosphenes – the tiny phenomenal fireworks you experience when you close your eyes and press your fingers on your eyelids – and not distally to coloured surfaces), then it is what Brentano calls a 'physical phenomenon'.[46]

Brentano's notion of *Phenomenology* is therefore, with one crucial exception, the same as Kant's notion of *empirical psychology*, with its

exclusive focus on the specifically subjective appearances of inner sense. Correspondingly, Brentano's Phenomenology, when considered metaphysically, is clearly a version of *subjective or phenomenal idealism*, according to which the world we cognise is nothing but a structured complex of specifically subjective appearances in consciously experienced time, but not in real space.

The one crucial qualification here is that whereas for Kant, empirical psychology can never be a genuine science – that is, an *a priori* discipline whose basic claims are necessarily true, law-governed and known with certainty – due to the non-mathematisable and idiosyncratically subjective character of its subject matter (MFNS 4: 470–71), by contrast for Brentano, Phenomenology is a genuine empirical science founded on first-person epistemic self-evidence and certainty. This lingering Cartesian assumption in Brentano's Phenomenology of a 'privileged access' to mental phenomena – implying, in effect, their intrinsic non-relationality, logical privacy, infallibility, ineffability and immediate apprehensibility, and therefore, in effect, implying that mental phenomena are nothing but *phenomenal qualia*[47] – has fundamental significance for the Phenomenological tradition. For in addition to Brentano's subjective or phenomenal idealism, to the extent that an assumption of privileged access is also retained by him, it further entails that Phenomenology after Brentano is also always teetering on the edge of Cartesian ontological dualism.

IV. Husserl, Phenomenology and the metaphysics of intentionality

Phenomenology, as Husserl understood it in 1900 in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*,[48] is an elaboration of 'descriptive psychology' in Brentano's sense. More precisely, Phenomenology as Husserl initially understood it is the first-person, introspective, non-reductive philosophical psychology of consciousness and intentionality, as opposed to the natural science of empirical psychology (LI V, §7). As a specifically *philosophical* psychology, its basic claims, if true, are non-logically or synthetically necessarily true and *a priori*.

As Husserl points out in Investigation V, 'consciousness' (*Bewußtsein*) is *subjective experience*, where the notion of 'experience' includes both

(i) *Erlebnis*, i.e., 'lived experience' or *phenomenal awareness*, and

(ii) *Erfahrung* in Kant's sense, i.e., 'objective experience' or *intentionality* that is directed towards either cognisable objects (thick objects) or merely thinkable objects (thin objects).

In turn, every conscious intentional mental item *M* has four individually necessary and jointly individuating features:

(1) *M* is a mental *act* (*psychischerAkt*) with its own 'immanent content' or 'act-matter' and its own specific character (i.e., phenomenal character) (LI V, §§11, 14, 20);
(2) *M*'s mental act falls under a specific intentional *act-type* or 'act-quality', e.g., perceiving, imagining, remembering, asserting, doubting, etc. (LI V, §20);
(3) *M*'s mental act has an intentional *objective reference* (*objektive Beziehung*) which at the very least has ontic status or 'being' (*Sein*) and perhaps also actual existence or 'reality' (*Wirklichkeit)*, although this object need not necessarily have reality – hence intentional objects can include fictional objects, impossible objects, abstract objects, ideal objects, etc. (LI V, §§11, 17, 20);
and
(4) *M* has an intentional *meaning content* or 'semantic essence' (*bedeutungsmässige Wesen*), which presents its target in a certain specific way, where this meaning content is either *propositional* or *referential* (LI V, §§21, 31–36).

It is crucial to note that this general phenomenological analysis holds *both* for the intentionality of judgement and belief, which presupposes pure formal logic and necessarily requires the existence of natural language and the intentional subject's linguistic competence, *and also* for the intentionality of perception and other modes of sensory cognition such as imagination and memory, which do not presuppose pure formal logic or necessarily require the existence of natural language or linguistic competence.

Thus in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl introduced an importantly new idea about intentionality that was a significant advance over Brentano's doctrine: namely, a sharp and explicit tripartite distinction between

(i) the subjectively conscious 'lived experience' (*Erlebnis*) or 'act' (*Akt*) of intentionality;

(ii) the objectively existing and intersubjectively shareable logical or semantic 'content' (*Inhalt*) of intentionality;
and
(iii) the mind-independent 'objective reference' (*objektive Beziehung*) of intentionality.

More precisely Husserl showed how, while each of these is an intrinsic feature of every intentional mental act, state or process, each component can nevertheless vary logically independently of the other. In the same period, Frege also systematically developed essentially the same distinction between what he called

(i*) the subjective 'idea' (*Vorstellung*) or attitudinal 'coloration' (*Färbung*);
(ii*) 'sense' (*Sinn*);
and
(iii*) 'reference' (*Bedeutung*).

Nevertheless, if the truth be told, *both* Husserl *and* Frege were merely recurring to *Kant's* tripartite distinction, made explicitly in and throughout the first *Critique*, between

(i**) the psychological *Form* and *Materie* (i.e., the representational character and phenomenal character) of inner sense, that is, its subjectively experienced attitudes, desires, feelings, sensations and images;
(ii**) the *Inhalt* or mental content of concepts or judgements, that is, their descriptive or propositional sense or meaning;
and
(iii*) the *Beziehung* of intuitions or the *Umfang* of concepts, that is, their singular objective reference or their general objective reference (i.e., their *comprehension* or *extension* – which Russell later called 'denotation').

There is, however, a fundamental meta-philosophical tension in *Logical Investigations*. This tension is that Brentano's Phenomenology, as a descendant of Kant's empirical psychology of inner sense, is at bottom factual and empirical, while Husserl's phenomenology is irreducibly modal, non-empirical and non-logical. Husserl's response to this tension is to reinterpret Brentano's notion of self-evident inner perception as *a priori insight* (*Einsicht*) or *a priori self-evidence* (*Evidenz*).[49] So for Husserl, Phenomenology has an *a priori* foundation, and its basic truths are synthetically necessary and *a priori*.

It may then seem that Husserl is back safely in the Kantian fold of *transcendental* psychology. Nevertheless there is another problem. Brentano's

Phenomenology has no rational soul as a subjective foundation, but instead only a functional unity of human intentional activities, and Husserl had explicitly adopted this conception of the phenomenological ego in the first edition of *Logical Investigations*:

> I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of relations [to the contents of experience].[z,50]

But by the second edition, Husserl explicitly realised that this would not suffice for an epistemic foundation of his apriorist version of Phenomenology, and that he had to upgrade to a higher-order ego:

> I have since managed to find [this ego], i.e., have learnt not to be led astray from a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of the ego-metaphysic.[aa,51]

In other words, Husserl managed to find a Kant-style *transcendental ego* in order to ground his theory of intentionality.

According to Husserl in his *Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), *Ideas I* (1913) and *Cartesian Meditations* (1931), finding a transcendental ego requires a special philosophical effort, or more precisely a series of such efforts. Recall that the function of a transcendental ego for Husserl is to ground his *a priori* rationalist phenomenological epistemology. And a transcendental ego in the Kantian sense is not a Cartesian mental substance, but instead an innately specified spontaneous non-empirical generative cognitive capacity for self-consciousness.

So the nature of a transcendental ego must be such that the act of self-conscious reflection suffices for the knowledge of the propositional content of intentionality. This in turn requires

(i) that this propositional content be guaranteed to be true, and
(ii) that this content be grasped by the thinking subject with self-evidence.

And *that* in turn requires

(i*) that this propositional content be materially identical with the truth-making object of the proposition,
and

z. 'Nun muß ich freilich gestehen, daß ich dieses primitive Ich also notwendiges Beziehungszentrum schlechterdings nicht zu finden vermag.' LU, ii, 361.

aa. 'Inzwischen habe ich es zu finden gelernt, bzw. gelernt, mich durch Besorgnisse vor den Ausartungen in dem reinen Erfassen des Gegebenen nicht beirren zu lassen.' LU, ii, 361, n.1.

(ii*) that the form of this propositional content be immediately and infallibly apprehended by the thinking subject.

Now Husserl secures condition (i*) by means of what he calls 'the transcendental–phenomenological reduction'. This treats the mental content of intentionality (now dubbed the *noema*, as opposed to the *noesis*, which is the intentional act) as *identical to* the objective reference of intentionality, and is therefore broadly equivalent to Kant's breathtaking fusion of TI and empirical realism. But there is a subtle difference.

Whereas Kant had argued for both his TI and empirical realism theses via his thesis of the transcendental ideality of space and time, Husserl takes a different route, which he rather unhelpfully calls by the Greek term *epoché*, and only slightly more helpfully calls 'abstention' (*Enthaltung*), 'bracketing' (*Einklammerung*) and 'putting out of play' (*außer Spiel zu setzen*). The basic idea goes back to Brentano's idea of an intentional *Vorstellung* of an object and to Husserl's own corresponding notion of a 'mere presentation' (*Präsentation*) in *Logical Investigations V*: it is one thing to represent an object or state-of-affairs *as actually existing*, and another thing altogether to represent it merely *as possibly not existing*. Given Cartesian sceptical doubts, the object possibly does not exist.

Assuming that this possibility obtains in a relevant relation to the actual world, then all that remains for the thinking subject of intentionality is the *content* of intentionality which represents the object in a certain way. So this content itself becomes the new or *indirect* object of intentionality. Frege discusses essentially the same idea under the rubric of the 'indirect reference' of meaningful expressions in 'opaque' contexts – that is, ordinary referring expressions falling within the scope of certain psychological verbs followed by propositional complements, such as 'believes that' or 'wonders whether' and so on – although without the Cartesian and Kantian metaphysical backdrops assumed by Husserl. What the parallel with Frege shows is that TI and empirical realism do not automatically *follow* from the transcendental–phenomenological reduction, but must in fact be a further metaphysical hypothesis added by Husserl in order to guarantee the truth of the propositional content to which the truth-making object has been 'reduced'.

Correspondingly, Husserl secures condition (ii*) by means of what he calls 'seeing essences' (*Wesensschau*, *Wesenserschauung*) and 'eidetic intuition'. Despite the allusion to the Platonic *eidos*, however, seeing essences is not supposed by Husserl to be Platonic insight, or a mysterious infallible

grasp of mind-independent, non-spatio-temporal, causally inert, universal, ideal objects; nor is it supposed to be Cartesian insight, i.e., the infallible, certain, clear and distinct awareness of innate ideas. Instead it is in effect *Kantian* insight or *Einsicht*, which is a reflective awareness of just those formal elements of representational content that express the spontaneous transcendental activity of the subject in synthesising that content: 'reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design'[bb] (CPR Bxiii). So Kantian insight is a special form of self-knowledge.

The crucial point of contrast with Husserl's eidetic insight, however, is Kant's fallibilistic thesis that insight yields at best only a subjective sufficiency of belief or 'conviction' (*Überzeugung*), but not, in and of itself, objective 'certainty' (*Gewißheit*) (CPR A820–22/B848–850). The world must independently contribute a 'given' element, the manifold of sensory content, in order for knowledge to be possible (CPR B145). Husserl, by sharp contrast, takes eidetic insight to be infallible and certain, which again shows his troublesome tendency to run together Kantian TI / empirical realism, which is explicitly anti-Cartesian, and Cartesian indirect realist epistemology, which entails a corresponding Cartesian metaphysics of ontological dualism.[52] Descartes's indirect realist epistemology is forever haunted by scepticism, and his ontological dualism of mental substance (whose essence is *thinking*) vs. physical substance (whose essence is *extension*) is forever haunted by the unintelligibility of mind–body interconnection and causal interaction. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* should have been *Kantian Reflections*.

Let me now try to make this critical point more clearly, using Husserl's distinction between *noesis* and *noema*. For the transcendental-Phenomenological Husserl, the *noesis* is the intentional act, as self-evidently grasped from the standpoint of the phenomenological reduction, and the *noema* is the mental content of intentionality, as self-evidently grasped from the standpoint of the phenomenological reduction. The pure transcendental ego is the metaphysical ground of all noetic acts and noematic syntheses. The intentional object, correspondingly, is the object *as* prescribed by the 'core' or objective essence of the noematic content. Therefore the intentional object *is identical to* the 'core' or objective essence of intentional content. Now there is one and only one object, the intentional object, whether taken from the standpoint of the natural attitude or from the transcendental standpoint.

This doctrine, in turn, is essentially the same as Kant's *strong transcendental idealism* or STI, on *The Two Aspect* interpretation, which says that the

bb. 'Die Vernunft nur das einsieht, was sie selbst nach ihrem Entwurfe hervorbringt.'

real empirical object, which is identical with the well-formed content of judgements of experience, is such that it can be both *regarded or taken* as phenomenal or 'for us', and also *regarded or taken* as noumenal or 'in-itself' (see, e.g., CPR Bxxvii). But even leaving aside any reasonable worries one might have about The Two Aspect Theory,[53] there is a much more serious worry about Husserl's transcendental Phenomenology: Does this mean that necessarily, all the contents of intentionality (i.e., all the noemata) and also all the real intentional objects go out of existence whenever *we* go out of existence? As far as I can see, *Yes*. So Husserl's transcendental-Phenomenological theory of intentionality entails STI, which is objectively false.

v. Back to transcendental idealism and beyond Phenomenology: how to solve the metaphysical problem

The early Phenomenologists were wrong about the metaphysics of intentionality. Brentano's doctrine of intentionality assimilates intentional objects to mental phenomena in inner sense, and therefore entails subjective or phenomenal idealism. Husserl tried to fix up Brentano's subjective or phenomenal idealism so that it would explain *a priori* knowledge, but ultimately ended up in STI, which is objectively false. A decisive reason for rejecting STI is that if STI is true, then necessarily, if all rational human cognisers go out of existence, then the manifestly real world goes out of existence too. But that is clearly a mistake.

My proposal for solving The Metaphysical Problem about intentionality is that we should adopt Kant's WCTI.[54] WCTI has the highly significant theoretical virtue of capturing a modally robust mind-dependency thesis without the clearly mistaken implications of STI. If WCTI is objectively true, then the non-existence of rational human cognisers, and also the non-existence of any other kinds of minds, is perfectly consistent with the existence of the manifestly real world, but the manifestly real world cannot exist unless, were we to exist, then we would be able to cognise it veridically, at least to some extent.

If all this is correct, then the very idea of intentionality historically flowed from Kant's cognitive semantics and his TI into Brentano's phenomenology, whereby it turned into the objectively false doctrine of subjective or phenomenal idealism, which then drove Husserl back to an objectively false version of Kant's TI, namely STI. But there is an objectively true version of Kant's TI, namely WCTI. What early Phenomenology teaches us about the metaphysics of intentionality, therefore, is twofold:

(1) the very idea of intentionality is a *Kantian* idea,
and
(2) the objectively true *metaphysics* of intentionality is Kant's WCTI, not STI.

In this way, the correct answer to Wittgenstein's deep question – 'What makes my representation of him into a representation of *him*?' – is simply this:

(i) necessarily all the thick objects of human intentionality are phenomena and never noumena;
(ii) necessarily all the essential formal or structural properties of thick intentional objects conform to the innately specified non-empirically spontaneously generated *a priori* forms or structures of the human mind;
(iii) necessarily the manifestly real world exists only if, *were* human cognisers to exist, then they *would* be able to cognise that world veridically, at least to some extent, but the manifestly real natural world can exist even if rational human minds, or any other kinds of minds, do not actually exist or never have existed;
and
(iv) I am now in an intentional act, state or process whose cognitive–semantic content, both essentially non-conceptual (i.e., intuitional) and conceptual, directly and uniquely refers to *him*.

Notes

1. My own view is that minds like ours are inherently rational, conscious, intentional *and* essentially embodied. See R. Hanna, *Rationality and Logic* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006); R. Hanna and M. Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and R. Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori* (Unpublished ms, Fall 2012 version).
2. See, e.g., P. Jacob, 'Intentionality', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition)*, available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>.
3. See, e.g., R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
4. See, e.g., D. Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London, Routledge, 2000).
5. See, e.g., M. Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chs. 2–4 and 9–10.

6. See B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. IV; and B. Russell, 'Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description', in *Mysticism and Logic* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1981), 152–67.
7. See L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), props. 2.0123–2.01231, 3.5, and 4.002, 33, 61 and 61–63.
8. See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, esp. part II; and L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2 vols (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
9. See P. Geach, *Mental Acts: their content and their objects* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956).
10. See R. Chisholm, *Perceiving* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957); R. Chisholm, *The First Person: an essay on reference and intentionality* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1981); and R. Chisholm and W. Sellars, 'Chisholm–Sellars correspondence on intentionality', in A. Marras (ed.), *Intentionality, Mind, and Language* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 214–48.
11. See J. Searle, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
12. See D. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); and D. Dennett, *The Intentional Stance* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
13. J. Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: Crowell/MIT Press, 1975); and J. Fodor, *RePresentations* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), esp. chs. 4 and 7–9.
14. F. Dretske, 'The intentionality of cognitive states', in P. French *et al.* (eds), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 5 (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 281–94; and F. Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).
15. See R. Hanna, 'Kant and nonconceptual Content', *European Journal of Philosophy* 13 (2005), 247–90; R. Hanna, 'Kantian non-conceptualism', *Philosophical Studies* 137 (2008), 41–64; R. Hanna and M. Chadha, 'Non-conceptualism and the problem of perceptual self-knowledge', *European Journal of Philosophy* 19 (2011), 184–223; R. Hanna, 'Kant's non-conceptualism, rogue objects, and the gap in the B deduction', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011), 397–413; R. Hanna, 'Beyond the myth of the myth: a Kantian theory of non-conceptual content', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011), 321–96; and Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 2.
16. For convenience I refer to Kant's works intratextually in parentheses. The citations include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard 'Akademie' edition of Kant's works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussische (now Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1900). For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Because the Akademie edition contains only the B edition of the first *Critique*, I have also consulted the following German composite edition: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in Kant, *Werke in sechs Bänden*, ed. W. Weischedel, iii (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). I generally follow the standard English translations from the German texts, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. Here is a list of the abbreviations and English translations of the works cited: LL: *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. M. Young

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) (Blomberg Logic: 5–246; Jäsche Logic: 519–640); CPJ: *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); CPR*: Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); MFNS: *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Correspondence: *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99*, trans. A. Zweig (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Prol*: Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1977).

17. See, e.g., K. Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
18. For a full development of this interpretation, see R. Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2001), chs. 1–2. See also Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. ch. 1.
19. G. Frege, 'On sense and reference', in G. Frege, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, trans. M. Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), 56–78.
20. See, e.g., T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds), *Cognitive Phenomenology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
21. See also R. Hanna, 'Kant's theory of judgment', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Summer 2009 Edition*), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/kant-judgment/>.
22. See, e.g., J. Kim, *Supervenience and Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. part 1; D. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 2–3; and T. Horgan, 'From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world', *Mind* 102 (1993), 555–86.
23. See, e.g., R. Hanna, *Metaphysics with a Human Face: lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, available online at <http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/lecture_hanna_metaphysics_with_a_human_face_lectures_winter11.pdf>.
24. See, e.g., Wikipedia, 'Pike's Peak', available online at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pikes_Peak>.
25. See R. Hanna, 'The inner and the outer: Kant's "refutation" reconstructed', *Ratio* 13 (2000), 146–74; and R. Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 1.
26. See also R. Hanna, 'Kant, truth, and human nature', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 8 (2000), 225–50; and Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, ch. 5.
27. See F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. A. Rancurello *et al.* (London: Routledge, 1995), book I, 3–73, PeS, 3–97; and F. Brentano, 'Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology', in D. Moran and T. Mooney (eds), *The Phenomenology Reader* (London: Routledge, 2002), 51–54, DP, 53–56.
28. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 100.
29. Brentano, 'Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology', 51.
30. *Ibid.*, 51. I have also used the following German editions: F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1874) (hereafter PeS) and F. Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982 (hereafter DP)).
31. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 78–79.

32. *Ibid.*, 80.
33. *Ibid.*, 81.
34. *Ibid.*, 79–80.
35. *Ibid.*, 88–89.
36. *Ibid.*, 91.
37. *Ibid.*, 92.
38. *Ibid.*, 91.
39. *Ibid.*, 92.
40. *Ibid.*, 98.
41. *Ibid.*, 98.
42. See W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols (New York, NY: Dover, 1950), vol. 1, ch. ix.
43. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 88–91, PeS, 115–18.
44. *Ibid.*, 91, PeS, 118–19.
45. *Ibid.*, 81, PeS, 106.
46. *Ibid.*, 83–85, PeS, 108–11.
47. See D. Dennett, 'Quining Qualia', in D. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: classical and contemporary readings* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 226–46.
48. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) (LI). I have also used the following German edition: E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 3 vols. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980 (hereafter LU)).
49. This is made clear in the second edition version of the Introduction to vol. 2 of the *Logical Investigations*, which was published in 1913, LU, ii, 361.
50. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, 549, LU, ii, 361, n. 1.
51. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 549, n. 1.
52. See also L. Kolakowski, *Husserl and the Search for Certitude* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
53. See, e.g., Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, 108–09; and Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, 422–23.
54. See also Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 6–8.

6

Heidegger and the impact of idealism

Daniel O. Dahlstrom

This essay elaborates the impact of idealism on Heidegger's thinking, in the context of the early transcendental and metaphysical phase of his thinking and in the context of his subsequent attempt to think being historically and non-metaphysically. Part I details how Heidegger in that first phase leaves the door open for characterising his own existential analysis and fundamental ontology as a new form of idealism, albeit an idealism with stark similarities to Kant's transcendental idealism. In the second phase, however, in a fit of self-criticism and criticism of Western thinking from its beginning, he rejects idealism *tout court*, seeing it as a form of Platonism that is oblivious to the historical character of being. After reviewing Heidegger's rendition of how Plato's interpretation of the *idea* sets the stage for modern idealism, Part II glosses his critical accounts of the pre-absolute and absolute forms of the latter. The third and final part of the essay reviews some implications that Heidegger draws from what he regards as the impact of idealism on Western thought.

I

In SZ,[1] Heidegger's existential analysis, undertaken for the sake of fundamental ontology, has a certain kinship with 'idealism', as he understands the concept. This understanding departs from the way the concept was typically understood in his day, namely, as an epistemological doctrine, one that forms the counterpart to realism.[2] Both epistemological doctrines are said to arise from the so-called problem of the reality of the external world. Since any sense of reality presupposes being-in-the-world, Heidegger rejects as senseless any attempt to question or to prove the reality of the external world, or – in the case of Dilthey – merely to explain the source of belief in that reality.

These attempts confuse the world-phenomenon (characteristic of Dasein's 'being-in') with the being of inner-worldly entities (SZ 202, 206f.). Whether the problem of reality is conceived along strictly epistemological lines or via phenomenological improvements of the concept of subject or consciousness, it fails because the corresponding conceptions of knowing or consciousness lack an appropriate existential analysis.

At the same time, in SZ, Heidegger makes the claim: 'Inner-worldly entities are respectively already disclosed with being-here as being-in-the-world.'[a] He immediately adds that this claim appears to speak for realism and that, indeed, it would if realism were not committed to the possibility and need for proving the world's reality and, indeed, to doing so 'ontically through real causal connections' (SZ 207). Because idealism denies these commitments, it has the better of realism, as Heidegger puts it in SZ: '*Idealism*, regardless of how contrary and untenable it is in the end, has a fundamental advantage over against realism, as long as that idealism does not misunderstand itself as "psychological" idealism.'[b] It enjoys this advantage thanks to its recognition that being cannot be explained by beings, a recognition that finds expression in the idealist claim that being is only in consciousness (without being *caused* by consciousness).[3] Yet this recognition does not entail that it can dispense with the question of the being of consciousness, the manner of being of the *res cogitans* itself. In other words, idealism forfeits its advantage over realism as long as it fails to provide an ontological analysis of consciousness itself: 'If the rubric "idealism" means in effect understanding that being is never explicable by beings but instead is in each case already the "transcendental" for each particular being, then idealism entails the sole and proper possibility of philosophical problems.'[c] Yet Heidegger is quick to add that, if idealism means tracing beings back to a subject or consciousness of which one can only say that it is not a thing, then idealism is 'no less naïve than the grossest realism' (SZ 208).

These remarks illustrate that Heidegger is willing to countenance a suitably qualified description of idealism as the only genuine way of posing philosophical problems. Not surprisingly, aspects of his existential analysis, as the key to fundamental ontology, bear an unmistakable affinity to this

a. 'Mit dem Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein ist innerweltliches Seiendes je schon erschlossen.' SZ 207.
b. 'Gegenuber dem Realismus hat der Idealismus, mag er im Resultat noch so entgegengesetzt und unhaltbar sein, einen grundsätzlichen Vorrang, falls er nicht als 'psychologischer' Idealismus sich selbst mißversteht.' SZ 207.
c. 'Besagt der Titel Idealismus soviel wie Verständnis dessen, daß Sein nie durch Seiendes erklärbar, sondern für jedes Seiende je schon das "Transzendentale" ist, dann liegt im Idealismus die einzige und rechte Möglichkeit philosophischer Problematik.' SZ 207f.

qualified version of idealism. That qualified version of idealism is one that pursues the question of the being of subjectivity or consciousness, in so far as its way of being is the source of the transcendental, constitutive determination of beings generally. While an entity's standing in nature or even in consciousness is causally dependent upon some other entity's standing, the sense of its being is not. Instead the sense of being of any entity is grounded on – i.e., is non-causally dependent upon – a human disclosure of that sense. To be sure, the disclosure is not simply a human projection, since such a projection supposes a world (an ensemble of inherited, unfolding and approaching horizons). Nevertheless, in as much as the sense of being of entities depends in each case on such a disclosure and that disclosure is at once irreducible to any real, causal connections among entities yet constitutive of Dasein, the dependency signals a kind of idealism. In this idealism, not the standing of entities in nature or of objects in science, but the sense of their being in general depends upon the transcendental constitution of Dasein. Given this understanding of idealism, Heidegger's efforts to reconstrue transcendental subjectivity as being-in-the-world are – by his own account – inherently idealist.

At the same time Heidegger eschews any explicit characterisation of his analysis as idealist, for at least two reasons. First, modern versions of idealism take their bearings from a conception of subjectivity or consciousness as something immediately given (Descartes), ultimately indeterminable (Kant), or the absolute end of any analysis (Hegel). In other words, what modern idealisms take as baseline is never being-in-the-world as such, in its unfolding historicity, but rather the very conception of subjectivity or consciousness that leads to pseudo-questions about the reality of the world. Second, even Kant's transcendental idealism leads to a version of such pseudo-questions, as evidenced by the seemingly interminable debates engendered by his talk of the difference between things-in-themselves and phenomena. (In this connection, it bears noting that Heidegger tends to interpret that difference as the difference between infinite and finite cognition rather than a difference of entities.[4]) Nevertheless, the remarks from SZ just glossed clearly leave the door open for characterising existential analysis as something analogous to idealism, call it an 'existential idealism' or an 'existential version of transcendental idealism'.[5]

There are two factors in Heidegger's thinking at this time that further support this conclusion: (1) his controversial reading of Kant and (2) his emphasis on rethinking subjectivity. As for the first factor, it can come as no surprise that Kant's finite, transcendental idealism is the kind of

idealism that comes closest to Heidegger's existential analysis. Establishing the transcendental conditions of the possibility of transcendence, the experience of inner-worldly things and objects, is as much a part of the agenda of Heidegger's existential analysis as it is that of Kant's transcendental logic. Not surprisingly, Heidegger's contention that fundamental ontology lays the groundwork for any ontic science parallels Kant's contention that transcendental idealism renders empirical realism possible. Heidegger's observation that in the existential analysis 'the on-handness of inner-worldly beings is not denied' parallels Kant's remark that his 'transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition actually are just as they are intuited in space'.[d] Just as Kant entertains a transcendental object as the thinkable limit of understanding, so Heidegger countenances the possibility of the real considered in itself, i.e., independently of transcendental conditions (SZ 202). Yet the real, so considered, is not an entity, Heidegger adds, since 'all access to entities is founded ontologically upon the basic state of Dasein'.[e,6] In the late 1920s Heidegger repeatedly touts Kant as the 'first and only one' to have taken steps to grasping the transcendental and thus ontological significance of time.[f] Just as for Kant there is no time without the transcendental subject, so for Heidegger there is no time without Dasein.

Along with these close analogies, there are some fundamental disanalogies between Kant's transcendental idealism and Heidegger's existential analysis that cannot go unmentioned.[7] Heidegger criticises Kant precisely for foreclosing the possibility of non-cognitive access to entities (SZ 202), for failing to move beyond the Cartesian paradigm of consciousness and self-consciousness[8] and – far more controversially – for 'shrinking back' from the implications of his discovery of how time, by way of the transcendental imagination, constitutes the root of sensibility, understanding and their synthesis.[g] Yet these considerable differences are not sufficient to keep Heidegger from continuing to understand the project of fundamental

d. 'Sofern in der existenzialen Aussage das Vorhandensein von innerweltlichem Seienden nicht geleugnet wird, stimmt sie im Resultat – gleichsam doxographisch – mit der These des Realismus überein.' SZ 207. 'Unser transzendentaler Idealism erlaubt es dagegen: daß die Gegenstände äußerer Anschauung, ebenso wie sie im Raum angeschaut werden, auch wirklich sind.' Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A491; B520.

e. 'Aller Zugang zu solchem Seienden ist ontologisch fundiert in der Grundverfassung des Daseins, dem In-der-Welt-sein.' SZ 202.

f. 'Der Erste und Einzige, der sich eine Strecke untersuchenden Weges in der Richtung auf die Dimension der Temporalität bewegte, bzw. sich durch den Zwang der Phänomene selbst dahin drängen ließ, ist *Kant*.' SZ 23.

g. 'Diese ursprüngliche, in der transzendentalen Einbildungskraft "gewurzelte" Wesensverfassung des Menschen ist das "Unbekannte", in das Kant hineingeblickt haben muß, wenn er von der von "uns unbekannten Wurzel" sprach . . . Kant ist vor dieser unbekannten Wurzel zurückgewichen.' GA 3: 160.

ontology as a transcendental project, with deep affinities to Kant's transcendental idealism, and even from averring, as noted above, the philosophical promise of idealism.

As for the second factor mentioned above, Heidegger's existential analysis is often read with good reason as an assault on a quintessentially modern, Cartesian conception of subjectivity and the versions of idealism spawned by it. Yet this reading can overlook the ways that Heidegger takes up the concept of subject in a positive way, in the late 1920s. By his own account, he is intent at this time on providing the sort of analysis of the ontological make-up of subjectivity that, as cited earlier, a legitimate idealism requires. Thus, existential analysis undertakes to establish 'the A priori of "actual" subjectivity', in contrast to ideas of a pure ego and of consciousness in general.[h] While Dasein transcends beings (and thus can use and know them) by virtue of projecting a world, Heidegger adds that that world is 'subjective' – though, to be sure, 'as temporally-transcendent', it 'is more "objective" than any "object"'.[i] In lectures in the late 1920s Heidegger takes pains to differentiate 'genuine subjectivity'[j] from any subject–object relation, particularly in so far as the subject and object are conceived as both on hand, existing for themselves, giving rise to the problem of how the subject is able to transcend itself and make contact with the object. The problem is a pseudo-problem since 'transcendence is the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of the subject'.[k,9] So, too, in Heidegger's 1929 Inaugural Address, he observes that transcendence can only be grasped 'through a constantly renewed ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject'.[l,10]

All this emphasis on getting subjectivity right is of a piece with the impact of Kant's transcendental idealism on Heidegger, particularly in the late 1920s. To be sure, as noted above, analogies with Kant's transcendental

h. 'So wird denn überhaupt bei der Frage nach dem Sein der Wahrheit und der Notwendigkeit ihrer Voraussetzung ebenso wie bei der nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis ein "ideales Subjekt" angesetzt. . . . Wird mit dem Begriff eines solchen Subjekts nicht gerade das Apriori des nur "tatsächlichen" Subjekts, des Daseins, verfehlt?' SZ 229.

i. 'Wenn das "Subjekt" ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird, dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann muß gesagt werden: Welt ist "subjektiv". Diese "subjektive" Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-transzendente "objektiver" als jedes mögliche "Objekt".' SZ 366.

j. 'Verfehlt wird der echte Begriff der Subjektivität, sofern man übersieht, daß die 'Beziehung auf' gerade zum Wesen der Subjektivität gehört.' GA 26: 162.

k. 'Vielmehr ist die Transzendenz 1. die ursprüngliche Verfassung der *Subjektivität* eines Subjektes.' GA 26: 211.

l. 'In dieser flüchtigen Erinnerung an die noch verborgene Geschichte des ursprünglichen Transzendenzproblems muß die Einsicht erwachsen, daß die Transzendenz nicht durch eine Flucht ins Objektive enthüllt und gefaßt werden kann, sondern einzig durch eine ständig zu erneuernde ontologische Interpretation der Subjektivität des Subjekts, die dem "Subjektivismus" ebenso entgegenhandelt, wie sie dem "Objektivismus" die Gefolgschaft versagen muß.' GA 9: 161f.

idealism break down in key respects. Nevertheless, as the texts cited from SZ make abundantly evident, Heidegger's differences with Kant at this time do not amount to a repudiation of idealism *tout court*. On the contrary, Heidegger's efforts to conceive transcendental subjectivity as being-in-the-world and to subject it to existential analysis constitute an expansion – suitably qualified to be sure – of the idealist paradigm.

II

After 1930, Heidegger increasingly thinks of philosophy in distinctively historical terms, as he deliberately sets to the side the transcendental structure that informed the project of fundamental ontology in SZ (GA 65: 216ff.). The history of philosophy is dominated by the leading question of metaphysics, namely, the question 'What are beings?' Because this question takes for granted the meaning of 'being', the history of Western philosophy is a history of neglect, i.e., neglect of the basic question: 'What is being?' It is a history of this neglect, moreover, not least when particular philosophers offer a conception of beings as a whole or attempt to formulate what it is common to all beings (GA 65: 205f.). They do so because they are, for the most part, idealists, albeit in the distinctive historical sense that Heidegger gives the term, based upon his reading of idealism as a form of Platonism. So, in stark or at least starker contrast to his remarks about idealism in SZ, Heidegger after 1930 draws the lines between traditional, inauthentic ways of thinking being, i.e., mistaking beings for being, and authentically thinking being, i.e., thinking being in terms of its historical character, as a contrast between idealist and non-idealist thinking. As in SZ, however, 'non-idealist' once again does not entail realism in any traditional form.

There are arguably few thinkers as sensitive as Heidegger is to the impact of idealism on philosophy, particularly in his 1936–1938 *Contributions to Philosophy*. Indeed, in this work he reads the entire history of philosophy in terms of the impact of idealism. The thinking running from the first beginning of Greek thinking (Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides), through the first end of 'the first beginning' (Plato and Aristotle), to Judaeo-Christian reinterpretations of Platonic transcendence (Philo, Augustine) is a kind of pre-idealist thinking that sets the stage for modern idealism.[m] The

m. 'Mit dieser Entfaltung des *ersten* Endes (mit der platonisch-aristotelischen Philosophie) ist die Möglichkeit gegeben, daß sie dann . . . den Rahmen für den jüdisch (Philo) christlichen (Augustinus) Glauben hergibt; . . . Aber nicht nur das Christentum . . . hat hier seinen Rahmen . . . , sondern alle nachchristliche, gegenchristliche und unchristliche abendländische Auslegung des Seienden und des Menschen innerhalb desselben.' GA 65: 211.

heyday of self-consciously idealist thinking develops in modernity from a pre-absolute idealism (epitomised by Descartes), through Kant's transcendental idealism, to the absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel. In late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century philosophy, Heidegger contends, 'idealism' (synonymous with 'Platonism') survives in ontologies and Kantian opposition to them, in all Christian and non-Christian metaphysics, in all doctrines that concentrate on values, meaning and ideas as well as those doctrines such as positivism and biologism that deny the latter, and in any philosophy of life or existentialism, including that of Nietzsche (GA 65: 198, 211, 218–22).

In the *Contributions*, Heidegger identifies the historical source of idealism with the hold that Platonic thinking – not least, Platonic thinking about thinking – exercises on Western philosophy. Idealism proper begins, to be sure, with Descartes's doctrine of the thinking self, the *ego cogito*, where thinking is equivalent at once to knowing and being or, in other words, where subject and object are paradigmatically identified. Yet modern idealism is, Heidegger contends, a form of Platonism, since it follows Plato in determining being on the basis of thinking, albeit in the modern sense of representing (a descendant of *noein*) (GA 65: 215). In particular, Plato's yoking of *psyche* (as the power of thinking) and *aletheia* prefigures the idealist construal of the subject–object relation. In this yoking, the unhiddenness of things – still appreciated by the earliest Greek thinkers – devolves into the correctness of the relation of the *psyche* to that unhiddenness (GA 65: 198, 202). Herein lies what we might term the first precondition of idealism, in Heidegger's story: the construal of truth in terms of correctness as a relation between the representing subject (*psyche*) and the represented object (*aletheia*), where the latter coincides with the unhiddenness or presence of beings.

At the same time Heidegger takes pains to point out that Plato himself was never an idealist but a realist (GA 65: 215). Plato exalts the *idea*, to be sure, but the Greek term stands originally, not for what is represented in a representing, but for something's appearance, the way that it presents itself, the look that it affords for seeing it. Changing and multiple aspects of beings are referred back to such a look as their unifying, constant presence and, hence, as their being. The idea is what is common to beings, and, as a result, the idea becomes 'the first and ultimate determination of beingness'.[n]

n. 'Die *ἰδέα* das, *wohin* das noch Wechselnde und Viele zurückgestellt wird, das *Einigende Eine* und deshalb *ὄν*, *seiend* = einigende; und *in der Folge* davon ist die *ἰδέα* mit Bezug auf ihr Vieles (*ἕκαστα*), das *κοινόν*, und, merkwürdig, diese nachträgliche Folgebestimmung der *ἰδέα* als Seiendheit, das *κοινόν*, wird dann zur ersten und letzten Bestimmung der Seiendheit (des Seins), dieses ist das "Generellste"! GA 65: 209.

From the vantage point of individual, changing beings, the idea counts as the most real, as genuinely being, and those beings themselves as never adequate to beingness (i.e., they are *me on*). So, while Plato's *idea* is not to be confused with a modern representation (*Vorstellung*), his account of its hold on our understanding of beings sets the stage for the privileged status subsequently accorded to what is represented. From these considerations arises a second precondition of idealism, namely, Plato's account of the idea as the determining feature of being, precisely because the idea is the common, unifying and constant look or presence of beings to us.

Plato's allusion to the good as beyond beings (*epekeina tes ousias*) – in Heidegger's eyes, the source of all subsequent talk of 'transcendence' – reveals, to be sure, an appreciation of the fact that the interpretation of being as *idea* is not exhaustive. However, the entire analysis remains within the ambit of beings, since what is allegedly beyond beings is their value for human beings, their relation to *psyche*. Conceiving what is beyond beings in this way (i.e., as a matter of value) is tantamount to denying any further inquiry into beings as such (i.e., into their being). As Nietzsche rightly inferred much later, valuation is put forth as what is supreme. More importantly for our purposes, this relation to *psyche* sets the stage for idealism proper in so far as the essence of beings – their being and their value – is gathered up in the *psyche* as the principle of life (GA 65: 210f.). Herein then lies a third precondition of idealism that Heidegger gleans from his reading of Plato, namely, the notion that analysis of beings in terms of ideas leads, not to inquiry into being, but into value, a phenomenon that is to be determined psychologically or biologically.

Modern idealism builds upon this Platonic tradition, a development that Heidegger charts in roughly two stages and with multiple coordinates.[11] The two stages correspond to pre-absolute or Cartesian idealism and absolute or German Idealism, with Kant's transcendental Idealism serving as a bridge from the former to the latter. In keeping with Heidegger's own account in the *Contributions*, the following two sub-sections gloss the two successive, main stages of idealism.

A. Pre-absolute idealism

A key coordinate in the account of the early stage of modern Idealism is the conception of reality itself. This stage follows in the footsteps of late medieval nominalism's identification of what is genuinely real with individual existence.[12] Because the individual, thinking ego is experienced as the most real, Descartes's *ego cogito – ergo sum* becomes possible. As already noted,

however, the ego here is not without what it thinks or perceives. While 'perception', like 'representation', is a double-barrelled concept, as James puts it, the being-ness of beings becomes equated with the idea as what is perceived. The perceiving subject itself is subsumed under the perceived: 'In the interpretation of ἰδέα as *perceptio*', Heidegger declares, 'Platonism first becomes "Idealism"; that is to say, the being-ness of beings becomes . . . represented-*ness*.'[o]

Concepts of unity and identity, cognition and volition make up further coordinates of modern idealism's trajectory in its pre-absolute stage. Along this trajectory the unifying function of *psyche* is taken over into the 'I think', in the sense that 'I think in an anticipatory way the unity of what is to be encountered', thereby enabling the knowing encounter of it.[p] In this way the cogito in its unifying and cognitive function becomes the ground of the being-ness of beings. Unity in the highest sense, i.e., identity becomes 'the essential determination of beings as such', and it is epitomised by the supreme, self-knowing (self-certain) identity of the cogito itself, i.e., 'the ego . . . conceived as the identity *explicitly* belonging to *itself*, that identity that, knowing itself, is precisely in this knowing'.[q] By virtue of the fact that the ego's self-certain cognitive character ('knowing as self-knowing')[r] is a universal condition, beings in general are equated with objects (i.e., what is represented) and philosophy with science. At the same time all representing of things is at once a self-representing, in which the self is certain of itself. The primacy of the ego lies in *willing* the self-certainty and self-assuredness that comes with regarding all entities and their values in terms of their relation to the ego (GA 65: 198f., 202). According to Heidegger, Leibniz's doctrine of monads as perceptual and appetitive sources of unifying representations gives paradigmatic expression to this idealist linkage of being with knowing and willing. It will be left to Nietzsche to recognise that this linkage itself is an expression of the will to power.

o. 'Und erst in der Auslegung der ἰδέα als *perceptio* wird der Platonismus zum "Idealismus", d.h. die Seiendheit des Seienden wird jetzt . . . zur Vorgestellt*heit*.' GA 65: 212.
p. 'Das Denken wird zum *Ich*-denke, das *Ich*-denke wird zum: Ich einige ursprünglich, Ich denke Einheit (vorweg). *Das Denken ist die Vorweggabe der Anwesenheit als solcher.* Diese Beziehung aber ist nur die Bahn des Denkens, auf der es vorgreifend-einigend die Einheit des Begegnenden setzt und so dieses als das Seiende sich begegnen läßt. Das Seiende wird zum Gegenstand.' GA 65: 198.
q. 'Auf diesem Wege wird die *Identität* die wesentliche Bestimmung des Seienden als solchen . . . Und sie gewinnt neuzeitlich ihre Auszeichnung im *Ich*, das alsbald als die ausgezeichnete, nämlich als die *eigens sich* zugehörige Identität begriffen wird, jene Identität, die *sich* wissend in diesem Wissen gerade ist.' GA 65: 199.
r. '*Das Wissen als Sichwissendes* ist, zufolge des schon herrschenden Leitfadens, die höchste *Identität*, d.h. das *eigentlich Seiende*.' GA 65: 199.

Heidegger appears to acknowledge that his account of the development of early modern idealism is little more than a gloss, leaving a great deal unexplained. Nevertheless, he insists that one point is decisive and apparent. What is unconditioned for the early modern idealist, the pure relation of the 'I-think-unity', means that 'the present in its presence to itself is the measuring-stick of all being-ness'.[s] This meaning of early modern Idealism demonstrates that the more thinking – so construed – takes the lead in an unconditional way, 'the more decisively the present as such, i.e., the "time" in a primordial sense is what affords the truth . . . in a manner that is completely covered over and not questioned'.[t] The anticipatory (i.e., futural) character of the thinking, itself bound to what has been handed down to it (i.e., its pastness), is thereby covered over. In as much as being itself is time or history in a suitably understood manner, the cited remark is Heidegger's way of restating that Idealism, in its pursuit of the leading question of metaphysics ('What are beings?'), is oblivious to the basic question of being.

B. Absolute Idealism

Absolute Idealism emerges with the recognition of a fundamental flaw of foregoing versions of idealism, namely, the recognition that in those accounts the self-representing in the representing is relative to the respective time of the respective ego (*Jedesmaligkeit des gerade jeweiligen Ichs*) (GA 65: 202). Relative in this way, what is represented does not yet correspond to the universal and eternal character of the idea: 'For this reason, the self-representing must become *self*-knowing in the absolute sense, [that is to say, it must become] that knowing that knows in one the necessity of the relation of the object to the ego and the ego to the object.'[u] Released (*ab-gelöst*) from all one-sidedness, this self-knowing is absolute and equated with divine knowledge. Crucial to this development are the steps that Kant takes beyond Descartes, such that the conditions of the possibility of any object coincide with a transcendental self-consciousness. As Heidegger puts it, absolute Idealism attempts to think in an absolute way the *ego cogito* of transcendental

s. 'Indem aber so die *reine Beziehung* des *Ich-denke-Einheit* (im Grunde eine Tautologie) die unbedingte wird, heißt dieses: die sich *selbst gegenwärtige Gegenwart* ist der Maßstab aller Seiendheit.' GA 65: 200.

t. 'Weil das Denken und je eigentlicher das Denken unbedingt Leitfaden wird, um so entschiedener ist die *Gegenwärtigkeit* als solche, d.h. die "Zeit" in einem ursprünglichen Sinne das, was ganz verhüllt und ungefragt der Seiendheit die Wahrheit gibt.' GA 65: 200.

u. 'Deshalb muß das Sichvorstellen werden zum *Sich*wissen im absoluten Sinn, zu jenem Wissen, das in einem weiß die Notwendigkeit des Bezugs zum Gegenstand.' GA 65: 202.

apperception, while at the same time conceiving the absolute in a way that is oriented to Christian dogma, indeed, so much so that Christian dogma attains its greatest certainty of itself in Hegel's philosophy.[13]

Just as early modern (Cartesian) and transcendental (Kantian) forms of Idealism are marked by a self-imposed finitude, so, too, the self-evidential character of being is a matter of 'immediate evidence' in them. In this respect, too, Heidegger notes, the contrast with absolute Idealism is stark. Instead of being located in the banality of immediate evidence, that self-evidential character is 'systematically extended' in absolute Idealism 'to the riches of the historicity of the spirit and its forms'.[v]

Heidegger repeatedly emphasises the overlooked impact of absolute Idealism, particularly given the philosophies that followed in its wake, from positivism and biologism to philosophies of life, lived experience and existentialism (GA 65: 203, 213f.). Far from merely setting themselves up in opposition to absolute Idealism, these philosophical movements are latter-day outgrowths or run-offs (*Ausläufer*) of it. Or, as he also puts it, they are counter-movements to Hegel's philosophy, the only philosophy that determined actuality in the nineteenth century and did so, not so much as a formal doctrine that was followed, but as metaphysics.[14] These claims follow from the fact that Heidegger reads absolute Idealism as completely waylaying every entity into object-hood. Far from being superseded (*aufgehoben*), this object-hood extends to 'the representing ego and the relation of representing of the object and the representing of the representation'.[w] In this way, Heidegger avers, machination moves into the form of the subject–object-dialectic that, as absolute, plays out and organises every possibility of all the known domains of beings (i.e., the produced or producible).[15] Knowledge is absolute because everything is subsumed with absolute certainty, leaving no room for inquiry into being itself. Heidegger accordingly concludes that there are no bridges from German Idealism to another beginning. Yet he stresses the need at the same time to know how it thinks since it takes to extremes the idea of being as an unconditioned power and, in so doing, prepares the end (GA 65: 203).

Prima facie this reading seems well off the mark, given absolute Idealism's commitment to an absolute form of subjectivity. Indeed, from Hegel's

v. 'Die Selbstverständlichkeit des Seins ist jetzt, statt in die Plattheit einer unmittelbaren Evidenz gelegt, in den Reichtum der Geschichtlichkeit des Geistes und seiner Gestalten systematisch ausgebreitet.' GA 65: 203f.

w. 'Das Seiende ist völlig in die Gegenständlichkeit verlegt, die mitnichten dadurch überwunden ist, daß sie "aufgehoben" wird; im Gegenteil, sie breitet sich aus auf das vorstellende Ich und den Bezug des Vorstellens des Gegenstandes und des Vorstellens der Vorstellung.' GA 65: 203.

point of view, Heidegger is plainly overreaching here. In the philosophy of spirit of the *Encyclopaedia*, for example, Hegel makes it abundantly clear that, while the spirit has 'its complete, external objectivity in nature', it has superseded this externalisation and 'become identical to itself in this externalisation' (*Encyclopaedia* §381).[x] Similarly, in the final chapter of both versions of Hegel's Logic, he stresses that the idea truly is, precisely as the unity of the subjective concept and objectivity.[16] In this same context he carefully differentiates various senses of objectivity in the processes that make up the ideas of life and knowing, emphasising that the conceptual object is not at all a representation in the subject.[17] Moreover, Hegel elaborates the absolute idea in the work's final chapter by way of a difference between an object (*Objekt*) contrasting with a subject on some level and an object (*Gegenstand*) that belongs to the absolute idea: 'In its other', the absolute idea 'has its own objectivity [*Objektivität*] for its object [*Gegenstand*]', and it possesses the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity in itself.[y] So, too, the method of the logic is 'the soul of all objectivity'; it is 'the concept that knows itself, the concept that possesses itself as absolute, subject as well as object [*Objekt*], for its object [*Gegenstand*]'.[z]

Heidegger appears oblivious to these nuances in Hegel's talk of objectivity.[18] The question remains whether this obliviousness undermines his charge that Hegel's system of philosophy amounts to a universal objectification, an explanatory scheme of subsuming all beings under a particular being, at the expense of inquiry into the basic question of being. On one level, this criticism is plainly external, since Hegel is, by Heidegger's own accounts, oblivious to the question of being, as he conceives it. (In this respect his criticism is of a piece with those advanced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.) On another level, however, the criticism is empty if there is no textual basis for the notion that absolute Idealism entails in some sense a complete objectification of beings, including absolute spirit itself.

One text that supports Heidegger's criticism is the opening paragraph of the last section of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*. In this section, entitled 'The absolute idea', Hegel writes: 'The idea as the unity of the subjective and the objective ideas is the concept of the idea, for which the idea as such

x. 'Diese Identität ist *absolute Negativität*, weil in der Natur der Begriff seine vollkommene äußerliche Objektivität hat, diese seine Entäußerung aber aufgehoben und er in dieser identisch mit sich geworden ist.' HW, x, 17; *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, translated by William Wallace, with a foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 8.

y. 'Der Begriff ist nicht nur *Seele*, sondern freier subjektiver Begriff, der . . . in seinem Anderen *seine eigene* Objektivität zum Gegenstande hat.' HW 6: 549 (SL, 735).

z. 'Die Methode ist daraus als *der sich selbst wissende*, *sich* als das Absolute, sowohl Subjektive als Objektive, *zum Gegenstand habende Begriff*.' HW 6: 551 (SL, 736).

is the object [*Gegenstand*], for which it is the object [*Objekt*], into which all determinations have gone together.'[aa] The point here is patent; every determination enters into the object that the idea not simply has but is. In the *Addition* to the same paragraph, Hegel contrasts the absolute idea with foregoing accounts of the idea of life and knowing as accounts of the idea in itself and for itself respectively. 'Up to now,' he concludes, '*we* have had for our object [*Gegenstand*] the idea in the development through its diverse stages; now, however, the idea is objective with respect to itself [*sich selbst gegenständlich*].'[bb] The absolute idea is absolute precisely because it is no longer simply an object for us, but instead an object with respect to itself. In other words, the idea is absolute because it is absolute as an object.

Notably, in the final line of the *Addition* to §236, Hegel states that the absolute idea, in so far as it is objective with respect to itself, is Aristotle's *noesis noeseos*.[19] In the context in which Aristotle uses this expression, as in the passage from the same context cited at the end of the *Encyclopaedia*, he stresses that thinking (*nous*) is dependent upon what is thought (*noeton*) for its actualisation (*energeia*), that its actualisation coincides with becoming or being its object, that the object of thought (*noumenon*) is higher than thinking, that it is supreme (*kratiston*) when it is itself its object, and that this supreme actualisation is divine. Interpreting these claims as well as Hegel's citing of them is a formidable task in itself. If, however, that citing is taken as an appeal to authority and the glosses of the objective, paradigmatically divine character of thinking stand, then they help explain and even underwrite Heidegger's reading of absolute Idealism as an absolute objectification of beings. Moreover, if being is not the same as objectivity, i.e., if being is not equivalent to being an object, then such an absolute objectification signals an obliviousness to being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) as well. The difference between absolute Idealist thinking and Heidegger's historical thinking can be drawn in terms of transparency. In the absolute idea, according to §237 of the *Encyclopaedia*, there is 'no transition or presupposing and no determinacy at all that is not fluid and transparent'.[cc] For Heidegger, by contrast, thinking is itself a leap and it depends upon a hiddenness. Perhaps for this reason, after 1930 Heidegger eschews any attempt to construe philosophy as a science –

aa. 'Die Idee als Einheit des subjektiven und der objektiven Idee ist der Begriff der Idee, dem die Idee als solche der Gegenstand, dem das Objekt ist; – ein Objekt, in welches alle Bestimmungen zusammengegangen sind.' HW 8: 388 (Enc., 299).

bb. 'Bisher haben *wir* die Idee in der Entwicklung durch ihre verschiedenen Stufen hindurch zu unserem Gegenstand gehabt; numehr aber ist die Idee sich selbst gegenständlich.' *Ibid.*

cc. 'Für sich ist die *absolute Idee*, weil kein Übergehen noch Voraussetzen und überhaupt keine Bestimmtheit, welche nicht flüssig und durchsichtig wäre, in ihr ist, die *reine Form* des Begriffs, die *ihren Inhalt* als sich selbst anschaut.' *Ibid.*

whereas for Hegel philosophy is a science in the form of a system of self-mediating, absolute knowing.

In Heidegger's 1957 essay, 'The Onto-Theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics', he returns to these themes, though in the context of a more differentiated conception of thinking.[20] After citing Hegel's remark (at the end of the *Science of Logic*) that the absolute idea is being, Heidegger observes that the matter of thinking for Hegel is 'being with regard to what beings are thought of, in absolute thinking, and as this'.[dd,21] Once again, Heidegger equates Hegel's account of being with the object of thought or, more precisely, with 'what is thought of beings in absolute thinking'. Being, in other words, is conflated with the way that beings are conceived, when they are conceived in an absolute way. Moreover, this absolute thinking thinks being in terms of the identity of beings in and with the absolute – or, to redeploy the language just cited from the *Encyclopaedia*, it thinks beings with the fluidity and transparency of absolute knowing. By contrast, the matter of thinking for Heidegger is being's difference from beings. The implication is patent: the obliviousness of Hegel – and, we might add, that of Idealism in general – to this difference coincides with an obliviousness to being.

This obliviousness is endemic to metaphysics in general, glued as it is to the leading question of what beings are. Metaphysics' answer to this question takes the form of onto-theo-logy. It is ontological by virtue of determining beings in general and, indeed, doing so by determining their ground; it is theological by virtue of determining the ultimate ground, namely, God as the supreme being. What is logical about the ontological and the theological character of metaphysics is the complementary way in which they give an account of being as the ground of beings. Hegel's absolute Idealism epitomises this onto-theo-logical character of metaphysics. What something is, i.e., its ontological make-up, rests – logically – upon how it is thought in an absolute thinking that coincides with God as the absolute, self-knowing spirit. In Hegel's account, being is the ground as the *causa sui*, the substance that prevails as subject.[22]

Yet to conceive being in this manner, the manner of Hegel's absolute Idealism, is to misconceive it as a particular being in relation to other entities and, indeed, in a relation of a grounding identity. If being is, as Heidegger contends, essentially different from any being, then absolute Idealism's identification of being with the absolute spirit is symptomatic of a failure to think being itself. As he puts it, given the difference between being and beings, 'we only think being rigorously [*sachlich*] if we think it in its difference

dd. 'Für Hegel ist die Sache des Denkens das Sein hinsichtlich der Gedachtheit des Seienden im absoluten Denken und als dieses.' GA 11: 56.

from beings and think these in their difference from being. Thus the difference comes explicitly into view'.[ee] To be sure, the metaphysics of absolute Idealism thinks being as something different (*Differente*) from beings; that something different presents itself in so far as absolute Idealism *qua* ontology thinks the being of beings in general and, *qua* theology, thinks the being of beings in the highest sense. But absolute Idealism fails thereby, Heidegger charges, to think the difference as difference.[23]

At this juncture readers of Hegel's *Science of Logic* might be inclined to protest that this charge overlooks Hegel's extensive treatment of difference in the Doctrine of Essence. Yet this difference remains part of the absolute mediation of essence with itself. The outcome of the analysis of difference is that it is the contradiction in itself, a contradiction that dissolves the seeming self-sufficiency of what are differentiated from each other (the positive and the negative) and, in the process, reduces to the ground as their unity. The following passage indicates how difference is subordinated to identity in Hegel's account.

> The resolved contradiction is therefore ground, essence as unity of the positive and the negative. In opposition, determinateness has progressed to self-subsistence; but ground is this self-subsistence as completed; in it, the negative is self-subsistent essence, but as a negative; and, as self-identical in this negativity, ground is thus equally the positive. In ground, therefore, opposition and its contradiction are just as much removed as preserved. Ground is essence as positive self-identity which, however, at the same time refers itself to itself as negativity and therefore determines itself, making itself into an excluded positedness; but this positedness is the whole self-subsisting essence, and essence is ground, self-identical in its negation and positive.[ff]

This passage also usefully illustrates the role of negativity in absolute Idealism. The positive self-identity of the ground as essence entails negativity as

ee. GA 11: 68: 'Sein denken wir demnach nur dann sachlich, wenn wir es in der Differenz mit dem Seienden denken und dieses in der Differenz mit dem Sein. So kommt die Differenz eigens in den Blick.'

ff. 'Der aufgelöste Widerspruch ist also der Grund, das Wesen als Einheit des Positiven und Negativen. Im Gegensatze ist die Bestimmung zur Selbständigkeit gediehen; das Negative ist in ihm selbständiges Wesen, aber als Negatives; so ist er ebensosehr das Positive als das in dieser Negativität mit sich Identische. Der Gegensatz und sein Widerspruch ist daher im Grunde sosehr aufgehoben als erhalten. Der Grund ist das Wesen als die positive Identität mit sich; aber die sich zugleich als die Negativität auf sich bezieht, sich also bestimmt und zum ausgeschlossenen Gesetztsein macht; dies Gesetztsein aber ist das ganze selbständige Wesen, und das Wesen ist Grund, als in dieser seiner Negation identisch mit sich selbst und positiv.' HW 6: 69–70 (SL, 378).

the way it refers to itself and thus renders itself a 'positedness' (*Gesetztheit*). This positedness, analogous to the object of thought or representation, but now conceived absolutely, is the whole self-subsisting, self-identical essence. Given Hegel's treatment of difference and negation as moments that are superseded or sublated (*aufgehoben*) in the process of the self-determining identity of the essence, appeal can hardly be made to this treatment to counter Heidegger's charge that absolute Idealism fails to think difference as the difference between being and beings.[24]

In the course of elaborating on the need to think difference as difference, Heidegger notes the misstep of attempting to represent difference: 'If we represent it, we find ourselves immediately misled into construing the difference as a relation that our representing has added to being and to beings. By this means, the difference is reduced to a distinction, a product of our understanding.'[gg] Heidegger does not mention Idealism explicitly in this context but the contrast between a difference and a distinction as well as that between thinking and representing reiterate his contention that Idealism generally, i.e., even absolute Idealism, fails to think being because it inevitably equates being with something thought, i.e., with being an object of thought or, as just noted, with being posited. Heidegger may well be equivocating in his pleas both for thinking the difference (between being and beings) as difference (*die Differenz als Differenz*) and for thinking being as difference (*Sein als Differenz*).[25] None the less, it is clear that the difference, under both descriptions, is not an object. Nor can it be traced to a particular being or essence – even the sort of absolute, all-encompassing being or essence that differentiates and thereby posits itself.

What appears above to be an equivocation, moreover, may be a double entendre that Heidegger deems necessary in order to ward off repeating the metaphysical mistake of construing being as a being or making its determination dependent upon a determination of particular beings and, indeed, doing so in a way that transcends history. For cognate reasons, Heidegger enlists multiple metaphors to characterise how, in view of that difference, beings *are* (or, equivalently, what the 'being' of beings means). Without leaving its place, being at once passes over into and comes over beings, disclosing them such that they first are at all, i.e., such that they first arrive of themselves, unhidden. The difference between being and beings is the difference between the way being comes-over beings and the way that beings arrive, a

gg. 'Versuchen wir sie vorzustellen, dann finden wir uns sogleich dazu verleitet, die Differenz als seine Relation aufzufassen, die unser Vorstellen zum Sein und zum Seienden hinzugetan hat. Dadurch wird die Differenz zu einer Distinktion, zu einem Gemächte unseres Verstandes herabgesetzt.' GA 11: 69.

difference in which being and beings (coming-over and arrival) are held apart from and towards one another.[26]

In the *Encyclopaedia*, in an attempt to characterise the universality of universals, Hegel mentions the case of someone who would like to purchase fruit but rejects the apples, pears and the like that are handed to him. After citing the case, Heidegger adds that it is 'infinitely more impossible to represent "being" as the universal for the respective beings'.[27] Representing being as a history-transcending universal is infinitely more impossible because there is being 'only respectively in this and that historical stamp', from Heraclitus' *physis* and Plato's *idea* to Hegel's absolute spirit and Nietzsche's will to power. The same 'epochal stamp' applies, Heidegger adds, to his own attempt to think the forgottenness of difference.[28] The allusion to the epochal in this context is a reminder that being as the un-hiddenness of beings – the timely interplay of the presence and absence of them – itself withdraws, leaving in its absence the presence of beings, some constellation of them, and a corresponding metaphysical conception of their being. To keep these two senses of 'being' – the historical and the metaphysical senses – apart, Heidegger distinguishes between *Seyn* and *Sein*. In Heidegger's view, if historical being (*Seyn*) is forgotten, the central reason is that, as the unhiddenness of beings, it is itself hidden in the process of their becoming, i.e., their coming to be unhidden, just as the unnoticed clearing clears the way for things to be seen and available. The metaphysical, i.e., onto-theological conception of being (*Sein*) that historically corresponds to this process, taking its bearings from the beings themselves, is no less central to this hiddenness. Herein (i.e., in being different from beings and hidden from metaphysics) lies the basic sense of the historical character of being (*Seyn*) for Heidegger.

At the conclusion of the gloss of pre-absolute idealism above, mention is made of the skewed dependency of its conception of being upon time. That conception is dependent upon time in so far as the measure of beings is the presence of the 'I-think-something' to itself in a present. The dependency is skewed in at least two ways. The temporal character of this presence is overlooked, such that the present is taken to be derivative of the 'I-think-something' rather than *vice versa*. That dependency is further skewed by the fact that there is no present presence without an inheritance and a projection, a sense of past and future that early modern idealism covers up. A similar confusion of time and being crops up in absolute Idealism as well. Hegel takes time to be the very alienation of the absolute and thus the essence of being itself. To be sure, the past makes up the essence of time for Hegel but in a way that corresponds to his basic conception of being, such that something genuinely is to the extent that it has returned to itself. That is to say, 'being

[*Seiend*] is what has always already happened, over against which nothing else can be earlier, but is instead always what is later and comes too late'.[hh] In sum, whereas Hegel construes being as the essence of time, Heidegger construes time as the primordial essence of being.

III

Idealism goes wrong, on Heidegger's account, because it equates being with what can be thought in the sense of being represented and, hence, what is – in some scarcely determinable sense – present. By contrast, Heidegger emphasises the mystery of being, its hiddenness as something that eludes representation. So one of the main implications of Heidegger's reconsideration of Idealism is the putative difference between thinking that represents entities (picturing, objectifying and calculating them) and thinking that lets them be. An equally important implication of the negative impact of Idealism on Heidegger's thinking is his insistence on the historical situatedness and reflexiveness of philosophical considerations. Although Heidegger takes this insistence as a way of distancing himself from Idealism generally, this implication aligns him with those idealists who reject naturalisms and other reductions of human understanding to reality as it is conceived by natural science, since naturalisms of this stripe, their reductive schemes, and their conceptions of reality all remain historically situated ideas, i.e., products of the ways that beings have presented themselves to human beings. Indeed, from this naturalist point of view, Heidegger's insistence on the grounding event (*Ereignis*) whereby being and human beings are appropriated to one another reeks of Idealism.

Yet that historical situatedness and reflexiveness puts Heidegger no less at odds with idealists who, while pretending that naturalism is not itself a form of Idealism, entertain the prospect of philosophy transcending history. Idealism makes too much of human thought as a capacity to represent and produce the world; it thinks too little of human openness to the presence of beings, a presence that singularly ennobles and liberates human beings from dissembling powers of representation (*Vorstellung*) and production (*Herstellung*). In these powers, making up the essence of technology (the *Gestell*), Heidegger locates the consummation of metaphysics. From this vantage point, 'Idealism' is a kind of synecdoche for 'metaphysics'. For Heidegger,

hh. 'Seiend ist das immer schon Geschehene, dem gegenüber nichts anderes früher sein kann, sondern das immer das Spätere und Zuspätgekommene ist.' GA 32: 211.

the impact of Idealism is the end of philosophy as we know it, but not of thinking. Idealism and realism alike (which is in the wake of modernity a disguised Idealism) are forms of metaphysics that are oblivious to being. Whereas Idealism coincides with a promise of mastering the world, Heidegger is bent on the sort of thinking that brings human beings down to earth as the place entrusted to them in their mortal condition to dwell.

Notes

1. 'SZ' refers to Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972). The pagination of SZ is reproduced in the margins of both English translations (see bibliography) [all translations DD].
2. Heidegger understands questions of realism and idealism to be questions rooted in epistemology. Yet each lacks, he charges, in an equally thoroughgoing way the sense of the Greek concept of truth that can alone explain the possibility of the doctrine of knowing that they suppose (SZ 34, 183).
3. If this interpretation of Heidegger's gloss on idealism (SZ 207) is correct, then it would seem that he considers only a non-causal or, more precisely, a non-efficient-causal idealism as worthy of consideration. As discussed below, in the late 1920s he regards Kant's transcendental idealism as the paradigm of such a non-causal idealism.
4. While infinite cognition has access to things-in-themselves, finite cognition does not. Yet for that very reason, on the one hand, for finite cognition, 'the entity "in the appearance" is the same entity as the entity in itself' (Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, *Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter GA), vol. 3, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2010), 31. On the other hand, the transcendental conditions under which an entity appears to us are never complete or the only possible ones (GA 3: 25).
5. Or, as Blattner puts it, 'ontological idealism' or 'temporal idealism'. For a valuable examination of the analogies and disanalogies between Kant and Heidegger in this connection, see William Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 233–54, esp. 245f. and 245 n. 25.
6. SZ 202. On this analogy between Kant's concept of the transcendental object and Heidegger's concept of the real, see the valuable gloss by Béatrice Han-Pile in her 'Early Heidegger's appropriation of Kant', in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds), *A Companion to Heidegger* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005), 95ff.
7. Heidegger's positive comments about idealism suggest only something analogous to Kant's transcendental idealism, and, indeed, his readings of Kant have a great deal in common with the realist neo-Kantian tradition. In the context of traditional interpretations of transcendental idealism, Heidegger seems to come closest to 'dual-aspect' interpretations; in this regard, see Han-Pile, 'Early Heidegger's appropriation of Kant', 80–101, esp. 87ff.; and my article 'The Critique of Pure Reason and Continental philosophy: Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental imagination', in Paul Guyer (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 380–400.

8. Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, GA, vol. 25, ed. Ingtraud Görland (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1987), 160f., 315.
9. Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, GA, vol. 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1990), 160ff., 190, 205f., 211.
10. Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, GA, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2004), 162.
11. 'Roughly' seems an apt qualifier since Heidegger singles out Leibniz's and Kant's contributions as preparing the way for German Idealism; Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*, GA, vol. 65, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1989), 201f., 208.
12. This identification supposedly marks a repudiation of a more adequate, realist conception of Platonism, namely, the medieval realism regarding essences and universals (GA 65: 211f.). In this context Heidegger fails to take note of the impact of this realism on Descartes.
13. GA 65: 202f. This last remark in the *Contributions* hearkens back to Heidegger's first lectures dedicated exclusively to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In these 1931 lectures Heidegger notes how Hegel combines the ancient onto-theo-logical approach to being with the modern ego-logical approach. See Martin Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, GA, vol. 32, ed. Ingtraud Görland (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1980), 183: 'Die [onto-theo-logische] Fragerichtung wird seit Descartes zugleich ego-logisch, wobei das ego nicht nur zentral ist für den Logos, sondern ebenso mitbestimmend für die Entfaltung des Begriffes *theos*, was sich wiederum schon in der christlichen Theologie vorbereitet hat. Die Seinsfrage im ganzen ist onto-theo-ego-logisch.'
14. Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA, vol. 7, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2000), 74.
15. 'Machination' (*Machenschaft*) designates the 'essence of beingness [*Seiendheit*] in modern thinking', according to which being is equated with being makeable or producible (*das Machbare*), even by itself; see GA 65: 126f.
16. G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, in Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (eds), *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969) (hereafter HW), vol. 6, 466 / George di Giovanni (ed. and trans.), *The Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) (hereafter SL), 673.
17. HW 6: 497 (SL, 696).
18. In the Encyclopaedia Logic, however, a difference between senses of 'object' (*Gegenstand*, *Objektivität*) is less obvious; see G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*, *Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik* in HW 8, §236, S. 388 / K. Brinkmann and D. Dahlstrom (eds and trans.), *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) (hereafter Enc), 299.
19. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 1074b34–35 in *Metaphysics*, X–XIV, trans. Hugh Tredennick, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 164–65; see, too, *Metaphysics* XII, 7, esp. 1072b20–22, cited as the last words of the *Encyclopaedia*.
20. This reference to a more differentiated conception of thinking warrants some explanation. Whereas Heidegger in the 1930s (notably in the *Einführung in die Metaphysik* as well as in the *Beiträge*) glosses the dominance of thinking, particularly as a form of representing,

in Western philosophy as a source of the obliviousness to being, his work in later years (notably in *Was heißt Denken?* and *Gelassenheit*) contrasts representational thinking with a poetic, genuine thinking that commemorates being.

21. Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, GA, vol. 11, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2006), 56.
22. GA 11: 66ff.
23. GA 11: 76.
24. See my 'Thinking of nothing: Heidegger and Hegel', in Stephen Houlgate (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Hegel* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2011), 519–36.
25. GA 11: 56, 70.
26. GA 11: 71.
27. GA 11: 72.
28. GA 11: 73.

7

French Hegelianism and anti-Hegelianism in the 1960s: Hyppolite, Foucault and Deleuze

GARY GUTTING

The French warmed to Hegel very slowly, despite a number of attempts from the early nineteenth century on to import his thought. In particular, the neo-Kantianism that dominated the French university from the Franco-Prussian War until just before the Second World War had a strong antipathy to absolute Idealism. The founder of the neo-Kantian school, Jules Lachelier, is said to have told his students: 'They'll be no Hegel here as long as I'm around.'[1] The neo-Kantians had persistently rejected Hegel's philosophy on the grounds that its ultimate telos in Absolute Spirit's all-encompassing self-knowledge was incompatible with the irreducible reality of finite human freedom. A genuine move towards Hegel began with the publication in 1929 of *Le malheur de conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* by Jean Wahl, who taught history of philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1927 to 1967. Wahl's books on Hegel and Kierkegaard were an important influence on the development of existentialism. Later, Wahl worked closely with Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and was a good friend of Lévinas.

Four years after Wahl's book on unhappy consciousness, Alexandre Kojève began teaching his famous seminar at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. This seminar, which ran from 1933 to 1939, was at various points attended by Bataille, Lacan and Merleau-Ponty,[2] and, although notes on his lectures were not published until 1947, they from the beginning exerted considerable influence through informal dissemination.[3] Whereas Wahl took Hegel's section on unhappy consciousness as the key to understanding his system, Kojève's reading was based on the chapter of the *Phenomenology* on the master–slave dialectic. But, like Wahl, Kojève provided ways of toning down Hegel's absolutism, reading the dialectic in terms of a purely human struggle. Wahl and Kojève also bridged the apparent distance of Hegel from Marx and Heidegger by offering humanist readings of the latter two thinkers.

The result was a Hegel of extreme interest to the rising generation of existentialist thought at mid century.

The next generation's rejection of humanism made these interpretations of Hegel far less attractive, although Wahl's influence probably remained stronger than Kojève's because of his close university contacts with students. Moreover, Wahl's approach was an important starting point for Jean Hyppolite, who none the less moved beyond it to a more balanced reading of Hegel that made him a key reference point for the next generation's efforts to find meaning beyond humanism. Older accounts[4] of twentieth-century French philosophy present Kojève as the centre of interest in Hegel, and Bruce Baugh (see note 6 below) has rightly emphasised the at least equally important role of Wahl. But an understanding of the confrontation of the philosophers of the 1960s with Hegel needs to give pride of place to Hyppolite.[5] I begin with a brief look at Wahl's approach to Hegel, move to a fuller discussion of Hyppolite's interpretation, and then turn to the anti-Hegelianism of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.

Jean Wahl's Hegel

Wahl approached Hegel through the famous chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the 'unhappy consciousness'.[6] In Hegel's presentation, this chapter corresponds to just one stage in the dialectical development of spirit, the stage that Hegel characterised as 'the Unhappy Consciousness [which] is the consciousness of self as a divided nature, a dual-natured, merely contradictory being'.[a,7] The division is that between the contingent, multiple and changeable self of my experience and the essential, simple and unchanging, self that I know I must be. On the one hand, this unhappy consciousness is the higher truth implicit in the preceding stage of scepticism, in which the doubting self unreflectively accepts the contradiction between its explicit effort to question everything and its implicit acceptance of truths essential for its life in the world. The 'doubling' of the unhappy consciousness is its reflective awareness of both the explicit, contingent doubting self and the implicit, essential self that escaped genuine doubt. On the other hand, at the stage of unhappy consciousness, spirit continues to see the essential self as outside its own contingent being in the world, thinking of it as an unattainable – though deeply desired – end (e.g., the transcendent God

a. 'Das unglückliche Bewußtsein . . . das Bewußtsein seiner als des gedoppelten, nur widersprechenden Wesens.' HW, iii, 163.

of Christianity). At the next stage, that of Reason, spirit realises that the unhappy separation of its contingency from essential reality is an illusion: spirit itself *is* the essential nature from which it seemed to be separated. This, for Hegel, is the first stage of Idealism, where the spirit begins to realise its identity with the essential, absolute truth.

Wahl, however, suggests that the unhappy consciousness, which Hegel presents as just one stage of spirit's development, can in fact be taken as the condition of consciousness at every stage of the dialectic short of the final synthesis in the Absolute's self-knowledge. At each point, there is a lived division between what spirit experiences itself as being and an apparently unattainable other that it aspires to be. From this standpoint, unhappy consciousness becomes a basis for interpreting the whole of the *Phenomenology*. Given such an interpretation, Wahl is led to what came to be called an 'anthropological reading' of Hegel. Hegel's description of the unhappy consciousness is taken as corresponding to the quintessential human experience, as, for example, embodied in the great Greek and Shakespearean tragedies that we see as the fullest expression of our lived reality. Human experience, then, becomes the privileged model for the life of Hegel's spirit. The result, as Wahl puts it, is a 'pantragicist' interpretation of Hegel, which extends the tragic vision of human life to Being itself.

Apart from its (debatable) merits as Hegel interpretation, the beauty of Wahl's book was that it showed how even philosophers who had no sympathy with Hegel's general approach or final conclusions could extract an attractive core from his system. Whether or not you accepted the general adequacy of the dialectical method or the absolute Idealism to which Hegel thought it led, you could appreciate the power of applying the method to the special case of human consciousness. Even if relentless dialectical self-negation is vapid as an account of nature or implausible as an account of history, it rings true of the endlessly self-reflective and self-questing of our lived experience. Whatever else Hegel achieved, he honed a language well suited – precisely because of its continual self-conflict – to describe the complex torsions of consciousness.

Wahl's approach also had the advantage of allowing French philosophers to assimilate Hegel's phenomenology – construed as the careful description of concrete experience – to that practised by Husserl and by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. (The last two were closely connected, because the Husserl imported into France – e.g., by Koyré and Lévinas – was read through Heideggerian lenses.) Add the vocabulary of Hegelian unhappy consciousness to a Heideggerised Husserlian phenomenology and you have the means to

carry out Sartre's ontology of freedom. For example, the key formulation that *human consciousness is not what it is and is what it is not* came to Sartre from Hegel through Wahl.

Even more important, Wahl's reading of Hegel suggested ways of finding an overall meaning in history that was consistent with existentialist freedom and excluded the facile optimism of the French neo-Kantians. On this view, tragic conflict and suffering were inevitable, but the logic of the dialectic grounded the hope that earlier losses would, to some extent, be redeemed in future syntheses – even if, contrary to Hegel, we would never reach an absolute end to our struggles. Beginning in 1929, the very year in which Wahl's book appeared, Marx's 1844 manuscripts were published. These early works, strongly influenced by Hegel's notion of alienation, provided a basis for a parallel existential reading of Marx, which was also strongly influenced by Kojève. The culmination of such readings was Sartre's effort at a synthesis of existentialism and Marxism in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), which, however, came well after the days of existentialist dominance.

Jean Hyppolite's Hegel

Hyppolite became professor in the history of philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1949 and was also, from 1954, director of the ENS. He held both positions until 1963 (when he was elected to the Collège de France), teaching influential courses on the history of philosophy (especially Hegel) and directing many theses, including those of Foucault and Deleuze.

Hyppolite became the dominant figure in French Hegel studies with his translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* (1939, 1941) and his massive commentary *The Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (1946). In the very beginning of his commentary's chapter on 'The Unhappy Consciousness', Hyppolite acknowledges the validity of Wahl's interpretation, saying that 'unhappy consciousness is the fundamental theme of the *Phenomenology*' and noting that 'we constantly find the theme of the unhappy consciousness in the *Phenomenology* presented in different ways'. But he goes on to point out that 'nonetheless unhappy consciousness – in the strict sense of the term – is the result of the development of self-consciousness',[8] thus implicitly distinguishing Wahl's broad sense of 'unhappy consciousness' from the narrow sense Hegel has in mind in his chapter explicitly on the topic. This chapter treats unhappy consciousness as due simply to reflection on the specific form of self-consciousness that makes explicit the contradiction of scepticism by bringing the conflict between finite and infinite mind into the individual's

own self-image. Wahl, he implies, is right because 'this reflection implies a break with life, a separation so radical that consciousness of this separation is the unhappy consciousness of all reflection'. But Hyppolite restricts his own detailed discussion to Hegel's narrow sense.

Later in his chapter, Hyppolite alludes to the use made of Wahl's interpretation by the existentialists. He points out that in Hegel's idealism there is eventually a synthesis whereby the division of the unhappy consciousness is overcome and spirit achieves 'an objectivity . . . that . . . is no longer the pure and simple in-itself but has become the in-itself for-itself or the for-itself in-itself'. The result is 'a substance that is at the same time subject, a substance that [in contrast to the self-division of unhappy consciousness] poses itself as what it is'. Hyppolite then notes that 'most contemporary thinkers deny the possibility of such a synthesis of the in-itself and the for-itself, and it is precisely on this ground that they criticize Hegel's system as a system (204)'. Instead,

> they generally prefer what Hegel calls 'unhappy consciousness' to what he calls 'spirit'. They willingly take up Hegel's description of self-certitude which fails to be in-itself . . . but they abandon Hegel when, according to him, specific self-consciousness – subjectivity – becomes universal self-consciousness – 'thingness' – a movement through which being is posed as subject and subject is posed as being.

In other words, 'they accept Hegel's phenomenology but reject his ontology' (p. 205). Hyppolite diplomatically says that his brief here is not to debate this issue, but simply 'elucidate as clearly as possible the endeavour of the *Phenomenology*'. In this regard, he concludes, there 'can be no doubt about the meaning [*sens*] of the dialectic of unhappy consciousness. As Hegel put it explicitly: "Self-consciousness which reaches its fulfillment in the figure of unhappy consciousness is only the torment of the spirit struggling to rise again to an objective state but failing to reach it"' (p. 205). Hyppolite at least makes it clear that the existentialist reading is not Hegel's own.

Hyppolite's later book on Hegel, *Logic and Existence* (1953),[9] moves more decisively away from the existentialists' anthropological reading and gives central place to language rather than human consciousness. He begins with the idea that there are aspects of being that are ineffable and so not accessible to knowledge but only to some sort of non-cognitive apprehension. The ineffable might take the form of an immediate sensation 'beneath' knowledge, which Hegel discusses at the beginning of the *Phenomenology*,

or, at the other extreme, a faith in an absolute that transcends knowledge, which Hegel discusses in his early critique of Jacobi (in *Faith and Knowledge*). As Hyppolite emphasises, the existence of an ineffable contradicts Hegel's fundamental assertion that knowledge is absolute; that is, complete and all-encompassing.

To appreciate this point, Hyppolite briefly recalls some basic features of Hegel's project in the *Phenomenology*. In that book, Hegel tries to demonstrate through a detailed analysis of various sorts (stages) of experience that all being is pervaded by conceptual structures that make it exhaustively knowable. Of course the subject that has this knowledge is not the finite human consciousness as we experience it in everyday life but rather the subject that the *Phenomenology* ultimately reveals as identical with being itself, which thus turns out to be its own self-knowledge. But the project of the *Phenomenology* is to examine successive forms of finite human experience, starting with the immediate certainty of our sensations and moving through perception of physical objects, the understanding achieved by experimental and theoretical science, etc., to the highest cultural forms of experience (art, religion). For each stage of experience, Hegel develops arguments purporting to show that the stage contains contradictions, resulting from the fact that the knowledge it achieves leaves out something that appears to be essentially unknowable. The process of working through these contradictions is what Hegel calls 'dialectic'.

For example, the certainty of sensation derives from what seems to be the sheer immediacy of the sensory experience; that is, the experience is apparently not 'mediated' by interpretative concepts, which would open up the possibility of our misunderstanding the experience's content. We are, we think, certain because we are in direct contact with a unique object (a 'this') in its full concrete singularity. But, Hegel argues, the exclusion (in the name of certainty) of conceptual content is inconsistent with the singularity and determinateness of the 'this' we are experiencing. For if there is no conceptual content in our experience, there is nothing to distinguish the 'this' from any other concrete 'this' of which we might have a sensation. As a result, the 'this', which seemed to apply to a unique singularity, applies universally to all possible sensations. But this result contradicts the claim that we are in direct contact with a specific object and thereby undermines the certainty of the experience. Later stages of consciousness can be analysed in a parallel way. One that Hyppolite discusses (§§360–63) is illustrated by an episode from Goethe's *Faust*, in which 'consciousness, weary of the universality of knowledge and of the burden of mediation . . . claims to turn

back completely to ineffable pleasure' (LE, 16). Another is that corresponding to the development of philosophical empiricism (§558).

After working through many successive stages of experience in this way, Hegel eventually reaches the stage of 'absolute knowledge'; that is, an experience that encompasses unlimited knowledge of all being. Each successive stage resolves the contradictions of the preceding stage by reconciling ('sublating') them under a higher, synthesising concept. For example, the stage of unhappy consciousness, discussed above, resolves the contradiction between the doubt and the certainty of sceptical consciousness by ascribing the doubts to a finite self and the certainty to an infinite self from which the finite self is separated. The final stage, the experience of absolute knowledge, effects a total synthesis, a total reconciliation, of the contradictions of all the preceding stages. The subject of this experience is, as we noted above, not our ordinary human consciousness but 'absolute spirit', the grasp of the totality of all being, existing as the historical process of its knowledge of itself. Since absolute spirit contains literally everything in its total self-knowledge, there is no ineffable that would escape its final conceptual synthesis.

So far, we have spoken of knowledge as knowledge of being. Such knowledge is universal, which means that, in particular, 'it sublates and absorbs all the consciousnesses of singular selves' (LE, 10). On Hyppolite's reading of Hegel, this implies 'the possibility of a universal recognition, of an intelligible *discourse* which is simultaneously this "I" and all "I's"' (LE, 11, my emphasis). In other words, 'language . . . is the universal instrument of mutual recognition' (LE, 10). It follows that 'knowledge . . . is not only knowledge of being, it is also what makes the instituted community of consciousnesses possible', which means that knowledge is essentially linguistic, since language is the instrument of communication. Nor is language present only in the final synthesis that is absolute spirit. Each stage of Hegel's dialectic can be understood as a process of dialogue. As Hyppolite says, 'originally, what does the word dialectic mean, if not the art of discussion and dialogue? . . . Human life is always language, sense, without which human life loses its character and returns to animal life.' At any stage, 'dialectical discourse could be interrupted, and scepticism [about the conceptual synthesis that moves the dialectic forward] is in effect always possible'. This happens when consciousness 'rejects language and discourse and claims to reach an ineffable absolute'. But such a claim either 'says the opposite of what it intends [by trying to say anything at all], and [then] it is language which is right'; or else, if a consciousness 'stubbornly renounces language, this

consciousness can only get lost, dissolved'. What is supposed to be the ineffable is merely 'the abstraction of nothingness' (LE, 11).

Granted that Hegel has established that language is the engine of his dialectic, the 'Dasein [*l'être-là*] of spirit' (LE, 19), the next question is just how to understand language in this sense. Hyppolite rejects the 'humanistic' interpretation (which is just a variation on the anthropological interpretation in terms of lived experience). Even 'in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel does not say man, but self-consciousness. The modern interpreters who have immediately translated this term by man have somewhat falsified Hegel's thought.' Hyppolite agrees that, for Hegel, 'the Logos appears in the human knowledge that interprets and says itself'. But he emphasises that, none the less, 'man is only the intersection of this knowledge and this sense. Man is consciousness and self-consciousness, but consciousness and self-consciousness are not man.' We need to understand 'that Hegel's philosophy results at least as much in a speculative[10] logic as in a philosophy of history' (LE, 20). Correspondingly, the language that drives the dialectic is not that of ordinary 'natural' human speech; it is, rather, 'the authentic language of being' (LE, 26). None the less, natural human language is not separate from the 'language of being', any more than finite human consciousness is separate from absolute spirit. By Hegel's definition, spirit is not a transcendent reality, existing outside human history; on the contrary, it is ultimately identical with that history. Accordingly, as Hyppolite puts it, the language of being exists 'within natural language', even though it is not the same as the merely human language spoken in any particular stage, short of absolute knowledge, of Hegel's phenomenology of consciousness. What we need to understand, however, is 'how is this language, which is no longer that of anyone, which is being's universal self-consciousness, to be distinguished from human, all-too-human language? In other words how does the passage from Phenomenology to absolute Knowledge work?' (LE, 26–27). This, Hyppolite tells us, 'is the Hegelian question par excellence' (LE, 27).

Even at the end of Hyppolite's detailed reflection on this question, the answer is not entirely clear. What is clear is that 'Hegel believed himself able to comprehend human reflection in the light of absolute knowledge', and Hyppolite allows that 'the principle of this comprehension is contained in the meaning of Hegelian ontology'. In other words, given Hegelian dialectic, we are able to understand how finite human existence is included (sublated) into the final synthesis of spirit's absolute knowledge. But Hegel also believed that he could 'exhibit human consciousness's becoming-absolute-knowledge, as if this becoming were a history'; that is, an occurrence within the temporal

framework of human history. If this were not the case, how could we, who exist in human history, move to the level of absolute knowledge? Hyppolite agrees that human history 'is the place of this passage' of human consciousness to absolute knowledge. But he notes that 'this passage is not itself a *historical fact*' (LE, 189). This is because, for Hegel, although absolute knowledge does not exist outside the historical world (the historical world is the only world), there is still a priority of the absolute over history: 'The Logos [absolute knowledge] is absolute genesis, and time is the image of this mediation, not the reverse' (LE, 188). But how can the genesis of absolute knowledge occur unless human consciousness makes the passage to absolute knowledge? And how can this happen unless this passage is an event of human history, so that, contrary to Hegel's claim about the priority of the absolute, time would be the ultimate expression of absolute knowledge? Hegel seems to have no answer to this final question about how we reach absolute knowledge.

Hegel and the project of 1960s philosophy

With a few exceptions, the general orientation of twentieth-century French philosophy was in solid accord with the secularism of the Third Republic in rejecting traditional theistic philosophies that made sense of the evils of human existence and offered hope for a better future. Prior to the First World War, this sense and hope was grounded in the anticipated progress of science. Comte had put forward a similar secular Gospel of Science in the mid nineteenth century. But during the early decades of the twentieth century, the philosophical engine of secularism was not empiricism but a historicised neo-Kantian idealism (most thoroughly worked out by Léon Brunschvicg) that presented the evolution of mathematical physics as the sun enlightening and sustaining the progress of 'man'. This also accorded with those philosophers' 'centre left' political orientation, supporting reforms such as workers' rights and the emancipation of women, but opposing revolutionary movements such as Marxism.

The young philosophers of the 1930s such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty found this optimistic scientific humanism wholly inadequate to make sense of the brutalities of two world wars. They turned instead to existentialist versions of Hegelianism and its materialist offshoot, Marxism, which saw human existence not as a continuous ascent to the good but as a violent struggle in which meaning emerges as a final resolution of tragic conflicts. But the philosophical generation that emerged in the 1960s in turn found

such tragic but ultimately redeeming visions inconsistent with the world they saw as unredeemable. They rejected all forms of humanism – religious, scientific and existentialist. They did not, however, abandon the hope that there might be modes of philosophical thought that could provide some sort of guidance adequate to human needs. French philosophy from 1960 on has been defined by the search for such modes of thought.

So understood, these philosophers, for all their iconoclasm and even 'anti-philosophy', have maintained, in their own distinctive ways, the perennial philosophical goal of finding some sort of guiding vision. Here their view differs from that of many analytic philosophers (and of Richard Rorty) who reject the classical view of philosophy as somehow a primary instrument of whatever salvation we can hope for.

The French philosophers of the 1960s reject from the start both the supernaturalist visions of traditional religions and reductions of human existence to its description by natural science. Instead, like the existentialists of the previous generation, they seek meaning in history, but without the existentialist (and earlier secular humanist) view of history as culminating in or constituted by human consciousness. The goal is a livable vision that neither eliminates the distinctively human nor makes human beings the centre of the universe.

For those seeking such a vision – particularly those who, like these French philosophers, also want that vision to be rooted in an engagement with past philosophical thought and to connect with science, art and literature – the philosophy of Hegel will almost inevitably be of great interest. As Hyppolite put it in a 1952 lecture on the recent resurgence of Hegelianism in France: 'We . . . direct our interest towards Hegelianism because there is in his thought a philosophy of history, an effort to reveal the ultimate meaning [*sens*] of history.'[11] Initially, this interest came from existentialists (including Sartre himself) looking for a way to situate their radically individual account of freedom in a more realistic social and historical context. The full fruition of this interest was Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, where he tried to synthesise existentialist freedom with a left-Hegelian Marxist social theory.

But Sartre's existential Marxism remained a humanism because, for all its contextualisation, free human consciousness was still the source of all meaning. The Sartrean world was still one of pre-Copernican anthropomorphism, unable to accept the fact that our world (our language, our unconscious) is not of our making. This was possible because the reading of Hegel (and of Marx) from which he began was itself an existentialist interpretation that

reduced dialectic to the level of human consciousness. If this were the only possible reading, the philosophers of the 1960s would have rejected Hegel as readily as they rejected Sartre himself. But, as we have seen, Hyppolite himself suggested a non-existentialist interpretation of Hegel that accorded with their anti-humanism. However, this anti-humanism did not go so far as to countenance the total absorption of human beings in absolute spirit. French philosophers' commitment to leftist political goals of individual liberation was inconsistent with this sort of Hegelianism. But perhaps there was a path between the existentialist and the absolutist Hegel? Hyppolite at least suggested that this might be possible. If so, Hegel's system would be just what the young philosophers were looking for: a secular philosophical vision of history that made sense of human existence (and thereby provided guidance for political action) without making it the Copernican centre of the world. In any case, it seemed clear that their philosophical project required coming to terms with Hegel.

Although they were Hyppolite's students, Foucault and Deleuze had no stake in saving the self-consistency of the Hegelian system. Like their existentialist predecessors, they found no plausibility or even charm in the idea of absolute knowledge and, indeed, insisted on giving priority to the finite world of human existence. Again like the existentialists, they emphasised the need to explore the differences that remain irreducible given the failure of absolute knowledge. On the other hand, they rejected the existentialists' prioritisation of human consciousness and accordingly found attractive Hegel's emphasis (at least in Hyppolite's interpretation) on language, which they could use to decentre lived experience. Indeed, they thought they could use Hegelian arguments to refute existentialist claims about the absolute position of human consciousness. Such arguments could, moreover, show that consciousness existed only in an ontological field of linguistic structures, which themselves had to be understood in terms of differences. The result was a domain of philosophical investigation that occupied, to adapt a phrase of Leonard Lawler's, the Hyppolitean middle: a turbulent space delimited by the two unacceptable resting points of existential phenomenology and Hegelian absolute knowledge.[12]

Their focus on the Hyppolitean middle reflects a long-standing concern of French philosophy with the tension between the concrete experience of the life-world and the universal concepts of rational thought. Alain Badiou has recently emphasised the role of this tension in French thought at least from the days of Bergson and Brunschvicg (with roots as far back as Descartes) and, in particular, has proposed reading the story of French philosophy since

1940 as an effort to combine a philosophy of concrete life with a philosophy of the abstract concept.[13] After about 1960, younger philosophers who had found existentialist reductions of Hegel to the endless dialectic of unhappy consciousness philosophically inadequate (and likewise, as the French always had, rejected a culmination of dialectic in absolute knowledge) were naturally drawn to a critical rethinking of the Hegelian Concept. We are now in a position to discuss how Foucault and Deleuze carried out this project.

Foucault and Hegel

In his eulogy for Hyppolite at the École normale, Michel Foucault formulates the problem in terms of the fundamental question Hyppolite posed for Hegel: how to unite the standpoint of the *Phenomenology* and that of the *Logic*. 'M. Hyppolite has always, from the beginning', focused his work on 'the point where the tragedy of life finds its meaning in a Logic, where the genesis of a thought becomes the structure of a system, where existence itself is articulated in a Logic'.[14] This, indeed, was the theme of Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence*, which Foucault calls 'one of the great books of our time' (p. 136).

About two years later, in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, where he succeeded Hyppolite, Foucault, in a warm and informative concluding tribute to his teacher, put the matter in more personal terms.[15] Hyppolite, he said, was crucial for his own effort to 'truly escape Hegel', an enterprise requiring 'an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him' and of 'the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us' (p. 235). The price of escaping Hegel (and the risk of failure), Foucault suggests, arises from what he sees as the central concern of Hyppolite's study of Hegel: 'Can one still philosophise where Hegel is no longer possible? Can any philosophy continue to exist that is no longer Hegelian? Are the non-Hegelian elements in our thought necessarily non-philosophical? Is that which is antiphilosophical necessarily non-Hegelian?' (pp. 236–37). In short, is being a Hegelian a necessary and sufficient condition of being a philosopher?

We may well wonder why Foucault thinks that there is a serious question of whether there can be a non-Hegelian philosophy. As a first step in answering this question, we need to recall how Foucault saw the range of choices confronting him as a young philosophy student. In a 1978 interview with Duccio Trombadori,[16] Foucault describes the 'intellectual panorama'

presented to him in the early 1950s as he tried to choose his own approach. The two extremes of the panorama were 'Hegel's theory of systems' and 'the philosophy of the subject . . . in the form of phenomenology and existentialism'. Outside the university, 'it was Sartre', with his particular version of the philosophy of the subject, 'who was in fashion'. Within the university, Hegelianism was dominant, although 'it was a Hegelianism permeated with phenomenology and existentialism, centred on the theme of the unhappy consciousness'. A third alternative, 'establishing a meeting point between the academic philosophical tradition and phenomenology, was the work of Merleau-Ponty (friend of Sartre but also a Sorbonne professor), 'who extended existential discourse into specific domains' (p. 247).

In assessing these alternatives, the young Foucault sought an approach that offered 'the broadest possible mode of understanding the contemporary world' (p. 246). Nor was this just a vague matter of wanting a philosophy that was 'up-to-date'. Foucault saw an urgent need to escape from the mistakes that had led to the horrors of the Second World War.

> The experience of the war had shown us the urgent need of a society radically different from the one in which we were living, this society that had permitted Nazism, that had lain down in front of it, and that had gone over en masse to de Gaulle.

Foucault shared the 'total disgust towards all that' with 'a large sector of French youth' (p. 247). As a result, 'we wanted a world and a society that were not only different but that would be an alternative version of ourselves: we wanted to be completely other in a completely different world' (pp. 247–48).

This desire for a complete break with the past excluded 'the Hegelianism offered to us at the university', since Hegel's dialectic, 'with its model of history's unbroken intelligibility' (p. 248), required the continual inclusion of the past in the future. But, at the same time, Foucault was firmly opposed to existential phenomenology, whether formulated by Sartre or Merleau-Ponty, because he questioned 'the category of the subject, its supremacy, its foundational function' (p. 247). *The Order of Things* deploys philosophical critiques of the subject, but apart from such critiques, Foucault found a philosophy of the subject incapable of taking him beyond the self that the society he rejected wanted to mould for him.

> The phenomenologist's experience is basically a way of bringing a reflective gaze to bear on some object of 'lived experience', on the

> everyday in its transitory form, in order to grasp its meanings. . . . Moreover, phenomenology attempts to recapture the meaning of everyday experience in order to rediscover the sense in which the subject that I am is indeed responsible, in its transcendental functions, for founding that experience together with its meanings (p. 241).

Foucault did not deny that there is a subject in this phenomenological sense. No doubt, 'the subject dispenses significations'; 'that point was not called back in question'. Rather, he says, 'the question was: Can it be said that the subject is the only possible form of experience? Can't there be experiences in the course of which the subject is no longer posited, in its constitutive relations, as what makes it identical with itself?' (p. 248).

Foucault saw post-war society as turning its youth into subjects who would continue the sordid history that had produced the war. Mere descriptions of the essential characteristics of all subjects, *à la* phenomenology, would do nothing to stop this process. What was needed, rather, were 'experiences in which the subject might be able to dissociate from itself, sever the relation with itself, lose its identity' (p. 248). Put this way, it might seem that all Foucault needed was an existentialist Hegel of the unhappy consciousness. His rejection of the phenomenological subject seems to extend only to a Husserlian transcendental subject, secure in its essential identity delineated by eidetic descriptions. It might seem that a move to the Sartrean/Hegelian subjectivity of a for-itself that 'is not what it is' would have been just what Foucault was looking for.

But Foucault also opted for what he called 'a philosophy of the concept' over a 'philosophy of experience'.[17] 'Philosophy of the concept' refers, in the first instance, to Canguilhem's view of the history of science as an account of how concepts have emerged and developed, rather than an account of the conflicting opinions of individual scientists. But Foucault also took it more broadly as an effort to understand history in general not in terms of the experiences and choices of individual subjects but in terms of the unconscious conceptual structures that underlie subjective life. For all his interest in radically transformative experiences, he still insisted that even such experiences did not take us outside the domain of conceptual intelligibility. They would require new concepts but could not escape to an ineffable world of non-conceptual experience. In short, Foucault required a philosophy that did justice to both existence (experience) and to logic (concepts) – precisely, on Hyppolite's reading, the Hegelian project. It is in this sense that Foucault saw the need for a philosophy that was essentially Hegelian.

Hegelian but, at the same time, not Hegelian. That is, not the Hegel of the complete System, of absolute knowledge, of total synthesis, of final necessity, but the Hegel of Hyppolite, who 'never saw the Hegelian system as a reassuring universe' but as 'the field in which philosophy took the ultimate risk' (p. 236). The project, then, is to avoid this 'bad Hegel' while preserving the 'good Hegel' for whom experience is given its undeniable place as a historical reality, but is none the less subordinated to a more fundamental objective structure, which, however, allows for new forms of experience whereby we can break out of the pattern set for us by the past. According to Foucault, Hyppolite set the parameters for this project by proposing five 'alterations . . . not within Hegelian philosophy, but upon it', each injecting into the Hegelian vision an element from some other major modern philosopher.

First, Hyppolite gave up Hegel's claim that philosophy could culminate in a 'totality' that synthesised and reconciled all oppositions, and instead presented philosophy, as, Foucault says, Husserl did, as 'an endless task, against the background of an infinite horizon'. Second, Hyppolite replaced the finality of absolute knowledge with the idea of 'continuous recommencement, thereby transferring 'the Hegelian theme of the end of self-consciousness into one of repeated interrogation' (recalling Kierkegaard's category of repetition). Third, rather than absorbing all non-philosophical experience and knowledge into the Absolute's final philosophical synthesis, Hyppolite, in the manner of Bergson, 'reestablish[ed] the contact with the non-philosophical' in a non-reductive manner. Fourth, the irreducibility of the non-philosophical led Hyppolite to look back, like Fichte rather than Hegel, to the question of how philosophy might find its beginning in the non-philosophical. Specifically (and this is the last alteration), Hyppolite invoked the challenge of Marx, and asked: 'If philosophy must begin as absolute discourse, then what of history and what is this beginning which starts out with a singular individual, within a society and a social class, and in the midst of struggle?'[18] This invocation of the 'singular individual' also refers to the fixed point of French philosophy throughout the twentieth century, the irreducibility of the free individual, which had always stood as the fundamental obstacle to a French appropriation of Hegel's thought.

These five alterations are interrelated, and both of the philosophers we are discussing implement them all in one way or another. Foucault's focus, however, is on the non-reductive 'contact with the non-philosophical', specifically with the history of what he calls 'the human sciences'.[19]

Because Foucault aims to write genuine histories, based on his own archival research, his projects have to be judged by criteria of factual accuracy that, in principle at least, guard against the Hegelian temptation of fitting everything too neatly into an independently posited philosophical system. On the other hand, within the discipline of history, his work is much closer to an 'idealist history' that deploys broad interpretative schemes, more illustrated than proven by data, than to an 'empiricist history' that fears to venture much beyond the bare catalogue of facts.[20] This sort of high-flying history can readily find itself taking on, for better or worse, Hegelian features.

Foucault's first historical work, *History of Madness in the Age of Reason*, is an instructive example. On the one hand, the history makes effective use of Hegelian concepts – for example, alienation, recognition, unhappy consciousness, master–slave relation – to describe various aspects of the existence of the mad and of society's perception of them.[21] But finding Hegel's concepts appropriate to describe a specific region of historical realities implies no commitment to his overall metaphysical view.

On the other hand, the *History of Madness* is framed in terms of what Foucault presents as Reason's effort, beginning in the mid seventeenth century, to exclude madness as its simple denial, rather than (as, Foucault claims, in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance) treating madness as the essential complement of Reason, in continuing dialogue with it. Moreover, Foucault describes these historical developments as changes in the *experience* of madness. If we ask who or what has this experience, the only answer would seem to be Reason itself, which, even if it avoids a progressive teleology, seems to posit something like Hegelian spirit as the subject of the historical experience of madness.[22] Foucault himself seems to recognise this in the self-critique of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, when he says that his *History of Madness* 'accorded far too great a place, and a very enigmatic one too, to what I called an "experience", thus showing to what extent one was still close to admitting an anonymous and general subject of history'.[23]

Foucault's next two histories, *The Birth of the Clinic* and, especially, *The Order of Things*, have distinctive features that might be seen as avoiding Hegelian pitfalls. First, they claim to uncover an 'archaeological' level of unconscious rules that constrained the thought of individual conscious minds in a given era. Beyond the consciously accessible rules of grammar and logic, there were, Foucault showed, a set of unconscious material (non-formal) rules that made certain grammatically and logically coherent ways of thinking none the less impossible. (Such rules corresponded to what Foucault called the *episteme* of a given period.) This explained why, for example,

thinkers of the Classical age (e.g., Lamarck) were unable to conceive of the possibility of the kind of evolution Darwin later discovered. The existence of such unconscious structures seemed to show that even the most striking achievements of conscious thought were, contrary to Hegel, based on and restricted by outside factors. Second, Foucault's histories avoided any hint of Hegelian dialectical development by renouncing any attempt to explain changes in episteme, since he limited himself to archaeological descriptions of the deep structure of thought in discrete periods. Foucault could demonstrate that Renaissance thought took place within an episteme quite different from that of the Classical age, and that the episteme of the Classical age was likewise quite different from that of modernity. But he made no effort to account for the processes whereby one episteme was replaced by another, but rather presented isolated snapshots of different periods.

But neither of these features was a sure protection against Hegelian totalisation. Structures that are unconscious for individual human minds at a given time may still be part of the conscious life of absolute spirit. (Even if we require that absolute consciousness be manifested in human consciousness, Foucault's subsequent discovery of these structures can be taken as precisely this manifestation.) And, as Foucault realised, full-blooded history requires explanations of why changes in thinking occurred. Unless he was able to find a satisfactory explanatory alternative to Hegelian dialectic, he had no reason to think that he had avoided Hegelian history. Moreover, even the avowedly explanation-free history of *The Order of Things* turned, at its most crucial point, to something very like Hegelian dialectic. This occurs when Foucault is trying to show how the modern episteme, centred on the concept of man as simultaneously empirical (an object in the world) and transcendental (constituting the world), is on the verge of collapse. In his section on 'The Analytic of Finitude', Foucault deploys a series of philosophical analyses that seem designed to show, in classic Hegelian fashion, how successive attempts at thinking man as both empirical and transcendental make some progress in reconciling the two aspects but eventually fall into contradiction.

The lesson of Foucault's archaeological histories was the need to develop an effective alternative to the dialectical method of explaining historical change. Only in this way could Foucault carry out Hyppolite's 'alteration' by confronting philosophical thought with a historical reality which that thought could not reduce to itself. Foucault eventually found such a method in Nietzsche's genealogy.

Foucault's historical 'alteration' of Hegel took him quite a distance away from traditional philosophical projects. Not only is there no effort to

construct a comprehensive account of reality, there is also no engagement with general questions about freedom, consciousness, values, religion, etc. Since Foucault is dealing with the history of sciences (or would-be sciences), questions about knowledge often arise, but these are about how a given age (or, better, particular disciplines in a given age) understood knowledge. Foucault's historical methods and concerns no doubt imply some assumptions about knowledge (e.g., rejections of foundationalism and naïve empiricism), but he never develops fully-fledged philosophical accounts of such assumptions. The efforts of enthusiastic admirers to extrapolate such accounts typically lead to self-refuting versions of scepticism or relativism that have no real tie to Foucault's thought beyond the fact that he sees knowledge as having a history and always existing in a socio-political context. Foucault did have an excellent philosophical ear and could, when it proved useful, deploy Kantian, Hegelian, Heideggerian or other appropriate vocabularies. But he readily abandons such vocabularies when they are no longer useful, and never pursues any of them for their own sake.

The closest Foucault comes to a philosophical credo is his endorsement in 'What Is Enlightenment?' of the 'philosophical ethos', which he associates with Kant, 'consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves'.[24] He agrees with Kant's idea that 'criticism . . . consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits'. But he characteristically inverts Kant's own project:

> If the Kantian question was that of knowing [*savoir*] what limits knowledge [*connaissance*] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by what is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over [*franchissement*] (p. 315).

In principle, the possible 'crossing-over' might take the form of a philosophical project of creating new metaphysical vocabularies. Foucault is, in fact, very supportive of Deleuze's work in this direction. But he makes it clear that his own inverse Kantianism does not share such philosophical ambitions. His criticism 'is no longer to be practised in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves'. Accordingly, 'this

criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible', and 'it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge [*connaissance*] or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events' (p. 315). Finally, emphasising the stated *practical* nature of his critique, Foucault says that he 'is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science' but 'to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom' (p. 316).

Foucault eventually came to see this practical project as philosophical in the ancients' sense of a reflective way of life. But his alteration of Hegel took him far away from the sorts of analyses and theories that define the modern philosophical journey. Gilles Deleuze, however, alters Hegel in ways that open up new directions for this philosophical journey.

Deleuze and Hegel

Deleuze takes up Hyppolite's idea of replacing the finality of absolute knowledge with a 'continuous recommencement', achieved through the endless creation of new philosophical concepts. This led him, in contrast to Foucault, to challenge Hegel directly by constructing a non-Hegelian metaphysics of difference. Deleuze, like Foucault, had first studied Hegel with Hyppolite and, very early in his career (1954), published a review of *Logic and Existence* in which he explained how he saw his own work in relation to Hegel's.[25]

Like Hyppolite's Hegel, Deleuze begins with the idea that 'philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else'. Also like Hyppolite's Hegel, he maintains that to say 'that philosophy must be ontology means first of all that it is not anthropology' (p. 191). Here 'anthropology' is understood as any view of knowledge that sharply separates the knowing subject from the known object. In its 'empiricist' form, anthropology treats the subject as simply one of many distinct things in the world (along with its objects) and presents itself 'as the science of this fact'. (Reductionist views in analytic philosophy of mind fit this understanding of 'anthropology'.) But Deleuze also includes Kant's position as an example of anthropology: 'Kant goes beyond the psychological and the empirical, but remains within the anthropological' (p. 192). His critical philosophy unites subject and object in that he sees the known object as constituted by the subject. But this union has no

ontological significance – does not occur at the level of metaphysical reality – because Kant still insists on a distinction between the object and the thing in itself, which remains entirely separate from (and unknown by) the subject. As Deleuze puts it, 'in Kant, thought and the thing [known] are identical, but what is identical to thought is only a relative thing, not the thing as being, in itself' (p. 192).

On Hyppolite's interpretation, Deleuze notes, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* refutes all versions of anthropology by showing that any distinction between being as an object and a subject's reflection on being leads to contradictions. Eliminating these contradictions requires, at each stage, unifying what seem to be distinct subjects and objects into a single self-knowing subject. Hegel's phenomenology is a matter of '"eliminating the hypothesis" of a knowledge whose source is alien' (p. 192, citing *Logic and Existence*, p. 158). 'In the *Phenomenology*, we are shown that the general difference of being and reflection, of the in-itself and the for-itself . . . is developed in the concrete moments of a dialectic whose very movement is to sublate this difference . . . In this sense, the *Phenomenology* starts from human reflection [anthropology] in order to show that human reflection and what follows from it lead to the absolute knowledge that they presuppose.' What anthropology viewed as 'the external difference between reflection and being' thus becomes 'the internal difference of being itself' (p. 192). The final result is that knowledge is always Absolute knowledge; that is, the self-knowledge of a single subject (the Absolute), the life of which includes all reality (including all the things – subjects and objects – that earlier stages of thought take as independent realities). Hegel's idealism is the assertion that this all-inclusive Absolute subject is literally all there is.

Here Hyppolite and Deleuze are using Hegel against the existentialist humanism that would make individual subjectivity the source of historical meaning. They maintain that, although this subjectivity has an essential place, it should not be the centre of our understanding of reality. In fact, according to the Hegelian analysis, it cannot, since making it the centre requires a subject–object dualism (man as simultaneously transcendental subject and empirical object that, as Hegel shows, leads to a series of contradictions). (Foucault later developed a similar point at length in his discussion of 'the analytic of finitude' in *The Order of Things* – although there he suggests that even Hegel does not escape from the fatal dualism.) To avoid the contradictions, we must realise that the subject–object division is not ontologically ultimate and begin instead from a single entity, 'Being itself' (the Absolute),

that contains within its own identity the root of subsequent distinctions between subject and object.

Hyppolite insists, however, that for Hegel, there is only one world: '"There is nothing to see behind the curtain" . . . or, as Hyppolite says, "the secret is that there is no secret"' (p. 193, citing *Logic and Existence*, pp. 60, 90). Being is the sense (intelligible meaning) of the only world there is, not a world of reality beyond the world of appearances. Nor, for Hegel, is there a separation within Being of thought from its object (which would lead back to the contradictions of anthropology) 'because being thinks itself in thought'.

So far, Deleuze has no quarrel with Hyppolite's Hegel. He agrees that a coherent ontology must be based on a unity of Being, not a dualism, that this unity must itself be the principle of all the diversity we find in the world, and that this diversity is one with the reality of Being itself, not a mere 'appearance' of that reality. We have, then, an ontology that rejects both the dualism of subject/object and the dualism of reality/appearance.

Now, Deleuze says, we can see the difficulty for Hegel 'that Hyppolite emphasises forcefully: if ontology is an ontology of sense and not of essence [in the sense of a hidden ground], if there is no second world, how can absolute knowledge still be distinguished from empirical knowledge?' If there is only one world, 'absolute knowledge must simultaneously comprehend all empirical knowledge and comprehend nothing else, since [given that there is only one world], there is nothing else to comprehend'. It would seem, then, that 'we . . . fall back into the simple anthropology' that we earlier rejected' (p. 193).

We can read this objection as challenging the temptation to 'naturalise' Hegel's idealism by reducing *Deus* to *Natura* in Spinoza's famous disjunction. We might, for example, try to tame Hegel by saying that he really asserts the existence of just the ordinary natural world (of subjects and objects) but sees that world as having an overall structure or significance due to the way that its temporal parts relate to one another. But such a move, Hyppolite points out, simply brings back all the contradictions of the subject–object distinction.

To avoid this regression, we must, Hyppolite says, realise that Hegel replaces the *external difference* between subject and object (found in empiricism, Kantianism and even idealisms of essence) with *internal difference*: 'in the empirical and in the absolute, it is the same being and the same thought; but the external, empirical difference of thought and being has given way to

the difference identical with Being, to the difference internal to the Being which thinks itself.' This response in effect insists on maintaining the priority of *Deus* over *Natura* by, as Deleuze puts it, asserting that 'Absolute knowledge is not a human reflection, but a reflection of the Absolute in man' (p. 194). The existence of the Absolute cannot be reduced to human existence, although it is always expressed through human existence. In the end, Hegel's Logic takes precedence over his Phenomenology.

But, Deleuze points out, giving priority to the Absolute over man raises the question of how the Absolute relates to history – to the time of the human struggle we are hoping for Hegelian philosophy to illuminate. The Absolute is a process of becoming (from one synthesis to another), but, precisely because the Absolute is not reducible to man, 'this becoming is not a historical becoming'. Indeed, we saw above that Hyppolite himself makes this very point: the passage [from human consciousness to absolute knowledge] is not itself a *historical fact*' (p. 189). From this there arises what for Deleuze is the fundamental question posed by Hegelianism: What is 'the relation between ontology and historical man'? (p. 194).

Deleuze reviews the terms in which Hegel has to answer this question. As we have seen, 'philosophy, if it is to have a meaning must be an ontology', giving priority to being rather than to man. Moreover, the ontology must be one of sense rather than essence; that is, being (absolute reality) must not be distinguished from appearance but must rather include everything, even the empirical realm of appearances: 'the same being and the same thought are in the empirical and in the absolute' (p. 194). As a result, the difference that empiricism and Kantianism view as an external relation between being (sensible things, the thing in itself) and thought becomes for Hegel an internal relation of absolute being to itself: 'The difference between thought and being is sublated in the absolute by the positing of Being identical to difference which, as such, thinks itself and reflects itself in man' (pp. 194–95).

At this point, the very end of his review, Deleuze briefly introduces his fundamental criticism of Hyppolite's Hegel – and, as it turns out, the key to his own anti-Hegelian ontology. Here, Deleuze says, 'Hyppolite shows himself to be altogether Hegelian, understanding the internal difference of Being as contradiction. Speculative difference [the internal difference of the Absolute] is the Being which contradicts itself.' Why, he asks, must we understand the difference that is identical with being in terms of contradiction? 'Can we not construct an ontology of difference which would not have to go up to

contradiction, because contradiction would be less than difference and not more?' (p. 195). Deleuze points out that, in insisting on understanding difference in terms of contradiction, Hegel must distinguish two quite different sorts of contradiction: on the level of Phenomenology, between a thing and other things that it is not; on the level of Logic, within the Being that is other than itself. But, Deleuze argues, this approach requires Hyppolite (and Hegel) to assume two sorts of self-contradiction. On the phenomenological level, 'the thing contradicts itself because, in being distinguished from *all* it is not, it finds its being in this difference itself; it reflects itself only by reflecting itself into the other, since the other is *its* other'. What the thing is, is entirely a matter of what it is not – its other. (This is what leads to a higher level of synthesis in which the thing is reconciled with its other and the contradiction is removed.) But this sort of contradiction cannot apply to the Absolute, which includes everything and has literally *nothing* that could be its other. Since Being has no other, we cannot understand its internal difference as a contradiction between it and its other. If we did, we would have to remove the contradiction by finding a higher synthesis in which Being and its other were reconciled. But there could be no such synthesis: since there is nothing besides Being, it has no other, and there is nothing else that could synthesise it.

Deleuze suggests that Hegel's mistake is to understand the internal difference of absolute being in terms of contradiction, which is in fact appropriate only for external differences between things: 'Is not contradiction itself only the phenomenal and anthropological aspect of difference?' (p. 195). The problem with contradiction, as Deleuze's later work makes clear, is that it brings into the heart of being the structures of conceptual rationality that make it impossible to supply a viable answer to the great Hyppolitean question about the relation between ontology and 'historical man'. Hegel's prioritisation of the conceptual forces him to exclude the radical historicity that is needed to make ontological room for the freedom and creativity that are the hallmarks of human history. Deleuze's counter-ontology, barely hinted at here, will fly the banner of a 'higher empiricism' based on contingent causal relations, not ideal rational connections. This will be an 'ontology of pure difference'; that is, of difference understood not in terms of contradiction and negation but in terms of a fundamental affirmation. This is the ontology that Deleuze will eventually develop much later in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*.

Deleuze notes that Hyppolite (like Hegel) would say that such an ontology of pure difference 'would prove in the final analysis to be an ontology

of essence' (that is, of a hidden ground) and so 'would return us to a purely external and formal reflection' (p. 195). Here the idea is presumably that pure difference, being free of contradiction, could not contain the contraries it is supposed to synthesise and so could only be a matter of thought taking the contraries as objects of its reflection from the standpoint of a higher level of reality. But this objection assumes precisely the view that Deleuze is challenging: that the ultimate structure of being must be understood in terms of the negations that distinguish the terms of a conceptual system. Deleuze does not deny the contention of Hyppolite's Hegel that the self-expression of being is linguistic. But he suggests that the language of being is an expression of pure affirmation. His final suggestion is that Hyppolite's discussion of language in Part 1 of *Logic and Existence* (particularly the chapter on 'Philosophical Dialectic, Poetry and Mathematics') could ground 'a theory of expression where difference is expression itself'; that is, where the internal difference of Being is understood as its purely affirmative self-expression.

This, of course, takes us to just the starting point of Deleuze's metaphysical challenge to the Hegelian system. The full journey – along an essentially Nietzschean path – will have to wait for another occasion.

Notes

1. Sartre reports hearing this story as part of the lore of the ENS. J.-P. Sartre, *Sartre by Himself*, trans. Richard Seaver (New York: Urizen Books, 1980), 25.
2. For a list of participants see the Appendix to Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History: appropriations of Hegel in twentieth-century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
3. For a partial English translation see Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
4. For a prominent example, see Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
5. Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History*, offers an excellent overview of Hyppolite's work and its influence. Earlier, Mark Poster had noted Hyppolite's importance in his *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 18–32. But Poster overemphasises the role of the unhappy consciousness in Hyppolite's interpretation of Hegel.
6. Jean Wahl, *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*, 2nd edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951) (first published 1929). For an excellent discussion of Wahl's role in the French reception of Hegel, see Bruce Baugh, *French Hegel* (London: Routledge, 2003).
7. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), sec. 206, 126.c.

8. Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit (1946), trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 184. Further references will be given in the text.
9. Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* (1953), trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997) [LE]. References will be given in the text.
10. 'Speculative' not in the sense of 'improbable' or 'unwarranted' but rather 'operating at a level of reason, above ordinary human consciousness'.
11. Jean Hyppolite, 'Humanisme et Hégélianisme', in *Figures de la Pensée Philosophique*, Vol. I (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), 147.
12. Leonard Lawler, *Thinking Through French Philosophy: the being of the question* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2003), 12.
13. See Alain Badiou, 'The adventure of French philosophy', *New Left Review* 35 (2005), 67–77. This recalls Foucault's similar distinction between the philosophy of experience and the philosophy of the concept, although, speaking of his student days, he presented this as a choice between existential phenomenology and philosophy of science (as developed by Bachelard and Canguilhem), not a project of reconciliation. From a broader perspective, however, the choice between, say, Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhem was between two ways of resolving Badiou's tension, the first giving priority to experience and the second to concepts. See Michel Foucault, 'Life: experience and science', in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, ed. James D. Faubion, vol. 2 (New York, NY: The New Press, 1998), 466.
14. Michel Foucault, 'Jean Hyppolite (1907–1968)', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1969, 134 [translation GG].
15. Michel Foucault, 'The discourse on language', in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1972). References will be given in the text.
16. 'Interview with Michel Foucault', in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, James D. Faubion (ed.), vol. 3 (New York: The New Press, 2000), 239–97. References will be given in the text.
17. See n. 11 above.
18. 'The Discourse on Language', 236.
19. We can even, without straining things too much, see Lévinas and Marion as particularly concerned with seeking a non-philosophical (ethical, religious) beginning for philosophy and Badiou as posing the 'Marxist' question of how the 'absolute discourse' of ontology relates to the historical reality of the event.
20. For the idealist–empiricist distinction and its application to Foucault's *History of Madness*, see my 'Foucault and the history of madness', in Gary Gutting (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 49–73.
21. For a good overview of these Hegelian elements in Foucault's account of madness, see Bruce Baugh, *French Hegel*, 162–64.
22. Derrida's critique of the *History of Madness* is a complex development of this sort of reading. See 'Cogito and the History of Madness', in *Writing and Difference* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 31–63.
23. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 16 (translation modified).

24. Michel Foucault, 'What is enlightenment?', in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1 (New York, NY: The New Press, 1997), 315. Further references will be given in the text.
25. 'Appendix. Review of Jean Hyppolite, *Logique et existence*, by Gilles Deleuze', in the English translation of *Logique et existence* (see n. 9 above), 191–95. References will be given in the text.

8

Scottish Idealism

David Fergusson

Although the English triumvirate of Green, Bosanquet and Bradley are often taken to be the leading exponents of British Idealism, a surprisingly long list of Scottish thinkers also made important contributions to the development and transmission of Idealist philosophy. In terms of their numbers, range of intellectual topics, influence throughout the wider English-speaking world, religious and political allegiances, and impact upon subsequent generations of philosophers, the Scottish Idealists deserve greater attention than is sometimes accorded in studies of the British movement.[1] As Tom Devine notes, this neglect has been compounded by excessive scholarly concentration upon the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment a century earlier.[2] Nevertheless, like their eighteenth-century predecessors, the Scottish Idealists also regarded themselves as part of a wider British and European culture. While their native provenance may have set them apart in important respects, they interacted with German and English scholars in multiple ways. There was, for example, already a long history of intellectual traffic between Glasgow and Oxford. Philosophers such as William Wallace (1843–1897) and Edward Caird (1835–1908) held prestigious positions at Merton and Balliol, and they would not have recognised their work as representing an exclusively Scottish school of thought. William Paton Kerr (1855–1923), a Glaswegian, held chairs in literature in South Wales, London and Oxford, where he was a fellow of All Souls for much of his life. W. R. Sorley (1855–1935), one of the few Idealist sympathisers in Cambridge, hailed from Selkirk in the Scottish borders. Since the Scots were so prominent within British Idealism, their distinctive contribution merits separate treatment.

The arrival of Hegel in Scotland

The extent to which British Idealism can be characterised as Hegelian is disputed. The arguments of Green and Bradley may have had affinities to German Idealism but these seemed to be advanced in relative independence from that tradition. In Scotland, however, the commitment to Hegel was generally stronger, especially in the writings of Edward Caird, John Caird and Henry Jones, all of whom taught in Glasgow. Most Scottish philosophers and theologians studied in Germany from about 1860. Their facility in the German language was confirmed by the production of some of the key translations of Hegel's works. Although Scottish writers were at pains to stress their avoidance of any slavish adherence to Hegel, this was asserted from within a context of developing and extending his project rather than departing from it.[3]

Yet Hegel's arrival was surprisingly late – the first book-length English study of his work did not appear until 1865. There are several reasons for this. The hold of the Scottish common sense philosophy in Edinburgh and elsewhere was largely unreceptive to the more speculative work of Kant and his successors. Dugald Stewart had been highly dismissive of Kant, while Hegel and other German Idealists were thought to have veered much too far towards pantheism, thus compromising theism with its clearer distinction between God and world. Moreover, although William Hamilton, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh from 1836 to 1856, had engaged thoroughly with Kant, his interpretation led him away from the views of Fichte and Hegel. The stress on the unknowability of noumena, things in themselves, was in sharp contrast to the Hegelian claim that the real must be known.[4]

The suspicion with which German philosophy, and Idealism in particular, were held is evident from the case of James Ferrier. Widely recognised as the most able Scottish philosopher of his day, Ferrier had applied to succeed Hamilton in Edinburgh in 1856. His application, however, was rejected by the Town Council on account of his philosophy appearing more characteristically German than Scottish. The Council evidently wished someone to maintain the native tradition of Reid, with the result that Ferrier was passed over in favour of Alexander Campbell Fraser, a candidate more acceptable to those who preferred the tradition of common sense realism to that of transcendental or absolute Idealism. Ferrier complained bitterly and wrote a pamphlet entitled *Scottish Philosophy: The Old and the New* (1856) in which he criticised the appointment process while arguing that 'my philosophy is

Scottish to the very core; it is national in every fibre and articulation of its frame. It is a natural growth of Scotland's soil and has drunk in no nourishment from any other land.'[5] What Ferrier intended by this remark was that his commitment to a form of Idealism had emerged through intensive dialogue with the epistemology of Hume and Reid, even though he was thoroughly dismissive of the latter and his followers. In making this connection, he sought to minimise his dependence upon Hegel, claiming that he had never been able to understand his writings.

For Ferrier, the experimental approach to the science of mind had generated some intractable questions concerning the existence of the intellectual subject. Neither Hume nor Reid had been able to resolve these. In its conscious acts, the self is also capable of a self-conscious transcendence in which it is not only subject to material causes: 'It is obvious that the point in man at which he becomes aware of his impressions must be free from these impressions, and must stand out of their sphere, otherwise it would be swallowed up by them, and nothing save the impressions would remain . . . The "I" is not engulfed and borne along in their vortices.'[6] In this act of transcendence, the self is able to distinguish itself from the outer world that impinges upon it. As such, it becomes free through this act of negation in which it differentiates itself from the not-self. Psychology or the philosophy of mind is thus a different kind of activity from that of the natural sciences, with its own distinctive method and subject matter. Ferrier holds that the self can only exist in and through the not-self, by an act in which it distinguishes itself from what it is not. This correlation of self and world leads to a commitment to a form of absolute Idealism – mind and world only exist together – the annihilation of one would entail the annihilation of the other. In his *Institutes of Metaphysic* (1854), he argues that every object is always the object plus the subject of its cognition – the one cannot be without the other. This leads to the conclusion that there is a correlation of mind and its objects in one single absolute: 'All absolute existences are contingent *except one*; in other words, there is One, but only one, Absolute Existence which is strictly *necessary*; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting Mind in synthesis with all things.'[7] What is clear from this, according to commentators like Broadie, is that Ferrier for all his protestations was a philosopher deeply immersed in the writings of the German Idealists.[8]

Two other points may be added. First, Scottish philosophers of all stripes, including Ferrier, continued to read Berkeley through the nineteenth century, so that consideration of Idealist claims was not startlingly novel.[9] (The successful candidate in Edinburgh, Campbell Fraser, made his reputation as

an editor and interpreter of Berkeley.) Second, Ferrier departed from the Scottish common sense tradition by virtue of attaching a corrective role to philosophy. Its function was not to underwrite the natural deliverances of common sense so much as to challenge, clarify and raise these to a new level of understanding. By providing an integrating vision, philosophy offered much more than a conceptual reiteration of popular intuitions.

It is for this reason that Idealist philosophy was viewed with some suspicion by Scottish theologians. It drew one into metaphysical territory that entailed broader commitments concerning the identity of God in relation to the world. These were regarded as threatening the standard Reformed theological account of the transcendence, sovereignty and otherness of God in relation to the created world. Thomas Chalmers – professor in St Andrews and Edinburgh and later leader of the Free Church after the Disruption of 1843 – preferred the older Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and duly advised his pupils not to read anything German: 'For those who are not inclined to study German philosophy, I do not recommend that they should suspend for it their ordinary readings. Their very ignorance of the German Idealism, the very confinement of their mental philosophy to the doctrines and metaphysics of the Scottish school, are guarantees in themselves against the deleterious influence of these outlandish speculations.'[10] Of course, this strategy was always likely to prove counter-productive by arousing the curiosity of his young audience.

Unlike many of the leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment who were theologically moderate and latitudinarian, Chalmers was an evangelical. Yet Chalmers preferred their philosophy as the most fitting handmaid to Christian doctrine. It gave him all the right apologetic arguments but without bringing any unwelcome metaphysical baggage. This reaction explains why, even as it was losing some ground at home, Scottish common sense realism was influential in North America throughout much of the nineteenth century, especially in Princeton, where James McCosh produced his famous history of Scottish philosophy, a text that displayed a strong preference for the approach of Reid and Stewart. Common sense philosophy had the merit of warding off scepticism and materialism but without producing a theological tendency that could compromise the tenets of Christian orthodoxy. Hence it was neither Kant nor Hegel but Reid who provided the most fitting response to Humean scepticism.[11]

Why then did Hegel start to exercise an influence after about 1860? One reason is the sustained study of Kant that was taking place around that time. The shortcomings of Kant's system led, at least on one reading,

to Idealism. In rejecting Kant's division between phenomena, which are partly constructed by the principles and categories of the mind, and the unknowable realm of things in themselves, Hegel argued that there was only Spirit (*Geist*) and its operations. The world was posited by Spirit which came to self-consciousness and self-realisation through the processes of nature and history. Spirit could here be understood as God becoming fully realised in and through the life of the world. Hence the intelligibility, unity and coherence of the world could be articulated in a manner that Kant had judged impossible. Idealism thus emerged from this close reading of Kant and was often described by friend and foe alike as 'neo-Kantianism'.

In the 1850s and 1860s, moreover, a group of thinkers came to prominence who were dissatisfied both with scientific materialism and also with theological orthodoxy. These included Carlyle, Emerson, Arnold, Tennyson and Browning. Muirhead writes that 'there was an increasing number of those who were prepared neither to sacrifice the reality of the experiences represented by morality, art, and religion to what appeared to be the demand of positive sciences for a rigidly naturalistic view of the world, nor to allow that the vindication of that reality depended on the maintenance of doctrines resting on other foundations than the witness of the spirit of man itself'.[12] In many ways, Scottish Idealism was as much literary as philosophical in its orientation. Philosophers came to their work furnished with insights and inclinations from the study of Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Carlyle. David Boucher has noted that the first publications of Edward Caird and Henry Jones were in the field of literature rather than philosophy.[13] Others such as W. P. Kerr and Mungo MacCallum in Sydney were literary critics who had been decisively influenced by Idealist philosophy while students of Caird in Glasgow.

Thomas Carlyle proved a seminal influence upon a younger generation of Scots, many of whom came to prominence in the Idealist movement. These included Caird, R. B. Haldane and A. S. Pringle-Pattison.[14] A spiritual interpretation of the world was sought but not one that owed allegiance to the particular claims of Scripture or church. For Carlyle, the Scottish philosophy taught in Edinburgh was merely a preparation for something else that must take us beyond the depressing *Zeitgeist* of the mechanical age. A new spiritual vision had to be found. Writing in the *Edinburgh Review* (1829) he asks: 'Are the solemn temples in which the Divinity was once visibly revealed among us, crumbling away? We can repair them, we can rebuild them. The wisdom, the heroic worth of our forefathers, which we

have lost, we can recover.'[15] Carlyle's opposition to scientific materialism was to prove inspirational for a younger generation of students.

In this intellectual climate, Hegel became a valuable resource. The first British study of his work was *The Secret of Hegel* (1865) by James Hutchison Stirling (1820–1909). Originally a medical practitioner from Glasgow, he had already registered his indebtedness to Carlyle while working in the Welsh valleys.[16] After his father's death in 1851, Hutchison Stirling was able to live from private means and so could devote himself to a life of scholarship. Although he was unable to secure a university appointment in Scotland, he was invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures in 1890. Hegel's work is expounded sympathetically by Hutchison Stirling, his philosophy being extolled as the moving force of modern Europe. The principles of the mind do not conceal the world of things in themselves but disclose the structure and content of that very world; it has no reality outside its being thought and known to mind. Unfortunately, Hutchison Stirling's exposition was less than lucid. In a famous quip, one reviewer remarked that if Hutchison Stirling knew the secret of Hegel, he had done a good job of keeping it to himself. It remained for later thinkers to expound Hegelian Idealism with greater clarity.

Aside from the influence of Carlyle, why was Idealism so heavily represented by Scottish thinkers, especially given the seeming hostility of the Presbyterian churches? First, it is clear that the winds of change were beginning to blow through the national church from the 1860s onwards, as it gradually recovered ground after the Disruption of 1843. Strict adherence to the Westminster Confession of Faith was found to be increasingly oppressive – its teaching on Scripture, total depravity, election, atonement, other faiths and the civil magistrate was judged wanting. Modern science, especially geology, required the questioning of a literal six days of creation, and not long after the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859 Scottish theologians were arguing for the accommodation of Darwinian evolution into a Christian worldview. Biblical criticism, another German import, gradually took hold amongst Hebrew and New Testament scholars from about this time. The Church of Scotland also began to change its patterns of worship and to alter the design of its buildings, partly in response to a renascent Episcopalianism. More aesthetically sensitive styles of worship were introduced with responsive prayers, hymns, pipe organs, church choirs and stained glass windows now decorating sanctuaries. Sermons started to become shorter, although you would find that hard to believe by reading some of them.

A more progressive politics begins to emerge in Scottish church life. The laissez-faire economics of Chalmers was increasingly questioned by thinkers like Robert Flint.[17] The capacity of the state to deliver social goods was stressed over against its role merely to impose public order and defend the realm, leaving the rest to voluntary organisations. Such shifts in doctrine and public theology were also apparent in the United Presbyterian Church and the late-Victorian Free Church.

More proximate reasons for the flourishing of Idealism in Scotland were the links between Balliol College and Glasgow through the Snell Exhibition, an annual scholarship that had enabled a Glasgow student to undertake postgraduate study in Oxford since the late seventeenth century. Adam Smith had been a Snell exhibitioner from 1740 and Edward Caird followed in this tradition in 1860. In Oxford, he became a lifelong friend of T. H. Green and from his later position in Glasgow ensured a regular exchange of ideas and scholars between the two institutions. John Nichol, W. P. Kerr, John Muirhead and David George Ritchie all took this same route, maintaining an important intellectual commerce between the two institutions.

Idealism also flourished in Scotland through the capacity of a steady stream of scholars to translate some difficult material into English. In addition to Hutchison Stirling, several Scottish translators of Hegel did much for the dissemination of his philosophy in the English-speaking world. This ensured its reception by a wider and younger audience. Translators included William Wallace, whose free renditions of Hegel's difficult prose provided some of the most accessible translational material for a century. Born and raised at Cupar in Fife, Wallace became tutor at Merton College and later Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy in Oxford. *The Logic of Hegel* (1873) was a translation of the first part of *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* and went through a second edition in 1892. His last translational work was *The Philosophy of Mind* (1894), representing Part 3 of *Enzyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* – it was revised by Michael Inwood and reissued in 2006 by Oxford University Press, New York. Another durable translation of Hegel was William H. Hastie's *Philosophy of Art* (1886). After a turbulent period in Calcutta that ended with his imprisonment, Hastie (1842–1903) eventually succeeded to the Chair of Divinity in Glasgow. This translation of the *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* continues to be widely used and cited. The younger sister of the Haldane brothers, Elizabeth S. Haldane (1862–1937), a social and political activist who also produced extensive philosophical and literary work of her own, added to the growing volume of English translational work. With Frances

Simson, she produced in three volumes *The Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1892–1896), the translation of *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, to which she added her own study of Hegel, *The Wisdom and Religion of a German Philosopher* (1897). J. B. Baillie (1872–1940), raised in Forfarshire, became Professor of Moral Philosophy in Aberdeen and later Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University. Publishing extensively on Hegel at a time when Idealism was becoming unfashionable, he produced in 1910 the standard English translation of *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Mind*). Much of the dissemination of Hegel's thought was thus the result of these intensive translational efforts on the part of Scottish scholars throughout this period.[18]

The shape of Scottish Idealism

The most significant Scottish Idealist was Edward Caird. In his work, a strong interest in literature, religion and science is apparent. The goal of Idealist philosophy is to achieve an understanding of their unity, thus overcoming false dichotomies between subject and object, mind and matter, the individual and the community, and the self and God. Here again the influence of Thomas Carlyle is apparent. For Caird, Idealism is a broad school, representing a tradition running from Plato through Kant and Hegel. His articulation of Idealist philosophy stresses the knowability of the world, the unity in differentiation of all things, and the identity in difference of finite and infinite. It is a position that emerges in dialogue with Kant and is an outcome of problems and developments discerned in his philosophy. This work on Kant was carried out during the 1870s and it led to the establishment of Idealism in much of Scotland until well into the twentieth century. According to this school of interpretation, the tensions in Kant's philosophy were best resolved by moving in a Hegelian direction. Kant's difficulty in integrating the world of things in themselves (noumena) with the world of appearances (phenomena) required a further adjustment in favour of a greater unity. Phenomena were known and understood according to the principles and categories imposed by the mind upon the manifold of sense experience. Knowledge of a world ordered in space and time according to causal laws provided a response to Humean scepticism, but it generated an unresolved problem in relation to things in themselves which remained largely unknowable, even if these had to be postulated as the cause of sense experience. There is a determinate world, not of our own making, but it is known and organised according to principles created by the mind itself.

This disunity was a source of dissatisfaction to Kantian sympathisers and it was compounded by two further issues. First, the mind was cast in an ambiguous role. As the organising subject of the phenomenal world, it was not itself a part of that world or confined to it. So it had to be considered as a thing in itself, this also generating the issue of the relation to other minds. Second, a different strategy was adopted by Kant with reference to the categorical imperative of morality and the postulates of practical reason – God, freedom and immortality. The law of morality was the result of the will legislating in accordance with its own rational nature. It is not bound by any external phenomenal consideration (hypothetical imperatives), so that in moral action the self becomes entirely free of external constraint. The unconditional binding force of the moral law derives from its being in accordance with the nature of the rational will. In postulating freedom, God and immortality, the will commits itself in practice to an integration of the sensible world with the rational ideals of morality and the spiritual ideals of art and religion. For Caird, therefore, the germs of Idealism are already present in Kant's critical philosophy. Both the direction and breakdown of his philosophy point towards a later resolution in the work of the German Idealists, especially Hegel.[19]

So, for the Scottish Idealists, the resolution of these problems lay in Hegel's philosophy. The intellectual and practical strivings of the human mind or spirit are set within a wider framework, whereby Absolute Spirit comes to realise itself in the life of the finite world. The world itself (not merely the forms and categories) is the product of Spirit and the partial resolutions achieved by our human science, morality and religion are set within a wider process of natural and historical integration in which each thing becomes itself in a differentiated unity with that which is not itself. Caird never tires of stressing that only such a view can satisfy the spiritual strivings of human beings. Poetry and mysticism may point to this higher unity of all things and its permeation by spirit, but it requires the greater clarity of Hegelian philosophy and logic to bring about its conceptual realisation. This is argued largely through discarding alternative possibilities as inconsistent or inadequate.

> 'The intelligible world is relative to the intelligence.' This principle, which was expressed by Kant, but of which Kant, by his distinctions of phenomenon and noumenon, reason and faith, evaded the full meaning, is taken in earnest by Hegel. He is therefore forced to deny the absoluteness even of those antagonisms which have been conceived

> to be altogether insoluble: for any absolute antagonism would ultimately imply an irreconcilable opposition between the intelligence and its object . . . The essential unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them, is the adamantine circle within which the strife of opposites is waged, which their utmost violence of conflict cannot break.[20]

This post-Kantian trajectory is also apparent in the collection of essays edited by Seth and Haldane in 1883, which became a kind of party manifesto for the Idealists and signalled their prominence in British philosophy. Dedicated to T. H. Green who had died suddenly during the previous year, *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* had originally been intended to launch a new journal in metaphysics.[21] Ranging over epistemology, the philosophy of science, history, art, ethics, politics and religion, the eleven essays and preface, mostly written by Scots, reveal the broad commitments of the Idealist school. The opening essay by Andrew Seth (later known as A. S. Pringle-Pattison) again illustrates the shift from Kant towards something closer to Hegel. The tensions and problems identified in Kant point towards a more unified metaphysics in which self and world are joined as subject and predicate. The self comes to an awareness of itself in the activity of thinking the world. So self and world are neither opposed to each other (as in a dualism of mind and matter) nor one reduced to the other (as in materialism or subjective Idealism); instead, only together as differentiated yet united can we understand the universe in its wholeness: 'The subject is identical with its completed predicate without remainder. So the self and the world are only two sides of the same reality; they are the same intelligible world looked at from two opposite points of view.'[22]

In many ways, Scottish Idealism was governed by a strong religious impulse. This is one of its distinguishing features. A response to the Victorian crisis of faith, Idealist philosophy provided an alternative to materialism and scepticism in which higher spiritual ideals could be expressed. Many of the leading figures in the movement would eventually deliver Gifford Lectures in the Scottish universities (Bosanquet, the Cairds, Henry Jones, R. B. Haldane, Pringle-Pattison and Sorley), each outlining a perspective on some aspect of natural theology or religion. Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion*, apparently the work which meant most to him, was a robust defence of the spiritual principle at the heart of the cosmos and of the Christian religion as the highest phase in an evolving process. Caird's biographers describe him as being a disciple of 'Jesus of Nazareth above all others'.[23] In this respect, Caird must

be placed in a long tradition of theistic philosophy in Scotland that remained loyal to the national Kirk. As Cairns Craig has argued, this largely disconfirms George Davie's longstanding thesis in *The Democratic Intellect* that Caird's philosophy represents a betrayal of the Scottish philosophical tradition. His Idealism is not 'the displacement of Scottish thought by the Germanism deplored by Davie . . . but a higher synthesis which reasserts fundamental Scottish values – particularly the traditions of Scottish religion – in a new philosophical form'.[24] In this respect at least, Caird might be cast as a Reidian of a higher order.

Raised in Wales, Henry Jones (1852–1922) spent much of his life in the west of Scotland. He held the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow from 1891, his earlier religious fervour having been transposed into a commitment to Edward Caird's Idealism during his undergraduate days. Jones was one of the few Idealist philosophers who dealt extensively with the person of Jesus. Claiming that the divine was revealed in Christ, Jones appeared to co-opt Jesus as a moral teacher and exemplar of an Idealist creed. This christological Idealism is famously illustrated by the story of the rescinding of an invitation to preach to a Welsh congregation on account of Jones's heterodoxy. On being informed of reports that he denied the divinity of Christ, Jones retorted: 'I deny the divinity of Christ! I do not deny the divinity of any man!'[25] While this tendency to reduce the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ limited the appropriation of Idealist philosophy in Scottish theology, it nevertheless underscores the extent to which Idealism north of the border was rooted in the religious life of Scotland.[26] The work of Scottish Idealist philosophers assumed the character of a vocation, not unlike that articulated by many churchmen and theologians.

In the writings of John Caird (1820–1898), Professor of Divinity and Principal of the University of Glasgow, we encounter the most significant theological reception of Idealist philosophy.[27] The elder brother of Edward, he played an important role in the transformation of Scottish theology and church life in the late Victorian period. His sympathies were catholic, tolerant, open, philosophical, historical, cultured and socially progressive. Many regarded him as the doyen of Victorian preachers. His sermon on *Religion and Common Life* made such an impression on the Queen at Crathie Kirk near Balmoral, that it was duly published, becoming a bestseller in Victorian Britain, and being subsequently described by A. P. Stanley, dean of Westminster Abbey, as 'the best single sermon in the language'.[28] Like other Idealist thinkers, he supported a stronger role for the state in the provision of social welfare and the regulation of the economy to serve human needs.

At times, his commitment to Hegelian Idealism is more implicit than explicit, perhaps arising from an ecclesiastical caution. In his commentary on Spinoza (in the same Blackwood series to which his brother contributed the volume on Hegel), John Caird offers a reading of Spinoza which reveals his own Hegelian leanings.[29] In the concluding section, he argues that the solution to the problems generated by Spinoza's philosophy – in particular, the tensions between monism and pluralism, and finite and infinite – can be resolved by a newer logic in which unity is achieved by the reconciliation of difference. Here Caird's language becomes thoroughly Hegelian. He views Spinoza as at best foreshadowing a later view of God as infinite, self-conscious Spirit which finds itself in maintaining but overcoming the difference of opposing objects.

> Without a world of objects in time and space, without other kindred intelligences, without society and history, without the ever-moving mirror of the external world, consciousness could never exist, mind could never awaken from the slumber of unconsciousness and become aware of itself. But it is also of the very nature of mind in all this endless objectivity to maintain itself . . . Consciousness, in other words, through the mediation of externality realises itself or becomes self-consciousness.[30]

Caird's allegiance to Hegel is similarly apparent in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (1889), Croall Lectures delivered in Edinburgh. Here he adopts a rational approach to religion which avoids a disjunction of science and religion on the one side and an overreliance on either intuition or religious authority on the other. There is an essential affinity between finite mind and the infinite. This is not the monistic unity found in pantheism, nor the dualism of finite and infinite that we find in traditional monotheism. Instead, it is a differentiated unity in which both finite and infinite are realised in an emerging, organic whole. This striving towards a higher unity is implicit in all the activities of our finite minds. Thought 'is forced onwards, from step to step, by an irresistible inward necessity, and cannot stop short till it has found its goal in the sphere of universal and absolute truth, or in that Infinite Mind which is at once the beginning and the end, the source and the final explanation of all thought and being'.[31]

Caird's demonstration of the necessity of religion, described in those terms, proceeds from a phenomenology of spirit. Each rational, spiritual being is driven by its activity to realise itself in that which lies beyond it. This striving is apparent in the world of nature and society. Within the mirror of matter and in union with other spiritual beings, we seek ourselves and

there we find the value of our own lives.[32] This higher organic unity is one that comprehends nature (in its rational order), ourselves (as finite minds) and God (as the infinite). Just as the finite contains within its own essential strivings an anticipation of the infinite, so the infinite by its very nature contains a reference to the finite. The union of God and the world cannot be ascribed to an arbitrary creative will but must instead belong to the essence of God as love. It is of the nature of God to go forth into that which is not God, and in this union the Infinite realises its own identity. Here God is not to be conceived as an infinite substance undergirding all other realities (as in pantheism) or as a self-sufficient Being who is the cause of everything else (as in deism): 'It is only when we think of God as Absolute Spirit of Self-consciousness that we attain to an idea of His nature which, while it gives to the finite the reality of an object ever distinguishable from, never lost in the subject, yet refuses to it any independence or individuality which cannot be brought back to a higher unity.'[33]

Although Caird's exposition is reassuringly laced with Scriptural allusion and claims for the distinctiveness of Christianity as surpassing other forms of religion, the radical break with earlier Scottish theological traditions is not hard to discern. Despite his eminence as a preacher and his prestigious role as Principal of the University of Glasgow, John Caird was viewed by many in the Kirk as worryingly heterodox. This scepticism extended to his students: 'They said he was all right in his prayers, but an awful heretic in his theology.'[34] The typical Reformed stress on divine transcendence, aseity and freedom is heavily qualified by the dialectical relationship of the Infinite to those finite objects by which it comes to consciousness of itself. The doctrines of sin and redemption seem to be muted or at least seen as now requiring significant restatement in favour of an upwards evolutionary rise towards the Absolute. And, even more strikingly, the eighteenth-century moderate stress on the limited reach of our theological knowledge has almost vanished. We can think God's thoughts and live God's life, or, to put the same thing in another way, God can think in and through us. We are drawn upwards and absorbed by the light of truth rather than left to live 'wisely in the darkness'.[35]

Caird's Idealism is impressively outlined, although one is left with the overall impression that it is a vision presented rather than argued. To claim that our conscious life must be based on an absolute spiritual life, since it can be explained in no other way, seems to overstate the case. Most of the time we are not conscious of thinking in and through the Absolute in our quotidian deliberations. These are conducted, often quite successfully,

without much reference to the divine. Even a sympathetic critic such as T. H. Green claimed that, while we may be Hegelians on 'the Sundays of speculation', we cannot function this way in the 'weekdays of ordinary thought'.[36] Green detected some 'intellectual jugglery' in Caird's dismissal of alternative positions. But his most serious criticism of the Hegelian position as expounded here is that it overstates our human capacity to know God and even to be God. Our discursive understanding both reveals and hides God, whereas the Hegelian position, admirably stated by John Caird, tends to inflate our intellectual possibilities. Other critics were even prone to castigate the Idealists for aspiring to a 'gnostic omniscience' which ignores the limitations of the human condition.[37] The clarity of Caird's Idealism tends to expose its weakness. It is achieved on a transcendental basis by arguing for the impossibility of all the available alternatives, so that the only theory left standing is the Idealist one. Whether transcendental arguments can achieve as much as this is doubted by critics. Even if it can be claimed that we must think of the world in this way, the sceptic can still ask whether it is so constituted.[38] To this extent, Caird's conclusions appear underdetermined by his reasoning.

Much of this bold theological revisionism can be detected in John Caird's Gifford lectures, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* (1899). In this posthumously published work, he attempts to synthesise the claims of Idealist philosophy with standard Christian tenets. Infinite Spirit or Mind constitutes the reality of the external world. We bring to sensation various organising power and principles. Nature must be suffused with the element of thought; its constancy is secured by virtue of an intelligence neither imperfect nor transient in which everything has its being (the standard Berkeleian solution). This same principle is also applied to finite minds. For Caird, all intellectual and spiritual progress is measured by the extent to which we cease to think our own thoughts and become instead the media for a universal and absolute intelligence (i.e., God).[39] The concept of God requires the existence of a finite world in which the divine fulfils itself. There is both a divine element in us and a human in God. All art, science, morality and religion rest upon a divine ideal which provides the standard of truth and judgement. By nature, God is self-communicative, an idea that Caird locates in the traditional doctrine of the Logos as the one in whom and by whom all things are made. God as subject requires a world as object. Indeed, it is of the essence of God to become incarnate in the world and to draw spiritual beings into the divine life. For Caird, Idealism can be integrated with orthodox Christian dogmas upon suitable restatement.

> In the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, whatever else they mean, we find a sanction for the thought that in the nature of God there is a capacity of condescending love, of boundless pity and forgiveness, yes, with reverence be it said, of pain and sorrow and sacrifice of finite souls, a capacity which has been, and could only be, revealed and realised through the sorrow and sin of the world.[40]

Some critics discerned a more conservative turn in his Gifford lectures, while others could assert that his early radicalism was only relative to the prevailing climate of Westminster confessional orthodoxy. At any rate, it is clear from his Giffords that John Caird is determined to show the consistency of Christian theology with the best insights of history and natural science. The Genesis story is not to be understood as a historical account of some original human perfection from which our ancestors declined. We must read the story as an imaginary account of the human travails of the journey from innocence through corruption to redemption. Beauty, goodness and truth only emerge through struggle and action. These cannot be delivered immediately and wholesale. Nevertheless, the ideal is present in germinal form, and this enables a subsequent wisdom and achievement. Moreover, this ideal limits our individuality by directing us towards a greater whole. We seek that which defines all spiritual life, not merely our own. Such knowledge both takes us beyond ourselves but also deeper into our selves: 'As part of an intelligible world, every object which intelligence contemplates is its own object; and as it enters into knowledge and yields up its essence to the mind that lays hold of it, it becomes for that mind a revelation of its own latent wealth, or rather of its capacity for participating in the wealth of the Mind for and in which all things have their being.'[41] For Caird, immortality appears to be conceived in terms of entering into union with the divine life. As the absolute surrender of the self to God, religion involves the renunciation of the individual and the particular for the sake of blending one's life and will with that of the Infinite.[42]

Although John Caird may have been more distinguished as a preacher than as a theologian of originality and force, he is undoubtedly the most significant figure in the established Kirk to identify with Idealist philosophy. His preaching and leadership at Glasgow University contributed to a more liberal, tolerant and progressive culture within Scottish church and society in the late nineteenth century. To that extent, he might be regarded as representative of newer trends in preaching, liturgy, politics and culture. In other respects, however, his work is a continuation of the synthesis of

Christianity with Enlightenment culture that is already underway in the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, albeit with an Idealist inflection. His sermons stand comparison with those of Hugh Blair, stressing a practical, calm and moderate Christianity yet with pious leanings and a reassuring appeal to Scripture and tradition.

Nevertheless, few younger theologians appeared to develop Caird's synthesis of orthodox Christianity with Idealist thought. The reasons for this are multiple. In part, the changing philosophical climate ensured that a younger generation schooled in the early years of the twentieth century was no longer imbibing Idealist philosophy, at least not in its pure form. Even those who reflected its influence indirectly tended to move in the direction of a more personalist philosophy with realist overtones. Examples of this include John Oman, John Macmurray and John Baillie. In any case, Scottish philosophy and biblical scholarship were turning towards other developments on the European continent – kenotic Christology, higher criticism, the liberal school of Ritschl and Herrmann, the *Glaubenslehre* of Schleiermacher, and soon the dialectical theology of the 1920s. Here again, many Scots were involved in important translational work.

The criticism of Idealism in H. R. Mackintosh's posthumously published *Types of Modern Theology* (1935) is representative of the lack of sympathy in the Scottish theological mainstream. Although a keen scholar of German thought, Mackintosh is impatient with much of what he finds in the heritage of Idealist philosophy. He denounces it as gnostic and tending towards a 'pantheistic monism'. Its failure to distinguish God and world, infinite and the finite persons, and the realities of sin and redemption all lead to a negative verdict. This results in a loss of a proper sense of divine mystery. Perhaps most curiously, he charges Idealist thought with its inattention to the details of history. With a tendency to idealise Christology, Hegel and his followers had viewed Jesus as a human archetype, thus avoiding the 'scandal of particularity'.[43] His reaction was shared by other Scottish theologians of the period – including James Orr and James Denney in Glasgow – who find in Idealism something like a hollowing out from the inside of distinctive claims for the person and work of Christ. This might be summarised by stating that, for more orthodox Scottish theologians, Jesus is not so much the representation of human nature everywhere, as the condition of the possibility of a different relationship of the human to the divine. There appeared to be little scope for such a notion in the philosophy of the Idealists. Meanwhile, other philosophers of the period – for example, Henry Calderwood in Edinburgh and William Davidson in Aberdeen – sat closer to their

Presbyterian heritage, preferring the older Scottish realist tradition of Reid and Stewart.

Two other important aspects of Scottish Idealism merit comment. First, it was a political philosophy that tended to position many of its exponents within the Liberal party, particularly as a consequence of their interest in educational and social reforms. As such, they influenced the new liberalism that was committed to state intervention for welfare provision and the regulation of the economy, especially in the period 1906–1914. In this regard, Scottish Idealists appeared to favour a greater measure of intervention than some of their English counterparts.[44] The state was to be understood in spiritual and moral terms as having a role to exercise in promoting the self-realisation of individuals in community. David George Ritchie offered the best-known response to Herbert Spencer in his *Principles of State Interference* (1891), which charts a route between laissez-faire individualism and state collectivism. Through selective government action, the life of the individual in society can be realised. The role of the state is not to be confined to maintaining order and enforcing contracts. Political government has an enabling function for personal life by virtue of creating the conditions that maximise human potential: 'The state's job is . . . the duty of providing such an environment for men and women as to give all, as far as possible, an equal chance of realising what is best in their intellectual and moral natures.'[45] Hence for the Idealists, the state has a moral role in promoting the commonweal yet without encroaching upon the sphere of individual action. So in providing the enabling conditions for such action, the state does not supplant the responsibility of each citizen for self-improvement. This interplay of forces provided the ideological framework for the politics of Asquith, who had been a pupil of Green and friend of Haldane, and it led to measures such as the introduction of old-age pensions, unemployment insurance and labour exchanges. Much of this political philosophy would later inform the Beveridge report.[46] Henry Jones himself campaigned actively for the Liberal Party, criticising the emerging Labour Party as founded on partisan class interest. (This attack perhaps concealed the strong affinities between Jones and the socialist movement.) Undaunted by such criticism, Ramsay MacDonald, who would become the first Labour Prime Minister, argued that, while they shared similar ideals, the Labour Party should not be intimidated by 'dainty professors'.[47]

Similar political perspectives were espoused by R. B. Haldane, who served as a cabinet minister from 1902 to 1915, until his sympathies for German culture and philosophy led to his enforced resignation. Born and educated

in Edinburgh, Haldane was an apostle of internationalism, citing Canada, the UK and the US as examples of societies which had embraced different nationalities and sub-cultures into a single political system. This pointed towards a new international order in which a neighbourly *Sittlichkeit* would be developed amongst the nations, especially those that had developed common bonds: 'If there be such a society, it may develop within itself a foundation for international faith of a kind that is new in the history of the world. Without interfering with the freedom of action of these great countries or the independence of their constitutions, it may be possible to establish a true unison between Sovereign States . . . Its substance, if it is to be realised, must be sought for deeper down in an intimate social life.'[48]

Educational reform was also a recurrent theme in the work of the Cairds and Jones, all of whom were successful advocates of the admission of women to degree courses in the University of Glasgow. Several Idealist philosophers found their way into leadership positions in British and Australian universities, although this may have simultaneously contributed to their loss of influence within the professional guild of philosophy. John Caird and Hetherington served as Principals of Glasgow University, J. B. Baillie became Vice-Chancellor in Leeds, while William Mitchell had a long and distinguished career in Adelaide.

A further aspect of Scottish Idealism that is worthy of note is its contribution to philosophy in other parts of the English-speaking world. Idealism was transplanted in Australia largely through the appointment to key posts in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide of Scottish graduates who had been decisively influenced by Edward Caird, Pringle-Pattison and others. Francis Anderson, Henry Laurie and William Mitchell were all raised in Scotland but migrated to Australia. Until the arrival of John Anderson in Sydney, they ensured that Australian philosophy was strongly marked by Idealist concerns. The lecture tour of Henry Jones in 1908 was to prove a significant event in Australian public life, Jones urging his Australian audience, which included the prime minister, to commit to state legislation that would create the environment for the realisation of Idealist values. He envisaged Australia as a kind of Idealist laboratory: 'I can form no higher wish for you than that it may be your destiny to try by actual experiment how far this faith of the Idealists will stand the strain of a nation's practice.'[49]

The Australian Idealists were characterised by a broad range of interests and a capacity to bring a multiplicity of perspectives to a single subject. The most distinguished of the Australian Scots was William Mitchell, whose work on psychology appeared to move in a materialist direction. The eschewal of a

more technical and narrowly professional pursuit of philosophy in Australia in favour of a commitment to the broader social contribution again reflected something of the Scottish ideal of the democratic intellect. Mitchell once remarked that his chair more closely resembled a sofa, so many were the subjects that he was required to address.[50]

Ironically, the demise of Idealism in Australia was largely brought about by the reaction of John Anderson, another pupil of Henry Jones from Glasgow. Raised in the west of Scotland, Anderson argued for a realism of multiple facts and types of explanation which could not be reduced to a single perspective. His influence extended to a later generation of distinguished Australian philosophers. The Idealists had imposed a totalising perspective unwarranted by experience, according to Anderson, particularly in their union of mind and object. His scornful comments at the time of the Hegel centenary must have been directed at the Glasgow Idealist professors who had been his teachers. Hegel's philosophy, he claimed, had provided a sounding and worthless terminology for 'the theologically-minded and the literary moralisers'.[51]

Reception, criticism and legacy

In Edinburgh and elsewhere, there was always some resistance to the incursion of Idealism and a continuing preference for the traditions of Scottish realism. Alexander Campbell Fraser, successor in 1856 to Hamilton in the chair of Logic and Metaphysics, was indebted to Reid and Kant. Although our knowledge of the natural world, ethics and God was reliable, its limitations were stressed. The unconditioned is not fully knowable by finite minds. A leading interpreter of Berkeley, Fraser attempted to develop a mediating philosophy that avoided both the reductive implications of a sceptical empiricism but also the inflated claims of the absolute Idealists. Looking back across his career, he would later write: 'In this way I found myself on a *Via Media*, repelled alike from an agnostic science wholly ignorant of God, and from a gnostic science which implied Omniscience.'[52] The more practical and theistic implications of this outlook were developed in the Gifford Lectures (1894–1896), *The Philosophy of Theism*.

In his Blackwood series study of Berkeley, Fraser signals his opposition to the emergence of Idealism in Oxford and Glasgow. Its extravagant claim to explain via Kant by a single principle 'all existence in the perfect unity of the Divine Thought' is too far-fetched.[53] It ignores the fragmentary, mysterious and limited nature of human comprehension. For much of the time, we walk

by faith not by sight. Immoral agents and the presence of evil in the cosmos are surd elements that cannot be readily resolved in the ways that the Gnostic tendencies of Idealist philosophers would have us believe.

Around the same time, Andrew Seth (A. S. Pringle-Pattison) was developing similar lines of criticism but from within the Idealist movement. Although he was one of the co-editors of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883), Pringle-Pattison's Balfour lectures reveal the simultaneous development of a rather different type of post-Kantian trajectory. In responding to Hume's scepticism, Reid and Kant did not extend their enquiries sufficiently far, according to Pringle-Pattison. Their failure to explore the nature of the self in relation to the principles of understanding was rectified by Hegel and in particular his sense of the co-inherence of the objects of knowledge.[54] The understanding of the ways in which reality forms a continuum, each object emerging in a set of relations to every other, is the central advance of Hegel's philosophy. Yet although this coherence of God, self and world was largely neglected by the Scottish philosophy of Reid and his successors, Pringle-Pattison goes on to claim that it is not incompatible with it. A dualism of subject and object is in itself quite admissible; it is a failing of some forms of Hegelianism (and Hegel himself to a lesser extent) to suggest that knowledge of the world is somehow identical with the world, as if that is all there is. When pressed, the Scottish philosophers would themselves have had recourse to the traditional terms of religion to explain the coherence and unity of God, self and the natural world. As much as Hegel, they too would have affirmed that only God can hold all things together, though not along the lines proposed by absolute Idealism. In this way, Pringle-Pattison seeks to mediate between Idealist philosophy and his native Scottish tradition, arguing that the disjunction between knowledge and faith in Fraser's aforementioned study is relative only.[55]

His sequel to this study of Scottish philosophy offers even more stringent criticism of Hegelianism. Here Pringle-Pattison registers his objection to absolute Idealism for the manner in which it is finally destructive of human personality, our ethical striving and hope of immortality, all of which are treated in more distinctively Kantian ways in his work. The tendency of the Absolute Spirit to sublate and absorb all finite manifestations undermines the infinite value of the person as described by Kant. This criticism of absolute Idealism moves Pringle-Pattison in the direction of a personal Idealism – perhaps under the influence of Lotze – in which there is an irreducible multiplicity of persons and objects of knowledge, each related to all others by their dependency upon an infinite source. Pringle-Pattison's work thus tugs

Idealist philosophy back towards something that appears more traditionally theistic.

In 1891, Pringle-Pattison succeeded Campbell Fraser as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh. Often described as an exponent of personal Idealism, his philosophy even from the time of the Balfour Lectures displays the same tendency to mediate between Scottish realism and German Idealism. This sets him apart from Bradley, Bosanquet, Caird and Jones as a distinctive voice within the British Idealist movement. In his later work, Pringle-Pattison increasingly annexed elements of a Reidian realism to his philosophy, arguing for a mind-independent world that could be apprehended by self-conscious subjects through ideas, a position that recalled Locke's representative realism. Yet, as we have seen, this is already being worked out in his Balfour lectures in the early 1880s. Pringle-Pattison's stress on personhood together with the distinctions between God, world and self rendered his philosophy more amenable to Scottish theologians. Whether this blend of Idealist and realist claims was wholly consistent is doubted by some commentators,[56] yet it ensured that his work was regarded as essentially compatible with some form of traditional theism. Several theologians began their studies as his philosophy pupils in Edinburgh, including the brothers John and Donald Baillie, the leading theologians in mid twentieth-century Scotland. In much of their published work, the Baillies reflect their philosophical antecedents, yet this tends to follow a Kantian (as opposed to Hegelian) trajectory in which attention is given to individual persons and their sense of duty. Increasingly, it was developed in a realist direction with a strong stress on the determination of persons by the social and physical world.[57]

Elsewhere in Scotland, there was less sympathetic reception of Idealism, particularly in the work of John Veitch who occupied the Chair of Logic and Rhetoric in Glasgow from 1864 until his death thirty years later. Veitch's work is closely aligned with the Scottish tradition of Reid and Stewart, and he offers a riposte to his Idealist colleagues in *Knowing and Being* (1889), the published version of lectures delivered to his advanced class in logic and metaphysics. According to Veitch, the 'neo-Kantianism' (i.e. Idealism) of his day has difficulties in dealing with our knowledge of the external world, other selves and God.[58] Building upon Hume's phenomenalism, it collapses the distinction between our knowing of the world and the world that is known. This leads to a dissolution of some of the fundamental tenets of science, morality and religion. Veitch's trenchant criticism is hardly offered *in optimam partem*, representing largely a return to an older native tradition that

had not thoroughly engaged with Kant. Despite its having the merit of clarity, critics have generally been dismissive of his philosophical work, preferring instead his output on the literature of the Scottish borders. Veitch merely reasserts the convictions of an older tradition with little engagement of later work and contemporary trends. On the other hand, much of his impatience with 'neo-Kantianism' might be seen as foreshadowing the early twentieth-century realist reaction against Idealism in writers such as Bertrand Russell, albeit with a rather different take on religion.

By about 1930, the pure Idealism of Caird and Jones had largely disappeared. The reasons for this demise of Idealism are inevitably complex.[59] These include the deaths of several leading figures together with the emergence of a new set of philosophical interests for the next generation. Geoffrey Warnock has described the ways in which Idealism was not so much defeated but abandoned in favour of different questions and concerns.[60] Idealism had run its course; philosophers now turned their attention to other problems and approaches. The resurgence of the British empiricist tradition in the work of Russell, Moore and Ayer had an impact on Scotland, especially with the recruitment of many younger philosophers from Oxbridge. Logical positivism, philosophy of language and the impact of the later Wittgenstein all shaped the interests and teaching of philosophers in the Scottish universities. The political progressivism and general optimism of Idealist thought appeared to suffer an irretrievable setback in the traumas of the Great War. Jones and Pringle-Pattison had each suffered the loss of a son. The religious ethos of Idealist thought also seemed to diminish into the twentieth century. John Anderson once complained of the 'kirky' atmosphere in the Edinburgh philosophy department. But in Sydney he provided a contrasting outlook that was more vigorously secular and humanist.

The stock narrative of Idealism is that it was decisively defeated and supplanted by types of empirical realism and linguistic philosophy in the UK from about the 1920s onwards. Although Bradley continued to be studied, the dominant philosophical ethos in Oxbridge and elsewhere was set by thinkers such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle and Austin, none of whom could be viewed as sympathetic to Idealism. Scholars such as G. R. G. Mure at Merton became isolated figures, working outside the mainstream.[61] In 'metaphysical Scotland', however, a quite different story now requires to be told of what took place in philosophy until around the 1960s.

If, following the lead of Pringle-Pattison, Idealism is understood as a much broader movement concerned with several dominant themes and pursuits, then it should be viewed as a tradition that continued and

developed under different intellectual and social conditions. Instead of making a decisive break by turning to a new set of philosophical interests, Scottish philosophers sought to maintain many of the convictions of the Idealists in a different milieu. Idealist themes such as the unity of knowledge, the connectedness of mind and object, and the capacity of moral and religious values to disclose the spiritual nature of the universe are still apparent in the work of Norman Kemp Smith, John Macmurray, C. A. Campbell, A. A. Bowman and several others. These wider spiritual, ethical and political concerns ensured that philosophy remained central to the curriculum in the Scottish universities, its organising power being seen as relevant to other disciplines and to professional formation in general.[62] In a recent essay, Cairns Craig has pointed to the ways in which Kemp Smith and Bowman returned from Princeton, each discerning a strong quasi-religious sense of vocation to serve in their native land. This approach to their subject and their personal role in expounding it further reflect the spiritual influence of the Kirk upon a wider Scottish culture.[63]

A clear example of the continuing influence of Idealism in Scotland is Norman Kemp Smith's *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* (1924), in which a blend of realist and Idealist themes can be detected. Nature imposes upon the mind its distinctive shape and content in our awareness of space, colour and other features of the sensible world. But the natural world also enables other forms of apprehension that similarly disclose something of the way the world is constituted. Idealism is to be identified not by the more extravagant claims of its leading exponents about the mind-dependence of the natural world but by the guiding conviction that spiritual values 'operate on a cosmic scale'.[64]

Similar philosophical work in Scotland after the 1920s has been discussed by Alexander Broadie.[65] The continuity of a tradition is evident from a surprisingly long list of philosophers (Laird, Bowman, Campbell, Macmurray, Maclagan, MacKinnon) who developed rather than eschewed the broad metaphysical agenda of their Idealist predecessors. This is reflected both by the extent to which the study of Kant remained central to the philosophical syllabus throughout that period and also by the ways in which many of the leading Scottish thinkers contributed some of their most important work to the Gifford Lectures.[66]

By the 1970s, much of the momentum had been lost with a decontextualised Hume now the only Scottish philosopher to receive significant attention in the undergraduate syllabus. Whether this will prove to be the twilight of a distinctively Scottish philosophical tradition or a more temporary eclipse

remains an open question. But several distinctive features of Scottish Idealism, which justify its identification as a discernible intellectual movement, have emerged from this discussion. These characteristics include a commitment to the close study of Kant and Hegel; an awareness of earlier Scottish traditions of philosophical thought, particularly those of Reid and Stewart; an allegiance to the spiritual culture of Presbyterian Scotland; the extensive influence of Scottish thinkers throughout the English-speaking world; and the ongoing development of Idealist themes in Scotland throughout much of the twentieth century. Embedded in Scottish intellectual and social life for around a century and exported to other parts of the world, these distinctive features of Idealism merit more sustained scholarly study.

Notes

1. H. D. Lewis, for example, pays little attention to the flourishing of Idealism in Scotland in his study of the movement. See H. D. Lewis, 'The British Idealists', in Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Patrick Sherry and Steven T. Katz (eds), *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 271–314.
2. T. M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation 1700–2000* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), 296.
3. 'Paradoxically, denying discipleship, it was precisely because they were freed from the obligation of taking *everything*, that the Idealists were able to take *so much* from German Idealism.' W. J. Mander, *British Idealism: a history* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 21–22.
4. For further discussion of the influence of Hegel in Britain see John H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1931), 147–73.
5. James F. Ferrier, *Scottish Philosophy: the old and the new* (Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox, 1856), 12.
6. James F. Ferrier, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains*, vol. II (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1856), 132–33.
7. James F. Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1854), 510.
8. Alexander Broadie, *A History of Scottish Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 311.
9. Broadie points to Ferrier's intensive interaction with Berkeley. *A History of Scottish Philosophy*, 311–12. Cf. James F. Ferrier, 'Berkeley and idealism' (1842), in *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*, vol. II, 291–350.
10. See Alexander Campbell Fraser, *Biographia Philosophica* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1905), 74. Chalmer's theological anxieties about German philosophy, his criticism of Carlyle, and his preference for the Reidian tradition are all apparent in his extended review of J. D. Morell, *An Historical Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (London: 1846), in *North British Review*, xii, 271–331.
11. James McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1875). For a recent study of Witherspoon and McCosh in their American context see Scott Philip Segrest, *America*

and the Political Philosophy of Common Sense (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2010).

12. McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy*, 160.
13. See David Boucher, *The Scottish Idealists: selected philosophical writings* (Exeter: Imprint Press, 2004), 3.
14. See Mander, *British Idealism*, 24–27.
15. Thomas Carlyle, 'Signs of the times', reprinted in *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. II (London: Chapman and Hall, 1899), 81.
16. See Amelia Hutchison Stirling, *James Hutchison Stirling: his life and his work* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1913), 94ff.
17. See Johnston Mackay, *The Kirk and the Kingdom: a century of tension in Scottish social theology, 1830–1929* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
18. For a chronological list of Hegel translations into English see Muirhead, 'How Hegel came to England', in *The Platonic Tradition*, 173.
19. See Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. II (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889), 630–46.
20. Edward Caird, *Hegel* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1891), 140–41.
21. See Muirhead, 'Hegelianism in being', in *The Platonic Tradition*, 174.
22. Andrew Seth, 'Philosophy as criticism of categories', in Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane (eds), *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1883), 38.
23. Sir Henry Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1921), 252.
24. Cairns Craig, 'Scotland's migrant philosophers and the history of Scottish philosophy', *History of European Ideas* (2012), 1–23, at 16.
25. H. J. W. Hetherington, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), 43.
26. See the discussion of Idealism and Christian doctrine in Alan P. F. Sell, *Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1995), 187–225.
27. For an overview of the career of John Caird see A. C. Cheyne, *Studies in Scottish Church History* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 165–84.
28. See Edward Caird, 'Memoir', in John Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. I (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1899), xxxii.
29. John Caird, *Spinoza* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1888).
30. Caird, *Spinoza*, 310–11. Such Idealist readings of Spinoza were not uncommon in the nineteenth century. Frederick Pollock, James Martineau and Harold Joachim all argue along similar lines. See Samuel Newlands, 'More recent Idealist readings of Spinoza', *Philosophy Compass* 6 (2011), 109–19.
31. John Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889), 87.
32. *Ibid.*, 114ff.
33. *Ibid.*, 244.
34. Charles Warr, *Principal Caird* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1926), 181–82.
35. This expression is used by Wolterstorff to describe the Reidian approach to the knowledge of God. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 250ff.
36. T. H. Green, 'Review of J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*', *Works* III (London, 1888), 142.

37. E.g. Alexander Campbell Fraser, *Biographia Philosophica* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1904), 186.
38. The link between transcendental arguments and Idealism is discussed by Ross Harrison, 'Transcendental arguments and Idealism', in Godfrey Vesey (ed.), *Idealism Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 211–24.
39. *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. I, 153.
40. *Ibid.*, 162. Caird's approach to the person and work of Christ appears more recognisably orthodox in the second volume of his Giffords, but here again Idealist themes dominate. 'The Divine Spirit that was embodied in the life of Christ, and which realises itself in every soul that yields itself to its transforming power, wherever or whenever it takes possession of human spirits, is in essence one and the same in all.' *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. II (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1899), 252.
41. *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. II, 187.
42. *Ibid.*, 193.
43. See Hugh Ross Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology* (London: Nisbet, 1935), 108–11.
44. See David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, *British Idealism and Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 13ff.
45. David G. Ritchie, *Principles of State Interference* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891), 149. Jones's political activities are sketched by his pupil H. J. W. Hetherington, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), 91ff.
46. For further discussion of the politics of the Idealists see Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 43–93.
47. Quoted by Vincent and Plant, *ibid.*, 79.
48. R. B. Haldane, *The Conduct of Life and Other Addresses* (London: John Murray, 1914), 101.
49. Henry Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1909), 299. Comprising the text of his Australian lectures, the book was dedicated to Mungo MacCallum and Edward Caird. For an account of Jones's time in Australia see David Boucher, 'Practical Hegelianism: Henry Jones's lecture tour of Australia', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990), 423–52.
50. See Martin Davies and Stein Helgeby, 'Idealism', in Graham Oppy *et al.* (eds), *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2010), 217–19. The influence of Idealism in Australia is explored by Vincent and Boucher, *British Idealism and Political Theory*, 15ff.
51. John Anderson, 'The place of Hegel in the history of philosophy', *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1962), 87.
52. *Biographia Philosophica*, 186.
53. A. Campbell Fraser, *Berkeley* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1881), 228.
54. See A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Scottish Philosophy: a comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1894), 188ff.
55. *Ibid.*, 209.
56. See John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1937), 73ff. Somewhat patronisingly, Passmore claims that the 'loose-jointed pieties' of Pringle-Pattison were appealing in provincial and colonial contexts to those who viewed philosophy 'as a medium for miscellaneous edification rather than a serious form of inquiry'. For a more sympathetic treatment of Pringle-Pattison, see Eugene Thomas Long, 'The Gifford Lectures and the Scottish Personal Idealists', *Review of Metaphysics* 49.2 (1995), 365–95.

57. See, for example, John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).
58. John Veitch, *Knowing and Being* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1889) 10ff. Another exponent of the Reidian tradition in Scottish philosophy was William Davidson in Aberdeen.
59. These are explored by Mander, *British Idealism*, 544ff.
60. Geoffrey Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 10–11.
61. See Mander, *British Idealism*, 539f.
62. See George Davie, *The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect: the problem of generalism and specialization in twentieth-century Scotland* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986). Davie tends to see evidence of this Scottish tradition continuing until around the changes of the 1960s.
63. Cairns Craig, 'Spiritual returns: ministers, theologians and philosophers 1843–1945', in Mario Varricchio (ed.), *Back to Caledonia: Scottish homecomings from the seventeenth century to the present* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2012), 128–50.
64. Norman Kemp Smith, *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* (London: Macmillan, 1924), 4.
65. Broadie, *A History of Scottish Philosophy*, 324ff.
66. See, for example, A. A. Bowman, *A Sacramental Universe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939); C. A. Campbell, *Selfhood and Godhood* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957); and John Macmurray, *The Form of the Personal*, vols 1–2 (London: Faber & Faber, 1956–1961).

9

'My station and its duties': social-role accounts of obligation in Green and Bradley

Robert Stern

Different elements in the reception history of German Idealism have had different impacts – such as the Young Hegelians on the philosophy of religion, neo-Kantianism on the philosophy of science, Kojève on accounts of recognition, Croce on theories of art, and so on. When it comes to the British Idealists, arguably the most obvious candidate for such impact is in the idea of 'my station and its duties'; for while the British Idealists engaged with many aspects of the thought of both Kant and Hegel (and to a lesser degree also of Fichte and Schelling), it seems that it is their notion of 'my station and its duties' that has the greatest resonance today, while their accounts of the Absolute, of relations, of the concrete universal, and other aspects of their idealist metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind have been largely forgotten.[1]

In this essay, I want to look again at this idea of 'my station and its duties', particularly as it figures in the work of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, who pioneered its significance.[2] For, while it is widely used as a slogan to represent both their ethical and political philosophy and that of Idealism more generally, and while it is of continuing influence within certain strands of contemporary ethical and political thinking as an alternative to other approaches,[3] it is rarely given any detailed treatment in historical terms.[4] In particular, I would like to ask precisely what theory of duty or obligation this position is meant to embody: that is, how an appeal to this notion is meant to answer a fundamental question in ethical theory, namely how moral obligation is to be accounted for and best understood. It is most usually assumed, I think, that in tying obligations to social roles, the British Idealists were offering what I will call an *identificatory* account of obligation: that is, acting in a certain way has an obligatory force because it relates to a role which constitutes your identity. I will contrast this sort of theory with two other

accounts, which I will call *hybrid* accounts and *social command* accounts – and suggest that in fact Green held the former and Bradley the latter; and I will also argue that this puts Green's account of obligation close to Kant's, while Bradley may be seen to be following Hegel (who therefore, like Bradley, should also not be seen as offering an identificatory account, which is often mistakenly what happens when his position comes to be viewed in Bradleyan terms).

As British Idealism is not a terribly well-known development in the history of Idealist thinking, I will begin by saying a little about this distinctive period in British philosophy, and particularly about Bradley and Green. I will then outline the problem of obligation that I think underlies their doctrine of 'my station and its duties', and how their approaches fit into the taxonomy of different theories, where I will defend the reading outlined above against the identificatory account.

1. Green, Bradley and British Idealism

After an initial wave of early pioneers (such as Coleridge and J. F. Ferrier), Green forms part of a first generation of thinkers influenced by German Idealism in Britain, alongside others such as J. H. Stirling and the Caird brothers, while Bradley forms part of a slightly later wave, including also J. M. E. McTaggart, Andrew Seth (later Pringle-Pattison) and Bernard Bosanquet, while later generations include R. G. Collingwood and G. R. G. Mure. In a movement that stretched from the 1860s through to the 1930s or 1940s, Green and especially Bradley were significant figures at what is probably its high-water mark, which is from roughly the 1880s to the 1920s.

Green, however, was somewhat older than Bradley, being born ten years earlier in 1836; but he died young at forty-six, while Bradley lived until his late seventies, and so outlived Green by forty-two years. Both had highly successful academic careers based in Oxford, with Green also having an impact in politics. Green published little in his lifetime, where his main contributions were a study of Aristotle and a powerful critique of Hume;[5] but he had several works published posthumously, including *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 'Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation', and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant',[6] while the lectures on which these publications were based also had much influence. Bradley published considerably more, including *Ethical Studies*, *Appearance and Reality*, and *Principles of Logic*.[7] As this suggests, Bradley's work ranged more widely than Green's, although the latter's ethics included a substantial metaphysical background, while

Bradley's *Ethical Studies* was considered a fundamental treatise in Idealist ethics, to put alongside Green's own *Prolegomena*.

Despite being frequently grouped together, and despite sharing many ideas and concerns, there are also significant differences between Green and Bradley. This is sometimes characterised by the suggestion that while Green was fundamentally Kantian, Bradley was more Hegelian.[8] While there is some truth in this (reflected, as we shall see, in their different accounts of obligation), neither followed their respective predecessors in any very orthodox way, nor conceived themselves as doing so – Green insisting that he was at best offering a 'friendly amendment' to Kant's approach in order to save him from himself,[9] while Bradley openly criticised Hegel despite none the less acknowledging his great significance.[10] And both, of course, came under other important influences, some arguably close to Hegel (such as Aristotle and Spinoza), but others arguably not (such as the British Empiricists). At the same time, as is common, neither liked to feel themselves pigeonholed into a movement or reduced to any form of discipleship – Bradley famously warning in the Preface to the first edition of his *Principles of Logic* that 'As for the "Hegelian School" which exists in our reviews, I know of no one who has met it anywhere else'.[11] Certainly, unlike some of the British Idealists (such as McTaggart), Green and Bradley published no scholarly works on the German Idealists, but clearly the latter helped to provide some of the key materials and ideas that they shaped after their own fashion, in response to their own concerns and against the background of their own assumptions – where one common point of focus was on the question of moral obligation.

II. Theories of moral obligation

How moral duty and obligation is to be understood has of course been a matter of long-standing debate within philosophy. In the medieval period, and into much of the early modern period too, there were fundamentally three major options in accounting for moral obligation. According to *radically voluntarist divine command* accounts, the obligatoriness of morality depends on the authority of some divine sovereign or commander, who has the freedom and power to make *any* act obligatory by so commanding. On *natural law* accounts, by contrast, the idea is that morality constitutes a natural law in which God plays a more indirect role, where an act is made right and hence something we are obliged to do because it conforms to the nature of things, where God is the source of that nature as creator, but not the source of obligatoriness as commander; moreover, his role as benevolent

creator places constraints on what within this creation can turn out to be right or wrong. And there were also what have been called *intermediate divine command* positions, that held that what is right only becomes an actual obligation through God's willing that it be done (hence opposing the natural law tradition, which gave God's will a less direct role), but that rightness itself is prior to and independent of obligatoriness and hence of God's will (hence opposing any radical voluntarism, as what God can command is now constrained by what is right, independent of that command).

Theories of obligation as they arise in more modern philosophy may be seen to grow out from, but also to break with, these more classical positions in different ways – where it is then these more modern theories that will concern us in considering Green and Bradley and their accounts of duty.

The first such theory can be found in Kant, and I will call it the *hybrid* theory because, like the intermediate divine command theory (of which I think it is a descendant), it combines a theory of the right with a separate theory of obligation. (Of course, like everything in Kant's philosophy in general and ethics in particular, what I say here is hardly uncontentious, and I will do little to defend the reading in any detail, though I try to do so elsewhere.[12] And even if my reading of Kant is deemed unacceptable, at least perhaps it will prove a useful background to my account of Green.) As is well known, Kant raises the question of how to explain the peculiar force that morality has for us, which takes the form of duties and obligations – that is, of commands and imperatives, telling us that there are actions which we *must* or *must not* perform. Kant calls this feature of morality 'necessitation' or 'constraint' (*Nötigung*), and he explains it not by recourse to divine command (in the manner of a voluntarist like Crusius), or to the inherent obligatoriness of the natural order of things (in the manner of a rationalist like Wolff), but in terms of the distinction between the holy will and our own, arguing that it is because we have dispositions to do things other than what is right, that the right for us involves a moral 'must'; but for a holy will, which has no inclination to do anything other than what is right, no such 'must' applies. A typical statement of Kant's view is the following from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*:

> A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as *necessitated* to actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence no imperatives hold for the *divine*

> will and in general for a *holy* will: the 'ought' is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for example, of the human will.[a]

Thus, the principles that determine what it is good and bad to do apply to the holy will, where these principles are laws because they hold of all agents universally, and of such agents independently of the contingencies of their desires and goals, and thus necessarily. However, because the holy will is morally perfect, these laws lack any necessitating force for wills of this sort, whereas our lack of moral perfection means that they possess such force for us.

It can therefore be seen how Kant's distinction between the holy will and ours is designed to resolve the problem of obligation, by appeal to the fact that our will is divided between reason and inclination in a way that the will of the divine being is not. Kant characterises this division in the terms of his transcendental Idealism as mapping on to the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms (or the 'intelligible world' and 'the world of sense'). Kant's distinction between the holy will and ours therefore forms a crucial part of his answer to the problem of accounting for the moral 'must', in a way that explains its possibility (unlike a view that simply treats the 'must' as a feature of the world), but without recourse to the problematic notion of a divine legislator as the source of that 'must' (thus avoiding any need to adopt a divine command theory).

Notwithstanding the ingenious nature of Kant's account of moral obligation, it seemed to Kant's successors, and particularly to Schiller and Hegel, that it involved paying an unacceptable price: namely, that moral duty is seen as a function of our imperfection as moral agents, and our status as creatures who must struggle against ourselves in order to act rightly. It thus appeared that if the Kantian account were correct, the most the dutiful agent could achieve was continence, not virtue – that is, a successful overcoming of her

a. 'Ein vollkommen guter Wille würde also eben sowohl unter objectiven Gesetzen (des Guten) stehen, aber nicht dadurch als zu gesetzmäßigen Handlungen *genötigt* vorgestellt werden können, weil er von selbst, nach seiner subjektiven Beschaffenheit, nur durch die Vorstellung des Guten bestimmt werden kann. Daher gelten für den *göttlichen* und überhaupt für einen *heiligen* Willen keine Imperativen; das *Sollen* ist hier am unrechten Orte, weil das *Wollen* schon von selbst mit dem Gesetz notwendig einstimmig ist. Daher sind Imperativen nur Formeln, das Verhältnis objectiver Gestze des Wollens überhaupt zu der subjectiven Unvollkommenheit des Willens dieses oder jenes vernünftigen Wesens, z. B. des menschlichen Willens, auszudrücken.' GS iv, 414; GMM 67.

non-moral inclinations, rather than an alignment between those inclinations and what it is right to do, of the sort that Schiller identified with grace. While Schiller himself perhaps held back from breaking entirely with Kant on this issue, he none the less raised two fundamental objections that led Hegel to go further: The first is that it incorporates what appears to be a demeaning picture of human nature, as essentially 'fallen' and unable to follow what morality asks of us without some sort of resistance; the second is that, ultimately, Kant's dualistic picture did not itself allow for full autonomy, even though the intention of his ethics was to avoid the heteronomy of other moral theories.

I would argue, then, that Hegel came to be dissatisfied with Kant's hybrid approach, and as a result adopted a different kind of position, which might be called a *social command theory*. Like Kant's account, this too may be seen as a descendant of the intermediate divine command view, where what is independently right comes to be made obligatory – but not from the dualism within the human will, but from the authority of society over the individual agent. As Robert Adams has put the basic idea of this theory (which he does not himself endorse): 'According to social theories of the nature of obligation, having an obligation to do something consists in being required (in a certain way, under certain circumstances or conditions), by another person or a group of persons, to do it.'[13]

Having criticised the Kantian theory of duty and obligation in the 'Morality' section of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel provides this social command account in the concluding 'Ethical Life' section. The latter takes into consideration not only the individual will, but also the '*laws and institutions which have being in and for themselves*'.[b] As a result, the individual can be seen to be part of an 'ethical substance' (*die sittliche Substanz*) that consists of 'laws and powers' (*Gesetze und Gewalten*)',[c] where 'these substantial determinations are *duties* which are binding on the will of the individual'.[d] Because of the authority of these duties over the lives of individuals, and of the relative unimportance of individuals within the social order, it can appear to them that the moral law has a divine origin, as it did in pre-modern societies. But this is to neglect the social basis of these obligations, and that while the social order is a substance to which individuals relate as 'accidents', none the less

b. 'Die *an und für sich seienden Gesetze und Einrichtungen*.' HW vii, 294 §144; PR, 189.
c. HW vii, 295 §146; PR 190.
d. 'Als diese substantiellen Bestimmungen sind sie für das Individuum, welches sich von ihnen als das Subjektive und in sich Unbestimmte oder als [das] besonders Bestimmte unterscheidet, *hiermit im Verhältnisse* zu ihnen als zu seinem Substantiellen steht, *Pflichten*, für seinen Willen bindend.' HW vii, 296–97 §148; PR 191.

these accidents are required by the substance in order to be actual. Hegel makes clear, therefore, that he sees divine command accounts of obligation as based on a picture of our relation to the world that has been surpassed, where these obligations are now better accounted for as an aspect of our existence within the social environment of ethical life.

As a result of the 'laws and powers' of the community, therefore, the individual will find duties that are 'prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him within his situation'.[e] These ethical laws may then appear to have 'an absolute authority and power, infinitely more firmly based than the being of nature'.[f] At the same time, however, Hegel argues that in so far as they stem from the ethical community, such laws are 'not something *alien* to the subject' but something to which 'the subject bears *spiritual witness* . . . as to its own essence'.[g] We should not think, therefore, just because something is an obligation because it is required by the social group, that the motivating reason the individual has for complying with it comes from these external ends: rather, it can be based on the recognised authority of the ethical community over the individual, where at the same time the individual is part of this group, and so not subordinated to it as by an alien will.

Now, if a social command account of this kind is going to be plausible, it can only treat what is required by society as a necessary condition for creating a moral obligation; for, if it were to also treat it as a sufficient condition, then the worry would arise that on this account, *anything* required by society would amount to an obligation. It is therefore important that Hegel considers these requirements as laid down by the *rational state*, which is seeking to uphold the freedom of its individual citizens: without this constraint, it is clear that it would not have the legitimacy to create genuine duties for people to obey.

We have seen, then, that Hegel's account of duty as this arises for the individual within ethical life can plausibly be considered to be a form of social command account, where what renders something a duty or obligation for an individual is the 'absolute authority and power' of the ethical

e. '*Was* der Mensch tun müsse, *welches* die Pflichten sind, die er zu erfüllen hat, um tugendhaft zu sein, ist in einem sittlichen Gemesinwesen leicht zu sagen, – es ist nichts anderes von ihm zu tun, als was ihm in seinen Verhältnissen vorgezeichnet, ausgesprochen und bekannt ist.' HW vii, 298 §150; PR 193.

f. 'Für das Subjekt haben die sittliche Substanz, ihre Gesetze und Gewalten einerseits als Gegenstand das Verhältnis, daß *sie sind*, im höchsten Sinne der Selbständigkeit, – eine absolute, unendlich festere Autorität und Macht als das Sein der Natur.' HW vii, 294–95 §146; PR 190.

g. 'Andererseits sind die dem Subjekte nicht ein *Fremdes*, sondern es gibt das *Zeugnis des Geistes* von ihnen als von *seinem eigenen Wesen*.' HW vii, 295 §147; PR 191.

community. And we have also seen how Hegel came to develop this account, as an alternative to both a divine command theory (which is seen as a kind of primitive forerunner of the social command account), and to Kant's hybrid theory (with its dualistic conception of the will).

We have therefore seen how the hybrid theory of Kant and the social command theory of Hegel are to be distinguished. But we must now also distinguish this from a third position, which is the *identificatory* account of obligation. On this account, the obligatoriness of certain actions is to be explained by appeal to what constitutes the identity of the agent, where obligatoriness is said to rest on what, given their sense of their identity, they may or may not do without giving this up. Now, in a way that is ironic given her close association with Kant, the person who has most developed this sort of account of obligation within contemporary ethics is Christine Korsgaard. This is reflected in her conception of *practical identity*, which is 'a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking'.[14] Some of these identities can be, and for most will be, tied in with an individual's social roles, whist others (such as 'being a human being') may not:

> Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, someone's lover or friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.[15]

Korsgaard's claim, then, is that '[a]n obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of identity',[16] in a way that is signalled in such 'astonishing but familiar' remarks such as 'I couldn't live with myself if I did that'.[17]

Now, if one starts with an identificatory account of obligation, and also takes on board the idea that our identity can be grounded in such things as our social roles, then it may seem natural to assume that any focus on the latter will lead one on to the former: and many social role theorists do indeed take this route. Thus, while Korsgaard herself takes it that our identity as humans is more fundamental than any mere social role, none the less she accepts that the latter would give rise to obligations were we to identify with them (as she admits can happen to the Mafioso raised as an example against her by G. A. Cohen).[18] A similar outlook can also be found in other

social role theorists, such as John Horton, who writes: '[B]oth the family and the political community figure prominently in our sense of who we are; our self-identity and our understanding of our place in the world . . . It should not be surprising, therefore, that some institutional obligations, through their deep-rooted connections with our sense of who we are and our place in the world, have a particularly fundamental role in our moral being. That these kinds of institutional involvement generate moral obligations, and these obligations rather than standing in need of justification may themselves be justificatory, is only to be expected.'[19]

Now, one important source of this sort of identificatory account is taken to be the British Idealists, and particularly Green and Bradley with their talk of social roles. So, for example, in criticising the identificatory position, A. John Simmons cites the following remarks from Bradley as 'the classic statement of the position': 'We have found ourselves when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social organism . . . If we suppose the world of relations, in which [an Englishman] was born and bred, never to have been, then we suppose the very essence of him not to be; if we take that away, we have taken him away . . . The state . . . gives him the life that he does and ought to live.'[20] But I now want to argue that this identificatory account of Green and Bradley is mistaken, and that the former is much more plausibly read as following Kant's hybrid approach, and the latter as following Hegel's social command theory. I will begin by discussing Green.

III. Green on duty

In order to understand Green's account of duty, it is necessary to say something first about his general position in ethics. Green begins with an account of action, where he argues that what guides the will is not some specific want or desire, but a conception of the agent's own greatest good – hence, he claims, the agent in acting aims at 'self-satisfaction'.[21] Thus, taking Esau selling his birthright for a mess of pottage as an example, Green argues that his motive for action was not mere hunger, for otherwise he would have been acting like an unreflective animal; rather, what led him to act was 'the presentation of an idea of himself as enjoying the pleasure of eating the pottage', where 'it is not the hunger as a natural force, but his own conception of himself, as finding for the time his greatest good in the satisfaction of hunger, that determines the act'.[22] As a result of this, Green argues, Esau 'recognises himself as the author of the act', and hence praise or blame are appropriate.[23]

For Green, therefore, when it comes to making a choice, there is no selection between competing desires made by the will; rather, the choice is made in determining which of the desires, if satisfied, would constitute the agent's greatest good, and on the basis of this decision the will then comes to act, with the other desires having been silenced.[24]

As a consequence of this picture, Green resists any strict division between the roles of desire and intellect in action (for example, he rejects the Humean view that reason is the slave of the passions, simply engaged in finding the means for the satisfaction of the latter).[25] For intellect plays a role in forming the conception of our good within which a desire can then play a part – as when Esau takes it that his desire for food, if satisfied, would realise that good. On the other hand, if an agent did not believe that desire satisfaction of any kind formed part of his good, then that agent would be inert. Green therefore argues that the will is not a faculty somehow separable from desire and intellect, but rather contains aspects of both, where this must be so in an agent that is seeking to bring about its self-satisfaction.[26]

Green recognises, however, that this picture (which is articulated in Book II of his *Prolegomena to Ethics*) leaves an important question unanswered when it comes to ethics, namely: What is it that distinguishes a morally good will from a morally bad one? Of course, on some accounts, this difference is marked by a distinction between the good agent who has no concern for their own well-being, and a bad one who is so concerned: but Green cannot take this option, given his account of action outlined above where such self-concern is present in *all* agents – so where does the difference lie? Green's answer is that the difference comes from the different conceptions of self-satisfaction that agents can have, and thus in 'the character of that in which self-satisfaction is sought, ranging from sensual pleasure to the fulfilment of a vocation conceived as given by God'. He goes on: 'It is on the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction that the [moral] quality of the will must depend. It is here therefore that we must seek for the basis for a distinction between goodness and badness of will.'[27] Green's position depends, therefore, on making out some grounds on which to distinguish good and bad conceptions of self-satisfaction that might be held by different agents, where this explains the basis on which we might make a moral distinction between them. In order to pursue this strategy, Green therefore rejects other accounts, such as hedonistic utilitarianism, which holds that *all* agents have the *same* conception of self-satisfaction, namely the gaining of pleasure, and which therefore distinguishes good and

bad agents extrinsically rather than intrinsically, on the basis only of the consequences of their actions.[28]

For Green, then, the difference between the virtuous and vicious person lies in their different conceptions of where and in what manner they can attain self-satisfaction, and what this consists in – where, like the Greeks, Green is confident that this vicious person is in error about where that self-satisfaction really lies, which is not in the life of the non-moral agent, but in the life of a social being who acts in an ethical manner towards others, where as a result their capacities are properly realised. It is this conception of their good that the virtuous agent holds, as opposed to the conception adopted by the vicious agent, that leads the former into virtue and the latter into vice.[29] What makes an agent good for Green, therefore, is not how much he actually achieves, but whether he is looking for his self-satisfaction in the right place.

Though, of course, there is much more to be said, and many possible objections to be answered, this completes all that is needed as the background for Green's account of duty, to which we now turn. This is given primarily at the end of Chapter II and the start of Chapter III of Book III of the *Prolegomena*.

As we have seen, Green holds that the good agent aims at the realisation of his capacities, where he now argues that this 'will keep before him an object, which he presents to himself as absolutely desirable, but which is other than any particular object of desire'.[30] In the case of such particular objects, he will take these to have value only in so far as they satisfy some desire of his; but in the case of his self-realisation, '[i]t will be an interest as in an object conceived to be of unconditional value; one of which the value does not depend on any desire that the individual may at any time feel for it or for anything else, or on any pleasure that, either in its pursuit or in its attainment or as its result, he may experience'.[31] In other words, Green claims that while the agent may see the value of everything else in terms of his wants and their attendant pleasures, he does not see the realisation of his capacities in this way, as these constitute the end against which such wants and pleasures are measured, where 'the desire for the object will be founded in a conception of its desirableness as a fulfilment of the capabilities of which a man is conscious in being conscious of himself'.[32]

Given this picture, then, Green argues that agents can be in the position of seeing their self-realisation as of unconditioned value, which is not valuable as a means to the satisfaction of some prior desire, but on the contrary can overrule any desire that does not tend to the attainment of this end:

> In such men [as are conscious of the value of self-realisation] and at such times as a desire for it does actually arise . . . it will express itself in their imposition on themselves of rules requiring something to be done irrespectively of any inclination to do it, irrespectively of any desired end to which it is a means, *other than this end, which is desired because conceived as absolutely desirable*. With the men in whom, and at the times when, there is no such desire, the consciousness of there being something absolutely desirable will still be a qualifying element in life. It will yield a recognition of those unconditional rules of conduct to which, from the prevalence of unconformable passions, it fails to produce actual obedience. It will give meaning to the demand, without which there is no morality and in which all morality is virtually involved, that 'something be done merely for the sake of its being done', because it is a consciousness of the possibility of an action in which no desire shall be gratified but the desire excited by the idea of the act itself, as of something absolutely desirable in the sense that in it the man does the best that he has in him to do.[33]

Green thus claims to have found here a version of a Kantian categorical imperative, but one which Kant himself wrongly overlooked:[34] for, the agent can find in self-realisation something that has value irrespective of what his desires or ends happen to be, where in identifying them reason has much more than an instrumental role, as here it determines the content of our desires themselves by establishing the proper object of our self-satisfaction; so in recognising this value as lying behind the requirements on us of the moral, we will see the latter in the necessary, universal and non-instrumental manner that characterises morality for Kant, but which (Green thinks) is inadequately captured in Kant's more formalistic approach.[35]

However, if this gives Green some way to characterise what the content of morality might be and how it might take on a non-contingent and non-instrumental character, it does not yet quite explain its *imperatival* force, or the kind of 'necessitation' that Kant also took to be characteristic of morality for us; but when it comes to explaining this, Green adopts precisely the kind of hybrid approach that I have identified previously with Kant himself. For, as Green sees it, while self-realisation may constitute the objectively valuable end towards which we would align our desires if fully rational, we are *not* in fact fully rational in this manner, and therefore are subject to other desires, where the tension that this gives rise to accounts for the felt necessity and imperatival force that morality seems to exert over us:

> [S]uch an ideal [of humanity], not yet realised but operating as a motive, already constitutes in man an inchoate form of that life, that perfect development of himself, of which the completion would be the realised ideal of himself. *Now in relation to a nature such as ours, having other impulses than those which draw to the ideal, this ideal becomes, in Kant's language, an imperative, and a categorical imperative.* It will command something to be done universally and unconditionally, irrespectively of whether there is in any one, at any time, an inclination to do it.[36]

Green's position would therefore appear to offer a variant on Kant's hybrid model, where what underlies morality is some unconditional value, but where that morality appears to us in the form of commands in so far as we are subject to desires that lead us to want to act differently, in pursuit of other ends.

Moreover, in Chapter III, Green goes on to explain why he takes the hybrid model to be more fundamental than any divine command or social command account. He begins by underlining that, because self-realisation is a social matter, ethics will involve social relations. To the individual, therefore, a life of this sort will 'express itself in the form of social requirement', in so far as his 'better reason' will be 'in antagonism to the inclination of the moment',[37] where as a result the individual will feel himself to be under some sort of moral law governing his relations with others. Thus, Green argues, while it may seem natural to associate law with the idea of some sort of authoritative commander (as on the divine command and social command models), this natural picture should be resisted, where the hybrid account reveals why in fact it is unnecessary, as it shows how the imperative of 'Thou shalt' and 'Thou must' can be explained in a different way.[38] Green suggests, therefore, that rather than arising in a legalistic manner, out of the authority over us of some superior commander, the moral 'ought' arises out of a prior awareness of the good, but that good stands opposed to some of the agent's desires and inclinations and thus puts constraints on them, in a way that comes to assume the form of an imperative, even though the agent need not yet have any conception of a law or a sovereign lawgiver.

Moreover, Green argues, it is this model that must truly be the fundamental one. For, he holds, any lawgiver account must explain the authority of the lawgiver, which cannot come from fear of their power as such fear does make this authority legitimate in any way; instead, Green claims, it can only arise if we see the lawgiver as following the good – but then the appeal to the lawgiver is made redundant, as on the hybrid model this already has its own imperatival force, as explained above.[39] Rather than being constrained by

an external lawgiver, therefore, for Green (as for Kant) moral obligatoriness is to be explained by appeal to the structure of the agent's own will, as her conception of the good limits her desires, in a way that makes it appropriate to talk of *self*-legislation.[40]

We have seen, then, that while Green's position is by no means that of the fully orthodox (or literal) Kantian, in so far as he treats self-satisfaction as a basis for the moral will, none the less his account of the moral 'must' still takes a Kantian form, in following the hybrid model we found in Kant, rather than any sort of divine command, social command or identificatory position. Turning now to Bradley, we will see that he too eschews any identificatory account, but that he also rejects a Kantian one, opting instead for a social command theory which puts him closer to Hegel.

IV. Bradley on duty

Whilst the *Prolegomena to Ethics* and Bradley's *Ethical Studies* stand as the twin peaks of Idealist ethics in Britain, and while they share important similarities of outlook, the relation between the texts is not straightforward, and they are also significantly different in the approaches they adopt. *Ethical Studies* appeared nearly a decade before the *Prolegomena*; but Bradley attended Green's lectures on ethics and related matters in Oxford, as did most of the other British Idealists who were therefore fully versed in the position developed by Green, so that *Ethical Studies* cannot be said to have had an independent influence on them despite its earlier publication. Moreover, Bradley here acknowledges the significance of Green, particularly when it comes to his treatment of hedonism in Essay III[41] – although Bradley is not mentioned in the *Prolegomena*.[42]

Ethical Studies, unlike the *Prolegomena*, is a work with a dialectical structure in the Hegelian sense; that is, positions are advanced but then 'aufgehoben' or sublated once their limitations are revealed, so that in this way the search for a more complete and less one-sided position is carried out. The book comprises seven main chapters (or 'Essays' as they are headed). In the first, Bradley defends the idea of moral responsibility against the twin threats of philosophical determinism and indeterminism, while in the second he turns to the question of 'Why should I be moral?' Anticipating Prichard,[43] Bradley suggests that taken as a demand by a sceptic who wants to know 'What's in it for me?', the question should be avoided, as the attempt to answer it will only reduce morality to self-interest – while the moral person will feel no need to ask it. On the other hand, Bradley allows

that there can be some genuine and legitimate point to the question, which is how far morality coincides with self-realisation, and in what form. How best to answer this question then becomes the main focus of the rest of the book.

Bradley begins his inquiry by considering hedonistic utilitarianism as an answer, which is then rejected for reasons we will come back to, where he then considers the opposite view, which is that morality is all about 'duty for duty's sake'. In the fifth chapter, which is the one entitled 'My Station and Its Duties', a position is adopted that Bradley represents as a kind of 'sublation' of hedonistic utilitarianism and 'duty for duty's sake'. However, in the next chapter he faces up to certain difficulties with this position, which revolve around the idea that there is more to morality and self-realisation than the social world encompasses – such as the obligation of the artist to create works of beauty – which Bradley puts within an 'ideal morality'. Finally, the last chapter considers 'Selfishness and Self-Sacrifice' and how the former relates to the bad self and the latter to the good, while the 'Concluding Remarks' consider how far '[r]eflection on morality leads beyond it',[44] and take us to a religious perspective.

While, as this shows, the outlook of 'my station and its duties' does not represent Bradley's final position, it is here that the core of his account of ethical duties lies and it is therefore on this chapter that the identificatory accounts of his position have focused. This chapter will also form the centrepiece of our discussion, but, given the structure of the book, it cannot properly be understood without taking into account the dialectic that has preceded it.[45]

As part of that dialectic, in the chapter on 'Duty for Duty's Sake', Bradley has already introduced but rejected the Kantian account of duty, emphasising its inherent dualism in a way that echoes the critique offered by Hegel.[46] Having presented this hybrid account of duty as an essential part of the outlook he is considering,[47] Bradley then goes on to explain why '[s]tated as we have stated it above, the theory of duty for duty's sake carries with it little or no plausibility'.[48] Acknowledging his debt to Hegel, Bradley considers various difficulties with other elements of the theory (particularly its 'empty formalism'), but also focuses on its dualism, which he thinks creates problems both for the account of action (which, like Green, he takes to involve both the sensuous self as well as the non-sensuous self), and for the very account it offers of the imperatival nature of morality, which (*contra* Green) he takes to involve some notion of a commander, whereas on the hybrid model this idea makes no real sense:

> We may remark in passing a contradiction involved in the doctrine of the imperative [that comes from this 'dualistic moral theory']. A command is addressed by one will to another, and must be obeyed, if at all, by the second will. But here the will that is commanded is not the will that executes; hence the imperative is never obeyed; and, as it is not to produce action in that to which it is addressed, it is a mere sham-imperative.[49]

There is no explicit mention of Green here, so we therefore cannot say for sure that Bradley took him to be a target; but as we have seen, despite their important differences, when it comes to the imperatival nature of duty Green has a position of a broadly Kantian sort, so one might expect Bradley's critique to apply also to him.

Having seen that Bradley rejects the Kantian hybrid model, the question now is what is he seeking to replace it with in moving to a discussion of 'my station and its duties'? As has been discussed, a standard approach is to take it that Bradley moves instead to an identificatory model; but I now want to suggest that this approach is mistaken, and that underlying this position is a social command account instead.

That this is so can be made plain once one recalls the structure of the dialectic in *Ethical Studies*, and the place of the chapter (or 'essay') on 'My Station and its Duties' within it. Up to this point, Bradley has considered two contrasting approaches, both of which are said to have some merit, but neither of which is wholly satisfactory as things stand. The first is 'pleasure for pleasure's sake', which has the merit of thinking about how morality might relate to the individual's 'self-realisation', but does so in a way that has a narrow and mistaken view of what this amounts to, namely pleasure. The second is 'duty for duty's sake', which rightly scorns the latter idea as simplistic, and instead conceives of the self to be realised as the pure will, and so conceives of morality in terms that are purely formal. Again, according to Bradley, there is some merit to thinking of morality in terms of duty, but as we have seen, for familiar Hegelian reasons (including the dualism we have discussed above), it is deemed unsatisfactory.

What is needed, therefore, is some sort of synthesis or 'Aufhebung' of these views, which Bradley tries to offer in 'My Station and Its Duties': namely, a position that has a conception of duty that overcomes the problems with the Kantian outlook, and which also relates it to a notion of self-realisation that is less crude than the one offered by the perspective of 'pleasure for pleasure's sake'. What we require, then, is a view that allows for

self-realisation on the one hand, and duty on the other, without treating the former as mere pleasure or hedonistic well-being, and the latter as something empty, formal and dualistic – and it is precisely in a view that tries to *achieve* both that these respective limitations will be overcome. Bradley's positive suggestion, therefore, is that if we think of the individual as following duties that relate to a good that is *more* than his individual good, then at the same time self-realisation will be achieved, and these duties will be given a content and context, in a way that will enable a satisfactory 'middle way' to be found.

And then, Bradley claims, this is just what one will get within a state, in which the individual is both part of the general good of the community, *and* also able to find itself fully realised by participating in that community as a result. Thus, Bradley declares, in a passage of considerable rhetorical force, by living within a 'social organism' of this sort, where the individual has a 'station and its duties' through which they contribute to this goal, and therefore also has contentful and objective requirements laid upon them, by a society in which they also flourish, then a notable advance towards dialectical stability will have been achieved:

> Here, and here first, are the contradictions which have beset us solved – here is a universal which can confront our wandering desires with a fixed and stern imperative, but which yet is no unreal form of the mind, but a living soul that penetrates and stands fast in the detail of actual existence. It is real, and real for me. It is in its affirmation that I affirm myself, for I am but as a 'heart-beat in its system'. And I am real in it; for when I give myself to it, it gives me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life which is happiness. In the realised idea which, superior to me, and yet here and now in and by me, affirms itself in a continuous process, we have found the end, we have found self-realisation, duty, and happiness in one – yes, we have found ourselves, when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social organism.[50]

My claim is, then, that up to this point, Bradley is offering a social command account, whereby on the one hand the state is such as to 'confront our wandering desires with a strict and firm imperative' because of its authority over us, but where on the other hand 'when I give myself up to it', the state 'gives me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life which is happiness'. Bradley makes the nature of his position fully clear when he writes: '[The state] speaks the word of command and gives the

field of accomplishment, and in the activity of obedience it has and bestows individual life and satisfaction and happiness.'[51]

Likewise, I would argue, from what we saw before in the earlier section, Bradley is in effect paraphrasing Hegel here (as he would no doubt happily grant), and Hegel's claim that '[i]n the state everything depends on the unity of universal and particular'.[h] It is precisely this, as we have seen, that allows Hegel also to strike the balance that Bradley is after, between duty as imposed by the state on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other, so that by having the source of those duties in the command of the rational state, the individual has obligations, has their 'particularity' taken into account, and is lifted above the narrow and egoistic concerns of the pre-social individual. By thinking of duty in these terms, as imposed by society on the individual who has a place and role within it, the dialectical harmony that both Hegel and Bradley are looking for can be achieved, but only because obligations are seen to arise from the social community of which they are part, and which has the self-realisation or freedom of its citizens (which for Bradley and Hegel are in effect the same thing) at its heart.

However, if this shows him to be a social command theorist, what of the passages in which Bradley seems to make so much of the way in which an individual's identity is bound up with their role, and which have led so many to interpret him as a social role theorist concerning obligation?

When it comes to Bradley, I think the simple answer is as follows: these 'identificatory' passages are there *not* to support a social role theory, but to answer three very significant objections to any social command theory, namely:

(a) that the state which Bradley claims has the authority to give individuals their duties does not really exist and is a myth, because it can always be reduced to a mere collection of individuals, with nothing but the authority of individuals over one another;
(b) that self-realisation does not require social membership, so that there is no essential connection (as Bradley claims there is) between a morality of social duties and self-realisation;
(c) that individuals must always see the authority of the state as taking away their freedom.

h. 'Auf die Einheit der Allgemeinheit und Besonderheit im Staate kommt alles an.' HW vii, 410 §261Z; PR 285.

All three objections can be urged by the 'individualist', who does not think Bradley's vision of the 'social organism' is at all plausible, where it is the position of this individualist that Bradley outlines immediately after the passage that we just cited, with its high-flown talk of the 'social organism'.[52] Now, it is also clear that it is in order to refute just this view that Bradley turns to his claim about the dependence of individuals for their identity on society and their place within it.[53] After a long disquisition in support of this view, which hinges on how much an individual's identity depends on his place within a social framework, Bradley concludes:

> In short, man is a social being; he is real only because he is social, and can realise himself only because it is as social that he realised himself. The mere individual is a delusion of theory; and the attempt to realise it in practice is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the production of monstrosities.[54]

Bradley's response to the reductionist objection that there cannot be any social commands, because 'in fact' there is no social organism, is that the reduction cannot work, as without the social organism there is 'in fact' no individual. What we see in this talk of identity and one's place in society, therefore, is *not* a defence of an identificatory theory of obligation, but a defence of the idea of society that is needed by the kind of social command theory that Bradley has put forward earlier in the chapter. It is also needed to substantiate his crucial link between duty and self-realisation, which on the individualist position does not require the person to have any place within a social whole, while it also shows that this social will is not alien to the agent's own will.

Bradley thus uses his 'identificatory' claims as a way of supporting his anti-individualism and his account of the social organism, which he needs in order to defend his social command theory:

(a) there *is* such a thing as the state or society, that can issue commands;
(b) the individual can realise themselves by following these social duties;
(c) the individual need not feel 'alienated' from these duties as external impositions, in so far as they are essentially bound up with this social whole.

It can be argued, then, that Bradley's focus on the social identity of the individual does not show that his account of duty based on roles is intended to be identificatory, but rather forms part of an approach that fits better with a social command model.

This is not quite the end of the story, however; for, as we have noted above, *Ethical Studies* is a dialectically structured work. Thus, while 'My Station and Its Duties' may defend a social command theory of the moral duties that attach to social roles, not an identificatory one, this does not mean that Bradley takes this to be the complete account of duties; on the contrary, he frankly acknowledges its limitations – where he argues, for example, that individuals who have a capacity for art or science may have a duty to take up these activities, but where that duty cannot rightfully be imposed on them by the social will, as it is a private matter that does not relate to the good of others,[55] but forms part of what Bradley calls 'ideal morality'. Within this sphere, Bradley suggests, something more like a hybrid model may be appropriate, where the 'ought' arises out of the sense that we fall short of being fully good selves because of the presence in us of what is bad[56] – a tension that points beyond morality, to religion. It is not necessary for us to follow Bradley's discussion to this level, however, because our concern has been to assess the account of obligation underlying Bradley's conception of 'my station and its duties', and not that of other aspects of his position.

Notes

1. I have discussed some of these topics in essays in *Hegelian Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a thorough overview of the work of the British Idealists, see W. J. Mander, *British Idealism: a history* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). A briefer, though still useful, discussion is Anthony Quinton, 'Absolute Idealism', reprinted in his *Thoughts and Thinkers* (London: Duckworth, 1982), 186–206.
2. While most closely associated with Bradley, the expression is also used by Green: see *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1883), reprinted in a new edition with introduction by David O. Brink (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), §183, and cf. §313 and §338. Because of the close interconnection between them, it is not clear which author employed the phrase first. Though Hegel does not quite adopt the expression, he comes close to something like it in §150 of the *Philosophy of Right*, in a way that may have impressed Bradley and Green, when he writes that 'In an ethical community . . . in order to be virtuous [a person] must simply do what is presented, expressly stated, and known to him within his situation' (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 193 ['*Was* der Mensch tun müsse . . . um tugendhaft zu sein, ist in einem sittlichen Gemeinwesen leicht zu sagen, – es ist nichts anderes von ihm zu tun, als was ihm in seinen Verhältnissen vorgezeichnet, ausgesprochen und bekannt ist', HW vii, 298]. The phrase seems to have been familiar enough in the early/mid nineteenth century in contexts ranging from the religious ('it will conduce to restore the quiet of the mind, to attend to the humble ordinary duties of our station', John Henry Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, vol I, 1834, sermon 18) to the popular (Eliza Cheap, *My Station and Its Duties: a narrative for girls going to service*, London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1836) (with thanks to Bill Mander for these references).

3. See Richard Norman, *The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 145–72; John Horton, *Political Obligation* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1992); Michael Hardimon, 'Role obligations', *Journal of Philosophy* 91 (1994), 333–63; John Horton, 'In defence of associative political obligations', Parts One and Two, *Political Studies* 54 (2006), 427–43 and 55 (2007), 1–19; Stefan Sciaraffa, 'Identification, meaning, and the normativity of social roles', *European Journal of Philosophy* 19 (2011), 107–28.
4. But see Stewart Candlish, 'Bradley on my Station and its duties', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 56 (1978), 155–70.
5. 'The philosophy of Aristotle', *North British Review* 45 (1866), 105–44, reprinted in *The Works of T. H. Green*, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London: Longmans Green, 1885–1888), III, 49–91; 'General introduction to vol. 1' and 'Introduction to the moral part of the *Treatise*', in David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: Longmans Green, 1874–1875), I, 1–299, II, 1–71; reprinted in *The Works of T. H. Green*, I, 1–371.
6. *Prolegomena*, 'Lectures on the principles of political obligation', in *The Works of T. H. Green*, vol II, 334–553, reprinted in *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings*, ed. Paul Harris and John Morrow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 13–193; 'Lectures on the philosophy of Kant', ed. R. L. Nettleship, in *The Works of T. H. Green*, II, 1–157.
7. *Ethical Studies*, first edition 1876, second edition 1927, reprinted with an introduction by Richard Wollheim 1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press); *Appearance and Reality*, first edition 1893, second edition 1897, 9th impression (corrected) 1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press); *Principles of Logic*, 2 vols, first edition 1883, second edition 1922, corrected 1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
8. See Brink, in the introduction to his edition of the *Prolegomena*, xciv.
9. Cf. Green, *Lectures on Kant*, §105: 'As it is, though his doctrine [of the a priori in ethics] is essentially true, [Kant's] way of putting it excites the same opposition as his way of putting the corresponding doctrine in regard to the a priori element in knowledge.'
10. Cf. Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, x: 'I fear that to avoid worse misunderstandings, I must say something as to what is called "Hegelianism". For Hegel himself, assuredly I think him a great philosopher; but I never could have called myself an Hegelian, partly because I can not say that I have mastered his system, and partly because I could not accept what seems his main principle, or at least part of that principle. [Characteristically, Bradley does not tell us which 'principle' he has in mind here!] I have no wish to conceal how much I owe to his writings; but I will leave it to those who can judge better than myself, to fix the limits within which I have followed him.'
11. *Ibid.*
12. See Robert Stern, *Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
13. Robert Merrihew Adams, *Finite and Infinite Goods: a framework for ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 242.
14. Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 101.
15. *Ibid.*, 101.

16. *Ibid*., 102. Cf. also 18: '[Moral claims on us] must issue in a deep way from our sense of who we are.'
17. *Ibid*., 101. Cf. also 239–40: 'You may be tempted to do something but find that it is inconsistent with your identity as a teacher or a mother or a friend, and the thought that it is inconsistent may give rise to a new incentive, an incentive not to do this thing. As Luther's "here I stand, I cannot do otherwise" reminds us, the human heart, being human, discovers itself not only in spontaneous desire, but in imperatives.'
18. *Ibid*., 183–84 and 255–58. Cf. also A. J Simmons, *Justification and Legitimacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81–82.
19. Horton, *Political Obligation*, 150 and 157. Cf. also Hardimon, 'Role obligations', 358–63.
20. *Ethical Studies*, 163, 166, 174. Simmons cites these remarks (from a different edition) in *Justification and Legitimacy* on 80–81, note 38. Hegel himself has also been interpreted as an identificatory theorist: see, e.g., Frederick Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: actualizing freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 97—98, where Neuhouser explicitly draws the parallel with Korsgaard. As briefly outlined above, however, I also think this is a misreading of Hegel's position, where I take his account of moral obligation to be that of a social command theorist. For further discussion, see Stern, *Understanding Moral Obligation*, pp. 148—61.
21. Cf. *Prolegomena* §95: '[W]e say that to every action morally imputable, or of which a man can recognise himself as the author, the motive is always some idea of the man's personal good – an idea absolutely different from animal want, even in cases where it is from the anticipation of the satisfaction of some animal want that the idea of personal good is derived.'
22. *Ibid*., §96.
23. *Ibid*.
24. Cf. *ibid*., §104 and §§145–46.
25. Cf. *ibid*., §116 and *Lectures on Kant* §97.
26. Cf. *ibid*., §153.
27. *Ibid*., §154.
28. *Ibid*., §§156–70.
29. *Ibid*., §176.
30. *Ibid*., §193.
31. *Ibid*.
32. *Ibid*.
33. *Ibid*.
34. Cf. *Lectures on Kant* §§119–24. For further discussion of this important aspect of Green's position, see T. H. Irwin, 'Morality and personality: Kant and Green', in Allen W. Wood (ed.), *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31–56, and *The Development of Ethics*, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 581–624; and David O. Brink, *Perfectionism and the Common Good: themes from the philosophy of T. H. Green* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92–106.
35. Like others who try to find in Kant resources for a less formalistic position, Green takes consolation in the Formula of Humanity, which he uses as a 'bridge' to his own position: cf. *Lectures on Kant* §111.

36. *Prolegomena*, §196, my emphasis.
37. *Ibid.*, §202.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Cf. *ibid.*
40. Cf. *ibid.* §203: 'It is in this sense that the old language is justified, which speaks of Reason as the parent of Law. Reason is the self-objectifying consciousness. It constitutes, as we have seen, the capability in man of seeking an absolute good and of conceiving this good as common to others with himself: and it is this capability which alone renders him a possible author and a self-submitting subject of law.'
41. See *Ethical Studies* 96 note 1 – where Bradley writes that '[o]n the whole subject of this Essay let me recommend the student to consult him' – referring in particular to Green's Introduction to Hume's *Treatise*.
42. For some discussion on the relation between Green and Bradley during this period, see Peter P. Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: selected studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 50–51.
43. Cf. H. A. Prichard, 'Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?', *Mind* 21 (1912), 21–37; reprinted in *Moral Writings*, ed. Jim MacAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7–20.
44. *Ethical Studies*, 314.
45. Bradley emphasises the importance of the structure of the work, when he writes that 'These Essays are a critical discussion of some fundamental questions in Ethics, and are so far connected that, for the most part, they must be read in the order in which they stand' (*Ethical Studies*, viii).
46. *Ibid.*, 146–47.
47. In a note on 'duty for duty's sake', Bradley emphasises '[a]s I have said before, this is not a statement of Kant's view' – but where with characteristic archness, he adds 'that view is far wider, and at the same time more confused' (*Ethical Studies* 148, note 1).
48. *Ibid.*, 148.
49. *Ibid.*, 151 note 1.
50. *Ibid.*, 163.
51. *Ibid.*, 184–85.
52. *Ibid.*, 163. Bradley does not identify precisely whom he was thinking of as holding this individualist position; but Peter Nicholson plausibly suggests that he 'perhaps had in mind such writers as Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer' (Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, 24). For the problem this position raises for the social command theorist, see Susan Wolf, 'Moral obligations and social commands', in Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen (eds), *Metaphysics and the Good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 343–67, at 345, where she notes that 'the question of society's existence is . . . a legitimate and serious question . . . To be sure, we live among other people – in a neighbourhood, a state, a world. But is any collection of them sufficiently organised and unified to constitute a group that can be seen to issue commands in the requisite sense?'
53. *Ethical Studies* 166.
54. *Ibid.*, 174.
55. *Ibid.*, 222–24.

56. Cf. *ibid*., 232–35 and 293–312. Bradley writes on p. 234: ‘Morality does involve a contradiction; it does tell you to realise that which never can be realised, and which, if realised, does efface itself as such. No one ever was or could be perfectly moral; and if he were, he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection there is no ought, where there is no ought there is no morality, where there is no self-contradiction there is no ought. The ought is a self-contradiction.’

10

Idealism and the origins of analytic philosophy[1]

PETER HYLTON

Analytic philosophy is widely, and with good reason, thought of as having two points of origin.[2] First, in the work of Gottlob Frege: with his systematic presentation of modern logic, his use of that logic to give an account of arithmetic, and his articulation of the philosophical views he takes to be required by his logic; second, in the work of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the very end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Russell and Moore put forward a metaphysical view incorporating a strong form of realism and developed their philosophical views on that basis. Russell formulated modern logic and used it to account for mathematics; in both of these matters his view resembles Frege's, but was initially worked out independently; he subsequently sought to apply the same principles to an understanding of empirical knowledge. Moore put forward a strongly realist view of ethics and developed a conception of philosophical analysis.

So we may distinguish the British origins of analytic philosophy from its German origins.[3] Under the former head we shall confine ourselves to discussion of Russell and Moore. Under the latter, however, we shall consider figures other than Frege. Frege's work was confined to logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and to what he took to be the philosophical implications of these subjects. Crucially, he makes no attempt at a systematic treatment of empirical knowledge. Furthermore, his direct influence was quite limited. (Although the philosophers who were directly influenced by him include Russell, Wittgenstein and Carnap.) For these reasons, even the most cursory account of the German origins of analytic philosophy must take some account of later thinkers who played a role in the development of Logical Empiricism (also known as Logical Positivism), especially Carnap, who had the most influence of any of the Logical Empiricists on the subsequent development of analytic philosophy.

Let me briefly remark on two points which must be otherwise omitted. One is the North-American origins of analytic philosophy. Neglecting these means that there is no discussion of Pragmatism which, especially in its Peircean variety, was significantly influenced by Idealism. The justification for this – apart from lack of space – is that it seems reasonable to think of Pragmatism as influencing an already formed movement of analytic philosophy, rather than as playing a formative role in that movement. (The terms here, however, are vague, for philosophical movements are by no means sharply delimited and real history is always more complicated than can be captured.) A second omission is that I say nothing about the British origins of analytic philosophy beyond my discussion of Russell and Moore. There is, of course, much that could be said, perhaps most notably about Oxonian streams of thought that influenced J. L. Austin and Ordinary Language Philosophy.

The fact that analytic philosophy (even in our schematic account) has two different points of origin suggests that there are two distinct stories to be told about the influence of post-Kantian Idealism on the formation of that movement. (In what follows, I shall generally omit the qualification 'post-Kantian'.) The first section reinforces this suggestion by discussing the differences between the philosophical situation in late nineteenth-century Germany and that in Britain. One important difference is the way Kant was interpreted: in the context of late nineteenth-century Britain it is natural to think of him as an Idealist; in the German context he appears as primarily concerned with epistemology, and especially with the status of the natural sciences.

The second section takes up the German origins of analytic philosophy. Its conclusions are negative, that here there is no very clear direct influence of Idealism. The case of Russell and Moore is quite different, for they were quite directly influenced by Idealism. The third section is thus concerned with the metaphysical view that they initially developed, which I shall call Platonic Atomism, and with the way in which it was shaped by their opposition to Idealism.

Platonic Atomism is very distant from what we usually think of as analytic philosophy. The third section will therefore show how some more familiar themes and doctrines develop out of the views explored in the second section. Russell, in particular, modifies his earlier views in response to various difficulties; in those modifications we see ideas and questions – and, more important perhaps, ways of approaching questions – which are characteristic of much later analytic philosophy.

1. Idealism in Germany and in Britain

Our concern in this section is with the philosophical situation in Britain, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, in so far as each is relevant to the influence of Idealism on the early stages of the formation of analytic philosophy in each country. As we shall briefly see, the position of Idealism in Britain in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is quite different from that which it occupied in Germany at the same period. This difference goes along with a difference in the ways that Kant was generally interpreted.

In Britain, Idealist philosophy became influential only in the last third of the century.[4] In the hands of such figures as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley and Edward Caird, it gradually became the dominant view, as it was in the 1890s, when Russell and Moore received their early philosophical education; it remained significant into the 1920s.

The British Idealists, for the most part, read Kant as a precursor of their own more Hegelian form of Idealism. T. H. Green, for example, rejects both the Kantian distinction between sensibility and the understanding and the idea of things in themselves. He does not repudiate Kant; rather, he interprets Kant as holding correct views but failing to think them through to their conclusion, because he had not wholly freed himself from the influence of earlier philosophy. If Kant had followed his principles to their conclusion, on this account, he would have been led to a broadly Hegelian form of Idealism. Green speaks of 'the incomplete development of [Kant's] idealism which is shown by his partial retention . . . of that antithesis between the world of experience and the world of ideas which he inherited from Leibniz'.[5] Similar views of Kant, as above all the precursor of a broadly Hegelian form of Idealism, are widely expressed in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British philosophy.[6]

In the context of late nineteenth-century British philosophy, it is thus natural to think of Kant as an Idealist. Certainly Russell and Moore did so. Their 'reaction against Idealism' was a reaction against a nexus of views broad enough to include Hegel, Lotze, the British Idealists such as Caird, Green and F. H. Bradley – and Kant (as read by the Idealists).

In Germany, by contrast, the popularity of Idealism declined after Hegel's death in 1831.[7] The increasing prominence of empirical science (including psychology), and of the use of historical-critical methods in the study of religion, encouraged naturalistic and materialistic views. (Whether such views should be thought of as philosophical or as rejecting philosophy is not always

clear.) In some cases, such views looked upon logic and science as no more than natural (psychological) phenomena, to be investigated in the same general way as any other phenomena (thereby threatening – or promising – to undermine the claims of truth and objectivity entirely).

Out of these views, and in conscious reaction to post-Kantian Idealism, a 'back to Kant' movement arose. In the initial phase of this movement Kant was himself interpreted in a naturalistic fashion: forms of sensibility were taken to be subject to psychological or physiological investigation. Later phases of the movement, including the views grouped together under the rubric 'Neo-Kantianism', rejected this kind of naturalism and insisted, in more truly Kantian fashion, on an *a priori* element in knowledge. The focus here was on epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*) rather than on metaphysics, and, in particular, on achieving an understanding of mathematics and the natural sciences.[8]

The crucial point, from our perspective, is that the various interpretations of Kant arising from the 'back to Kant' movement do not make it natural to think of him primarily as a precursor of later Idealism, i.e., as holding views which reach their natural fruition in the work of Hegel and his successors. The concern with epistemology, and, in particular, with mathematics and with natural science, are quite different from the concerns which the British Idealists emphasised in interpreting Kant as the predecessor of their own more Hegelian work. In the context of late nineteenth-century Britain it is appropriate to think of Kant as a proto-Idealist; in the context of mid and late nineteenth-century Germany, however, Kant appears more as a scientific philosopher.[9]

II. The German origins of analytic philosophy: Frege and Logical Empiricism

Frege is most concerned to oppose the naturalism that became prevalent in mid nineteenth-century Germany, especially in its psychologistic version. He argues vehemently against the view that the way to understand arithmetic and logic is in psychological terms, by attending to events in the mind of the person performing arithmetical calculations or logical inferences. There is, by contrast, no sign in Frege's work of any argument directed explicitly against post-Kantian Idealism.[10]

The question of the positive influences on Frege's philosophical thought is less straightforward. He shares with the neo-Kantians a concern with epistemology (in some sense of that term) and in particular with the foundations

of mathematics (although not, in Frege's case of the empirical sciences) and also a rejection of naturalism and an insistence on there being an *a priori* element in knowledge. Clearly he was influenced to some extent by Kant; it has also been persuasively argued that Lotze is a significant influence, as we shall see.

Frege argues against Kant on specific points but he does not reject Kant's thought in the wholesale way in which Russell and Moore do. His references to Kant are invariably respectful – a fact that is especially striking given his harsh and polemical discussions of a wide range of other philosophers. He thinks that Kant was wrong about the scope of logic, and, in consequence, wrong about the status of arithmetic. He puts forward extremely powerful methods, which he takes to embody logic, and shows that those methods suffice to give an account of arithmetic; he concludes that arithmetic and (Fregean) logic have the same status. On Frege's account, both are analytic; he denies the Kantian view that arithmetic depends upon forms of intuition and is synthetic *a priori*. In Frege's hands, however, unlike those of Russell and of many subsequent analytic philosophers, the reduction of arithmetic to logic is not put forward as the basis of a general argument against Kant. On the contrary: Frege accepts a number of distinctively Kantian doctrines. In particular, he accepts Kant's view of geometry: that it is based on intuition and is therefore synthetic *a priori*.[11] This is a view that Frege never abandoned. In two essays that he wrote near the end of his life he distinguishes three sources of knowledge: sense perception, the logical source of knowledge, and a third source which in one essay he calls 'the geometrical source of knowledge and the temporal sources of knowledge' and in the other simply 'the geometrical source of knowledge'. This third source of knowledge is clearly a descendant of Kant's *a priori* forms of intuition.[12]

The significance and extent of Kant's influence on Frege, and the more general issues in the interpretation of Frege which go along with it, are still disputed. Fortunately, they need not be settled for present purposes. The Kant who influenced Frege – to whatever extent he did – was clearly a Kant whose interests were in epistemology and in mathematics and natural science, not a Kant who should be classified as a precursor of later Idealism. The evidence for this is chiefly negative: there is simply no sign in Frege's work of the concerns that dominated the thought of post-Kantian Idealists. One positive piece of evidence is that while the Idealists almost invariably rejected the Kantian distinction between sensibility and the understanding, Frege accepts it unquestioningly. Two paragraphs back we saw him appealing in late essays to the geometrical (or geometrical and temporal) source of

knowledge. The point is even clearer in a remark at the start of his doctoral dissertation, some fifty years earlier. Geometry, he says, 'rests ultimately on axioms which derive their validity from the nature of our intuitive faculty'.[13] The same point is repeated elsewhere. In an 1882 letter, for example, he writes, as if it were an obvious point: 'The field of geometry is the field of possible spatial intuition.'[14] There is thus every reason to think of the Kant who influenced Frege as the scientific Kant, rather than the proto-Idealist Kant.

Frege's understanding of Kant may well have come in significant part from Lotze. (Certainly Frege attended lectures by Lotze while studying for his PhD at Göttingen.)[15] Besides the doctrines already mentioned, Frege accepts the Kantian view, also found in Lotze, that a complete thought or proposition is prior to the concepts that compose it, and that the concepts are to be understood only as abstractions from the complete thought.[16] Like Lotze, Frege insists upon anti-psychologism, and upon the distinction between the act of knowledge and the content of knowledge. Something like Lotze's Platonism, and his notion of objectivity or validity, are also in Frege's thought.[17] Lotze, however, while certainly influenced by the post-Kantian Idealists, is not in any very clear sense to be thought of as among them. Furthermore, the aspects of his thought that influenced Frege are not those which are characteristic of the Idealists. As Sluga puts it: 'There is no indication [in Frege's work] of any interest in Lotze's metaphysics, his aesthetics, or his philosophy of religion. It is a Lotze stripped to the logical bones that appears in Frege's thought.'[18] In spite of Lotze's influence, there is no sign in Frege's work of the influence of the Idealists.

Similar remarks can be made about the philosophers who played a formative role in Logical Empiricism, although here the story is significantly more complicated. The work of Kant was influential, but, again, it was Kant interpreted as scientific philosopher rather than as a proto-Idealist. Almost all the thinkers who played important parts in the early history of Logical Empiricism were trained as scientists or mathematicians rather than, or as well as, philosophers. In particular, the early members of the Vienna Circle, with one exception, were all trained in science or mathematics rather than philosophy; Schlick, the central figure in the formation of the group, took his PhD in mathematical physics under Max Planck before he turned to philosophy.[19] Carnap, who joined the Circle in 1926, four years after its founding, studied both physics and philosophy and conceived the idea of formulating an axiomatisation of the theory of relativity to submit as a

doctoral dissertation to the physics department.[20] The physicists told him such a project really belonged in philosophy; the philosophers that it belonged in physics. He was clearly interested in both subjects – as well as logic – from the outset. It is thus not surprising that the primary theoretical concerns of the Vienna Circle were with the status of mathematics and the natural sciences, and with epistemology more generally.

Recent scholarly work on Logical Empiricism, and especially on Carnap's early work, has emphasised that it should not be seen as straightforwardly empiricist and that it was influenced by neo-Kantianism, either of the naturalistic variety put forward by Helmholtz or of the so-called Marburg school variety, of which Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp were notable proponents.[21] These intellectual movements were influenced by Idealism, largely negatively.[22] By going 'back to Kant', and emphasising those aspects of Kant's work which promised to be of use in understanding the sciences, they hoped to overcome the alienation between science and philosophy which they thought had come about with Idealism.

Idealism would play some part in a full account of the German origins of analytic philosophy. Its influence, however, is diffuse and indirect. There is simply no sign of direct influence of post-Kantian Idealism in the work of Carnap or other Logical Empiricists. (Carnap's criticism of metaphysics is for the most part generic; when he specifies a target and goes into detail it is Heidegger whom he discusses.) Nor are there clear signs of its indirect influence: if one were asked to say how Carnap's work was affected by the fact that the neo-Kantians were opposing Idealism there would be no very clear answer. The situation is very different in the case of Russell and Moore, as the next section will argue.

III. The British origins of analytic philosophy: Moore and Russell

In their very earliest work, both Russell and Moore advocated – or assumed – Idealist doctrines.[23] In their mid twenties, however, each of them explicitly rejected those doctrines and began to develop an alternative philosophy that I shall call 'Platonic Atomism'.[24] Moore took the lead in this; the slightly older Russell quickly followed. Moore's argument begins with a criticism which the Idealists had made of Kant and which Kant had made of the Empiricists. Moore presses it further.

Kant claims that Locke's discussion of the origin of knowledge is simply an empirical psychological account of how we come to acquire certain

concepts; and that, in virtue of its psychological character, it cannot answer the genuine philosophical questions about knowledge.[25] Kant's account, however, with its description of how intuitions and concepts are combined to form judgements, is vulnerable to the same charge of being unduly psychological. Thus Hegel, for example, says 'Kant remained restricted and confined by his psychological point of view and his empirical methods'.[26]

Moore claims that the Idealists do not go far enough in freeing their philosophy from psychologism – that, in spite of their opposition to *Kant*'s (supposed) reliance on psychology, the Idealists themselves were also, at least implicitly, psychologistic.[27] As against that, Moore puts forward an extreme anti-psychologism, beginning with the dissertation that he submitted to Trinity College, Cambridge in support of his (successful) application for a Prize Fellowship early in the Autumn of 1898, when he was twenty-four years old.[28] He rejects the central Kantian idea of necessary or transcendental conditions of knowledge, arguing that the Kantian idea of a condition of knowledge is doubly ambiguous:

> By 'knowledge' what is meant? If 'truth', then it is difficult to see that there can be any other conditions for a true proposition than some other true proposition. If empirical cognition, then does not empirical psychology investigate the conditions for the possibility of this? A similar ambiguity is involved in the word 'condition'. In what sense a 'condition'? If an existent be meant . . . then condition is equivalent to 'cause' . . . as in empirical psychology. But if a logical condition be meant, then it must be some true proposition, from the truth of which the truth of another can be inferred.[29]

Moore's view is that a condition on knowledge must be either logical or straightforwardly empirical – presumably psychological or physiological. On neither understanding do we have a condition on knowledge which is also a condition on what is known. He thus makes a sharp distinction between the act of knowledge and the object which is known. The latter is wholly independent of the former.[30]

Moore's argument here depends on the claim that conditions on knowledge must be either logical or empirical, that there is no third possibility. In a slightly later work he also offers a different kind of argument against the idea that there are conditions on knowledge that are also conditions on what is known. The idea, he claims, is self-defeating; what we aim to know is how things are independent of us, but if there were conditions on knowledge of

that sort then 'we never do know what we know, but always something else, which is to be regarded as the result of the interaction with our minds of the object we alter by knowing it'.[31]

The focus of Moore's criticism here is a view that was also subject to much criticism by the Idealists. The view that our knowledge results from an interaction between our minds, on the one hand, and something wholly external to them, on the other, is always liable to the criticism that it makes our knowledge seem inadequate; hence the familiar Idealist criticism that Kant's view is a form of scepticism. The characteristic Idealist response is not to completely abandon the idea of presuppositions of knowledge but, rather, to give up on the idea that we can coherently think of anything wholly independent of such presuppositions, i.e., to give up on the Kantian idea of things in themselves.

Moore also rejects unknowable things in themselves, but in a completely different way. Rather then denying that there are things wholly independent of our minds, he accepts that there are such things but insists that we can know them. This knowledge has no presuppositions or conditions (other than logical conditions and empirical conditions). He insists that in knowledge we are directly and immediately related to objects outside our minds, objects which are in no way affected by being known.

Moore's view that we have immediate knowledge of objects outside our minds shows up in his frequent use of perceptual (usually visual) language, referring especially to our perception of simple sensory qualities. His Idealist opponents would, of course, not accept that even our knowledge of simple sensory qualities is immediate and presuppositionless, but it is perhaps the kind of knowledge for which this view is most plausible. Thus in *Principia Ethica* Moore explains his view of our knowledge of the indefinable quality *good* by comparing it with our perception of the indefinable quality *yellow*.[32] Similarly, Russell, in the Preface to the *Principles of Mathematics* (published in the same year as *Principia Ethica*), says:

> The discussion of indefinables – which forms the chief part of philosophical logic – is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple.[33]

The point is the same in Russell as in Moore: our knowledge of simple sensory qualities is taken to be direct, immediate and presuppositionless, and our knowledge of other, far more abstract, entities – of goodness or of

the indefinables of logic and mathematics – is then assimilated to that kind of knowledge. All knowledge, on this view, is fundamentally of this sort.

The fundamental cognitive relation – 'acquaintance', as Russell calls it – is a relation between a mind and the known entity. One important point is that this kind of knowledge is thus not intrinsically propositional or judgemental; it is knowledge *of* an entity, not knowledge *that* such-and-such is the case. (We shall enlarge upon this point shortly.) A second point is that knowledge, on this picture, is atomistic: the knowledge that I acquire by knowing any one entity – being acquainted with it – is independent of my knowledge of any other. This is a strongly atomistic view of knowledge which goes naturally with an atomistic metaphysics, i.e., a view which sees the universe as made up of entities each of which is what it is independent of any other entities. The entities are related, of course, but any one of them is unaffected by its relations to other entities; the relations are, as both Moore and Russell emphasise, *external*. It is in this spirit that Moore takes, as the epitaph of *Principia Ethica*, the saying attributed to Bishop Butler: 'Everything is what it is, and not another thing.'

According to this picture, the knowing mind is purely passive and receptive. Knowledge is fundamentally a matter of acquaintance, and acquaintance is a purely external relation between a mind and the known object. The mind, in being acquainted with an object, does not in any way affect that object. One might suppose that Russell, as a logician, would emphasise the mental activity of inferring one thing from another, and see that as an activity which leads to knowledge. But not so. He accepts that inference may bring knowledge but he denies that it is in the relevant sense an *activity* of the mind: 'the mind, in fact, is as purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it to be in perception of sensible objects.'[34]

The view that the mind is passive in knowledge is an important point of affinity between Moore and Russell, on the one hand, and classical Empiricism, on the other. We should not, however, be tempted to think of Moore and Russell as setting out to revive Empiricism. On the contrary; they held that view to have been definitively refuted by the Idealists. Moore, for example, says of 'the philosophic school, to which modern Idealists belong' that '[a]gainst Sensationalism and Empiricism they [*sic*] have maintained the true view'.[35]

One focus of Idealist criticism of Empiricism is that the latter view cannot account for judgement, for our knowledge of truths, or for propositional thought in general. Even the simplest kind of thought or judgement,

according to the Idealists, requires more than mere receptivity, more than the mind's capacity to have simple ideas, and thus requires more than the Empiricists can allow for. Green, for example, follows Kant in arguing that judgement, and hence knowledge, presupposes certain formal conceptions that empiricist principles cannot allow for. Empiricism, he claims cannot 'account for any significant predication whatsoever, as distinct from mere exclamations prompted by feelings as they occur'.[36]

One might think that Platonic Atomism would be vulnerable to the same charge. On that view, acquaintance is the fundamental relation between a mind and things outside it, and in acquaintance the mind is passive and purely receptive. How, on the basis of this kind of knowledge of entities, can we explain propositional thought? The view answers, or evades, the question by reifying propositions and asserting that they are among the things with which we are acquainted. How am I able to judge that the table is brown? By being acquainted with the proposition *that the table is brown*!

The Platonic Atomist account of propositional thought is worked out in Moore's 1899 essay 'The Nature of Judgment', where he criticises F. H. Bradley's theory of judgement.[37] Moore's criticism of Bradley's attempt to explain meaning leads him to the conclusion that concepts, of which propositions are composed, cannot be explained 'in terms of some existent fact, whether mental or of any other nature. All such explanations do in fact presuppose the nature of the concept, as a *genus per se*, irreducible to anything else.'[38] Propositions, and the concepts which compose them, are, in particular, wholly independent of us and our ideas.

Moore also makes a further claim. The concepts that, on his account, make up a given proposition are not merely *related to* the subject matter of that proposition: they *are* its subject matter. Or, to put the same point the other way around, the ordinary objects of the world, the things we make judgements about, are concepts or complexes of concepts: 'All that exists is thus composed of concepts necessarily related to one another in specific manners, and likewise to the concept of existence.'[39] What there is in the world is to be understood in terms of concepts and their relations, which are also concepts, and propositions, which are complexes of concepts. If a proposition is true then it does not merely *express* a fact; it *is* a fact. Here, truth and falsity are simple and unanalysable properties of propositions; fact, reality and existence are explained in terms of them. Thus Moore says that an existent is 'nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the concept of existence'.[40] His view thus makes no

distinction between objects of thought and reality, between the entities of which a proposition is composed and the entities which it is about. The view, he says, is 'the most Platonic system of modern times'.[41]

In taking this further step, Moore may have been influenced by a line of thought later made explicit by Russell. Suppose the content of our judgements were made up of entities other than those the judgement is about – 'ideas', Russell calls them. In that case, Russell says, 'ideas become a veil between us and outside things'.[42] In that case, Russell holds, 'we never really, in knowledge, attain to those things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things'.[43] If our judgements were made up of ideas, we would need to explain how those judgements manage to be about what they are about: What makes a given idea the idea of a certain entity, distinct from the idea? How, in virtue of having the idea, do I succeed in thinking *about* that other entity? The answers are, at least, not obvious. As Russell says: 'The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure.'[44] Given the emphasis on immediacy in Platonic Atomism, a view in which our contact with the things we talk about is indirect, mediated by ideas, is likely to seem problematic.

The crucial fact for our purposes is not *why* Moore takes this step but simply the fact that he does so and that it makes a crucial difference to his thought as a whole. As Baldwin and Preti put it: 'In effect a theory of judgment turns into a metaphysics, thanks to the role of propositions.'[45] Russell, moreover, follows him. The way in which this doctrine, and other aspects of Platonic Atomism, lead to more familiar issues and doctrines in analytic philosophy will be the subject of the next section.

IV. From Platonic Atomism to analytic philosophy

The previous section was concerned with Platonic Atomism, the view developed by Russell and (especially) Moore in the first stage of their rejection of Idealism. That view is very strongly influenced by Idealism; its main doctrines emerge out of the drive by Moore and Russell to escape from the Idealism in which they were educated and to which they initially adhered. Platonic Atomism, however, may seem to be quite unrecognisable as a form of analytic philosophy. The aim of the present section is, accordingly, to indicate how some more recognisable themes and doctrines of analytic philosophy develop out of the views discussed in the previous section – and are thus influenced by Idealism. I take up one aspect of Moore's work and three lines of thought in Russell's; I divide the discussion into four sub-sections.

i. *Moorean analysis*

Moore played a dominant role in British philosophy in the 1920s and into the 1930s. He became editor of *Mind*, the leading British philosophical journal, in 1921, and in 1925 he became Professor at Cambridge, where he had taught since 1911. (During the course of the 1930s Wittgenstein, who returned to Cambridge in 1929, took over the pre-eminent role.) A certain conception of philosophical analysis was central to Moore's work, and to his influence. John Wisdom, in an essay published in 1931, wrote: 'Philosophy is concerned with the analysis of facts – a doctrine which Wittgenstein has lately preached and Moore long practised.'[46] In the 1930s increasing numbers of philosophers came from overseas, especially from the US, to study with Moore (and with Wittgenstein), thus spreading his influence.[47]

Moore's conception of philosophical analysis presupposes the sort of realism about concepts and (with some qualification) about propositions that we saw in the previous section.[48] Moorean analysis of propositions presupposes that propositions are complex, made up of other entities, in ways that are not immediately apparent from the sentences that are usually used to express them; the analysis of concepts likewise presupposes that the analysed concepts are made up of other concepts. Independent of us, the proposition or concept that is being analysed has a certain complexity; the task of the philosophical analyst is, of course, to reveal the hidden complexity. As an example of the analysis of a concept Moore offers: 'The concept "being a brother" is identical with the concept "being a male sibling".'[49] (He does not, however, go so far as to claim that this is a *correct* analysis.) Among the alternative formulations which he suggests is: 'To be a brother is to be a male sibling.'

Moore's view is always that the object of analysis is a non-linguistic entity: 'When I have talked of analysing anything, *what* I have talked of analysing has always been an idea or concept or proposition, and *not* a verbal expression.'[50] Nevertheless, the evidence for or against a particular proposed analysis is, inevitably, drawn from the ways in which we use the word or sentence which supposedly expresses the concept or proposition in question. This fact, together with the increasing weight that Moore put on the deliverances of 'common sense', make it natural to misunderstand Moorean analysis so that what is being analysed is a sentence in our ordinary language – or, indeed, to modify the Moorean conception in this direction.[51] Moore's conception of philosophical analysis thus provides a bridge between the Platonic Atomism discussed in the previous section and the Ordinary Language Philosophy that

played a central role in British (and, to a lesser extent, American) analytic philosophy in the two decades after the end of the Second World War.[52]

ii. Propositions and their difficulties

In the few years after their rejection of Idealism, both Russell and Moore held propositions to be abstract entities with which we may be acquainted; this idea was crucial for the way in which their overall view was able to accommodate propositional thought. Thinking of propositions in this way, however, brings with it a number of difficulties which became increasingly apparent, especially to Russell, towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century.[53] One difficulty is that propositions, thus conceived, are complex entities made up of simpler entities which are – somehow – united. Russell's underlying metaphysics, unlike Frege's, is atomistic, and leaves no room for an account of such unity.[54] Another difficulty is that, on this view, there must be false propositions as well as true propositions and the difference between them is undefinable. As Russell remarks as early as 1904: 'this theory *seems* to leave our preference for truth a mere unaccountable prejudice.'[55] Even worse, perhaps, the view *seems* to leave it a mere matter of chance that every proposition is either true or false.

In response to these difficulties, Russell developed the so-called 'multiple relation theory of judgement': when I judge that Socrates is mortal, I am not related to a single entity, *that Socrates is mortal*. I am, rather, related separately to each of the entities, Socrates and *mortality*, and I unite them in thought.[56] This theory faces considerable difficulties of its own. Wittgenstein severely, although obscurely, criticised the version that Russell produced in 1913 while drafting a projected book, to have been called *Theory of Knowledge*;[57] as a result of this criticism Russell abandoned the book and quite fundamentally changed his philosophical orientation.[58]

Wittgenstein's own view of how propositional thought is possible emerges from his criticism of Russell. Central to Wittgenstein's view at this time is a focus not on the thought that a sentence expresses but on the actual sentence, the piece of language, itself: what signifies is (say) that one word stands to the left of a second, and the third to its right, and facts of that kind. The 'linguistic turn' is often said to be characteristic of analytic philosophy; if there is one place where that turn is decisively taken, it is here.[59]

iii. The nature of logic

Logic is central to Russell's philosophy from 1900 onwards. Logicism – the reduction of mathematics to logic – and his conception of philosophical analysis both obviously depend upon it. The logic that plays this role is essentially higher-order quantification theory, containing first-order logic (what today is most often called 'logic') as a fragment.

What is the status of this logic, and of our knowledge of it? Russell's answer is constrained by the realism of Platonic Atomism, and the conception of knowledge that goes along with it. Logic, and indeed other subjects knowable *a priori*, must concern the properties or relations of real entities; our knowledge of it must be based on our being acquainted with those entities. Logic is not about entities which are in space or time (though it does apply to such entities). Hence there must be entities which are not in space and time – universals, as Russell comes to call them – with which we can be acquainted. As he says in *Problems of Philosophy*: 'the statement "two and two are four" deals exclusively with universals, and therefore may be known by anyone who is acquainted with the universals concerned' (p. 105).

This view, however, is quite problematic. For one thing, it leaves us with no criterion for what is knowable *a priori*. To be knowable in that way, it is necessary that a proposition should concern only universals but this condition is not sufficient. Russell himself gives the proposition 'all men are mortal' as an example of a proposition which does concern only universals but is, he claims, not knowable *a priori*.[60] As to what further condition must be satisfied, it is hard to see what Russell could say.

More generally, we might say that Russell's account of *a priori* knowledge does not sufficiently distinguish it from empirical knowledge. Each is based on acquaintance with the relevant entities; in each case our attempts at knowledge are correct if the entities are as we say they are. Russell insists, of course, that different kinds of entities are involved: much of our empirical knowledge involves entities other than universals. (Not all of it, however, as the example of the previous paragraph indicates.) This view, however, may be thought not to do justice to the evident differences that obtain between our knowledge of logic and our knowledge of empirical subjects. It does not, for example, provide a compelling account of any sense in which logic provides a structure for our knowledge, or in which it reflects anything other than the way things happen to be in the realm of universals.

This kind of dissatisfaction was the stimulus for Wittgenstein to develop a quite different account of logic. According to this account, logic is tautologous; sentences of logic simply make no claim about the world (they are, he says, *sinnlos*).[61] They are not claims about any kind of reality, concrete or abstract; they are simply by-products of any system of representing reality.

This is, of course, a view that, in one form or another, plays a central role in much subsequent analytic philosophy. Carnap takes it up but prefers the term 'analytic' to the term 'tautologous'.[62] He extends the idea, and in his hands it plays something of the role of the Kantian idea that our knowledge has a form or structure which can be sharply distinguished from its matter. And Quine's disagreement with Carnap on this point provides the form in which a number of Quine's central doctrines are first articulated.

iv. Acquaintance, denoting, descriptions and Russellian analysis

According to the views of Moore and Russell discussed in Section II, above, all knowledge is based on the mind's capacity to have direct and unmediated knowledge of entities outside itself. *Acquaintance*, as Russell calls it, is the only fundamental kind of knowledge. In the case of sentences about one or more particular objects, this picture thus requires that we be acquainted with those objects and with a universal corresponding to the predicate or relation in the sentence. We understand 'Socrates is mortal', presumably, in virtue of being acquainted with Socrates and with mortality. Initially, the idea that we can be acquainted with the long-dead Socrates does not trouble Russell. He is even willing to accept that we are acquainted with objects that have never existed, such as Pegasus; such objects are said to have being, even though they do not exist. The view is profligate both ontologically and epistemologically.

Sentences involving generality pose greater problems for the view. Consider: 'Any number which is prime and greater than two is odd.' If we try to explain our understanding of this sentence along the lines of the previous two paragraphs, we presumably have to say that we are acquainted with a proposition that contains all the numbers or at least all the prime numbers greater than two. Russell was willing, for a while, to accept our acquaintance with Socrates, and even with Pegasus, but not with the infinitely many natural numbers, or with a proposition that contains them. (This point is explicit in Section 141 of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*.) The first signs of Russell's concern with this issue come as he is beginning to develop a system of logic.[63] He requires a metaphysical view that can underpin that

logic and, in this respect, the view that Moore first developed is unable to do so. Some modification is required.

The modification that Russell puts forward in *Principles* is the theory of denoting concepts. This solves the problem more or less by stipulation. Russell asserts that there are *denoting concepts*, which have the useful and agreeable property that a proposition that contains such a concept is not about that concept but is rather about the object or objects – in some cases an infinite number – which the concept denotes. This theory, as Russell articulates it, becomes exceedingly complex and seems to be in danger of incoherence. It also seems to be incapable of performing its central task of explaining generality. For these reasons, Russell abandons the theory in the 1905 essay 'On Denoting'.[64] He takes generality for granted and uses it to explain sentences containing denoting phrases. A sentence of the form 'All Fs are Gs' is explained in Fregean fashion as: 'for all x, if Fx then Gx'. A sentence of the form 'The F is G' is explained by Russell's own invention, the theory of descriptions, as: there is one and only one thing x, such that Fx, and Gx.

The theory of descriptions – 'that paradigm of philosophy'[65] – plays a central role in Russell's thought partly because he increasingly limits the scope of acquaintance. By 1905, he no longer thinks that we can be acquainted with physical objects or with the minds of other people: I can think about such an entity only as *the* object which stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such other objects (where the latter, presumably, are entities with which I am acquainted). Thus when I utter 'Socrates is mortal', for example, I express a thought which would be more accurately expressed by: 'There is one and only one object which stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such entities [with which I am acquainted] and it is mortal.' The point is a general one: almost all the sentences we utter are misleading because their superficial form is different from the logical form of the underlying thought.[66]

One weakness of this view is that it implies that I can only succeed in talking about a physical object if I know of some relation that it stands in to entities with which I am acquainted (presumably sense data of mine). The existence of physical objects has to be inferred from the existence of sense data, via general principles relating the two. It is, however, hard to see how I could come by knowledge of the relevant sort of principle.[67] This leads Russell, beginning in 1912, to adopt a view according to which sentences that appear to be about physical objects are really about classes (of classes . . .) of sense data. (Sentences that appear to be about classes are in turn really about propositional functions, but I shall ignore that complication here.)

Russell speaks of *constructing* rather than inferring physical objects.[68] The metaphor may hide how drastic this view is. It implies that there are no physical objects (or at least if there are they are wholly inaccessible to us, and not what we think and speak about). All that there is, on this view (or at least all that is accessible to us), are simple entities which are potential objects of acquaintance – abstract objects, sense-data, for each person his or her own mental entities or events, and memories of sense-data and mental events. The systematic misleadingness of ordinary sentences, which was already in place by 1905, is greatly magnified and made almost universal (except when we confine ourselves to logic). Only the simple 'atoms' have to be accepted as real. Everything else, all complex entities and everything not potentially knowable by acquaintance, has the status of a logical construction; i.e., sentences that appear to be about such things are really not. Here we have the basis of the view, enormously influential in later analytic philosophy, known as 'logical atomism'.[69]

Notes

1. For comments on drafts of this essay I am indebted to members of the Impact of Idealism project, including Karl Ameriks, Nicholas Boyle and Liz Disley and, especially, to Andrew Lugg.
2. Thus Hans Sluga says: 'Following common practice, I take analytic philosophy as originating in the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein', 'Frege on meaning' in H.-J. Glock, *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), 17–34; the passage quoted is at 17n. (I omit Wittgenstein from consideration in sections I and II because the primary influences on his early thought were Russell and Frege.) Another distinguished commentator focuses exclusively on Russell and Moore: 'Twentieth-century analytic philosophy has its twofold roots in Cambridge at the turn of the century in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.' Peter Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 5. It seems to me, however, a mistake to omit Frege, and Germany, from the story.
3. This is not to deny that there was contact, and cross-fertilisation, between the two. Limitations of space require that our account be schematic.
4. The origin of Idealism in Britain is sometimes said to be H. Stirling's book *The Secret of Hegel* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865); some earlier idealist influence is to be found in the work of Carlyle and Coleridge but it played no significant role in academic philosophy. See Jean Pucelle, *L'Idéalisme en Angleterre* (Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, Boudry, 1955) and ch. 3 of John A. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1957).
5. *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 3rd edn, 1894), iii, 137.

6. A particularly noteworthy example is Norman Kemp Smith: 'all that is most vital in his [Kant's] teaching, and has proved really fruitful in its after-history, would seem to be in line with the positions which have since been more explicitly developed by such writers as Lotze, Sigwart, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, James and Dewey, and which in their tenets all derive from Hegel's re-statement of Kant's logical doctrines.' *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (London: Macmillan, 1918; 2nd edn, 1923), 36.
7. For discussion of philosophy in Germany between 1830 and 1881, see Klaus Christian Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
8. See Michael Friedman, *The Parting of the Ways* (Chicago and LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 2000).
9. André Carus speaks of Kant's 'ambivalence with respect to enlightenment and scientific thinking', and of his 'two legacies'. *Carnap and Twentieth Century Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69.
10. Here I disagree with Michael Dummett, who describes Frege as 'a realist in revolt against the prevailing idealism of his day'; *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (London: Duckworth, 1973), 197. For evidence for what I take to be the correct view, see Hans D. Sluga, 'Frege and the rise of analytic philosophy', *Inquiry* 18 (1975), 471–87, and 'Frege as a rationalist', in M. Schirn (ed.), *Studies on Frege* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976), i, 27–47.
11. See, for example, Gottlob Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968, with English translation by J. L. Austin *en face*; 1st edn 1884), §14: 'the axioms of geometry are independent . . . of the primitive laws of logic, and consequently are synthetic.' (I have modified Austin's translation slightly.)
12. 'Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften' and 'Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung der Arithmetik', in Gottlob Frege, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, ed. Hans Hermes *et al.* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), 286–94 and 298–303, respectively; English translation: 'Sources of knowledge of mathematics and the mathematical natural sciences' and 'A new attempt at a foundation for arithmetic', respectively, in Gottlob Frege, *Posthumous Writings*, ed. Hans Hermes *et al.* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 267–74 and 278–81, respectively.
13. *Über eine geometrische Darstellung der imaginären Gebilde in der Ebene*, doctoral dissertation in the Philosophical Faculty of Göttingen, 1873; in Gottlob Frege, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Ignacio Angelli (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990; 1st edn 1967), 1–49; the passage quoted is on p. 1; translated under the title 'On a geometrical representation of imaginary forms in the plane' in Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers*, ed. Brian McGuiness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 1–55; the passage quoted is on p. 1.
14. Letter to Anton Marty of 29 August 1882, in Gottlob Frege, *Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel*, ed. Gottfried Gabriel *et al.* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976), 163; translation in Gottlob Frege, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, ed. Gottfried Gabriel *et al.* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 100.
15. See Hans Sluga, *Frege* (London: Routledge, 1980), ch. II, §2.
16. This view is manifest in what has come to be called 'the context principle': 'it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning' ['*Nur im Zusamenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas*.'] Frege, *Grundlagen*, §62. Some commentators have claimed that Frege abandoned this view. It is, however, clear in later writings. In the notes that Frege wrote for the historian of science Ludwig Darmstaedter in 1919, for example, he says: 'I

do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or a judgement; I come by the parts of a thought by analysing the thought', *Nachgelassene Schriften*, 271; *Posthumous Writings*, 253.

17. See Sluga, *Frege*, especially ch. II, §5 and ch. V, §5; also Gottfried Gabriel, 'Frege, Lotze, and the continental roots of early analytic philosophy', in Erich H. Reck (ed.), *Frege to Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 39–51.
18. Hans Sluga, *Frege*, 52.
19. Viktor Kraft was the exception. Of the other initial members of the group Philip Frank was a physicist, Hans Hahn, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Theodor Radacovic and Gustav Bergmann were all mathematicians, and Otto Neurath was a social scientist. See Thomas Uebel, 'Vienna circle', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition)*, available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/vienna-circle/>.
20. See Carnap, 'Autobiography', in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court: 1963), 11.
21. Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth Century Thought*, argues that Carnap's early Kantianism is of the naturalised variety advocated by Helmholtz; see especially 111–15. Michael Friedman gives more weight to the influence of the Marburg school variety of neo-Kantianism on Carnap's early work. See, in particular, *The Parting of the Ways*, in which he argues that 'Carnap begins his philosophical career by attempting to realise the philosophical ambitions of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism', 149.
22. The Marburg school neo-Kantians, however, partially agree with Idealism on one important point: they deny that sensibility by itself imposes *a priori* structures on what is known. See Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth Century Thought*, 81f. Perhaps there is some influence of this idea on Carnap's work, but at least in his mature work it is not at all evident.
23. See, for example, Russell, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897); Moore, 'In what sense, if any, do past and future time exist?, *Mind*, n.s. 6 (1897), 228–40; and 'Freedom', *Mind*, n.s. 7 (1898), 179–204. For discussion of Russell's idealist phase see Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 3, and Nicholas Griffin, *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
24. For more detailed discussion of the rejection of Idealism by Moore and Russell, and of the view which they developed in opposition to Idealism, see Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, pt. II.
25. See, for example, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1968; 1st edn 1929), A84–87 = B116–19. (I follow the usual convention of citing by page numbers of the first and second editions of the original.)
26. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane and Francis H. Simon (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955; 1st edn 1892), iii, 431; cf. also 432f.
27. This suggests that exactly what it is to 'rely on psychology' is not at all a straightforward matter. Moore is, no doubt, shifting the standards here. Mid nineteenth-century attempts to put psychology on an empirical and scientific basis surely reinforced the idea that philosophy should be independent of it.

28. What remains of this dissertation, together with the entirety of his earlier (unsuccessful) dissertation, is published in G. E. Moore, *Early Philosophical Writings*, ed. Thomas Baldwin and Consuelo Preti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
29. *Ibid.*, 156.
30. The idea that the act of knowledge must be distinguished from the object of knowledge, and that the object is wholly independent of the act, is central to Moore's early argument against Idealism. He takes the idea to be effective both against Berkeley's form of Idealism and against the Idealism of Kant and his successors; it is for this reason that he thinks that an argument which applies most obviously to the former is in fact quite general, and effective also against the latter. See 'Refutation of Idealism', first published in *Mind*, n.s. 12 (1903), 433–53; reprinted in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1922), 2–30; see also ch. IV of Bertrand Russell, *Problems of Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, Home University Library, 1952, 1st edn 1912).
31. 'The relativity of knowledge' in J. M. Baldwin (ed.), *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1901–1905), vol. 2, 450–52; the passage quoted is at 451. Compare Hegel's statement that 'if cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being' then it 'sets out to reshape and alter it' (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 46). Moore may be alluding to this passage.
32. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 10.
33. Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), xv.
34. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, 33. In *Problems of Philosophy* he speaks of '[t]he faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself' as 'the main characteristic of a mind' (p. 28).
35. Moore, 'Refutation of Idealism', 7.
36. Green, *Works*, i, 185.
37. 'The nature of judgement', *Mind*, n.s. 8 (1899), 176–93. This essay seems to be drawn from the first two chapters of the 1898 dissertation; the only extant copy of the dissertation is missing a number of pages from those chapters and internal evidence very strongly suggests that those pages were extracted in order to be used in the essay. See the editors' introduction to Baldwin and Preti (eds) *Early Philosophical Writings*, §VIII.2. For Bradley's theory of judgement see F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1922, 1st edn 1883), Book I, ch. I.
38. Moore, 'Nature of judgement', 178f.
39. *Ibid.*, 181.
40. *Ibid.*, 183. In a letter to Russell dated 11 September 1898 about his 1898 fellowship dissertation, Moore says: 'My chief discovery, which shocked me a good deal when I made it, is expressed in the form that an existent is a proposition. I see now that I might have put this more mildly.' (Quoted by Baldwin and Preti, *Early Philosophical Writings*, xxxiv).
41. Moore to Desmond McCarthy, August 1892. The letter is in the Moore Archives in Cambridge University Library.
42. 'Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description', first published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–11*; Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918) 209–32; and *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vi, ed. John G.

Slater (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1992), 148–61. The passage quoted is 155 of this last work.

43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. Baldwin and Preti, *Early Philosophical Writings*, xxxiii.
46. Wisdom, 'Logical constructions (I)', *Mind*, n.s. 40 (1931), 195, note 2. I am indebted for this reference to Thomas Baldwin, *G. E. Moore* (London: Routledge, 1990), 193.
47. Two notable cases in point are Max Black and Norman Malcolm.
48. The qualification is that, for a period, Moore adopted Russell's view that there are no propositions (see sub-section ii, below). This view presupposes realism about the entities which Russell and Moore had earlier thought of as the constituents of propositions but not about the propositions themselves. Moore seems to have adopted this view soon after Russell put it forward, around 1909, but then to have had doubts about it. See *Lectures on Philosophy*, ed. C. Lewy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 133f.; for discussion, see Baldwin, *G. E. Moore*, especially ch.V, §1. Neither the change, nor the subsequent doubts about it, seem to have made a significant difference to the way Moore practised philosophical analysis.
49. P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Evanston and Chicago, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942), 664.
50. *Ibid.*, 661.
51. The sentence just quoted comes from Moore's response to an essay in which the author suggests that Moore put forward a view of analysis according to which it is linguistic expressions which are analysed: C. H. Langford, 'The notion of analysis in Moore's philosophy', in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, 321–42.
52. Hence the line attributed to J. L. Austin, the leading proponent of Ordinary Language Philosophy: 'Some people like Witters but Moore is *my* man.' See Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, 172 and note 106 on 314.
53. See Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, especially ch. 8, §1; also Thomas Ricketts, 'Truth and propositional unity in early Russell', in Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh (eds), *Future Pasts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101–21.
54. For an attempt to connect the issue of the unity of the proposition directly to the rejection of Idealism, see Peter Hylton, 'The nature of the proposition and the revolt against Idealism', in R. Rorty *et al.* (eds). *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 375–97; reprinted in Peter Hylton, *Propositions, Functions, and Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9–29.
55. 'Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions', *Mind* n.s. 13 (1904), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* vol. 4, ed. Alistair Urquhart (London: Routledge, 1994), 432–72; the passage quoted is on 473.
56. For an early version of this general view, see 'On the nature of truth and falsehood' in Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966; first published in 1910); reprinted in John G. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* vi, 116–24. Russell subsequently puts forward a number of other versions of the theory, each one responding to difficulties he has come to perceive in the previous version. According to later versions, when I judge that Socrates is mortal I am related to a logical form as well as to Socrates and mortality.

57. The completed portions of the book are now published as *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vii, ed. Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984). For detailed discussion of the various versions of Russell's multiple relation theory, and of Wittgenstein's criticism, see Alexander Dolnick, *Russell's Multiple Relation Theory: evolution and demise*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, Chicago, 2012.
58. Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971; 1st edn 1921) puts forward quite a different view of meaning, one influenced to some extent by behaviourism.
59. See Thomas Ricketts, 'Pictures, logic, and the limits of sense in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*', in Hans Sluga and David Stern (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59–99.
60. Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, 106.
61. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with *en face* translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961; first published 1921, under the title *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*), 4.461, 5.132 and elsewhere.
62. Rudolf Carnap, *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1934); translated by Amethe Smeaton as *Logical Syntax of Language* (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937), section 14 under 'remarks on terminology'.
63. Russell attended the International Philosophy Congress in Paris in August 1900. He was already interested in the philosophy of mathematics and, of those who spoke on this subject at the conference, it was the Italian mathematician and logician Giuseppe Peano who most impressed him. Soon after returning he began to develop his own system of logic, based on that of Peano but far more powerful. (Peano's system cannot handle multiple generality, which marks the crucial distinction between Fregean and post-Fregean logic and earlier efforts.) Immediately after returning to England, Russell wrote to Moore 'Have you ever considered the meaning of the word *any*? I find it to be the fundamental problem for mathematical philosophy.' Russell to Moore, 16 August 1900, in Nicholas Griffin (ed.), *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell* v. I (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 202. Russell expresses the same concern with 'discovering the meaning of the word *any*' in the Preface to *Principles of Mathematics*, xvii.
64. *Mind* n.s. 14 (1905), 479–93; very widely reprinted, including in Alistair Urquhart (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 4, 415–27.
65. F. P. Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), 263, n. The phrase is quoted, and endorsed, by G. E. Moore: 'Russell's theory of descriptions', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Evanston, Ill.: The Library of Living Philosophers Inc., 1946), 175–225.
66. Thus Wittgenstein says: 'It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.' *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.0031.
67. Another weakness is that it requires that I understand quantified sentences although I cannot understand any instance of them. There is, however, no clear indication that Russell was troubled by this.
68. See, for example, *On Scientific Method in Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); reprinted in Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963;

first edition 1917), 75–93; and in John G. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* viii (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986), 55–73.

69. The name comes from Russell's lectures, 'The philosophy of logical atomism', given in January–March 1918. A transcript was made as Russell spoke and published in *The Monist* 28 (1918), 495–527 and 29 (1919) 32–63, 190–222 and 345–80. The lectures are reprinted in several places, authoritatively in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* viii, 160–244.

11

Idealism and Pragmatism: the inheritance of Hegel's concept of experience

Dina Emundts

German Idealism and American Pragmatism are closely related in a complicated way. Lines of comparison and influence can be drawn, but there are significant differences as well. Superficially, one might think that the biggest difference is that Hegel is a metaphysician whereas the pragmatists are not. However, Hegel was also a major critic of metaphysics, and the pragmatists were also concerned with many metaphysical questions and principles. The issue has become even more complicated because of the way that philosophers have referred to both traditions. Most of the neo-pragmatists, like Robert Brandom, have a close relationship not only to classical Pragmatism but also to Hegel.[1] However, although one might be led from these affinities to the impression that Hegel and Pragmatism form a single tradition, this is not the case – at least not without certain restrictions.[2] For various reasons, many contemporary philosophers tend to stress how closely related Pragmatism is to Kant and German Idealism. But one must also be aware of the critical distance of the pragmatists to Idealism. The role of experience is central to the philosophy of the pragmatists, and it is on this basis that they criticised a major feature of German Idealism.[3]

In the first part of what follows, I will sketch the criticisms that the pragmatists voiced against German Idealism as well as the influence that they admitted it had on their own positions. In the second part I will turn to the specific relationship between Hegel and Peirce. I take this relationship to be an especially interesting example of a fruitful discussion between Hegel and Pragmatism. The third part will contain some concluding remarks.

1. Pragmatism: for or against Idealism?

I will be using 'Pragmatism' as the name for the philosophies of C. S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey.[4] In doing so I do not mean to claim that there is a single programme that they all shared. However, there are some central ideas they have in common, such as their critical stance towards Idealism. The common core of this critical stance is the claim that the Idealists and, more generally, the rationalists as a whole, fail to take experience sufficiently into account. It may be no exaggeration to say that the pragmatists understood their main philosophical task and their highest achievement as a matter of putting *experience* in a proper light. They tried to develop, for example, the concepts 'truth', 'justification' and 'meaning' in a way that relates fundamentally to experience. Thus, one might say that they see their own philosophical programme as consisting in an explicit renunciation of what they understand as the Idealist position.

An example of this criticism is James's *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907). James maintains the provocative thesis, put forth also by Fichte, that the philosophy one adheres to is dependent on one's character. Rationalism and Idealism are, according to James, the product of *tender-minded* philosophers. Tender-minded philosophers like to close their eyes to the facts of reality. Instead of dealing with the 'real world', rationalists and Idealists create their own reality far away from what there really is. The pragmatist, on the other hand,

> turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad *a priori* reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth.[5]

In Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), there is a similar criticism: 'historic intellectualism . . . is a purely compensatory doctrine which men of an intellectual turn have built up to console themselves for the actual and social impotency of the calling of thought to which they are devoted.'[6] The idea that Idealists avoid the 'real' facts can also be found in Peirce's famous essay 'The Fixation of Belief' (1877) and the later additions to it.[7] Peirce here characterises the '*a priori* method' as the method from which he wants to distance

himself.[8] Because this method does not restrict philosophers to experience, they can claim whatever seems to be most 'welcome' to philosophers.

All these passages are directed against philosophers who are looking for *a priori* truth. Moreover, they express a – albeit somewhat simplified – position in philosophy that might be called 'anti-metaphysical'. According to the pragmatists, principles accepted in philosophy (and elsewhere) ought to be restricted to those that we can evaluate solely by experience. Against more 'metaphysical philosophers' such as Kant and Hegel, the pragmatists attempt to establish a new problem-solving and experience-related philosophy.

Straightforward rejection is not, however, the only stance of the pragmatists towards Idealism. One cannot understand Pragmatism without also taking into account the huge positive influence that the Idealism of Kant and the German Idealists had on each of these three pragmatists. Much of what the pragmatists are famous for has its roots in Hegel's philosophy and above all in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[9] One need only think of its claim that we acquire knowledge by *doing* something, or of its stress on action, even for questions about truth, and on the crucial role of the social world for our understanding of ourselves and the nature of knowledge.[10]

Hegel's influence on the early Dewey is well known. In fact, Dewey himself states clearly that Hegel was an important influence on his philosophy.[11] Dewey claims that Hegel's main influence was his anti-dualistic approach, and although this is rather vague it nevertheless fits Dewey's overall philosophy. In his article from 1888, 'The Ethics of Democracy', Dewey clearly maintains a position that is close to Hegel's. Several aspects of Dewey's so-called 'instrumentalism' can also be viewed as broadly Hegelian. For example, his conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge has to be seen as something that is continually a work in progress and open to change in the future, seems to allude to some of the main theses of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Something similar can be said with respect to James, especially concerning his concepts of action, experience and truth. One might also note that in his later writings he holds a position that displays monistic as well as idealistic traits. He calls this position 'Radical Empiricism'.[12] The main idea here is that the whole of reality is to be understood as consisting of pure experiences. These experiences provide the basis for all of our subjective experiences of objects. However, they themselves are neutral, neither objective nor subjective. They form a still unstructured layer of experience that can then become structured through reflection. Although James wanted to avoid the *Absolute Idealism* of F. H. Bradley by denying that we need to think of one single

unified experience or consciousness of this experience, his project is nevertheless closer to Idealism and monism than might have been expected from what James wrote in his earlier works.[13] Above all, the concept of experience as not (yet) either subjective or objective, but as forming the basis for this distinction, has its roots in Hegel's concept of experience in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

With respect to the 'earlier' Peirce, the influence of Kant seems to be most obvious. However, as I will spell out later, his criticism of Kant, too, can be viewed as in line with Hegel's criticism. Indeed, in his lectures from 1903 on, Peirce explicitly claims that he is following Hegel in some of his main ideas.

Although what I have said thus far is relatively familiar, it is still very significant that we can understand the pragmatists' critical as well as affirmative stance towards Hegel as a matter of their addressing his concept of experience. On the one hand, the pragmatists think that Hegel is too intellectual and does not put enough emphasis on experience. On the other hand, their own philosophy seems to be heavily influenced by Hegel's specific conception of experience. Of course, these two facts are perfectly consistent with one another. Perhaps the pragmatists suspected that Hegel did not take his own insights seriously enough but instead sacrificed them for an overly intellectual or logical understanding of the world. But what exactly are these insights according to Pragmatism? Would the pragmatists be right to claim that Hegel had a richer and better conception of experience than one can find expressed in his 'official' philosophical doctrines? In what sense do they understand Hegel as an Idealist, and are they right? There are many ways to approach these questions. In what follows I focus specifically on Peirce and elaborate in more detail his relationship to Hegel and Hegel's Idealism.

II. Peirce and Hegel

Whereas Peirce sees himself in his early writings as committed to a kind of Kantian position, in the Lectures of 1903 he thinks of himself to some degree as a kind of Hegelian. I intend to show that, at that time, Peirce did in fact share with Hegel several basic philosophical assumptions.[14] The first section of this part will deal with this relation to Hegel by discussing in a general manner Peirce's idea of a theory of the categories and the role of phenomenology within that theory. In the second section, I will spell out in more detail what Peirce's theory of categories consists in and how it relates to Hegel's.

i. Peirce's phenomenology

The project of Peirce's Lectures from 1903 is not very easy to understand.[15] One of his goals is to present philosophy as a system that includes, first and foremost, a system of normative sciences. The relevant normative sciences according to Peirce are logic, ethics and aesthetics. The system of normative sciences has to be grounded in mathematics and phenomenology. In addition to these normative sciences, the system also contains a metaphysics that is meant to deal with the question of reality. Phenomenology is meant to give us a description of what there is – or, in other words, of all *phenomena*, and this description itself narrows in on very general features of what there is. This is why Peirce introduces three categories in his phenomenology. He calls them *Firstness*, *Secondness* and *Thirdness*. But he also refers to them by other terms. For example, he sometimes uses the triads of 'quality' (of feeling), 'reaction' (or 'struggle') and 'representation',[16] or of 'presentness', 'resistance' and 'representation' to refer to these categories. It is important to say a little more about these categories and their content here. First of all, (a) I will explain in what sense they are *categories*. Then (b) I will sketch what the categories consist in.

(a) Peirce made a distinction between general and specific categories. *Firstness*, *Secondness* and *Thirdness* are meant to be the general categories. When we look at the content of these categories – namely, presence, resistance and representation – it seems natural to suggest that they describe *ways* in which human beings may be aware of something. Something may simply be present, or we might experience it as in some way 'resistant' to us. Further, we can see it as a representation for, or as being represented by, something else. In other words: the simplest general characteristic of what we may experience is its presence, the second general characteristic is its resistance, and the third is that it represents something or is represented by something.

The fact that Peirce thinks of these concepts as *categories* means that he thinks of them as more than mere modes of awareness. Peirce wants to understand them in two further ways: first, the categories are the most general features of everything there is; second, the categories structure our fundamental ways of thinking.

It might be confusing to employ the same categories with respect to experiences, thinking and the question of what there is. None the less, to take the categories simultaneously as ways of thinking and as the fundamental structures of reality is a familiar Kantian move. The Kantian treatment of

the categories was a subject that Peirce dealt with quite often in his earlier writings. According to Peirce's early view, we can understand the categories as concepts that provide unity for 'the manifold of sensuous impressions'.[17] Because this unity is a necessary condition for something's being an object for us, the categories can be viewed as the basic structure of objects as well as of our thinking. In the Lectures of 1903, however, Peirce's view seems to be slightly different: the three general categories are the *ways* we experience things. We can get at these categories by describing our experience. The way we think of things corresponds to these ways of experiencing, but thinking does not operate at the same level as experiencing. Rather, thinking always takes place on the level of the third category: that is, it is an instance of representation. Peirce also introduces 'degenerated' categories, so that the different stages of complexity to be found in our experience of things can also be found in the ways we represent them. Moreover, the categories are not only modes of our experiences. As we can see when we think about phenomena, the very general structure of what there is must also correspond to the three categories.[18] Perhaps instead of speaking of 'things' it is better to say that the essence of what-there-is is structured according to the categories.[19]

Thus, the crucial point of the Lectures from 1903 seems to be to introduce general categories into phenomenology. First and foremost, the categories are the possible modes of experience. Experience is, therefore, not something that should be characterised as belonging either to the subject – as concepts do – or to the object – as that to which different subjects can refer. Rather, experience is something that has both a subjective and an objective component. It is subjective in so far as we are doing something (perhaps even *acting*). It is objective because what we experience is not completely up to us. That experience in this sense is the *basis* for the distinction between objective and subjective is the reason why Peirce claims that phenomenology 'precedes' all distinctions. And it is also one of the reasons why he claims that phenomenology is to be done in Hegel's spirit – and not in Kant's.[20]

In the end, we might conclude that these general categories are structures that can be found in all kinds of human affairs. They are, moreover, basic to *all sorts of relations*: to our experience, to our thinking, to our ways of representing, to things and to our sciences. For example, we can understand semiotics in these terms because in semiotics the different ways of our relating to things with icons, indexicals and signs correspond to the three categories.[21] One might also propose that the categories determine the possible *relations* we can have to whatever seems to be there. But again, one has to be careful here:

ontologically speaking, a relation between us and something else cannot be simply *Firstness*, because this relation implies two different things that stand in a relation of reaction to each other. Ontologically, a relation of real things occurs first under *Secondness*. To speak of *Firstness* when there is a relation between us and a thing that is really given is to speak merely about a *phenomenological* aspect, a pure feeling without reaction, which is highlighted. Because I think that Peirce understands the categories as saying something about *relations*, I will henceforth often speak about 'relations' instead of 'categories'. Now I want to say a few words about what each category is meant to denote.

(b) *Firstness* is a kind of relation in which the relata of the relation are not differentiated in any way. If someone experiences something in this way, it is simply present to her without her even reacting or referring to it, or recognising it as being something different from her, or as being different from other things. It is merely a feeling or sensation of something as present. Any description of this relation is only possible under the condition of the other categories. It is important for Peirce that this does not mean that the category of presentness does not amount to a category in its own right. The presentness of something is a feature we have to take into account in order to give a full description of experience, even though we cannot give this description while we are standing in this kind of relation.[22]

Secondness is the name for the relation of an action and a reaction between two things. We call this relation 'struggle' or 'resistance' because it is the most basic moment of opposition between two elements. Here again, it is not possible to describe or cognise this relation solely via the resources of the relation itself, since in order to describe something one needs to represent it. However, the point again is that the reaction itself does not consist in and cannot be reduced to its description.

Thirdness is a relation of two elements that are related or even mediated by a third one. Whenever I refer to something by means of a concept or another sign, the sign is an element that represents the other element, and therefore it is a relation of *Thirdness*.

In other words: whenever we experience something as real we are in a relation of *Secondness*. However, if we are not aware of our act of referring and are just feeling something, this experience is *Firstness*. If, however, we refer to the thing as real, we must stand to it in a relation of *Thirdness*.

After this rough sketch of Peirce's categories, I would like to begin considering the relationship of these ideas to Hegel. Peirce maintains that his

three categories are taken over from Hegel, and he thinks that the way he is introducing them is close to what Hegel meant to be doing in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Concerning the first point, it might not be obvious exactly what Peirce is referring to when speaking about 'categories' in connection with Hegel. Peirce himself says that Hegel does not call them 'categories' but 'stages of thinking'.[23] He explains that what he himself calls 'Presentness' is what Hegel called 'Immediacy',[24] and Peirce (rightly) sets this in close relation to 'Pure Being'. For Peirce, *Thirdness* – or representation – is closely linked to generality[25] as well as to mediation.[26] One point of reference here could be Hegel's very general idea that we have to think of every kind of development as a process of mediation, in which an undifferentiated, immediate unity comes first, then a kind of struggle or a contradiction occurs, and finally there arises a new sort of unity in which the different elements are mediated in such a way that there can be real differences between them which nevertheless allows them to form a unity. One can ask whether there might be a more specific point of reference here: Hegel's triad of *Sein*, *Wesen*, *Begriff*, or of *Einzelheit*, *Besonderheit*, *Allgemeinheit*. It seems likely that Peirce takes both of these triads as expressions of Hegel's general idea. Thus, perhaps one can speak of a sequence of Immediacy, Difference and Mediation. In the following section, I will address the second point, namely, the role of phenomenology. I will start by (1) explaining the similarities between Peirce and Hegel with respect to phenomenology. Then I will (2) discuss Peirce's criticism of the characteristic features he thinks Hegel finally gave his phenomenology.

(1) The role Peirce gives to his phenomenology in the Lectures of 1903 seems to display a shift away from Kant in the direction of Hegel. This is because the categories are – at least initially – revealed by an inquiry named 'phenomenology'. Peirce thinks that this inquiry must precede any normative science. He suggests in his first lecture that this is a kind of phenomenology in Hegel's sense. What does he mean? It is well known that the relation between Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his system of philosophy – including his *Logic* – is very complex, and I cannot spell it out here.[27] Yet one similarity to Hegel is Peirce's plan to let a phenomenology precede the system of the sciences – including logic and metaphysics. In addition, Peirce's phenomenology, like Hegel's, is meant to begin with a naïve picture of what there is. In phenomenology one does not simply state a philosophical theory; instead, the structural and elementary forms of our relations to things are found or otherwise uncovered by a process of looking at our own

experiences. Here it is important that experiences are understood as something we are engaged in, although not as something that depends totally on us. All these points can be understood as Hegelian in a broad sense. As a paradigm case of an opposite method of thinking philosophically about structure, consider Kant. According to Peirce and Hegel, Kant's procedure in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be described in the following way: the categories are understood as pure subjective forms of thinking. They are found by looking simply at the logical forms of our judgements. This procedure is problematic, and not only because it lacks a proof that these forms are complete. Kant's procedure appears to presuppose that the forms of thinking are first of all purely subjective. This presupposition is the background for the crucial Kantian question concerning the objectivity of the categories. The only way that is then open to answer this question is to maintain, as Kant did, that the world is a product of our construction. This construction, however, is regarded as subject-dependent because the underlying concepts and rules are claimed to be subjective. But this is precisely the method from which both Hegel and Peirce wanted to distance themselves by means of their phenomenologies.[28] I do not want to claim here that Kant actually has difficulties in reaching his proposed results by following his own method. I simply want to make clear that for Hegel and Peirce phenomenology plays a significant methodological role with respect to the introduction of the categories.

Note that these considerations can also lead to the question of whether phenomenology plays any role in the *justification* of the categories.[29] Instead of understanding phenomenology as a kind of justification, I think it is better to say that phenomenology is meant to make a justification of the categories by Kantian means superfluous. I would also say that, for both Hegel and Peirce, the question as to whether the categories reveal the structure of how things really are is not completely answered by introducing them as means for the description of experience. This has to do with the fact that experience is neither object- nor subject-independent. It is up to the logic of the system to show whether and how the categories can be used in objective thinking. With respect to this task, logic is independent of phenomenology: it is not the case that the question of justification is transferred from logic to another discipline. In whatever way this is to be spelled out, it should be clear by now that, for both Hegel and Peirce, phenomenology evidently plays an important role in our understanding of the categories.

(2) Although one can claim that, in developing his phenomenology, Peirce in fact followed Hegel, this is not a claim Peirce himself puts forward. After

having said that he got the idea of phenomenology from Hegel, Peirce also claims that Hegel considered phenomenology in a

> fatally narrow spirit, since he restricted himself to what *actually* forces itself on the mind and so coloured his whole philosophy with the ignoration of the distinction of essence and existence and so gave it the nominalistic and I might say in a certain sense the pragmatoidal character in which the worst of Hegelian errors have their origin.[30]

What Peirce describes here is, in his eyes, Hegel's main error. I assume that by using the word 'pragmatoidal' Peirce means to convey that this error makes Hegel look like a pragmatist even though he is not really one. But what does Hegel's error consist in? Is Peirce right in his interpretation of Hegel? In the remainder of this essay, I will try to answer these questions. I will begin with Peirce's general project. I will then move on to a discussion of the specific categories.

Peirce's objection can be summarised as follows: although Hegel introduces all three categories (albeit not explicitly as categories), he sees the first two as not really essential. Rather, Hegel seems to maintain that they are in the end all to be reduced to conceptual operations, i.e., according to Peirce, to *Thirdness*. This reduction ignores the fact that, although we can only cognise things we represent, we can nevertheless stand in a non-representational relation to them, and we can also experience them in other ways.

Peirce's claim that Hegel reduces everything to *Thirdness* is combined with another objection that might at first seem surprising: because Hegel reduces everything to *Thirdness*, he cannot even claim that *Thirdness* is real. For example, general laws are expressions of what is present in or conditioned by the third category. Now Peirce is a realist with respect to general laws. This means that what there is and what we experience really is structured in the way the laws tell us it is. But if Hegel reduces everything to concepts, he cannot maintain this realistic position. For him, there is nothing really there except concepts. This is the reason why Peirce calls Hegel a 'nominalist'.[31]

There is another claim in the quotation given above that I find significant – namely, that Hegel is only interested in what 'actually forces itself on the mind'. This criticism especially concerns Peirce's understanding of *Secondness*. Peirce wants to take into account real physical movements, whereas for Hegel *difference* seems to be part of an intellectual process. I will spell out what Peirce wants to say with respect to *Secondness* in the next section. At the moment I want to stick to the issue of how to understand phenomenology.

How must Peirce understand Hegel's claims if he wants his criticism to be justified? There are several possibilities here. I will mention just a few:

(a) Without doubt, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* has a focus on intellectual movements. This has to do with the programme of his book, namely, to work out the correct understanding of knowledge. This does not necessarily imply that Hegel reduces everything to concepts. Peirce might mean, more precisely, that Hegel thinks we can stand in an immediate relation to things but that standing in such a relation is not sufficient for arriving at knowledge of things. Rather, to attain knowledge we need to stand in a relation in which concepts play an essential role. However, thus far there is nothing that would contradict Peirce's own position. On the contrary, as I understand Peirce, this is exactly what he maintains. There is, nevertheless, room for criticising Hegel even within such a shared view on the conditions of knowledge. The criticism can concern the understanding of the *task* of phenomenology. Whereas Hegel focuses from the beginning on questions concerning knowledge, Peirce thinks of phenomenology as much more than that. I will explain why shortly.

(b) Peirce could also be understood as claiming that Hegel ends up reducing everything to concepts in the sense that there is no possible awareness of things if there are no concepts in use. Or he might think that for Hegel the very idea of reality only makes sense under the condition of our having concepts. These claims are difficult to evaluate. In some sense Peirce himself appears to maintain them. He, too, wants to say that whenever we think of ourselves as being aware of something and whenever we think of something as being real, we only do so by means of representation. Thus, the whole phenomenological endeavour would not be possible without *Thirdness*.[32] But even if this were the case, it would not mean that there could not be any feeling of presentness without concepts. Here one has to be careful, for this claim can be true under two different interpretations, and it is not completely clear to me how far Peirce himself wants to go. One could say that in so far as we use concepts, there can nevertheless also be a feeling of presentness accompanying these concepts that is itself not reducible to those concepts. Or one could claim that even if there are no concepts in play at all, there can still be the feeling of presentness and that we can, later on in another context, conceptually refer to this feeling. I would say that both claims are true. I also think that neither Peirce nor Hegel

would deny them, although Peirce might believe that Hegel does, and one might think on the basis of some of his statements that Peirce does too.

(c) Furthermore, Peirce might be of the opinion that the result of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* consists in the claim that concepts are the only things that are real.[33] Now, this would certainly be something that Peirce would like to refute. But what can this claim mean? Peirce might understand Hegel as saying that it turns out in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that concepts just are the things themselves. Because there is nothing that we can distinguish from concepts that can be said to have any substantial existence on its own, and concepts are things that have substantial existence on their own, they are the only real things. This also means that everything in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* that was about something other than conceptual movements turns out to be without any real importance. It is true that only conceptual movements are spelled out in Hegel's *Logic*, which is meant to give the structure of our whole world. Thus, it seems that an objection along the lines pointed out is justified. But does Hegel in fact hold that concepts *qua* pure concepts are real? It is a common view that he does. And as I understand it, it is this view that leads to Peirce's criticism.

This is demonstrated by the following quotation from Peirce:

> Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomena that is not accompanied by Thirdness. If the Hegelians confined themselves to that position they would find a hearty friend in my doctrine. But they do not. Hegel is possessed with the idea that the Absolute is One. Three absolutes he would regard as a ludicrous contradiction *in adjecto*. Consequently, he wishes to make out that the three categories have not their several independent and irrefutable standings in thought. *Firstness* and *Secondness* must somehow be *aufgehoben*. But it is not true. They are no way refuted or refutable. Thirdness it is true involves Secondness and Firstness, in a sense. That is to say, if you have the idea of Thirdness you must have had the idea of Secondness and Firstness to build upon. But what is required for the idea of a genuine Thirdness is an independent solid Secondness and not a Secondness that is a mere corollary of an unfounded and inconceivable Thirdness; and a similar remark may be made in reference to Firstness.[34]

What becomes clear here is that Peirce thinks that Hegel reduces everything completely to *Thirdness*.[35] I think that this view of Hegel is not quite fair, for the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not that concepts are real as opposed to something else. Rather, Hegel's thesis is that knowledge is a process of determining something by concepts. In this process, concepts develop according to what there is, and what there is can only be cognised by concepts. It turns out that we only cognise something if we determine it conceptually, but the concepts themselves are given neither *a priori* nor purely subjectively. There are no concepts independent of experience. Concerning the point made above with respect to Hegel's *Logic*, I would say that one has to take into account that the *Logic* is also not about pure concepts. On the contrary, the starting point is that dealing with 'pure concepts' is misguided. We cannot make the distinction between concepts and experience or real things. We cannot deal with concepts alone. There is much more to say about this.[36] But that is beyond the scope of this essay.

Let us come back to the overview of possible criticisms in Peirce's sense. As was already mentioned, one of Peirce's criticisms concerns the epistemological focus of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is likely that Peirce believes that Hegel cannot even think something like a non-conceptual feeling of presence to be possible. I have shown that this is unfair to Hegel. But Peirce's main criticism concerns a position that is commonly taken to be Hegel's view. This view holds that concepts are the only real things. Peirce criticises this view because he wants to establish an understanding of reality that has clear non-conceptual and physical aspects. This is something that Hegel would not be able to account for with such a view of concepts. However, although this is a commonly held interpretation of Hegel's position, I do not think that it is right.

What I take to be Hegel's view is not identical with the position that Peirce holds. That is, there is, first of all, the difference regarding how to understand phenomenology that I have already mentioned, but then there is also a further difference that explains why the project of a phenomenology is crucial for the entire philosophy of both Hegel and Peirce.

The main difference here lies in the fact that Peirce thinks of concepts and laws as *representations* of something. Peirce makes a sharp distinction between general laws and physical relations. The former is part of the third, the latter of the second category. Moreover, it seems that the physical relations are a precondition of general laws being real. Hegel does not make this distinction. According to Hegel, general laws are real because they are the products of experience understood as a process in which physical and mental elements

play an essential role. Because Peirce makes this sharp distinction, he also thinks it important that phenomenology not be only about knowledge. On his view, for knowledge – or at least for our understanding of general laws – it is necessary to see that there is a realm of physical movements that in some way is independent of concepts.[37] This is without doubt an essential difference between Hegel and Peirce.

None the less, there also appear to be remarkable similarities between the two philosophers: both think that in comparison to Kant we need a new method that starts with experience. Both think that the structure of experience has something to do with immediacy, difference and mediation. Both hold that thinking is a process of mediation and therefore has to be understood as a case of *Thirdness*. And both maintain that concepts and laws are real, in a crucial way – one which has to do with the structure of immediacy, difference and mediation (although the way in which they spell out this structure is different).

ii. The category of resistance

So far I have looked only at the very general picture that Peirce gave of his categories. Now I want to take a closer look at Peirce's criticism of Hegel's way of dealing with the individual categories. Although Peirce says that he takes over the three categories from Hegel, he criticises Hegel with respect to each of them.[38] In the following section, I will focus primarily on *Secondness* and only summarise a few points with respect to the other categories.

The first category is presentness or immediacy. That something is present is for Peirce the simplest general characteristic of what we experience. One of his objections in this context against Hegel has to do with Hegel's claim that presentness as a determination is abstract. Peirce seems to think that Hegel would thereby claim that there is never something just given to us as it is, for the presentness of something is always abstracted from other concrete experiences that are conceptual. I would view this as a misunderstanding. As I understand Hegel, he wants to say that conceptual determination is necessary for cognising whatsoever. Even to cognise that something is present requires a conceptual determination of something. But Hegel can claim this without denying that there are feelings of presentness. There is a passage in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in which Hegel says that presence is not rich but poor experience.[39] This seems to be the passage that Peirce is thinking of when he says, in intended opposition to Hegel: 'Go out under the blue dome of heaven and look at what is present as it appears to the artist's eye.'[40] But, as

pointed out in the last section, if we have a closer look at Hegel's text we can see that he does not deny that there are feelings of presence and that these can be intense. What Hegel wants to deny is that there is cognition of that fact, or that these experiences as such can justify any knowledge claim.[41] Furthermore, he wants to say that even for rich sense experience we need some kind of differentiation. This differentiation can, however, take place within perception.[42] Thus, I would not say that Peirce's criticism fits Hegel's conception of presentness or immediacy.

The second category is struggle or resistance. Every relation between existing things has the character of reaction and resistance because these things have effects on each other, and for every action there is a corresponding counteraction. Resistance is a very general feature of our experience, and it is an essential aspect of thinking of something as being real.

With *Secondness*, Peirce refers first of all to physical influences. These are basic movements, such as simple actions and the reactions of physical bodies. However, Peirce also thinks of much more complex cases of resistance. One example of resistance he cites is a drawing in imagination that resists metamorphoses over time.[43] This does not seem to be a purely physical process. Rather, mental items such as thoughts and wishes are, at least to a certain degree, involved. Another interesting question with respect to the scope of a physical understanding of Secondness has to do with Peirce's claim that we need the category of resistance to understand how we learn something new. In order to learn something new, we must be able to have an effective relation to things. This is a key for understanding Peirce's concept of perceptions and their relationship to judgements.[44] The main idea can be summarised as follows: without taking perception to be something in which a real thing has an effect on us, we cannot explain how we get knowledge through experience. Thus perception has to be understood as a relation between real things. This also leads to a realist picture of the world. Peirce expresses these considerations by saying that we have to take *Secondness* as a real and important category and that perception is to be understood as a case of *Secondness*.

My whole approach in analysing Peirce's connection to Hegel becomes quite complicated at this point. Consider the topic of perception. On the one hand, what Peirce appears to be saying here does not sound at all like Hegel. Indeed, in this context Peirce explicitly refers to Kant and other dualists and praises them for their insight that there has to be something like 'immediate Perception'.[45] I assume that with *Secondness* Peirce is following a

thought he had already entertained in the early Harvard and Lowell Lectures from 1865 and 1866, i.e., the idea that we must presuppose the existence of a real, independent world because otherwise there would be no basis for our inferences. We are, so to say, forced to take it for granted that there are brute facts if we want to hold that knowledge is possible at all. Now, at the time of the Harvard and Lowell Lectures the following seems to be true: by claiming that there has to be an independent reality, Peirce wants to present a convincing theory of how to gain knowledge without ending up with the Kantian distinction between things in themselves and appearances. The same seems to be true for Peirce in 1903. And Peirce is right: this epistemological project truly has some similarities to Hegel's philosophical views. Moreover, in considering reality as something that is describable from a phenomenological standpoint, Peirce takes over another Hegelian idea. However, he still sees a significant difference between his view and Hegel's: he believes that in the end Hegel does not take the description of phenomenological facts seriously and instead ends up 'conceptualising' or 'mentalising' all of reality. Although, according to Peirce, Hegel does this in order to avoid Kantian problems that Peirce also recognises, Hegel does not do so in the 'right' way. The relation to independent reality that leads Kant to the thesis of things in themselves becomes for Hegel something that ultimately is only conceptual.

If this is indeed the point that Peirce is raising against Hegel, I do not believe that he is right to do so. I do not think that Hegel 'conceptualises' all of reality. I will return to this issue shortly. First, however, we should understand more precisely what *Secondness* means. On the one hand, the claim that resistance is a general characteristic of experience is compelling. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand Peirce's conception of resistance, and its meaning is far from clear. From what I said in the previous paragraph, it is clear that *Secondness* means something non-conceptual, something like 'raw facts' or 'real otherness'. This point is highlighted in Peirce's claim that we need *Secondness* to understand how we can learn something new: there has to be something that is real independently of any judgement, which is itself the basis for such judgements and which can be represented by true sentences. Here again Peirce's criticism would be that Hegel does not ultimately think in terms of this kind of independence, but holds instead that otherness can be constituted by concepts alone. Peirce, in contrast, does think of otherness as something non-conceptual, something physical or material. Sometimes it sounds as if Peirce wants to restrict *Secondness* to physical movements. This is especially the case when he discusses the reality of *Thirdness*, i.e., of concepts

and laws. Let us have a closer look at this notion, then, to get clear on what Peirce is driving at.

In regard to *Thirdness*, Peirce is also critical of Hegel. According to Peirce, Hegel is not in a position to understand *Thirdness* as real, even though such an understanding is necessary. It is not easy to discern what Peirce is up to here. At first glance, one might assume that he wants to claim that we can only think of laws as real if we also think that there is an independent reality that the laws represent. But this is the argument for the reality of *Secondness*, not of *Thirdness*. This argument against Hegel leads yet again to the question that I will discuss later on, namely how Hegel would deal with the Peirceian conception of 'otherness'. However, there is another concern regarding a different claim about the reality of *Thirdness*. Peirce thinks that in *addition* to accepting *Secondness*, we have to think of laws and concepts as themselves real. The main reason Peirce gives for this claim is that words and thoughts can have effects on the world.[46] If these effects are to be distinct from *Secondness* then this seems to imply that the category of *Secondness* is restricted to mechanical or physical reactions.[47] To say that ideas are real would then mean that our world does not consist solely of physical relations (as represented by physical laws) but that there are also other kinds of relations. Peirce thereby wants to allow that thoughts have a kind of independent existence from the thinker and that there is a kind of evolutionary history of thoughts.[48] In addition, Peirce wants to allow our words and statements to have an influence on the physical world. Although Peirce does not think that he is able to explain this sort of impact, he nevertheless thinks that we cannot deny it.[49] Our understanding of the world needs to make room for such non-physical relations. The reason for Peirce's criticism of Hegel here again rests on Peirce's presumption that for Hegel only concepts are real whereas, for Peirce, to say that thoughts are real is to say that they have an effect on physical objects. Thus, in the end, for Peirce *Secondness* signifies non-mental action and reaction, i.e., physical relations. Although we cannot cognise physical relations without concepts, we can still experience them and also assert (for philosophical reasons such as the fact that they are the basis for our gaining knowledge) that they are out there.

We can now evaluate Peirce's criticism of Hegel in more detail. The crucial point appears to be the understanding of reality. Consider again Peirce's criticism that Hegel does not take *Secondness* seriously enough but merely reduces it to *Thirdness*. This means that Hegel reduces real relations between physical bodies to laws alone. According to Peirce, these relations must be treated as *Secondness*, whereas Hegel thinks of them solely as cases of *Thirdness*.

More precisely, this could mean that Hegel has no room for the experience of physical bodies at all. But this claim does not seem to be justified. Although Hegel definitely wants to say that we need concepts and conceptual laws for *cognising* things as standing in a relation of cause and effect, this does not have to mean that causes and effects are not independently real at all, or that no experience of physical effects without concepts is possible. It is not even likely that Hegel wants to claim something like this, for he explicitly speaks about experiences of the physical.[50] With respect to cognition, however, Peirce agrees with Hegel that *Thirdness* is necessary. Thus, on this point there is no difference between Hegel and Peirce. Instead, there is difference concerning the relation between knowledge and physical actions. According to Peirce, in order to explain knowledge we cannot rely merely on laws but must also think that there is something that is represented by these laws. According to Peirce, Hegel denies this because he understands laws as conceptual or analytic truths. I do not believe this criticism is justified.[51] Both Hegel and Peirce have a realistic understanding of laws, and for both thinkers laws can only be understood as true if they do not consist in mere conceptual relations. None the less, these philosophers do not criticise the conception of purely conceptual truth in the same way because there is a difference in the way in which they are conceptual realists.

Hegel would not agree that laws are 'real' because they instantiate a relation of representation. According to Hegel's view it would be better to say that the laws are real because they are the product of successfully structuring the real world. Hegel thinks of laws as always already mediated by what there is. Hence, according to Hegel it is simply wrong to separate real things and conceptual laws. By taking his categories of *Secondness* and *Thirdness* to be indispensible, however, Peirce seems to endorse this kind of distinction between thoughts and reality. This is a very complicated issue. Peirce does not want to claim that laws are merely a kind of 'picture' of real relations. Both Peirce and Hegel think of representation as a kind of mediation. But Peirce nevertheless wants to recognise a difference between pure physical movements and representing laws because, according to him, this difference is necessary in order to explain how we attain knowledge from experience and are able to learn something new. Peirce does not see this explanation as available to Hegel. However, this again seems not quite fair to Hegel. If laws were merely conceptual truths then perhaps there would (at least in principle) be nothing surprising and new.[52] This is what Peirce believes that Hegel's view implies. But this is not the case. Although Hegel takes the structure of laws to be a logical topic, this does not mean that for

him all laws are simply logical or conceptual relations. In Hegel's philosophy, the statement that something is logical does not mean that it is *exclusively* logical, in contrast to real. On the contrary: Hegel wants to overcome the distinction between the logical or conceptual and the real. For him, to give up the distinction between the real and the logical or conceptual is not to conceptualise everything but is rather to think that logical relations are, on the one hand, a product of the determination of real relations and, on the other hand, are real relations that we can epistemically rely on only in so far as they are conceptualised. I cannot elaborate this point in more detail here, and I do not want to take a stance here on who is right. I only want to claim that there indeed is a genuine difference between Hegel and Peirce, even though it is not exactly the one Peirce has in mind, namely, that Hegel reduces reality to concepts. We can express the genuine difference in Peirce's own terms: Hegel does not deny real physical aspects as such, but he holds that they are linked to conceptual elements in a way that makes it impossible to think, as Peirce does, of reality and laws as being at two different levels.

In this context, we should also consider another difference, one that refers us back to the concept of resistance or struggle. As mentioned above, Peirce has a concept of resistance that is aimed specifically at covering physical actions and counteractions. However, it is not clear to me whether he really holds to using this concept in this restricted manner. The examples Peirce gives – such as the drawing in imagination that resists modification – do not work if we are restricted to merely physical resistance, for there are mental aspects involved as well. The issue of what resistance really means here is interesting in its own right, but it is also of interest for considerations pertaining to Peirce's relation to Hegel. Peirce seems to assume that Hegel's concept of reaction or resistance is solely intellectual – this is the reason that he says that Hegel reduces *Secondness* to *Thirdness* and speaks (in the quotation above) about what 'actually forces itself on the mind'. However, it is not true that Hegel restricts 'resistance' to intellectual relations. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* one can find, for example, the idea that living beings, and especially human beings, are resistant to any expectations concerning them that are based on the assumption that they can be treated by us as purely material beings.[53] Of course, one might respond that this point is not exactly at the centre of Hegel's philosophy, and it is true that Hegel's main idea with respect to processes or development is *contradiction*, which sounds rather intellectual. But even in this case one has to admit that the Hegelian concept of contradiction surely does not designate a purely formal or intellectual relation. Rather, Hegel's understanding of contradiction implies that

we can talk of contradictions between all kinds of things – even with respect to physical forces. This, of course, again has to do with Hegel's philosophical thesis that the distinction between concepts and what we refer to with concepts is extremely problematic. To understand something *as* being in struggle with something else presupposes a lot of concepts. But it is not for this reason a conceptual struggle. It is a *real* struggle that would not be a struggle at all if we did not conceptualise things. Thus, we can say the following: Peirce and Hegel differ indeed with respect to the concept of reaction or resistance. But in order to explain and discuss this difference, one should not follow Peirce's interpretation of Hegel as having a one-sided intellectualist (or nominalist) approach to this category. As I see it, the difference is that, according to Peirce, it makes sense to speak of reaction and resistance in an exclusively physical and non-conceptual way, whereas on Hegel's view this does not make sense. Note again that this does not mean that, according to Peirce, we can *cognise* a relation of struggle as struggle without *Thirdness* – in this sense Peirce and Hegel are indeed both conceptualists. Rather, Peirce wants to claim that there are relations which are independent of concepts and which we have to accept as the basis for acquiring knowledge.

In general, I believe there are good reasons for allowing a realistic conception of truth on the basis of phenomenological descriptions and for arguing in favour of the reality of the phenomenologically introduced categories of *Firstness* and *Secondness* by pointing out the need for them in order to make room for our concept of knowledge. This is what I see Peirce as doing. However, I also believe that it then becomes quite unclear how we should understand resistance. Hegel's suspicion of the idea of purely physical relations that are represented by laws is also convincing. We might have an experience of simple physical resistance, but if we say that something is resistant over time and against influences, then we presuppose certain concepts with which we can make these distinctions of change and persistence. Some of Peirce's examples of *Secondness* are also not completely explicable solely on a physical basis. If Peirce says that there must be something surprising in order for us to learn something new, then this idea cannot be grounded in a physical concept of resistance alone. What also plays a role in learning is the fact that *something is not as we thought it is*, that something is resistant with respect to our expectations, and so forth. Only then can we take resistance to explain that there is something new and surprising for us.[54] I think Hegel agrees that there must be something real that is somehow independent of us, something that can resist our expectations. However, even if this resistance is physically grounded, it certainly is not purely physical. In support of his view, Hegel

could maintain that the physical understanding of resistance is much too narrow. Even if there are physical aspects – and even if these aspects are essential in many cases of resistance – in almost every case we will also need mental or conceptual or logical equipment to understand what resistance is.

We now come, finally, to Peirce's claim that *Thirdness* is real because we must acknowledge that thoughts can be real and have influence on the physical world. Here we must note that Hegel would completely agree with the claim that the structure of our world cannot be explained without relying on other categories than the physical.[55] His disagreement with Peirce lies again in the concept of resistance, for Hegel would not restrict this concept to mechanistic and physical relations alone but would also stress that other kinds of relations are at work that contain more than mere action and reaction. However, Hegel also differs significantly from Peirce in so far as Hegel would *not* say that thoughts have an effect on the physical world. With respect to the physical world, Hegel maintains, physical factors are sufficient to explain physical phenomena and there is no need to introduce factors other than physical ones. The need for categories that are not merely physical lies in the fact that we always need concepts in our explanation. Thus, physical explanations presuppose concepts that go beyond the domain of pure physical reality.

III. Concluding remarks

The issue of relations of influence, similarity and opposition between Peirce and Hegel is rich and complex not only because of the inherent complexity of their philosophies but also because of the different possible readings of Hegel's philosophy itself. Disregarding all the controversial details, we can, however, agree on the thesis of the first part of my discussion: the crucial point for Peirce is Hegel's concept of experience. Although this concept is developed very insightfully by Hegel, it nevertheless is said to be mistaken because, according to Peirce, Hegel cannot integrate all the phenomena that this concept has to accommodate. This is so because Hegel does not allow for non-conceptual content and thus has to conceptualise everything. According to my reading of Hegel, this criticism is not appropriate. Hegel and Peirce share the idea that experience is the basis for all kinds of knowledge. They also share the view that resistance is an essential characteristic of what there is. They also think that without resistance we would not be able to learn anything new. Peirce also shares with Hegel the thesis that we need concepts for knowledge. However, Peirce believes that Hegel does not take

seriously enough the thought that what we learn by means of mediation through concepts cannot be reduced to concepts. There are different ways of understanding this objection. It is a commonly held view that for Hegel there is no real, independent 'other', and everything is constituted conceptually. On this view Peirce would be right and there would be no real *Secondness* in Hegel's system. Indeed, this is probably the view of Hegel that Peirce had. But I do not think that it is the correct view. Hegel does not want to say that only concepts are real. Rather, he would agree with Peirce that we need something resistant and surprising in order to learn something new, and this cannot be something purely conceptual. He would not agree, however, with Peirce that the non-conceptual elements of experience can be separated from the conceptual as 'real physical movements'. In addition, there are further significant differences between Peirce and Hegel on these points. The main difference has to do with the connection between concepts and physical reality. Whereas Peirce holds that we can categorically separate concepts and physical reality, Hegel does not. This also leads to a different understanding of the status of immediacy, resistance and mediation. Peirce thinks of the first two as non-conceptual categories, but for Hegel all three are to be understood as having conceptual and non-conceptual elements.[56]

Notes

1. Regarding this line of thought, see, for example, Tom Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy* (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 2005).
2. Brandom takes the main idea of classical Pragmatism and Hegel to be their insights into 'the normative character of cognitive undertakings'. But then he continues: 'Its expression is often obscured (Peirce is, as so often, an exception) by the pragmatists' further commitment to the sort of naturalism about the norms involved', in Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 289.
3. The pragmatists also wanted to distance themselves from philosophers of their time in America who expressed certain sympathies with Idealism. Concerning James, see Timothy L. S. Sprigge, 'James, Empiricism, and Absolute Idealism', in John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (eds), *A Companion to Pragmatism* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 166–76. Concerning Peirce, see, for example, Robert Stern, 'Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness', *Inquiry* 50 (2007), section 2.
4. G. H. Mead as well as F. C. S. Schiller will not play a significant role in my account, although I think most of what I say about Pragmatism is true for them too.
5. William James, *Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking* (1907), ed. Fredson Bowers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 31.

6. John Dewey, *The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, vol. 12, *Essays, Miscellany, and Reconstruction in Philosophy published during 1920*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 147.
7. References to the works of Peirce are from *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols 1–6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931–1935, vols 7 and 8, ed. A. W. Burks, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press) [hereafter CP; references to volume and paragraph number]. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, 2 vols, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992) [hereafter EP; references to volume and page number]. CP 5.358ff.; EP I, 109ff.
8. CP 5.383ff.; EP I, 119.
9. G. W .F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in Verbindung mit der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968 ff.), [hereafter GW], 9.
10. On these general philosophical similarities, see Kenneth Westphal, 'Hegel and Realism', in John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (eds), *A Companion to Pragmatism* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 177–83. Westphal directly identifies Hegel's philosophy with pragmatic realism and sees 'social ontology' as a key to this form of Pragmatism. Additionally, he sees the replacement of dualism by continua, the elements of naturalism and the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology* as being 'core views of Peirce and Dewey'.
11. See John Dewey, *From Absolutism to Experimentalism* (1930) in *The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Later Works, 1925–1953*, vol. 5, *Essays, The Sources of a Science of Education, Individualism, Old and New, and Construction and Criticism*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 148. See also Marc Rölli, 'Die Durchquerung des Absoluten. Zur Hegel-Rezeption John Deweys', in Thomas Wyrwich (ed.), *Hegel in der neueren Philosophie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2011), 17–46.
12. See especially the part under the title *The Many and the One*. James, however, did not finish this project. William James, *The Many and the One* (1903–1904), in *Manuscript Essays and Notes* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 21ff.
13. See Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 'Idéalisme et pragmatisme. Peirce, James et Dewey en tant que critiques de l'idéalisme', in F. Dagognet and P. Osmo (eds), *Autour de Hegel* (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 209–25. (German edition in *Philosophical Inquiry* 22 (2000), 26–43.)
14. As I will discuss later, however, I do not see a real gap between the early and later Peirce here. One can characterise the main project in the early Harvard and Lowell Lectures from 1865 and 1866 as well as the lectures from around 1907 as answering the 'Kantian' questions regarding why logical principles are valid, why we are successful in acquiring knowledge about the world, and how knowledge is even possible. Even the young Peirce had a critical stance towards Kant that might remind one in many respects of a Hegelian attitude. For example, both Hegel and Peirce would say that Kant lacks a (satisfactory) theory of judgement and that this is one of the reasons why Kant ended up with an unconvincing theory, which had to distinguish between things-in-themselves and appearances.
15. CP 5.14–40; EP II, 133ff.
16. CP 5.77n.; EP II, 179.

17. See, for example, Peirce, 'On a new list of the categories'. Peirce there refers to Kant when he claims: 'This paper is based upon a theory already established.' CP 1.545; EP I, 1.
18. This idea (that we can find out something about the structure of reality by thinking about our experiences) is not explicitly made clear in Peirce's text. But I think it is at least clear that we can experience a real thing as just being present, while at the same time we know that, from an ontological perspective, it must be characterised by *Secondness*. Thus, we can make a distinction between the ontological and the phenomenological description of things.
19. Peirce: 'A guess at the riddle', CP 1.355; EP I, 248.
20. For a fuller understanding of the project of the categories from 1903, one also has to take into account that Peirce thinks that the understanding of the categories is necessary to *justify* his early pragmatic maxim. This has to do with his theory of judgement, according to which the three different types of judgement are based on the three categories. This idea can also be seen as somewhat Hegelian. But I will leave this aside for now.
21. However, for a more accurate explanation one has to take into account Peirce's idea of *degenerated Thirdness*.
22. Peirce claims: 'unintelligibility does not suffice to destroy or refute a Category', CP 5.49; EP II, 153.
23. CP 5.38; EP II, 143.
24. CP 5.44; EP II, 149.
25. CP 5.103; EP II, 183.
26. CP 5.104; EP II, 183.
27. See Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 'Der Anfang vor dem Anfang. Zum Verhältnis der Logik zur Phänomenologie des Geistes' (forthcoming).
28. In a very interesting paper, Robert Stern points out that the common ground of Peirce and Hegel is anti-Cartesianism. With respect to Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Stern argues against Houlgate that Hegel does not want to establish a theory of knowledge without any preconditions. This is a difficult discussion. I would at least agree with Stern that the method of analysing experiences is anti-Cartesian. See Robert Stern, 'Hegel and Pragmatism', in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (eds), *A Companion to Hegel* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 556–75.
29. Concerning Hegel, see for this discussion Dina Emundts, *Erfahren und Erkennen: Hegels Theorie der Wirklichkeit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2012), 77ff.
30. CP 5.37; EP II, 143.
31. Peirce also claims that, for example, Berkeley is a nominalist. However, he obviously wants to distinguish between different kinds of nominalism: CP 5.93ff.; EP II, 181.
32. On the other hand, it has to be degenerated *Thirdness* because phenomenology is meant only to describe experience. It is therefore according to Peirce itself in the mode of presentness.
33. This is not in contradiction to the second proposal. On the contrary, it fits well, but these are two different aspects and they can be separated.
34. CP 5.90–92; EP II, 177.
35. For the 'aufgehoben', compare Stern, 'Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness'.
36. See Emundts, *Erfahren und Erkennen*.

37. How far Peirce wants go is not clear. He says, as mentioned earlier, that there is nothing without *Thirdness*.
38. Robert Stern has discussed each of these criticisms in detail. See the three papers: Robert Stern, 'Peirce, Hegel and the Category of Firstness', *International Yearbook of German Idealism* 5 (2007), 276–308; 'Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness'; 'Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* XLI (2005), 65–99. My project in this essay is very similar to Stern's project. Stern analyses the possible readings of Peirce's criticisms with respect to each category by looking at different passages of Peirce in this context. He then shows that most critical points are not based on a correct understanding of Hegel. I want to focus the whole discussion on the conception of experience and, accordingly, on the role of concepts. Therefore, I will only concentrate on the category of *Secondness*. Furthermore, Stern's aim seems to be to show that it is not the case that Hegel reduces everything to *Thirdness*. I agree here. However, I will also argue that Hegel has another understanding of the categories.
39. GW 9, 80.
40. CP 5.44; EP II, 149f.
41. For a detailed discussion on this, see Stern, 'Peirce, Hegel and the Category of Firstness', 301.
42. GW 9, 71.
43. CP 5.45; EP II, 151.
44. CP 5.53ff.; EP II, 155.
45. CP 5.56; EP II, 155.
46. CP 5.105; EP II, 184.
47. CP 5.65; EP II, 158. Stern, 'Peirce on Hegel', claims that this criticism, too, hangs together with the fact that Peirce thinks that Hegel has a subjective conception of laws and does not allow for contingency.
48. See CP 5.65; EP II, 158.
49. CP 5.106; EP II, 184.
50. The first two or even three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* deal with the experience of immediacy and perception. I cannot find anywhere that Hegel claims these experiences are not possible – though they are according to him certainly not sufficient to justify knowledge claims. See Emundts, *Erfahren und Erkennen*, ch. 3.
51. Peirce claims for the same reason that Hegel is a nominalist. Compare Stern, 'Peirce on Hegel', 77ff. Against this criticism, Stern shows that Hegel is not a subjective idealist.
52. See *ibid.*, 77. Stern's response is that Hegel can allow contingency. I think this is right. However, I am not sure that this is enough to defend Hegel. One could claim in Peirce's sense that for Hegel contingency is not the basis or even a part of what we learn. Thus, I think we have also to take into account that Hegel wants to contradict the distinction between the real and the conceptual without claiming that only concepts are real. We can then claim that for Hegel (as well as for Peirce) we can learn something new because there are not only concepts but also non-conceptual elements in our experience.
53. GW 9, 107. See Emundts, *Erfahren und Erkennen*, 342ff.
54. CP 5.51; EP II, 154.

55. According to Peirce, understanding reality solely as structured by physical or mechanical laws is one of Descartes's mistakes. This is definitely an anti-Cartesianism that is shared by Hegel.
56. I would like to thank especially Rolf Horstmann for helpful discussions. Many thanks are due to Karl Ameriks and to Amber Griffioen for their careful reading and comments on this text. I am also indebted to Wolfgang Schaffarzyk for bibliographical help.

12

Reason's form

Robert Pippin

I

The question of freedom in the modern German tradition is not just a metaphysical question. It concerns the status of a free life as a value, indeed, as they took to saying, the 'absolute' value. A free life is of unconditional and incomparable and inestimable value, and it is the basis of the unique, and again, absolute, unqualifiable respect owed to any human person just as such. This certainly increases the pressure on anyone who espouses such a view to tell us what a free life consists in. Kant's famous answer is 'autonomy', where this means first or minimally freedom from external constraint, coercion and intimidation ('thinking for yourself'), but even more importantly, being in a certain specific sort of self-relation. I can only be said truly to be 'ruling myself' when the considerations that determine what I do are reasons. But if, finally, in exercising reason I am merely rationally *responsive* to inclinations and desires and aversions, I am (according to Kant) still letting such contingent impulses 'rule' my life, however strategically rational or hierarchically ordered my plans for satisfaction turn out to be. So, Kant concludes, I am only truly autonomous, self-ruling, when the one consideration of importance (that is, normatively authoritative) in what I do is, as he says so frequently if still mysteriously, the '*form* of rationality' as such.[1] The more familiar name for such a necessary condition of autonomy is the Categorical Imperative. To make clear that this subjection to the 'form' of rationality counts as autonomy, Kant also insists that this moral law be understood as 'self-legislated', that we must be able to regard ourselves as its 'author', and that we are bound to such a law because we bind ourselves to it.

Kant's doctrine of freedom as, paradigmatically, autonomy, interpreted as the self-legislated rule of pure practical reason, is understood to have

provided us with one of the three basic alternatives in secular conceptions of the nature of practical normativity, alongside consequentialism and ethical naturalism, or 'virtue theory'. Since the issue was just as crucial for his Idealist descendants, the theory has to count as one of the most enduring and still influential legacies of that entire tradition. But Kant's account is embedded in a much larger and quite complicated picture of the normative relation between rational subjects and the world in general, and this 'big picture' also became a major issue in the work of the post-Kantian Idealists, and controversies about it are also still a major component of the continuing legacy of Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism. Accordingly, we need to understand that picture and how the practical part of Kant's philosophy fits in before we can return to the question of what he might mean by the freedom–autonomy–self-legislation equation.

Quite a typical and bold indication of the core of that picture occurs in a passage from the section on 'The Regulative Employment of the Ideas' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[2] Kant is describing the incessant attempt by human reason to find unity behind diversity and to reduce the principles of explanation to the smallest number, and he rejects the idea that we do this only for practical purposes, to save ourselves some trouble or merely to make it easier to organise the results of empirical inquiry. Instead, he insists, in such a case and in general reason 'does not beg but commands'.[a]

This language about commanding is part of a well-known complex of legal and political metaphors Kant uses to state his basic position on our cognitive, practical and aesthetic relation to the world. The Copernican turn in philosophy had already proposed that objects be understood to 'conform to our cognition' rather than the other way around,[b] and the understanding itself had been defined as 'the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the *spontaneity* of cognition'.[c] Throughout the first *Critique* it would at least appear that Kant's case for the possibility of *a priori* knowledge everywhere depends on the notion of an active intellect prescribing or legislating or commanding that experience have a unity without which representational content would not be possible.

a. 'Die Vernunft hier nicht bettele, sondern gebiete.' A653/B681, CPR 596.
b. 'Man versuche es daher einmal, ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen, daß wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten.' Bxvi, CPR 110.
c. 'So ist dagegen das Vermögen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen, oder die *Spontaneität* des Erkenntnisses, der *Verstand*.' A51/B75, CPR 193.

As noted, this idea is also central to his practical philosophy. It suffices to quote what may be the single most important (and ambiguous) passage from his moral philosophy:

> Thus the will is not just subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must also be viewed *as self-legislating*, and just on account of this as subject to the law (of which it can consider itself the author) in the first place.[d]

And while the third *Critique* would seem to depart the most from the picture of a subject legislating and imposing, the argument nevertheless manages an odd, indirect appeal to such a picture: pleasure in the beautiful is pleasure occasioned by the experience of a formal unity in apprehension of the sort that would have resulted from such legislative requirements, but which is in fact experienced independent of such an application. We thereby can experience pleasure in 'purposiveness' but 'without a purpose'.[e]

So, the legislating, commanding subject apparently retains its priority throughout the critical philosophy. But there is one further, crucial element to the picture; the most important and the most compressed element. That dimension is summed up in the final entry in the list of 'concepts of reflection':

> *Matter* and *Form*. These are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding.[f]

Our legislating subject legislates *the form* of experience, the rational form of action, and the *formal*, subjective conditions of experience in general set the conditions under which an aesthetic experience can be pleasurable and yet rationally 'demanded' from anyone. Transcendental knowledge concerns the mode of knowledge, the *Erkenntnisart*, of objects, or the form of such knowledge[3] and a pure concept is only 'the form of thinking of an object in general'.[g]

d. 'Der Wille wird also nicht lediglich dem Gesetz unterworfen, sondern so unterworfen, daß er auch als *selbstgesetzgebend* und eben um deswillen allererst dem Gesetze (davon er selbst sich als Urheber betrachten kann) unterworfen angesehen werden muß.' GS iv, 431, GMM 43.
e. 'Zweckmäßigkeit . . . ohne Zweck.' e.g. KW x, 299, 319.
f. 'Reflexionsbegriffe . . . *Materie* und *Form*. Dieses sind zwei Begriffe, welche aller andern Reflexion zum Grunde gelegt werden, so sehr sind sie mit jedem Gebrauch des Verstandes unzertrennlich verbunden.' A266/B322, CPR 369–70.
g. '[Daher enthält] reiner Begriff allein die Form des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt.' A51/B75, CPR 193.

In the practical sphere, the moral law or categorical imperative is regularly said to be the 'form of pure practical reason' as such. Since, according to Kant, unaided human reason has no insight into natural law or objective moral properties, only subjection to the form of pure practical reason can ground a rationalist ethics. This of course already sounds very far from our ordinary understanding of the urgency of moral obligations and the nature of the claim of such requirements. (Why am I supposed to be so deeply committed to 'subjection to the form of pure practical reason'?) But this is certainly Kant's position. In the second *Critique*, the '*formal* supreme principle of pure practical reason' is said to constitute an 'autonomy of the will';[h] the '*formal practical principle* of pure reason' itself is said to be the 'determining ground of the will' in such moral autonomy.[i] It is clear enough that Kant means to say by these claims that when we act according to what he calls 'material' principles, like the satisfaction of desires or even in the pursuit of what we take to be substantive goods, we cannot be said to be truly self-determining, simply because we have no control over what inclinations, impulses and passions we happen to experience, or why some putative good should be taken actually to be a good; whereas we have acted in a completely self-determining way when we always attend, as a possible constraint on any materially motivated action or on the setting of any finite end, to the purely formal character of any such maxim, asking in effect if this maxim's form can satisfy the formal nature of reason as such – that it can be shared by all, that no 'exception' is claimed for oneself. That much about Kant's intentions is clear, but the link between this formulation about formality, and the good or bad making features of our reasons, has always been a source of great controversy, and still is today.

II

So much for the standard summary and the standard picture. Let us say that it seems by and large to be an 'impositionist' picture, with spontaneous human reason imposing a self-legislated form *on to* the unruly material contents of intuition, *on to* the unruly egoistic passions due to our sensible natures, and that such rational form provides the formal framework imposed as the form

h. 'Wenn wir nun unseren formalen obersten Grundsatz der reinen praktischen Vernunft (als einer Autonomie des Willens) mit allen bisherigen *materialen* Principien der Sittlichkeit vergleichen.' GS v, 39, CPrR 36.

i. 'Das *formale praktische Princip* der reinen Vernunft, nach welchem die bloße Form einer durch unsere Maximen möglichen allgemeinen Gesetzgebung den obersten und unmittelbaren Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ausmachen muß.' GS v, 41, CPrR 37.

of all experience, within which the experience of some objects could occasion a distinctly aesthetic and shareable pleasure. Stated this way, without qualification, it is also an immensely unattractive, implausible philosophical account, suggesting a crude idealism in cognition, a narrow, rigoristic, self-alienated, motivationally opaque moralism and an unstable subjectivism in aesthetics. The picture is made even more unattractive by Kant's suggestion that the source of all such forms is reason's self-legislating activity, as if we actually *produce* forms that we then impose on a recalcitrant sensible materiality. What I want to suggest is that this impositionism is only superficially Kant's picture. The strategy will be to show that the self-originating and self-legislating impositionist picture is not faithful to the deepest insights of the theoretical philosophy, and then to suggest what implications this might have for practical philosophy.

But even before proceeding to the details, there is an immediately pressing, prima facie reason for doubting that this picture could be accurate: it saddles Kant with a position he could not possibly hold. In his epistemology, the fact that Kant thinks of the form of experience as having something to do with the judgemental form of thought, and the fact that he says the chief activity of the understanding is judging, nevertheless could not mean that he thinks of empirical experience itself (perception, for example) *as consisting in judgings*, in the actual application of conceptual form to sensible matter as in predicative classification. That would mean that he would have to think that the perception of a red rectangle on a table in front of me consists in some silent and, one would assume, extremely rapid judgemental activity occurring *in each perceptual episode*, a token of the 'There is a red rectangle in front of me' type. If that is not so, and, when one considers the extraordinary variety of perceptual content in any moment of experience, it cannot be so on pain of absurdity, one must still do justice to the fact that Kant nevertheless insists that experience would not be possible without the understanding's 'activity' – so how should we understand that 'activity'? (One way to think of this would be to align oneself with Geach, who insisted that 'whatever one can judge to be so one can also conceive to be so without judging it', and so, as with McTaggart's 'non-assertoric thought', identify the 'internal structure' of such a judgement and such a thought. This would come close to Spinoza's view that a thought is by its nature assertoric and so 'only a background of adult conviction keeps a thought of a winged horse from being a judgement that a horse is winged'. This is certainly relevant to Kant but it does not yet specify the act of thinking or conceiving if this is not an act of judging. Likewise by saying that experiencing cannot be simply judging,

I do not mean to conflate judging with linguistic expressions of or reports of judgement. Experiencing is certainly not identical with these either, but that is another issue.[4])

Moreover, while Kant's account of the form of practical rationality might have suggested to some commentators that the actual exercise of such practical rationality simply *consists* in 'applying' a universalisability test to explicitly formulated maxims, as if moral deliberation consisted in explicitly attending *to the proper logical form of a material maxim*, testing its universalisability, and then proceeding to act or to refrain from action because the maxim 'passed' or not, there is nothing in Kant's many examples of ordinary moral deliberation to suggest such a picture. It is true that in the four famous examples from the Second Section of the *Groundwork*, Kant writes as if an agent in doubt about the rightness of a possible action performs a universalisability test and thereby comes to see a 'contradiction' and therewith why a wrong action would be wrong. But he has already told us that in such examples he is *not* describing ordinary moral experience, but is making an abstract philosophical point. The examples are not meant to reveal what actually goes on in the assessment of a course of action as impermissible, any more than the claim that the form of our perception is judgemental is meant to suggest that perception consists in judgements. As Kant had made clear in the First Section:

> Thus, then, we have progressed in the moral cognition of common human reason to reach its principle, which admittedly *it does not think of as separated in this way in a universal form*, but yet always actually has before its eyes and uses as the standard of its judging. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, it is very well informed in all cases that occur, to distinguish what is good, what is evil, what conforms with duty or is contrary to it.[j]

And later in the paragraph:

> Here one cannot without admiration observe the great advantage the practical capacity to judge has over the theoretical in common human understanding . . . what is most important, in the latter case [in practical matters] it [the power of judging] stands just as good a chance

j. 'So sind wir denn in der moralischen Erkenntniß der gemeinen Menschenvernunft bis zu ihrem Princip gelangt, *welches sie sich zwar freilich nicht so in einer allgemeinen Form abgesondert denkt*, aber doch jederzeit wirklich vor Augen hat und zum Richtmaße ihrer Beurtheilung braucht. Es wäre hier leicht zu zeigen, wie sie mit diesem Compasse in der Hand in allen vorkommenden Fällen sehr gut Bescheid wisse, zu unterscheiden, was gut, was böse, pflichtmäßig, oder pflichtwidrig sei.' GS iv, 403–04, GMM 19 [emphasis mine].

> of hitting the mark as a philosopher can ever expect; indeed it is almost more sure in this than even the latter, because he can have no other principle, but can easily confuse his judgement with a host of alien and irrelevant considerations and deflect it from the straight course.[k]

Now to be sure, Kant goes on to explain that while we have no need of philosophy to clarify *what we ought to do* in any case, we are so tempted by self-love that we constantly devise arguments against the moral point of view and for the satisfaction of our desire for happiness. Accordingly, even common human reason requires critical philosophy as either a barrier or corrective to these temptations, but the elaborate detailed formulation and reformulations of the moral law in the Second Section and the casuistical discussions of examples are relevant only to this second-order and defensive task, and are clearly not meant to be articulations of ordinary moral knowledge or themselves a component of that 'ordinary human reason'.[l,5]

And so the same question arises: What would be the right account of the actualisation of pure practical reason, *reason in action*, one could say, if it is not such a continual testing procedure?

III

The key to what Kant is trying to say lies in a proper understanding of what he calls *Spontaneität*, what we can generally call the problem of conceptual or rational activity, an activity that Kant considers fundamentally legislative. The most comprehensive characterisation of that feature of human awareness that makes such activity conceptual or rational ('normative' in the broadest sense) is that such awareness is apperceptive. The argument is that any possible objective purport in experience (any intentional determinacy, thought's possibly being about objects at all) has to be understood as a relation that must be established, cannot be understood as a result *only* of sensory interchange with the world, as if the mere presence of sensible objects and their modification of sensibility on its own, as it were, sets or triggers the content

k. 'Hier kann man es doch nicht ohne Bewunderung ansehen, wie das praktische Beurtheilungsvermögen vor dem theoretischen im gemeinen Menschenverstande so gar viel voraus habe . . . und was das meiste ist, er [der gemeine Verstand] kann im letzteren Falle sich eben so gut Hoffnung machen, es recht zu treffen, als es sich immer ein Philosoph versprechen mag, ja ist beinahe noch sicherer hierin, als selbst der letztere, weil dieser doch kein anderes Princip als jener haben, sein Urtheil aber durch eine Menge fremder, nicht zur Sache gehöriger Erwägungen leicht verwirren und von der geraden Richtung abweichend machen kann.' GS iv, 404, GMM 19.

l. 'Gemeinen Menschenvernunft.' KW vii, 292.

of conscious thought. This means that all contentful consciousness is a self-relation in relation to objects, although that self-relation cannot, on pain of regress, be a dyadic intentional relation or a simple self-monitoring. Wilfrid Sellars, in his classic essay *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, put this point by saying that perception is 'so to speak, making an assertion or claim'.[6] It is not easy to spell this out because the character of the conceptual activity at work is difficult to describe. As noted before, it certainly does not mean that experience actually consists of some string of impossibly many assertoric judgements. But the key point is that any conscious attentiveness to content of a sort cannot be said merely to happen to a subject, but must be an exercise of what Kant called spontaneity, even if not an exercise attended to as such. (At any point when there is some need to do so, a challenge or an anomaly, any such taking can always be made into a judgement; it must be of the character always to be available for such an explicit claim.) That is, in all my conscious attentiveness to the world there is some kind of implicit continual responsiveness to the normative dimensions of all experience, an openness we might say everywhere and always to whether I am getting it right, an openness that must be '*held* open', all as a characteristic of my attentiveness. It is this feature of that attentiveness that for Kant and his successors forever makes a wholly psychologistic or naturalistic account of consciousness incomplete. I want to claim that there is a parallel phenomenon in play in what Kant must understand to be a kind of practical apperception, and so a parallel temptation to misinterpretation or over-interpretation. Awareness does not consist in judgements, and moral attentiveness and responsiveness (what Kant calls ordinary human reason, *gemeine Menschenvernunft*) does not consist in universalisation tests.

I want now to take up some suggestions from Wilfrid Sellars about this issue and follow through its implications in some of his articles.[7] The first and most important suggestion comes from §33 of *Science and Metaphysics*, where, in support of the claim that 'it would be a radical mistake to construe mental acts as actions', he writes of our perceptual takings that 'It is nonsense to speak of taking something to be the case "on purpose". Taking is an act in the Aristotelian sense of "actuality" rather than in the specialised practical sense that refers to conduct.'[8] (By 'perceptual takings', as in taking there to be a book on the table, I understand Sellars to be referring to perceiving [in the sense, he says, of 'noticing'] a book on the table, not taking it that what I am seeing on the table is a book; he is quite deliberately not talking about 'judgemental taking'.)

What we want to understand (in order to disabuse ourselves of any worry about intellectualism or the 'over-intellectualising' perceptual experience described in the last section) is how considering perceptual takings as 'actualities' in the Aristotelian sense might help in such disabusing. However, these remarks are part of a larger Sellarsian picture built up of the notions of form and content as well as actuality and potentiality and we need a few more elements of that picture before we can appreciate the force of this claim about 'conceptual actualisation'. We need especially to take on board, here without defence and only for the sake of understanding this one issue, a controversial aspect of Sellars's Kant interpretation.[9] What we have been referring to as the 'content of experience' is for Sellars a manifold of empirical intuitions, once we realise that such empirical intuitions are conceptually informed, have a conceptual form.

Here is Sellars from his essay 'Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience', explaining his famous denial that the understanding/intuition distinction in Kant is congruent with the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction.

> Actually, the pattern of Kant's thought stands out far more clearly if we interpret him as clear about the difference between *general* conceptual representations (sortal and attributive), on the one hand, and, on the other, *intuition* as a special class of *non-general* conceptual representings . . . 'Intuitive' representings would consist of those conceptual representings of individuals (roughly, individual concepts) which have the form illustrated by
>
> this-line
>
> as contrasted with
>
> the line I drew yesterday
>
> which is an individual concept having the form of a definite description.[10]

So it is the notion of conceptual activity relevant to these 'this-such', intuitional representings, to the content of experience as the experience of discriminated particular objects and events that we want to understand.

And we note right away that by understanding the way such conceivings are in play as actualisations, not judgings, Sellars does not mean that we should think that some sort of mental activity is merely triggered into

operation, or let us say, occurs non-apperceptively. He says that the 'evoking' by a red object in sunlight of 'this is red' from a person who knows the language to which this sentence belongs is 'no *mere* conditioned response'. This is just as true of the evokings of intuitional representings, the content of experience, because, in the same way:

> To know the language of perception is to be in a position to let one's thoughts be guided by the world in a way that contrasts with free association, with day-dreaming, and, more interestingly, with the coherent imaginings of the story teller.[11]

This 'letting be guided' is thus somehow neither a causal notion of evocation (causally wrung out of us) nor a judgement in the sense of a 'decision' of sorts about what is before me.

It is in this sense that Sellars can formulate his own version of Kant's 'same function' claim, Kant's assertion that 'The same function that gives unity to the different representations *in a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations *in an intuition*'.[m]

> In receptivity we do the same sort of thing we do in the 'spontaneity' of imagination, but we do it as receptive to guidance by objects we come to represent.[12]

The 'same thing' is conceiving, but '*in* receptivity' is a dialectical notion we need more of the picture to understand.

We need this following piece above all. Sellars then warns against a temptation (a temptation I think at play in many of the accusations about Kantian 'over-intellectualising'):

> The temptation is to think of the 'content' of an act as an entity that is 'contained' by it. But if the 'form' of a judging is the structure by virtue of which it is possessed of certain *generic* logical or epistemic powers, surely the content must be the character by virtue of which the act has *specific* modes of these generic logical or epistemic powers.[13]

So it is not the case that we should think of the subject–predicate logical form or the substance–property categorical form or any general form as 'empty' containers or something analogous to empty shapes or moulds which are either 'filled' by sense impressions of, say, the 'Tom-is-tall' sort when we

m. 'Dieselbe Function, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen *in einem Urtheile* Einheit gibt, die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen *in einer Anschauung* Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt.' A79/B105, CPR 211.

encounter the tall Tom, or which is sufficiently stimulated to 'stamp' sensory impressions with the Tom-is-tall form. 'Tom is tall' *is* just the specific way *the S is P form* is actual, manifests in actuality the *discriminatory power* that having *the S is P form* enables. That form is 'enmattered' just by being this specific mode of actualisation of the capacity, not by being some stuff that is shaped. And an empirical intuition, a perception of a particular, a perception of a particular-with-attribute, or the determination of a specific temporal relation between events, are the ways any such generic powers are, differentially, specifically actualised in sensible creatures like us.

And we can already note that none of this is guilty of cognitivism or intellectualism or, maybe the term should be, 'explicitism'. One's seeing the tall Tom approaching involves the actualisation just described without one thinking or judging 'There is that tall Tom' or 'Tom is tall' or any application of concepts to sensory material. Just as in Aristotle's account the *phronimos*'s practical rationality is *in* the way he attends to, ignores, selects and dwells on (or not) aspects of the events and possibilities before him, the power of seeing *is* for us a conceptual power. That does not mean it is not a 'truly sensual seeing' power but *rather* a 'conceptual' or judgemental power. Because it is a conceptual power (apperceptive, as Kant puts it) it can always, as we see, also be 'attuned' to or 'open' to, say, it actually not being Tom I see. We see the tall Tom in a way always open to cues that it is not Tom because in perceptually taking it to be Tom, I am apperceptively aware of it being such a taking. Not aware of Tom and aware of the taking, but aware of Tom *in that way*, in that adverbial sense. That is the way we *see*; it is not a seeing also 'monitored' by a self-conscious I.

This is also relevant to how the way animals have representations is different from ours. Theirs are intentional in their way, but they do not have the status of 'cognitions', as McDowell puts it. A dog might see a human figure far away (upwind, let us say) and seeing an unknown person, begin barking, only later to start wagging her tail as the known person it really is comes into view. *But the dog did not correct herself.* Here we do want to say that a perceptual cue prompted a response (one we can even call a rational response), and then a different perceptual cue (with more detail of visual features in view) prompted a different behavioural response. (I have never noticed, for example, that my dog became embarrassed that she made such a mistake – which she often makes – since she has no way of knowing that she made a mistake that she ought to correct. That is not how she sees; she sees one set of cues then she sees another. This would be one way of saying she has no unity of apperception.)

And here we might as well take fully on board the form–matter, actuality–potentiality language Sellars is suggesting, and so the kind of hylomorphism that is most interesting, soul–body hylomorphism. In the standard analogy (from Book Two of Aristotle's *De Anima*), if the eye were body (matter), *seeing*, the power of sight, would be its soul (form), the distinct way of the being-at-work or first actuality of its body. (There is thus no true separability (even if there is logical distinguishability); a 'dead' eye is not an eye any more, except homonymously.)[14]

So in a human sensibly receptive creature, subject to sensory impressions, specific conceptual intuitings (this-suches) would be the distinctive actuality, the distinctive being-at-work of such a capacity in creatures like us. The temptation to think that for creatures like us we must distinguish the sensory manifold from the form that informs it, is the great temptation to be avoided, Sellars is insisting. The power of the eye's sight is not a power 'added' to a material eye, as if there could be an eye identical in all respects to a normal eye, but which cannot see, and which is then 'infused' with the seeing power. The seeing power *is* the distinct being at work of that body.

Analogously: when Kant famously says, that 'intuitions without concepts are blind',[n] he does not mean that we are first subject to blind intuitions which can be said to become 'informing' and 'guiding' intuitions 'after' concepts are applied to them. There are no blind intuitions, waiting to be conceptualised. Kant means to be rejecting the idea of non-conceptual content, not specifying its initial blindness. Blind intuitions are no more determinate intuitions than dead eyes are eyes. It is thus also a mistake to ask a question like 'How do sensations guide or constrain the application of concepts?', the same mistake as asking 'How do we compare our judgements about states of affairs or our experiences of states of affairs with the states of affairs?' Experience is not guided by sensations; it *is* sensory awareness and can only be sensory awareness, on to particular objects and events, if it has the power of discrimination, a conceiving power, actualised sensorily. Likewise, the contents of experience *are* states of affairs. Any reluctance to judge on the basis of such experience comes from what else we experience not from any comparison.[15]

So it is not the case that ostensible seeings are so necessitated that when we correct what we wrongly took to be what we saw, we are just *otherwise necessitated*. I have tried to say why this is not so. Ostensible seeings are just that, *ostensible* as such, apperceived in Kant's terms, and so always *subject* to

n. 'Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.' A51/B75, CPR 193–94.

correction, not to alternate necessitation. And it all does not suggest that cognitive claims are simply up to us, as if we *could* irresponsibly judge there to be an elephant in the seminar room when there is not one.

The conceptual capacities that are brought into play, actualised, in a perceptual experience (that is, properly understood, in empirical intuitions of the world) amount to the kind of actualisation called for in the seamless and generally unproblematic perceptual experience of the world. But those capacities (the same capacities) can be brought into play in another way, at another register, when, in that experience, the actualisation of an order of reflectiveness and assertoric claim-making is called for, which, while always available, is mostly not called for. This actualisation is called for whenever something discordant in our perceptual experience occurs (we perceive at a later time aspects of the world inconsistent with what we took ourselves to be perceiving earlier, say, or when a question is posed: 'Did you really see the cube?'). The *modes of actualisation* are different, not the *relation to the will*.[16]

Of course, these suggestions are just suggestions at this point; they do nothing to establish that Kant's position was not 'impositionist' in this sense. But we have already quoted the 'same function' passage from A79, and there are others of the same tenor. At B138, in the second-edition deduction, Kant writes:

> The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognise an object but rather something under which every intuition must stand *in order to become an object for me*.[o]

And he works hard to insist that he is not turning the question of objectivity into the question of subjectively necessary unity.

> For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what the sceptic wishes most, for then

o. 'Die synthetische Einheit des Bewußtseins ist also eine objektive Bedingung aller Erkenntniß, nicht deren ich bloß selbst bedarf, um ein Objekt zu erkennen, sondern unter der jede Anschauung stehen muß, *um für mich Objekt zu werden*.' B138, CPR 249.

> all of our insight through the supposed objective validity of our judgements is nothing but sheer illusion.[p]

The point of all these metaphors, of course, is to find as many ways as possible to suggest some modality of conceptual activity other than assertoric judging or acts of conceptual sorting ('This is an A, this is a B, etc.'), or deliberate rule-following. We can claim that we cannot be successfully on to objects without the actualisation of a sortal discriminatory power, even while insisting that the actualisation of that power in the sensory presence of the object is quite different from its actualisation in judgemental sorting.

IV

This is even clearer in practical contexts, I now want to claim, especially in consideration of something like practical apperception, the self-relation by virtue of which what I am doing is *this* deed of mine, not that, and not something happening to me or that I suffer. The full claim, which would require a lengthy separate discussion, is that my intention (conceptually mediated mindedness in this context) should be said to be 'in' the action, not 'before' or 'behind' it, in much the same way we discussed rationality for the *phronimos*.[17] In initiating and then sustaining an action I obviously know what I am doing and have some sense of why, and so can be said to be going about my task 'knowingly' without that having to mean that, as the deed unfolds, I keep checking to see if my intention is being fulfilled or if the action still fits the act-description under which I became committed to the intention or if I still regard it as justified. I can clearly be said to be attentive to all this without being attentive *to* the intention and act description and evaluation '*as such*' (just as I can be said to have reasons for what I am doing without ever reasoning). To return to the point of the analogy with cognition, just as experience, perceptual knowledge, say, does not consist in some series of empirical judgements, so rectitude in a life does not consist in some kind of self-monitoring and self-testing. No 'impositionism' anywhere, in other words. A righteous moral life is not one in which some individual has

p. 'Denn z.B. der Begriff der Ursache, welcher die Nothwendigkeit eines Erfolgs unter einer vorausgesetzten Bedingung aussagt, würde falsch sein, wenn er nur auf einer beliebigen uns eingepflanzten subjektiven Nothwendigkeit, gewisse empirische Vorstellungen nach einer solchen Regel des Verhältnisses zu verbinden, beruhte. Ich würde nicht sagen können: die Wirkung ist mit der Ursache im Objecte (d.i. nothwendig) verbunden, sondern ich bin nur so eingerichtet, daß ich diese Vorstellung nicht anders als so verknüpft denken kann; welches gerade das ist, was der Sceptiker am meisten wünscht; denn alsdann ist alle unsere Einsicht, durch vermeinte objective Gültigkeit unserer Urtheile, nichts als lauter Schein.' B168, CPR 265.

decided at some punctuated moment to make the Categorical Imperative the superordinate principle of choice for all decisions, as if there is some noumenal 'moment' of election: a choice between radical evil or the *summum bonum*. Rather, such a life involves a variety of discriminatory and evaluative capacities 'actualised' in sensibly embodied ways as occasions demand. Prior to any putative deliberative moment, capacities for discrimination, perception, assessments of relevance, affective responses and so forth have already long since been engaged in ways that are conceptually complex and subject to possible direct assessment if something happens that calls for it.

To return one last time to the analogy with cognition, when Kant says that the 'undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*',[q] I take it that he means (that he *must* mean since he also says that we *know* appearances) that such an appearance is an articulate one without yet any explicit articulation having 'gone on'. Such an articulation would mean that I would have to stop and think about what it is exactly that I saw, what would be relevant to answer a question I was posed, etc. It (the *Erscheinung*) is undetermined *for me*. Likewise, as noted earlier, I can have several reasons for what I am doing without, yet, any *reasoning* having gone on. Prior to such an articulation by me, the reasons could be said to be as *yet* undetermined for and by me; I would have to stop and think about just why I was doing this or that. Or: *the undetermined object of a human intention is a phenomenal action*.

So what gets attended to in practice as salient, of ethical significance; even what goes 'properly' *unnoticed* in a division of labour in, for example, a well functioning egalitarian society (race, gender, etc.), a society with a rational form; what occurrence raises a question, demands attention; what does not; who is taken to be of relevance to the moral community; who is not; and so forth, can all be imagined to be of great, attended to, but unreflected weight in our practical world, some so deeply unreflective and strongly held that it is hard to imagine ever questioning them. We have all of this is 'in mind', without any of it being 'before the mind'. And yet it is highly implausible that such historically and culturally quite variant shared forms of practice could be said to have any immediate, direct presence in our experience 'on their own', as if pressing on our attention in themselves or 'from the outside'. A highly complex conceptual or normative interpretive framework is at work, is actual, and is available for reflection, without it being the case that such

q. 'Der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung, heißt *Erscheinung*.' A20/B34, CPR 155.

a being at work is a matter of some explicit 'reflective endorsement', or the result of an articulated moral evaluation somehow 'going on' as a mental event and so a distinct component of such normative attentiveness.

This also gives us a different way, or the beginning of a different way, to think about the autonomous individual. Commonsensically, we rightly understand the minimum condition for such self-rule to be freedom from external constraint or coercion or threat and so forth. In a general sense, we also accept what Kant introduces as a condition for such self-rule being genuine: it should be rational. If we are under the influence of some urge or passion that tempts us to do something we recognise we have no good reason to do or very good reason to refrain from doing (or, to add massively to the complexity of the case, we could so recognise were we not under such an influence), and yet we satisfy the urge, we tend to agree that something is going wrong; we are not *leading our lives* in the proper sense. But we baulk at what is taken to be the next Kantian step: that what it would be to be fully rational would be to submit our reasons for action to some consideration of compatibility with the form of rationality as such. That move introduces all the rigorism and empty formalism and difficult motivational worries. But these worries look different if we concede that by the form of rationality Kant means a capacity for assessment that can no more be isolated as a kind of criterion than there are ever 'substances' or 'causes' in experience, or than we can understand seeing without understanding it as the seeing of a kind of eye, human, or bat, or fly, say. (There is no 'seeing as such'; there are only species-specific actualisations of such a power.) And it looks different if we understand the actuality of reason in a human life as a capacity for justification specific to, relative to, the way in which some form of life at some time calls for, or does not call for, such justifications and acknowledgements. The idea of autonomy as the capacity of an individual to 'think for herself', of such thinking as the genuine deliberation necessary for self-rule only if rational, and the idea of the standard of rationality conceived in the 'formal' way I am suggesting Kant does not hold, all begins to look different if we consider how Kant meant us to understand 'form' and 'activity' in the theoretical philosophy.

To be sure, in the practical context, there *are* things we do 'on purpose'; there are genuine actions that are up to us, not only actualisations. But these actions are initiated fairly far 'downstream', within some understanding of the context of possible action, the available alternatives and the relevant criteria for assessment. There are practically relevant *perceptual* 'takings' that are hardly the result of how we might 'decide' to look at things, and it is

only in such determinate contexts that rationally evaluative capacities are then drawn into play, and this again in ways that are not simply 'up to us'. (We don't decide what justifies what.) There is also, of course, deliberation, where what we ought to do is not clear: Is this action a betrayal of friendship or what a good friend ought to do? But the terms of the deliberation and the relevant options must still be understood as aspects of the actualisation of our rational capacities and not as resolvable finally by something like a 'free choice'. It is much the same as cognitive deliberation: Was that a dog or a wolf I just saw? No one finally simply 'decides' what the answer shall be.

V

Now admittedly this all also begins to look very different from the historical Kant. He certainly seemed to think that freedom minimally required an ability, as it is said, 'to step back' from what we might be inclined, even powerfully inclined, to do, and deliberate about what we ought to or may do, and *this simply qua rational deliberator*, having put out of play all considerations except what it would be rational to do. His account of moral responsibility has always suggested to many that he meant us to consider each action as chosen, that in cases of moral temptation, we should think of ourselves as like controllers faced with a switch, with access to a guide book about tests; either act for self-love or elect to act only on maxims that can be universalised, according to the rules in the guide book. Such election would, of course, only be possible in Kant's noumenal world, unconditioned and so not in time, and so a choice for which we bear sole and absolute responsibility. Moreover, given what is accepted as Kant's picture of moral conflict – a struggle between inclinations, all species of self-love in one way or another, and what we know is the right thing to do – there just cannot be a continuity between Kant's practical philosophy and his theoretical philosophy, if the latter is, as has been claimed, non-impositionist. Moral life according to the canonical Kant *is* certainly the struggle to *impose* 'what reason demands' *on to* the resistant passions of self-love we are naturally subject to. And, as already conceded, there are certainly passages where he seemed to be saying that the question of whether our lives could be said to conform to the form of rationality and so count as autonomous was indeed a matter of constantly testing maxims for universalisability, or for conformity to some moral ideal (respect for persons as ends) said to be equivalent to the universalisability test.

It is too late in the day at this point to turn to the minutiae of Kant interpretation, but I think we should at the very least hesitate before concluding that while Kant was not an impositionist in his theoretical and aesthetic philosophy, he was in his practical philosophy. It may have served Kant's purposes occasionally to lay out the issues and alternatives in stark and somewhat simplified terms, suggesting mind-made empirical objects and self-monitoring maxim testers, but when one considers his overall position and more of the details, it looks less likely that the core, canonical, formulations should be taken as his last word. Consider this one indication of the complexity of his position.

Very early on in Book One of Kant's *Religion* book, he attests in a striking footnote to his deep sympathy with Schiller, the author of one of the most famous little poetic objections to Kant (that if I aid my friend, I should find some way to dislike the friend or, for the Kantian, there could be no moral worth in the action).[18] In praising Schiller's essay *Über Anmut und Würde*, Kant, while agreeing that actions done from duty are not properly understood as ever 'graceful' (they rather inspire 'awe'), he surprisingly agrees with Schiller that there is something wrong, objectionable, about the picture of someone who experiences doing his duty as, one has to say, the difficult imposition of a constraint on what he would truly like to do, doing his duty always reluctantly or grudgingly. Kant writes:

> Now, if we ask, 'What is the *aesthetic* constitution, the *temperament* so to speak *of virtue*: is it courageous and hence *joyous*, or weighed down by fear and dejected?' an answer is hardly necessary. The latter slavish frame of mind can never be found without a hidden *hatred* of the law, whereas a heart joyous in the *compliance* with its duty (not just complacency in the *recognition* of it) is the sign of genuineness in virtuous disposition.[r]

It is true that Kant is here commenting on virtue and not autonomy as such (where virtue is something like having an autonomy as an end), but his general point seems to be about the *genuineness* of moral motivation, a more general condition of moral worth in both individual actions and in the virtue of a life as a whole. So even in individual cases, when the question is whether

r. 'Frägt man nun: welcherlei ist die *ästhetische* Beschaffenheit, gleichsam das *Temperament der Tugend*, muthig, mithin *fröhlich*, oder ängstlich-gebeugt und niederschlagen? so ist kaum eine Antwort nöthig. Die letztere sklavische Gemüthsstimmung kann nie ohne einen verborgenen *Hass* des Gesetzes statt finden, und das fröhliche Herz in *Befolgung* seiner Pflicht (nicht die Behaglichkeit in *Anerkennung* desselben) ist ein Zeichen der Ächtheit tugendhafter Gesinnung. GS vi, 23–24, RBR 49.

the moral law has been the superordinate factor in the decision, this kind of remark suggests a far more complicated set of conditions for the attainment of this commitment, the 'out of duty' state of mind, than what strength of will or resolve alone can achieve. And since our moral vocation requires us always to strive for such a dutiful state, whether as a ruling principle in all our actions (virtue) or in any single act, such conditions are essential to the achievement of 'what morality requires'. To experience the moral law as a painful constraint on what one would otherwise want to do is, Kant is suggesting, even if one ends up doing what duty requires and because it is required, evidence of a sort that one has *not* yet 'genuinely' made 'the right' the determining ground of one's actions. He says that without the right 'joyous frame of mind' we won't ever know whether we have attained a true love of the good; that is, whether we have the condition he calls 'having incorporated' such a concern with the morally good 'into one's maxim'.[s] Or put the other way, even the fact of the moral law 'winning out' in some conflict with self-love is not evidence of a morally righteous action, but at most still only a 'legally' correct compliance.

Kant is of course famous for expressing scepticism that we can ever attain anything more than legal compliance like this, but he is suggesting that the picture of a dualism between sensible inclinations and a constraining, regulating moral law, an impositionist picture, is not something we should consider the default position; it is not the true picture of a moral, or said more broadly, an autonomous life. (The passage indicates that subjection of my will to the Categorical Imperative may be a necessary condition of autonomy, but it is not sufficient.) And this opens up on to a lot of issues not usually associated with the canonical Kant. For if a properly autonomous life does not involve some sort of mere rule over our rebellious affective lives, then it is also true that we cannot manage to have the proper affective attunement, the avoidance of a dualism between affective matter and rational form, simply by choosing to have it, as in choosing to love doing our duty. The conditions that must be fulfilled for us to be in the position of having genuinely adopted moral rightness as of superordinate importance in what we do are not then themselves simply up to us, but require a sort of socialisation and education and affective relationships with parents and other members of what Kant calls 'the ethical commonwealth'.[t] This would

s. 'Im festen Vorsatz es künftig besser zu machen besteht, der, durch den guten Fortgang angefeuert, eine fröhliche Gemüthsstimmung bewirken muß, ohne welche man nie gewiß ist, das Gute auch *lieb gewonnen*, d.i. es in seine Maxime aufgenommen zu haben.' GS vi, 24, RBR 49.

t. 'Ein ethisches gemeines Wesen.' KW viii, 754ff.

suggest that the form of one's action could not count as rational in isolation, that it depends on whether the form of one's life as a whole is rational, and this might then depend, in the sense just suggested, on whether a community's form of life was rational. Perhaps this would mean that a certain economy of shared affective and evaluative responsiveness had been achieved and had become interwoven in the fabric of the self-understanding, culture and educational practices of a community, all such that the possible achievement ('actualisation') of autonomy might be more a social than an individual achievement.

Let me summarise the claim I am making one final time with reference to the crucial self-legislation claim. There are several levels to Kant's insistence that we must be able to regard ourselves as the 'authors' of the law and that it is self-legislated, not, let us say, merely self-administered. It clearly involves simply thinking for oneself, not being coerced, cowed, intimidated, subject to influences and impulses in some way responsible for one's choices. Second, it must mean that in opting to constrain everything I do and to set my own ends according to 'what is rational', there is no other consideration motivating me except reason itself. The air of paradox begins here (or the whiff of a possible regress can be detected). But neither of these formulations does justice yet to the strong language of 'authoring' and self-legislating. Kant does not say I am the rational *executive* in this legislative analogy, but am *legislative*. So there must be a third and deeper formulation of autonomy. The claim clearly cannot mean that one formulates for oneself what will *count* as rational. The form of rationality just *is* the form of rationality. But Kant's language suggests that this form is motivationally inert (just a logical form) and indeterminate unless and until I legislate it as the superordinate practical principle of my life. (It would then be the rational form *of my life*; not, as one usually hears about Kant, that my life should be understood to have *the form of a pure practically rational being*.)[19] I cannot 'legislate' it as *the* law, but I do legislate that it be *my* law. (I must, if it is to *be* my law.) The air of paradox then returns. Understood this way, it will be very difficult for Kant to keep distinct what the form of reason, considered simply as such, means, and what the form means – amounts to – when 'actualised' as a life-principle. That will largely depend on the concrete form of life itself.[20]

All of this, of course, begins to sound less like the Sage of Königsberg and more like the wise Swabian from Stuttgart, but that is hardly worrisome in itself.

Notes

1. E.g. KW vii, 135–37.
2. KW iv, 563–82: A642–68/B670–96.
3. Cf.: 'Diese Untersuchung, die wir eigentlich nicht Doktrin, sondern nur transzendentale Kritik nennen können, weil sie nicht die Erweiterung der Erkenntnisse selbst, sondern nur die Berichtigung derselben zur Absicht hat und den Probierstein des Werths oder Unwerths aller Erkenntnisse a priori abgeben soll, ist das, womit wir uns jetzt beschäftigen.' A12/B26, CPR 133.
4. Peter Geach, *Mental Acts: their content and their objects* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), xi. Geach cites Spinoza, *Ethics*, II.49 *scholium*. It would involve a lengthy digression to explain why this issue is also relevant to Geach's rich discussion of why we should never understand expressions like 'the wisdom of Socrates' in a Platonic way, as splitting into 'the wisdom' and 'of Socrates', but rather 'What refers to a form is "the wisdom of . . . ," not the whole phrase "the wisdom of Socrates"; "the wisdom of . . . " needs to be completed with a name of something that has the form, just as the predicate "is wise", which also stands for this form, needs to be completed by a subject.' Geach, *God and the Soul* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1969), 48. Cf. also his 'form' and 'function' argument, 49ff.
5. When Kant does discuss the education of such common human reason (*gemeine Menschenvernunft*), as in the 'Methodology of Pure Practical Reason' (KW vii, 292) that closes the second *Critique*, he concedes the importance of argument and the battle with egoistically motivated sophistry, but his emphasis is on examples and on finding a way to allow the motivational power of the representation of righteousness to accomplish its task unimpeded.
6. Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 39.
7. This will also, indirectly, further confirm the continuing philosophical relevance of the legacy of Idealism.
8. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 74.
9. It is not controversial for me; I am in complete accord with it, and think it is the key to understanding later German Idealism. See my *Hegel's Idealism: the satisfactions of self-consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), ch. 2.
10. Wilfrid Sellars, *Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics: Sellars' Cassirer lectures, notes and other essays*, ed. Jeffrey F. Sicha (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 2002), 272.
11. *Ibid.*, 273.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, 274–75.
14. I mean this analogy only as an analogy, although when one takes this line similar issues arise as in the case of Aristotle. Some commentators insist that, given what Aristotle says about artefacts (the same matter persists even when no longer enformed), there must be an equivalent, say, sub-organic identity for ensouled or organic beings that actually persists, not merely homonymously. Christopher Frey seems to me to have refuted this 'two body' view in 'Organic unity and the matter of man', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 32 (2007), 167–204, and his result is important for this use of Aristotle. Similar issues arise in the

post-Kantian tradition and in much of the commentary, since it is often assumed that on the 'matter–form' picture, it must be the same matter whether enformed or not, or the same matter if enformed differently. I (and Hegel) deny such an inference.

15. Compare Hegel's formulation. In the *Encyclopaedia* 'Philosophy of Spirit', in trying to distinguish sensory receptivity as the mere modification of sensibility from intuition he says, 'intuition [on the other hand] is consciousness *filled* with the certainty of Reason, whose object is *rationally* determined and consequently not an individual torn asunder into its various aspects but a totality, a unified fullness of determinations' (die Anschauung dagegen ein von der Gewißheit der *Vernunft erfülltes* Bewußtsein ist, dessen Gegenstand die Bestimmung hat, ein *Vernünftiges*, folglich nicht ein in verschiedene Seiten auseinandergerissenes *Einzelnes*, sondern eine *Totalität*, eine *zusammengehaltene Fülle* von Bestimmungen zu sein: HW x, 254; *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 199, §449.
16. I am not claiming that Kant kept carefully to the distinctions I, following Sellars, am making. As at B130 and many other places, he often talks of any representation of complex unity as a result of the understanding's activity, and what the understanding does is judge. But taken without qualification this would make for an impossible picture of experience. See McDowell, 'Self-determining subjectivity and external constraint', in *Having the World in View: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 96.
17. I argue for this in chapter 6 of *Hegel's Practical Philosophy: rational agency as ethical life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
18. Schiller, 'Gewissensskrupel' and 'Decisum' in *Xenien*, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G. Göpfert, 4th edn (Munich: Hanser, 1955), i, 299–300.
19. I realise how heterodox this sounds and how many issues it leaves unresolved. What to do with the phenomenal/noumenal distinction is an obvious question.
20. The contemporary Kantian who has done the most thorough job of thinking through the implications of this core notion in Kant is of course Christine Korsgaard, but I disagree with her approach. See chapter 2 of my *Hegel's Practical Philosophy*, and see Terry Pinkard's demonstration of the relevance of the notion and its potential paradoxes for later German philosophy in *German Philosophy 1760–1860: the legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Bibliography

A. Primary literature – German Idealism

Collected Works: Standard Editions

Fichte, J. G., *Fichtes Werke*, 11 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971. Reprint of *Johann Gottlieb Fichte's sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 8 vols. Berlin: Veit & Co., 1845–6 [FSW], and *Johann Gottlieb Fichte's nachgelassene Werke*, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 3 vols. Bonn: Marcus, 1854–5 [Nachlass].

J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. R. Lauth *et al.* 41 vols. planned. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964– .

Hegel, G. W. F., *Gesammelte Werke. Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in Verbindung mit der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 32 vols. planned. Hamburg: Meiner, 1968– [GW].

Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–71 [HW].

Kant, I., *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Reimer [now W. de Gruyter], 1902– [GS].

Werke in sechs Bänden, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1956–62 [KW].

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, *Schellings sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling, 14 vols. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61 [SSW].

Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Jörg Jantzen *et al.* 40 vols. planned. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976– [HKA].

Other texts

Bubner, Rüdiger (ed.), *Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellung. VI. Deutscher Idealismus*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1978 (translated as *German Idealist Philosophy*, London: Penguin, 1997).

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, *Foundations of Natural Right*, trans. and ed. Frederich Neuhouser and Michael Baur, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

The Science of Knowledge, with the First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

The System of Ethics (1798), trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Hegel, Georg W. F., *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, ed. and trans. K. Brinkmann and D. Dahlstrom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. A. V. Miller, foreword J. N. Findlay, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Francis H. Simon, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955; first edition 1892.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Philosophy of Mind (1830/1842), trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, with revisions and commentary by Michael Inwood, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

The Science of Logic, ed. and trans. George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Kritische Ausgabe / Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie: Orientalische Philosophie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993.

Kant, I., *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), trans. and ed. Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Briefwechsel von Immanuel Kant in drei Bänden, ed. H. E. Fischer, 3 vols., Munich: Georg Müller, 1912.

Correspondence, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Critique of Judgment, Including the First Introduction, trans. Werner Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.

Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1968; first edition 1929.

Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787), ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, introduction by Christine Korsgaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steven Naragon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen Wood and Gertrude Clark, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. J. Ellington, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Opus postumum, trans. and ed. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99, trans. A. Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary Gregor, introduction by Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. Carus and J. Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.
Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, trans. and ed. David Walford, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 'Allgemeine Übersicht der neuesten philosophischen Literatur', *Philosophisches Journal* (1797), republished in 1809 as 'Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre', in *Schriften von 1794–1798,* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975, 223–332.
Briefe und Dokumente, ed. Horst Fuhrmans, 3 vols. to date, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1962–.
Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: three essays by F. W. J. Schelling, trans. and ed. T. Pfau, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. E. Harris and P. Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
On the History of Modern Philosophy, ed. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath, intro. Michael Vater, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978.
Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums, in *Schriften von 1801–1804*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher, 7 vols., 4th edn, Mannheim: Brockhaus, 1988.

B. Other primary literature

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X–XIV, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Baillie, John, *Our Knowledge of God*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972.
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, *Über den Bildungstrieb*, Göttingen: Dieterich, 1789.
Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte, Göttingen: Dieterich, 1781.

Bowman, A. A., *A Sacramental Universe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.
Bradley, F. H., *Appearance and Reality*, 1st edn 1893, 2nd edn 1897, 9th impression (corrected), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Ethical Studies, 1st edn 1876, 2nd edn 1827, reprinted with an introduction by Richard Wollheim, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
Principles of Logic, London: Oxford University Press, 1922 (1st edn 1883).
Brentano, F., 'Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology', in D. Moran and T. Mooney (eds), *The Phenomenology Reader*, London: Routledge, 2002, 51–54.
Deskriptive Psychologie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982.
Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, 2 vols. Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1874. English trans.: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. Oskar Kraus and Linda L. McAlister, trans. Antos Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda L. McAlister, London: Routledge, 1973.
Caird, Edward, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889.
Hegel, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1891.
'Memoir', in John Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I, Glasgow: Maclehose, 1899.
Caird, John, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889.
Spinoza, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1888.
Campbell, C. A., *Selfhood and Godhood*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1957.
Campbell Fraser, A., *Berkeley*, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1881.
Carlyle, Thomas, 'Signs of the Times', in *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. II, London: Chapman and Hall, 1899.
Carnap, Rudolf, 'Autobiography', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1963, 3–84.
Logische Syntax der Sprache, Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1934; English translation: *Logical Syntax of Language*, trans. Amethe Smeaton, London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937.
Carus, Carl Gustav, *Von den Ur-Theilen des Knochen- und Schalengerüstes*, Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer, 1828.
Caspari, Otto, *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge: Gesammelte philosophische Aufsätze*, Breslau: Trewendt, 1881.
Cassirer, E., *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*, Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1910; English translation, *Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, trans. William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey, Chicago, Ill. and London: Open Court, 1923.
The Problem of Knowledge: philosophy, science, and history since Hegel, trans. W. Woglom and C. Hendel, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950.
Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie. Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen, Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1921.
Cheap, Eliza, *My Station and Its Duties: a narrative for girls going to service*, London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1836.
Chisholm, R. and Sellars, W., 'Chisholm–Sellars correspondence on intentionality', in A. Marras (ed.), *Intentionality, Mind, and Language*, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972, 214–48.

Cohen, H., *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1871, 1885[2].
Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte, Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1883.
Conway, Moncure D., *The Earthward Pilgrimage* (facsim. reprint of edn published in London: John Camden Hotten, 1870), in James A. Good (ed.), *The Ohio Hegelians*, Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005, Vol. II.
Darwin, Charles, *Beagle Diary*, ed. R. D. Keynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Charles Darwin's Notebooks, 1836–1844, ed. Paul Barrett *et al.*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited by H.M.S. Beagle, London: Henry Coburn, 1839.
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, London: John Murray, 1859.
The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, ed. Nora Barlow, London: Collins, 1958.
The Correspondence of Charles Darwin, 18 vols. to date, ed. Frederick Burkhardt *et al.*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–.
The Foundations of the Origin of Species: two essays written in 1842 and 1844, ed. Francis Darwin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909.
DeArmey, Michael H. and Good, James A. (eds), *The St Louis Hegelians*, Bristol: Thoemmes, 2001 (Vol. I: *Origins, the Dialectic, and the Critique of Materialism*; Vol. II: *Cultural, National, and World Unity*; Vol. III: *Aesthetics, Art, and Art History*).
Dewey, John, *From Absolutism to Experimentalism* (1930), in *The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Later Works, 1925–1953*, Vol. V, *Essays, The Sources of a Science of Education, Individualism, Old and New, and Construction and Criticism*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, 147–60.
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), in *The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, Vol. XII, *Essays, Miscellany, and Reconstruction in Philosophy Published during 1920*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982, 77–201.
The Ethics of Democracy (1888), in *The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Early Works, 1882–1898*, Vol. I, *Early Essays and Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston *et al.*, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969, 227–47.
Düntzer, Heinrich (ed.), *Zur deutschen Literatur und Geschichte: Ungedruckte Briefe aus Knebels Nachlass*, 2 vols., Nuremberg: Bauer und Raspe, 1858.
Easton, Loyd D., *Hegel's First American Followers: the Ohio Hegelians: John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, and August Willich, with key writings*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966.
Eckermann, Johann Peter, *Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens*, 3rd edn, Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1987.
Eichhorn, J. G., *Urgeschichte*, ed. J. P. Gabler, Altdorf: Monath und Kußler, 1790–93.
Emerson, R. W., *The Works of R. W. Emerson*, London: Routledge, n.d.
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, *Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwickelungsgeschichte der Organismen*, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1873.

Ferenczi, Sandor, *Thalassa: a theory of genitality*, trans. H. A. Bunker, London: Karnac, 1989 (first published 1924).
Ferrier, James F., *Institutes of Metaphysic*, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1854.
Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains, Vol. II, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1856.
Scottish Philosophy: the old and the new, Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox, 1856.
Fischer, Kuno, *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling*, 2 vols., Vol. VI of *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1872.
Immanuel Kant: Entwicklungsgeschichte und System der kritischen Philosophie, Mannheim: Bassermann, 1860.
Kant's Vernunftkritik und deren Entstehung, rev. 2nd edn, Heidelberg: Bassermann, 1869.
Foster, Michael, *Lehrbuch der Physiologie*, trans. N. Kleinenberg, intro. W. Kühne, Heidelberg: Winter, 1881.
Foucault, Michel, *The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences*, London: Tavistock, 1974.
Frege, G., *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, with English translation by J. L. Austin *en face*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968; first edition 1884.
'Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften', in Hans Hermes *et al.* (eds), *Gottlob Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, 286–94; English translation: 'Sources of knowledge of mathematics and the mathematical natural sciences', in Hans Hermes *et al.* (eds), *Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 267–74.
'Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung der Arithmetik', in Hans Hermes *et al.* (eds), *Gottlob Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, 298–303; English translation: 'A new attempt at a foundation for arithmetic', in Hans Hermes *et al.* (eds), *Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 278–81.
'On sense and reference', in G. Frege, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, trans. M. Black, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, 56–78.
Über eine geometrische Darstellung der imaginären Gebilde in der Ebene, doctoral dissertation in the Philosophical Faculty of Göttingen, 1873; in *Gottlob Frege, Kleine Schriften*, ed. Ignacio Angelli, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990; 1st edn 1967, 1–49; English translation: 'On a geometrical representation of imaginary forms in the plane', in Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers*, ed. Brian McGuiness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 1–55.
Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, ed. Gottfried Gabriel *et al.*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976; English translation: Gottlob Frege, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, ed. Gottfried Gabriel *et al.*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Freud, Sigmund, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, 24 vols., London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–74.
Fries, Jakob Friedrich, *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode betrachtet: ein Versuch*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1822.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 'Hegel and Heidegger', in *Hegel's Dialectic: five hermeneutical studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.
Gentile, Giovanni, *Theory of the Mind as Pure Act*, London: Macmillan, 1922; Italian original, 1903.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens* (Münchner Ausgabe), ed. Karl Richter *et al.*, 21 vols., Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985–98.
Good, James A. (ed.), *Early American Reception of German Idealism*, 5 vols., Bristol: Thoemmes, 2002.
Green, Joseph Henry, *Vital Dynamics: the Hunterian oration before the Royal College of Surgeons in London, 14th February 1840*, London: William Pickering, 1840.
Green, T. H., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ed. A. C. Bradley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1883; reprinted in a new edition with introduction by David O. Brink, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
'Review of J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*', in *Works*, Vol. III, London, 1888.
Works of Thomas Hill Green, ed. R. L. Nettleship, 3rd edn, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894.
Haeckel, Ernst, *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Form-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie*, Berlin: Reimer, 1866.
Haldane, R. B., *The Conduct of Life and Other Addresses*, London: John Murray, 1914.
Hartmann, Eduard von, *Philosophy of the Unconscious: speculative results according to the inductive method of natural science*, trans. William Chatterton Coupland, from the 9th edn, 1882, London: Kegan Paul, 1931 (first published 1868).
Heidegger, Martin, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe*, vol. LXV, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989.
Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. XXXII, ed. Ingtraud Görland, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1980.
Identität und Differenz, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. XI, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2006.
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. III, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2010.
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. XXVI, ed. Klaus Held, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990.
Nietzsche, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. David Farrell Krell, Joan Stambaugh and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1979–87.
Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. XXV, ed. Ingtraud Görland, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1987.
Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972.
Vorträge und Aufsätze, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. VII, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2000.
Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. IX, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2004.

Helmholtz, H., *Epistemological Writings*, trans. and ed. Robert Cohen and Yehuda Elkana, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977.

Goethes Vorahnungen kommender naturwissenschaftlicher Ideen. Rede, gehalten in der Generalversammlung der Goethe-Gesellschaft zu Weimar den 11. Juni 1892, Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1892.

Handbuch der physiologischen Optik, 3. Aufl., Leipzig: Voss, 1910; English translation: *Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics*, ed. James P. C. Southall, Menasha, Wis.: George Banta, 1925.

Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz, ed. R. Kahl, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1971.

Vorträge und Reden, Vol. I, Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1903.

Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, Vol. I, Leipzig: Barth, 1882.

Hertz, P. and Schlick, M. (eds), *Hermann v. Helmholtz: Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie*, Berlin: Springer, 1921.

Herzen, Alexander, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956.

Humboldt, Alexander von, *Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung*, 5 vols., Stuttgart: Cotta', 1845–58.

Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd edn, rev., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Husserl, E., *Ideas*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Macmillan, 1931.

Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

Logische Untersuchungen, 3 vols., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980.

James, W., *The Many and the One, in Manuscript Essays and Notes*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988, 1–64 (first published 1903–4).

Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking, ed. Fredson Bowers, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975 (first published 1907).

Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., New York: Dover, 1950.

Jones, Henry, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, Glasgow: Maclehose, 1909.

Jones, Sir Henry and Muirhead, J. H., *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, Glasgow: Maclehose, 1921.

Lange, Friedrich Albert, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, Iserlohn: Baedeker, 1866.

Lewes, G. H., *A Biographical History of Philosophy*, London: C. Cox, 1851.

Liebmann, Otto, 'Platonismus und Darwinismus', *Philosophische Monatshefte* 9 (1874), 441–72.

Mackintosh, Hugh Ross, *Types of Modern Theology*, London: Nisbet, 1935.

Macmurray, John, *The Form of the Personal*, Vols. I–II, London: Faber & Faber, 1956–61.

Maimon, Salomon, *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz, London: Continuum, 2010.

McCosh, James, *Scottish Philosophy*, London: Macmillan, 1875.

McTaggart, J. E., 'I. – the unreality of time', *Mind* 17 (1908), 457–74.
Moore, G. E., *A Defence of Common Sense*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1925.
Early Philosophical Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin and Consuelo Preti, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
'Freedom', *Mind* n.s. 7 (1898), 179–204.
'In what sense, if any, do past and future time exist?, *Mind* n.s. 6 (1897), 228–40.
Lectures on Philosophy, ed. C. Lewy, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966.
'Letter to Desmond McCarthy, August 1892', in the Moore Archives in Cambridge University Library.
Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
'Refutation of idealism', first published in *Mind* n.s. 12 (1903), 433–53; reprinted in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922, 2–30.
'Russell's theory of descriptions', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Evanston, Ill.: The Library of Living Philosophers Inc., 1946, 175–225.
'The nature of judgment', *Mind* n.s. 8 (1899), 176–93.
'The relativity of knowledge', in J. M. Baldwin (ed.), *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1901–5.
Müller, Johannes, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen für Vorlesungen*, Koblenz: Hölscher, 1833.
Newman, John Henry, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 8 vols., new impression, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke*, founded by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Norbert Miller, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–.
Werke in drei Bänden, ed. Karl Schlechta, 3rd edn, Munich: Hanser, 1965.
Norton, Andrews, 'A discourse on the latest form of infidelity' (1839), in George Hochfield (ed.), *Selected Writings of the American Transcendentalists*, New York: New American Library, 1966, 203–9.
Novalis, *Fichte Studies* (1795–96), trans. and ed. Jane Kneller, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Oken, Lorenz, *Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie*, Jena: Frommann, 1809.
Owen, Richard (anon.), 'Darwin on the Origin of Species', *Edinburgh Review* 11 (1860), 487–532.
On the Nature of Limbs, ed. Ron Amundson, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2007 (first published in London: Van Voorst, 1849).
Report on the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton, in *Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, London: Murray, 1847.
Richard Owen's Hunterian Lectures, May–June 1837, ed. Phillip Sloan, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Peirce, Charles Sanders, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vols. I–VI, ed Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931–35, Vols. VII and VIII, ed. A. W. Burks, 1958, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
The Essential Peirce: selected philosophical writings, 2 vols., ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992.

Pictet, M. F. G., 'On the writings of Goethe relative to natural history', *Annals of Natural History* 2 (1839), 313–22.

Pringle-Pattison, A. S., *Scottish Philosophy: a comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume*, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1894.

Ramsey, F. P., *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays*, London: Kegan Paul, 1931.

Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, *Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere, hauptsächlich über ihre Kunsttriebe: Zum Erkenntniß des Zusammenhanges der Welt, des Schöpfers und unser selbst*, 2nd edn, Hamburg: Bohn, 1762.

Ritchie, David G., *Principles of State Interference*, London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891.

Robinson, Henry Crabb, *Essays on Kant, Schelling, and German Aesthetics*, ed. James Vigus, London: MHRA, 2010.

Roux, Wilhelm, *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus: Ein Beitrag zur Vervollständigung der mechanischen Zweckmässigkeitslehre*. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1881.

Russell, Bertrand, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897.

'Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description', first published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *1910–11*; in Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918, 209–32; and in John G. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. VI, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1992, 148–61.

'Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions', *Mind* n.s. 13 (1904), in Alistair Urquhart (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. IV, London: Routledge, 1994, 432–72.

My Philosophical Development, London, Unwin Hyman, 1995.

Mysticism and Logic, Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1981.

'On denoting', *Mind* n.s. 14 (1905), 479–93; widely reprinted, including in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. IV, ed. Alistair Urquhart, 415–27.

On Scientific Method in Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914; reprinted in Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963; 1st edn, 1917, 75–93; and in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. VIII, ed. John G. Slater, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986, 55–73.

'On the nature of truth and falsehood', in Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966; first published in 1910; reprinted in John G. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. VI, 16–24.

The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971; Ist edn 1921.

The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. VII, ed. Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

'The philosophy of logical atomism', talk given in January–March, 1918. A transcript was made as Russell spoke and published in *The Monist* 28 (1918), 495–527, and 29 (1919) 32–63, 190–222 and 345–80. The lectures are reprinted in several places, authoritatively in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. VIII, 160–244.

The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.

The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, 1991; 1st edn 1912.

The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, ed. Nicholas Griffin, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992.
Theory of Knowledge: the 1913 manuscript, London: Routledge, 1992.
Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology* (1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London: Methuen, 1958.
Schiller, F., *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. G. Fricke and H. G. Göpfert, Munich: Hanser, 1965.
Schlick, M., *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, Berlin: Springer, 1918, 2nd edn 1925; English translation (from 1925[2]): *General Theory of Knowledge*, trans. A. Blumberg, La Salle: Open Court, 1985.
'Kritizistische oder empiristische Deutung der neuen Physik?', *Kant-Studien* 26 (1921), 96–111; English translation: 'Critical or empiricist interpretation of modern physics?', in M. Schlick, *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. I, 322–34.
Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, ed. H. Mulder and B. van de Velde-Schlick, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978.
Schmid, Carl Christian Erhard, *Empirische Psychologie*, Vol. I, Jena: Verlag der Crökerschen Handlung, 1791.
Schubert, Gotthilf Heinrich von, *Die Symbolik des Traumes*, 4th edn, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1862 (first published 1814).
Sellars, Wilfrid, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics: Sellars' Cassirer lectures, notes and other essays, ed. Jeffrey F. Sicha, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 2002.
Science and Metaphysics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
Seth, Andrew, 'Philosophy as criticism of categories', in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, ed. Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1883.
Stirling, H., *The Secret of Hegel*, London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1865.
Teichmüller, Gustav, *Darwinismus und Philosophie*, Tartu: Mattiesen, 1877.
Ueberweg, Friedrich, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart*, Vol. III, *Die Neuzeit*, Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1866.
Veitch, John, *Knowing and Being*, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1889.
von Baer, Karl Ernst, *Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaften*, St Petersburg: Schmitzdorff, 1876.
von Kölliker, Albert, 'Über die Darwin'sche Schöpfungstheorie', *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Zoologie* 14 (1864), 174–86.
von Nägeli, Carl, *Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1884.
Whewell, William, *History of the Inductive Sciences, from Earliest to Present Times*, 3 vols., 3rd edn, London: Parker & Son, 1857 (first published 1837).
[White, William Hale], *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1928.
Wilde, Oscar, 'The Preface', *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, The Works of Oscar Wilde, ed. G. F. Maine, London: Collins, 1957.
Windelband, Wilhelm, 'Vorwort', in *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1884.

Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edn, New York: Macmillan, 1953.
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2 vols., Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with *en face* translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961; first published 1921 under the title *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*.

C. Secondary literature

Abel, Günter, *Nietzsche: Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr*, 2nd edn, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998.
Adams, Robert Merrihew, *Finite and Infinite Goods: a framework for ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Allison, Henry E., *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an interpretation and defense*, rev. and enl. edn, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004.
Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Ameriks, Karl, 'Husserl's Realism', *Philosophical Review* 86 (1977), 598–619.
'Introduction: interpreting German Idealism', in Ameriks (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 1–17.
Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: problems in the appropriation of the critical philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Interpreting Kant's Critiques, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
Kant's Elliptical Path, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012.
'History, Idealism, and Schelling', *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism* 10 (forthcoming).
Anderson, John, 'The place of Hegel in the history of philosophy', in *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1962.
Anderson, P. S., 'Life, death and (inter) subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 60 (2006), 41–59.
Ansell Pearson, Keith, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the transhuman condition*, London: Routledge, 1997.
Ashton, R., *The German Idea: four English writers and the reception of German thought 1800–1860*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
G. H. Lewes: *a life*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Assoun, Paul-Laurent, *Freud: La philosophie et les philosophes*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976.
Freud and Nietzsche, trans. Richard L. Collier, London: Continuum, 2000.
Baldwin, Thomas, *G. E. Moore*, London: Routledge, 1990.
Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds), *Cognitive Phenomenology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Beach, Edward Allen, *Potencies of God(s): Schelling's philosophy of mythology*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Beebee, Helen, *Hume on Causation*, London: Routledge, 2006.
Béguin, Albert, *L'Âme romantique et le rêve: un essai sur le romantisme allemand et la poésie française*, 2nd edn, Paris: Éditions José Corti, 1946.
Beiser, F., *German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, 1781–1801*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.
The Romantic Imperative: the concept of early German Romanticism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003.
'Kant and *Naturphilosophie*', in Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann (eds), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, 7–26.
Bell, Matthew, 'Carl Gustav Carus and the science of the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Berlin, I., *Two Concepts of Liberty: an inaugural lecture delivered before the university of Oxford on 31 October 1958*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
Berthold-Bond, Daniel, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995.
Blattner, William, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Boden, Margaret, 'Freudian mechanisms of defence: a programming perspective', in Richard Wollheim (ed.), *Philosophers on Freud: new evaluations*, New York: Aronson, 1977.
Boer, Karin de, *Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger's encounter with Hegel*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
Boucher, David, 'Practical Hegelianism: Henry Jones's lecture tour of Australia', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990), 423–52.
(ed.) *The Scottish Idealists – Selected Philosophical Writings*, Exeter: Imprint Press, 2004.
Boucher, David and Vincent, Andrew, *British Idealism and Political Theory*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.
Bowie, Andrew, 'The philosophical significance of Schelling's conception of the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Boyle, N., ' "Art", literature, theology: learning from Germany', in Robert E. Sullivan (ed.), *Higher Learning and Catholic Traditions*, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001, 87–111.
Goethe: the poet and the age, Vol. II, *Revolution and renunciation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
'Redeeming *Culture*', in Charles B. Gordon and Margaret Monahan Hogan (eds), *Sacred Imagination*, Portland, Oreg.: University of Portland, Garaventa Center, 2009, 121–31.
Brandom, Robert B., *Making It Explicit: reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment*, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Between Saying and Doing: towards an analytic pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Perspectives on Pragmatism: classical, recent, & contemporary, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Brink, David O., *Perfectionism and the Common Good: themes from the philosophy of T. H. Green*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Broadie, Alexander, *A History of Scottish Philosophy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Brook, Andrew, 'Freud and Kant', in Man Cheung Chang and Colin Feltman (eds), *Psychoanalytic Knowledge*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Bruford, W. H., *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935.

Theatre, Drama, and Audience in Goethe's Germany, London: Routledge and Paul, 1950.

Butler, J., *Giving an Account of Oneself*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2005.

Cahan, D. *Hermann von Helmholtz: philosopher and scientist*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992.

Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science, Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993.

Candlish, Stewart, 'Bradley on my station and its duties', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 56 (1978), 155–70.

Carus, André, *Carnap and Twentieth Century Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Cavell, Marcia, *The Psychoanalytic Mind: from Freud to philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Centonze, Diego *et al.*, 'The *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895): a Freudian anticipation of LTP-memory connection theory', *Brain Research Reviews* 46 (2004), 310–14.

Chalmers, D., *The Conscious Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Cheyne, A. C., *Studies in Scottish Church History*, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998.

Chisholm, R., *Perceiving*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957.

The First Person: an essay on reference and intentionality, Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.

Clark, Maudemarie, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Coffa, J. A., *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna station*, ed. Linda Wessels, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Comay, Rebecca and McCumber, John (eds), *Endings: questions of memory in Hegel and Heidegger*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999.

Connor, S., *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Cox, Christoph, *Nietzsche: naturalism and interpretation*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999.

Craig, Cairns, *Intending Scotland*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

'Scotland's migrant philosophers and the history of Scottish philosophy', *History of European Ideas* (2012), 1–23.

'Spiritual returns: ministers, theologians and philosophers 1843–1945', in Mario Varricchio (ed.), *Back to Caledonia: Scottish homecomings from the seventeenth century to the present*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 2012, 128–50.
Cummins, Robert, 'Neo-teleology', in André Ariew, Robert Cummins and Mark Perlman (eds), *Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 157–72.
Dahlstrom, Daniel, 'The *Critique of Pure Reason* and continental philosophy: Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental imagination', in Paul Guyer (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 380–400.
'Thinking of nothing: Heidegger and Hegel', in Stephen Houlgate (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Hegel*, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2011, 519–36.
Davie, George, *The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect: the problem of generalization and specialization in twentieth-century Scotland*, Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986.
Davies, Martin and Helgeby, Stein, 'Idealism', in Graham Oppy *et al.* (eds), *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*, Clayton: Monash University Press, 2010, 217–19.
Davis, C., *Levinas: an introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
Dennett, D., *Content and Consciousness*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
'Quining qualia', in D. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: classical and contemporary readings*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 226–46.
Devine, T. M., *The Scottish Nation 1700–2000*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999.
Dews, P., 'Power and subjectivity in Foucault', *New Left Review* 144 (1984), 148–52.
Dolnick, Alexander, 'Russell's multiple relation theory: evolution and demise', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Chicago, 2012.
Dretske, F., 'The intentionality of cognitive states', in P. French *et al.* (eds), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. V, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980, 281–94.
Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
Dreyfus, H. (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
Dummett, Michael, *Frege: philosophy of language*, London: Duckworth, 1973.
Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Düsing, Klaus, *Selbstbewußtseinsmodelle. Moderne Kritiken und systematische Entwürfe zur konkreten Subjektivität*, Munich: Fink, 1997.
Earle, Peter, *The Making of the English Middle Class*, London: Methuen, 1989.
Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: the history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry*, New York: Basic Books, 1970.
Emden, Christian J., *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Emundts, Dina, *Erfahren und Erkennen: Hegels Theorie der Wirklichkeit*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012.
Engstrom, Stephen, *The Form of Practical Knowledge: a study of the categorical imperative*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Erdelyi, Matthew Hugh, *Psychoanalysis: Freud's cognitive psychology*, New York: Freeman, 1985.
Fairfield, Paul (ed.), *John Dewey and Continental Philosophy*, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010.
Fergusson, David (ed.), *Scottish Philosophical Theology 1700–2000*, Exeter: Imprint Press, 2007.
Fodor, J., *The Language of Thought*, Cambridge, Mass.: Crowell / MIT Press, 1975.
RePresentations, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981.
Fogarty, Robert S., *All Things New: American communes and utopian movements, 1860–1914*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Förster, E., 'Is there "a gap" in Kant's critical system?', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 533–55.
Kant's Final Synthesis: an essay on the Opus postumum, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.
The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: a systematic reconstruction (2011), trans. Brady Bowman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Forster, Michael N., *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Francis, Richard, *Transcendental Utopias: individual and community at Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and Walden*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Frank, Manfred, *Unendliche Annäherung. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.
Franks, P., 'What should Kantians learn from Maimon's skepticism?', in G. Freudenthal (ed.), *Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003, 200–32.
Frey, Christopher, 'Organic unity and the matter of man', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 32 (2007), 167–204.
Friedman, M., *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
'Helmholtz's *Zeichentheorie* and Schlick's *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*: early Logical Empiricism and its nineteenth-century background', *Philosophical Topics* 25 (1997) 19–50.
A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2000.
'Geometry, construction, and intuition in Kant and his successors', in G. Sher and R. Tieszen (eds), *Between Logic and Intuition: essays in honor of Charles Parsons*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 186–218.
'Transcendental philosophy and mathematical physics', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 34 (2003), 29–43.
'Ernst Cassirer and the philosophy of science', in Gary Gutting (ed.), *Continental Philosophy of Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 71–83.
'Kant–*Naturphilosophie*–Electromagnetism', in M. Friedman and A. Nordmann (eds), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-century Science*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, 51–79.
Friedman, M. and Nordmann, A. (eds), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-century Science*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006.

Gabriel, Gottfried, 'Frege, Lotze, and the continental roots of early analytic philosophy', in Erich H. Reck (ed.), *Frege to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 39–51.
Gardner, Sebastian, *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
'Schopenhauer, will and the unconscious', in Christopher Janaway (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
'Psychoanalysis and the personal/sub-personal distinction', *Philosophical Explorations* 3 (2000), 96–119.
'Eduard von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Geach, P., *God and the Soul*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
Mental Acts: their content and their objects, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956 and 1971.
Gedo, John, *The Evolution of Psychoanalysis: contemporary theory and practice*, New York: Other Press, 1999.
Gerth, Hans Heinrich, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800: Zur Soziologie des deutschen Frühliberalismus*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976.
Geuss, R., 'Kultur, Bildung, Geist', in *Morality, Culture, and History: essays on German philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 29–50.
Gödde, Günter, *Traditionslinien des "Unbewußten" Schopenhauer – Nietzsche – Freud*, Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2009.
'Freud and nineteenth-century philosophical sources on the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
'The unconscious in the German philosophy and psychology of the nineteenth century', in Alison Stone (ed.), *Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011.
Gödde, Günter and Buchholz, Michael B. (eds), *Das Unbewusste, Bd. I. Macht und Dynamik des Unbewussten – Auseinandersetzungen in Philosophie, Medizin und Psychoanalyse*, Gießen: Psychosozial Verlag, 2005.
Görner, Rüdiger, 'The hidden agent of the self: towards an aesthetic theory of the non-conscious in German Romanticism', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Gould, Stephen Jay, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Grene, Marjorie and Depew, David, *The Philosophy of Biology: an episodic history*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Griffin, Nicholas, *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Grünbaum, Adolf, *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984.
Guyer, Paul, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

'Organisms and the unity of science,' in *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: selected essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 86–111.

Hacker, Peter, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996.

Hanna, R., 'Kant, truth, and human nature', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 8 (2000), 225–50.

'The inner and the outer: Kant's "refutation" reconstructed', *Ratio* 13 (2000), 146–74.

Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon / Oxford University Press, 2001.

'Kant and nonconceptual content', *European Journal of Philosophy* 13 (2005), 247–90.

Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Rationality and Logic, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006.

'Kantian non-conceptualism', *Philosophical Studies* 137 (2008), 41–64.

'Kant's theory of judgment', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Summer 2009 Edition*), available at http://plato.standford.edu/archives/sum2009/entires/kant-judgment.

'Beyond the myth of the myth: a Kantian theory of non-conceptual content', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011), 321–96.

'Kant's non-conceptualism, rogue objects, and the gap in the B deduction', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011), 397–413.

'Cognition, content, and the a priori', unpublished ms, Fall 2012 version.

'Kantian ethics and human existence', unpublished ms, Summer 2012 version.

'Wittgenstein and Kantianism', in H. J. Glock and J. Hyman (eds), *Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming.

'Metaphysics with a human face: lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*', available at www.colorado.edu/philosophy/lecture_hanna_metaphysics_with_a_human_face_lectures_winter11.pdf.

Hanna, R. and Chadha, M., 'Non-conceptualism and the problem of perceptual self-knowledge', *European Journal of Philosophy* 19 (2011), 184–223.

Hanna, R. and Maiese, M., *Embodied Minds in Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Han-Pile, Béatrice, 'Early Heidegger's appropriation of Kant', in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds), *A Companion to Heidegger*, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005, 80–101.

Hardimon, Michael, 'Role obligations', *Journal of Philosophy* 91 (1994), 333–63.

Harrison, Ross, 'Transcendental arguments and Idealism', in Godfrey Vesey (ed.), *Idealism Past and Present*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 211–24.

Hatfield, G., *The Natural and the Normative: theories of spatial perception from Kant to Helmholtz*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.

Heidelberger, Michael, 'Gustav Theodor Fechner and the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hemecker, Wilhelm W., *Vor Freud. Philosophiegeschichtliche Voraussetzungen der Psychoanalyse*, Munich: Philosophia, 1991.

Henrich, Dieter, 'Ethik der Autonomie', in *Selbstverhältnisse*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981, 6–56.
Der Grund im Bewusstsein: Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–1795), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992.
Henry, Michel, *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Douglas Brick, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993.
Herman, Barbara, *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Hetherington, H. J. W., *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924.
Hill, R. Kevin, *Nietzsche's Critiques: the Kantian foundations of his thought*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
Hopkins, James, 'Synthesis in the imagination: psychoanalysis, infantile experience and the concept of an object', in James Russell (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
'Psychoanalysis, representation, and neuroscience: the Freudian unconscious and the Bayesian brain', in Aikaterini Fotopoulou, Donald Pfaff and Martin A. Conway (eds), *From the Couch to the Lab: trends in psychodynamic neuroscience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Horgan, T., 'From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world', *Mind* 102 (1993), 555–86.
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, 'Idéalisme et pragmatisme. Peirce, James et Dewey en tant que critiques de l'idéalisme', in François Dagognet and Pierre Osmo (eds), *Autour de Hegel. Hommage à Bernard Bourgeois*, Paris: Vrin, 2000, 209–25; German edition in *Philosophical Inquiry* 22 (2000), 26–43.
Der Anfang vor dem Anfang. Zum Verhältnis der Logik zur Phänomenologie des Geistes (forthcoming).
Horton, John, *Political Obligations*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1992.
'In defence of associative political obligations', Parts One and Two, *Political Studies* 54 (2006), 427–43 and 55 (2007), 1–19.
Houlgate, Stephen and Baur, Michael (eds), *A Companion to Hegel*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2011.
Howard, D., 'Realism and conventionalism in Einstein's philosophy of science: the Einstein–Schlick correspondence', *Philosophia Naturalis* 21 (1984), 619–29.
Hylton, Peter, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
'The nature of the proposition and the revolt against Idealism', in R. Rorty *et al.* (eds), *Philosophy in History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 375–97; reprinted in Peter Hylton, *Propositions, Functions, and Analysis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 9–29.
Irigaray, L., *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Irwin, T. H., 'Morality and Personality: Kant and Green', in Allen W. Wood (ed.), *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984.

The Development of Ethics, Vol. III, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Jacob, P., 'Intentionality', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition)*, available at http://plato.standford.edu/archives/fall2010/entires/intentionality.
Janaway, Christopher, 'The real essence of human beings: Schopenhauer and the unconscious will', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Jensen, Kipton E., 'Peirce and educator: on some Hegelisms', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 40 (2004), 271–88.
Johnson, Dirk A., *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Käufer, Stephan A., 'Heidegger's interpretation of Kant', in Daniel Dahlstrom (ed.), *Interpreting Heidegger: critical essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 174–96.
Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, London: Macmillan, 1918; 2nd edn London, 1923.
Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1924.
Kern, I., *Husserl und Kant*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Kim, J., *Supervenience and Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Kitcher, Patricia, *Freud's Dream: a complete interdisciplinary science of mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992.
Kant's Transcendental Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Köhnke, K., *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Kolakowski, L., *Husserl and the Search for Certitude*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Kolb, David, *The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and after*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Korsgaard, Christine, *The Sources of Normativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
The Constitution of Agency: essays on practical reason and moral psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kristeva, J., 'Negativity: rejection', in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, ed. Dennis King Keenan, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, 327.
Kuhn, Thomas S., 'The road since *Structure*', in *The Road since Structure: philosophical essays, 1970–1994, with an autobiographical interview*, ed. James Conant and John Haugeland, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2000, 90–104.
Langford, C. H., 'The notion of analysis in Moore's philosophy', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, Evanston and Chicago, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942, 321–42.
Lear, Jonathan, *Love and its Place in Nature: a philosophical reconstruction of psychoanalysis*, London: Faber, 1990.
Freud, London: Routledge, 2005.
Leiter, Brian, *Nietzsche on Morality*, London: Routledge, 2002.

Lewis, H. D., 'The British Idealists', in Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Patrick Sherry and Steven T. Katz (eds), *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 271–314.
Liebscher, Martin, 'Friedrich Nietzsche's perspectives on the unconscious', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Loewald, Hans, *Sublimation: inquiries into theoretical psychoanalysis*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988.
Look, Brandon C., 'Blumenbach and Kant on mechanism and teleology in nature: the case of the formative drive', in Justin E. H. Smith (ed.), *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 355–73.
Lyotard, J. F., *La condition postmoderne*, Paris: Editions de minuit Paris, 1979.
Mackay, Johnston, *The Kirk and the Kingdom: a century of tension in Scottish social theology, 1830–1929*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
Malabou, C., *The Future of Hegel: plasticity, temporality, and dialectic*, trans. Lisabeth During, London: Routledge, 2005.
Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: dialectic, destruction, deconstruction, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Mander, W. J., *British Idealism: a history*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Marquard, Odo, 'Über einige Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Therapeutik in der Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts', in *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975.
Transzendentaler Idealismus, romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalyse, Cologne: Dinter, 1987.
McDonald, Terrence J. (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
McDowell, J., *Mind and World*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Having the World in View: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.
'Sellars, Kant, and intentionality', in *Having the World in View: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009, 1–65.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: new foundations for Realism*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.
Mills, Jon, *The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's anticipation of psychoanalysis*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002.
Mills, P. J., *Feminist Interpretations of GWF Hegel*, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1996.
Mohanty, J., 'Kant and Husserl', in *Husserl Studies* 13 (1996), 19–30.
Moore, G., *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
'Nietzsche and evolutionary theory', in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
Moore, Michael, 'Mind, brain and unconscious', in Peter Clark and Crispin Wright (eds) *Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.

Moran, D., *Introduction to Phenomenology*, London, Routledge, 2000.
Muirhead, J. H., *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1934.
Nagel, Thomas, 'The boundaries of inner space', *Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969), 452–58.
Neuhauser, Frederick, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: actualizing freedom*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Newlands, Samuel, 'More recent Idealist readings of Spinoza', *Philosophy Compass* 6/2 (2011), 109–19.
Nicholls, Angus, 'The scientific unconscious: Goethe's post-Kantian epistemology', in Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Nicholls, Angus and Liebscher, Martin (eds), *Thinking the Unconscious: nineteenth-century German thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Nicholson, Peter P., *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: selected studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Nordenskiöld, Erik, *The History of Biology*, trans. Leonard Eyre, 2nd edn, New York: Tudor, 1936 (1st edn 1920–24).
Norman, Richard, *The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Nyhart, Lynn K., *Biology Takes Form: animal morphology and the German universities, 1800–1900*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Opatow, Barry, 'Drive theory and the metapsychology of experience', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 70 (1989), 645–60.
Orsini, G. N. G., *Coleridge and German Idealism: a study in the history of philosophy with unpublished materials from Coleridge's manuscripts*, Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
Page, Scott E., 'Path dependence', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (2006), 87–115.
Papadaki, E. L., 'Sexual objectification: from Kant to contemporary feminism', *Contemporary Political Theory* 6 (2007), 330–48.
Pasnau, R., *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Passmore, John A., *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, London: Duckworth, 1957.
Pettigrew, David E., 'The question of the relation of philosophy and psychoanalysis: the case of Kant and Freud', *Metaphilosophy* 21 (1990), 67–88.
Pickering, Andrew, 'Explanation and the mangle: a response to my critics', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 30 (1999), 167–71.
Pinkard, Terry, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: the legacy of Idealism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pippin, Robert B., *Hegel's Idealism: the satisfactions of self-consciousness*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
'On being anti-Cartesian: Heidegger, Hegel, subjectivity, and sociality', in *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian variations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian variations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Hegel's Practical Philosophy: rational agency as ethical life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Hegel on Self-Consciousness: desire and death in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Pochmann, Henry A., *German Culture in America: philosophical and literary influences 1600–1900*, Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.
Poellner, Peter, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Prauss, Gerold, 'Freuds Probleme mit dem "Unbewußten" ', in Reinhard Hiltschner and André Georgi (eds), *Perspektiven der Transzendentalphilosophie: im Anschluß an die Philosophie Kants*, Munich: Alber, 2002.
Prichard, H. A., 'Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?', *Mind* 21 (1912), 21–37, reprinted in *Moral Writings*, ed. Jim MacAdam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 7–20.
Pucelle, Jean, *L'Idéalisme en Angleterre*, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, Boudry, 1955.
Quinton, Anthony, 'Absolute Idealism', in *Thoughts and Thinkers*, London: Duckworth, 1982, 186–206.
Redding, Paul, *The Logic of Affect*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Reill, Peter Hanns, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005.
Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, *Toward a History of Epistemic Things: synthesizing proteins in the test tube*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Richards, J., 'The evolution of empiricism: Hermann von Helmholtz and the foundations of geometry', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 28 (1977), 235–53.
Richards, Robert, *The Romantic Conception of Life: science and philosophy in the age of Goethe*, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the struggle over evolutionary thought, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Richardson, A., ' "The fact of science" and critique of knowledge: exact science as problem and resource in Marburg Neo-Kantianism', in M. Friedman and A. Nordmann (eds), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, 211–26.
Richardson, John, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Ricketts, Thomas, 'Pictures, logic, and the limits of sense in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*', in Hans Sluga and David Stern (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 59–99.
'Truth and propositional unity in early Russell', in Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh (eds), *Future Pasts*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Robin, G., *Collingwood: an essay on metaphysics*, London: Oxford University Press, 1940.
Rockmore, Tom (ed.), *Heidegger, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism*, New York: Humanity Books, 2000.
Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005.
Rölli, Marc, 'Die Durchquerung des Absoluten. Zur Hegel-Rezeption John Deweys', in Thomas Wyrwich (ed.), *Hegel in der neueren Philosophie*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2011, 17–46.

Rorty, R., *Irony, Contingency and Solidarity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Rotenstreich, N., *Synthesis and Intentional Objectivity: on Kant and Husserl*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2010.
Ryckman, T. A., '*Conditio Sine Qua Non*: *Zuordnung* in the early epistemologies of Cassirer and Schlick', *Synthese* 88 (1991), 57–95.
Sagarra, Eda, *A Social History of Germany*, London: Methuen, 1977.
Said, E. W., *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Schalow, Frank, *Language and Deed: rediscovering politics through Heidegger's encounter with German Idealism*, Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998.
Schmidt, Dennis J., *The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the entitlements of philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
Schöffler, Herbert, *Protestantismus und Literatur*, Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1922.
Schulze, Hagen, *Kleine deutsche Geschichte*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2011.
Sciaraffa, Stefan, 'Identification, meaning, and the normativity of social roles', *European Journal of Philosophy* 19 (2011), 107–28.
Searle, J., *Intentionality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Segrest, Scott Philip, *America and the Political Philosophy of Common Sense*, Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2010.
Sell, Alan P. F., *Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief*, Cardiff: University of Wales, 1995.
Shaffer, Elinor, *'Kubla Khan' and* The Fall of Jerusalem*: the Mythological School in biblical criticism and secular literature 1770–1880*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Shanahan, Timothy, *The Evolution of Darwinism: selection, adaptation, and progress in evolutionary biology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Shapiro, Gary, 'Peirce's critique of Hegel's phenomenology and dialectic', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 17 (1981), 269–75.
Sheehan, Paul, 'Postmodernism and philosophy', in S. Connor (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 20–42.
Shook, John R. and Margolis, Joseph (eds), *A Companion to Pragmatism*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Simmons, A. J., *Justification and Legitimacy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Simpson, J., *Matthew Arnold and Goethe*, London: MHRA, 1979.
Sluga, Hans D., 'Frege and the rise of analytic philosophy', *Inquiry* 18 (1975), 471–87.
'Frege as a rationalist', in M. Schirn (ed.), *Studies on Frege*, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976, Vol. I, 27–47.
Frege, London: Routledge, 1980.
'Frege on meaning', in H.-J. Glock (ed.), *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997.
Snelling, David, *Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and the Origins of Meaning: pre-reflective intentionality in the psychoanalytic view of the mind*, Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2001.

Sommer, Andreas Urs, ‘Nietzsche mit und gegen Darwin in den Schriften von 1888’, *Nietzscheforschung* 17 (2010), 31–44.
Spiegelberg, H., *The Phenomenological Movement*, 3rd edn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Sprigge, Timothy L. S., ‘Idealism’, in Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
‘James, empiricism, and absolute Idealism’, in John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (eds), *A Companion to Pragmatism*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 166–76.
Stack, George J., *Lange and Nietzsche*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983.
Stegmaier, Werner, ‘Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution’, *Nietzsche-Studien* 16 (1987), 264–87.
Stein, H., ‘Some philosophical prehistory of general relativity’, in J. Earman, C. Glymour and J. Stachel (eds), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. VIII, Minneapolis, Minn.: Minnesota University Press, 1977, 3–49.
Stephen, Leslie, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, London: Hart-Davis, 1962.
Stern, Robert, ‘Peirce on Hegel: nominalist or realist?’, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 41 (2005), 65–99.
‘Peirce, Hegel and the category of firstness’, *International Yearbook of German Idealism* 5 (2007), 276–308.
‘Peirce, Hegel, and the category of secondness’, *Inquiry* 50 (2007), 123–55.
Hegelian Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
‘Hegel and pragmatism’, in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (eds), *A Companion to Hegel*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2011, 556–75.
Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Stirling, Amelia Hutchison, *James Hutchison Stirling: his life and his work*, London: Fisher Unwin, 1913.
Strong, Tracy B., *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, exp. edn, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988.
Sulloway, Frank, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: beyond the psychoanalytic legend*, London: Burnett Books, 1979.
Tauber, Alfred I., ‘Freud’s dreams of reason: the Kantian structure of psychoanalysis’, *History of the Human Sciences* 22 (2009), 1–29.
Theunissen, M., ‘The repressed intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, *Hegel and Legal Theory*, ed. D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson, London: Routledge, 1991, 3–63.
Torretti, R., *Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978.
Tugendhat, Ernst, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Paul Stern, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986.
Uebel, Thomas, ‘Vienna circle’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition)*, available at http://plato.standford.edu/archives/sum2012/entires/viennacircle.
Venturelli, Aldo, ‘Genealogie und Evolution: Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit dem Darwinismus’, in *Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte bei Nietzsche*, ed. Silke Richter, trans. Leonie Schröder, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003.

Ver Eecke, Wilfried, *Denial, Negation, and the Forces of the Negative: Freud, Hegel, Lacan, Spitz, and Sophocles*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006.
Vierhaus, Rudolf, *Deutschland im Zeitalter des Absolutismus*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978.
Vincent, Andrew and Plant, Raymond, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
Vogel, Stanley M., *German Literary Influences on the American Transcendentalists*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955.
Völmicke, Elke, *Das Unbewusste im Deutschen Idealismus*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005.
Warnock, Geoffrey, *English Philosophy Since 1900*, London: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Warr, Charles, *Principal Caird*, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1926.
Watkins, Eric, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Westphal, Kenneth, 'Hegel and Realism', in John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (eds), *A Companion to Pragmatism*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 177–83.
Williams, L. Pearce, *Michael Faraday: a biography*, New York: Basic Books, 1965.
The Origins of Field Theory, New York: Random House, 1966.
Wisdom, John, 'Logical constructions (I)', *Mind* n.s. 40 (158) (1931).
Wolf, Susan, 'Moral obligations and social commands', in Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen (eds), *Metaphysics and the Good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 343–67.
Wollheim, Richard, 'The mind and the mind's image of itself', in *On Art and the Mind: essays and lectures*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
Freud, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
'The good self and the bad self: the moral psychology of British idealism and the English school of psychoanalysis', in *The Mind and Its Depths*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Wood, Allen, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Young, Christopher and Brook, Andrew, 'Schopenhauer and Freud', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 75 (1994), 101–18.
Zuckert, Rachel, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: an interpretation of the Critique of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Index